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Abstract 
Concession has been acknowledged as a valuable tool for port authorities to retain control of 
ports and shape the supply side of the terminal market, in the absence of full privatisation.  
This study empirically examines the influence of transfer of port operational services from 
the public to the private sector, through concession contracts on operational performance in 
the context of the Nigerian port industry. It extends the work of Liu (1995) and others on the 
comparative performance of public and private ports in the UK and other countries, by 
extending the study to the Nigerian ports concessions.  
 The Nigerian port reform was borne out of the belief that the transfer of port operations from 
the public to the private sector will improve the efficiency of the ports, by instigating 
competition among the various terminal operators. The Nigerian port concession involved the 
delineation of six Nigerian ports into 25 terminals and awarded to terminal operators. The 
objectives of the study include, among others; the benchmarking of pre- and post-concession 
efficiency, to determine sources of efficiency change and to determine factors responsible for 
the improvement of Nigerian port performance.  
 
A positivist approach is adopted, using quantitative data that involves outputs and inputs 
related to the port‘s production function. Theoretical underpinnings of privatisation and 
performance, as well as empirical evidence from countries, were presented and discussed. 
The variables of the research were analysed using non-parametric DEA and the Malmquist 
Productivity Index to determine the efficiency and the sources of productivity change 
respectively. This study introduced a novel idea, by adopting a concentration index in 
measuring the level of competitiveness of ports. The conceptualised theoretical model of 
operational performance was solved using a two-stage multivariate regression, to determine 
the factors responsible for the improvement of the Nigerian ports‘ efficiency.  
  
The results of the analysis suggested that the productive performance of the ports under 
consideration improved after the transfer of terminal operations to the private sector, though 
not in all the ports. Indicating that the wholesale concession of the ports is not the best after 
all, some ports would have been better left under public ownership. The driver of the 
improved efficiency after concession, is scale efficiency (increased throughput levels), rather 
than technical efficiency. Therefore, the post-concession Nigerian ports performance is 
influenced by the scale of production and change of ownership. The delineation of the ports 
into terminals has not ushered in the expected competition among and within the ports.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the Research 
The last decade has witnessed significant changes in the ports in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 31 
countries with ports in the sub-region have either improved legislation or policy oversight, 
restructured, or embraced private participation in an attempt to reform the ports. The ports in 
the sub-region are gradually moving away from being publicly operated to engaging the 
private sector in terminal operations through concession contracts. Most container ports have 
been a concession, while the specialised ports and terminals are either privately owned or 
leased. International and local companies participate in the operation of a vast number of 
ports, even in relatively small ports and in competing terminals at more major ports. 
 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have embraced reforms, as ports play a role in the global 
trade logistics chain, which impacts heavily on the cost of many exported and imported 
goods. The belief is that the reforms that improve efficiency will lead to a reduction in total 
logistics costs. It also impacts positively on the overall competitiveness of economies of 
reforming countries (Estache, González, & Trujillo, 2001). The most commonly used tool to 
engage the private sector in the port industry is a concession contract. It is a public–private 
partnership (PPP) of a contractual nature and has been a favourite means worldwide of 
instigating port development. It provides new opportunities for injecting private capital, by 
adopting a market orientation approach. A common feature of reforms is monitoring and 
evaluation. The focus of ports in post-reform monitoring is partial productivity indicators. 
The partial indicators, though useful, can be quite misleading, as they do not generate the 
same ranking for all the ports. As a result, the port authorities have limited information to 
implement some of the regulatory mechanisms that require consistent estimation of efficiency 
gains (Trujillo & Nombela, 2000). Hence, the need for a study that reflects the joint effects of 
all inputs and outputs in the measuring of absolute performance. 
    
Nigeria ports play a significant role in international trade in the sub-region; over 90% of 
traded goods are carried by sea. The Nigeria economy accounts for over 70% of seaborne 
trade in the West and Central African sub-region due to its vast population (Fivestar 
Logistics, 2008). Therefore, assessing the productive efficiency of Nigerian ports after 
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concession is crucial to the implementation of port reforms of other countries in the sub-
region.  
 
Port development in Nigeria has a chequered history. However, the history of modern ports 
administration can be traced to the Port Act 1954. The Act gave impetus to the establishment 
of the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA) in April 1955, as a public corporation. It was owned 
wholly by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) and charged with the responsibility to 
operate and regulate seaports in Nigeria (Mohammed, 2008). The importance of ports as a 
catalyst for economic development was recognised in the first national development plan 
(1962-1968). The plan earmarked Nigerian ports for development; it provided for the 
expenditure of £45 million for the improvement of facilities at Lagos and Port Harcourt ports 
(Akinwale & Aremo, 2010). The Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970) constituted a major setback 
for port development in Nigeria due to the closure of Port Harcourt port to foreign traffic. 
Lagos port was left to supply port services in Nigeria. As a result, the then military 
government enacted a decree empowering the NPA to acquire the private ports in the Eastern 
part: Warri port operated by John Holt transport, Burutu port owned by United African 
Company (UAC) and Calabar port by five different operators. 
 
After the end of the Civil War, the ports were characterised by a massive influx of imports 
(construction equipment and cement) for post-war reconstruction. It resulted in 
unprecedented levels of congestion at the ports. In addition, the road infrastructure was 
inadequate and could not cope with expeditious evacuation of cargo. The average ship 
waiting time before berthing was 180 days and approximately 250 days for Lagos port, 
resulting in the imposition of surcharges. The government embarked on several emergency 
measures, such as; the construction of a new port in the Lagos area (Tin Can Island port); and 
the acquisition of new equipment to increase berth productivity and to ameliorate the problem 
(Shneerson, 1981). The main consequence of port delay is the rise in freight charge. The 
increase in freight charge impacted on agricultural exports as they could no longer compete in 
the international market due to the high cost. 
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The NPA continued with the responsibility of piloting the affairs of the ports as a public 
corporation with subsidy from the federal government until the economic downturn of the 
1980s. The economic recession of the 1980s affected Nigerian ports, as traffic to the ports 
declined. In response, the government initiated a process of divesting in public corporations, 
through either commercialisation or privatisation policies. As a result, the NPA was slated for 
commercialisation.  In 1992, the NPA was commercialised and the name was changed to 
Nigerian Ports Plc, but the ownership was still in the public domain, as the FGN solely owns 
it. In 1996, four years after commercialisation, the organisation reverted to its former name, 
the Nigeria Ports Authority (NPA), as a parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Transport 
(FMOT). However, the revision did not stop the commercialisation efforts, as the corporation 
continued to operate as a commercial enterprise (NPA Brand Manual, 2005). 
  
The global changes in the port industry, coupled with the economic downturn of the 80s, 
triggered infrastructure obsolescence and decay.  It became evident that the government had 
no resources, or the managerial ability, to run a modern port successfully (Razak, 2005). In 
addition, the trend worldwide was that governments were disengaging from port operations 
and restricting activities to regulation and providing an enabling environment for the private 
sector to operate, providing the impetus for change. The option of  transfering port operations 
to the private sector through concession contracts then became imperative. The policymakers 
realised that maintaining the status quo would lead to further decay of the ports and losing the 
competitive edge among ports in the sub-region. Therefore, the introduction of the private 
sector in port operations in Nigeria was embraced, as it has been acknowledged that private 
operation of ports will encourage greater flexibility, efficiency and better services to port 
consumers. It brought to the fore the disengagement of government from the activities that 
could be more efficiently performed by the private sector.  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
During the 1990s and prior to concession, Nigerian seaports were considered inefficient and 
unsafe due to massive cargo thefts (wharf rat phenomenon) and among the most expensive 
ports in the world. Also, the ports in Lagos were notorious for congestion that led to the 
continuing imposition of congestion surcharges and the high cost of imports, resulting in long 
turnaround times for ships and increased container dwell times (Leigland & Palsson, 2007). 
Instead of the international standard of 48 hours ship turnaround time in most Asian and 
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European ports, as observed by Ducruet and Merk (2012), it took weeks to load and unload 
ships in Nigeria ports. There were also problems of over bloated workforce, excessive port 
charges and too many agencies involved in cargo clearing. In addition, the port infrastructure 
and superstructure had become obsolete and in a state of disrepair and in need of 
rehabilitation. The government was unwilling to provide the enormous financial outlay 
required in financing the restoration of port infrastructure due to existing operational 
inefficiency and corruption, therefore the need for external financing became apparent. In 
order to mitigate these problems, government decided to introduce the private sector, to bring 
in expertise in the operation of the ports through concession contracts. 
  
 
These massive reforms were undertaken in the belief that the reforms that improve 
operational efficiency of ports are likely to bring down total logistics costs and in turn 
improve the competitiveness of the Nigerian economy. The most valuable tool for bringing 
cost-cutting efficiency gains and improvements in the overall performance of the ports is the 
introduction of some form of competition. Competition can be introduced into the ports 
through ex-ante or ex-post approaches (Estache, González, & Trujillo, 2002). Ex-ante relies 
on the auction of rights to operate the port, or in the port while ex-post is competition 
between ports, or between terminals within the port. The Nigerian port concession is 
articulated to involve these two types of competition. 
  
 
As a result, the Nigerian government embarked on the most extensive infrastructure port 
reforms that have taken place worldwide. It culminated in the handing over of port 
operations, through concession contracts, in 2006 (Ocean Shipping consultants, 2008; 
Palsson & Leigland, 2007). The primary objective of the Nigerian ports‘ concession is to 
attract investment, lower tariffs, improve service delivery to the consumer and in the end 
improve the overall performance of the ports. However, six years after handing over the 
operation of Nigerian ports to the private sector, in what is described as the most ambitious 
port reform that has taken place worldwide, no study has examined the overall impact of the 
concession to ascertain if the ports are on the path to efficiency.  Though there are some 
studies that have dealt with some aspects of the Nigerian ports‘ concession such as Akinwale 
and Aremo (2010), which examined concession as a tool to manage the crisis at Nigerian 
ports. Oghojafor, Kuye, and Alaneme (2012) studied concession as a strategic instrument for 
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efficiency and Okeudo (2013), looked at the efficiency level of Onne port after the reform. 
However, all these studies have only employed a piecemeal approach to studying the 
Nigerian port reform programme and none have evaluated the outcome of the concession 
programme holistically.  That being the case, the research question is: Has the massive 
reform that took place during a short period improved the performance of Nigerian ports?  
That is what this study investigates and provides a model for future evaluation. To put it 
succinctly, the study investigated the underpinning questions: ―Does the transfer of the 
operation of a whole nation‟s ports from the public to the private sector, through concession 
contracts, have an influence on the performance of the ports?  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Focusing on the Nigerian port sector, the study examines the relationship between 
privatisation through concession contracts and performance. The study focused on 20 
concessions for six Nigerian ports (Apapa, Calabar, Onne, PH, TCIP and Warri), which are 
representative of port infrastructure concessions in 2006. On average, these concessions have 
been in operation for 6 years. 
The research concentrated on investigating these questions:  
 Are ports with terminal operations in the hands of the private sector more efficient 
than those in the public sector?   Are ports that are under intense intra-port competition more efficient than those that 
are not?   What factors influence port operational performance?   What role does ownership of port institutions play in influencing operational port    
performance?   
 
1.4 Research Aim and Objectives  
The aim of this research is to study the port concession programme and its influence on the 
efficiency of Nigerian seaports, as well as benchmark the operational efficiency of the ports, 
to determine which operators are making efficient use, of resources allocated to them. In 
other words, the research examined in-depth, the post-concession operational performance of 
Nigerian ports to ascertain whether the ports are on the path to efficiency. The study 
addressed the aim by focusing on these specific objectives: 
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i. To measure and examine the efficiency trend of Nigerian seaports;   
ii. To evaluate pre- and post-concession Nigerian ports‘ efficiency; 
iii. To examine the overall performance of Nigerian ports from productivity and 
efficiency change perspectives;  
iv. To determine the competitiveness of Nigerian seaports after concession; 
v. To determine the factors that influence Nigerian ports‘ operational performance;  
vi. To assess the impact and port users‘ perspective on the concession programme; 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The result of this study is significant and can have some important policy implications.  
Nigeria is a major force in international trade, with 70% of goods coming to the West, and 
Central Africa destined to Nigeria. Out of which 80% of the traded goods are transported by 
sea (UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, the study of port performance is crucial to the sub-region. 
The World Bank African infrastructure country diagnostics (2008) assessment of ports in 
Sub-Saharan Africa ranked Nigeria as the top reformer Vagliasindi and Nellis (2009).   The 
PPI database put the total private sector investment in Sub-Saharan African ports at $1.3 
billion, with 62 percent related to the container terminals and 32 percent to multipurpose 
terminals, with little in the bulk cargo facilities. Nigeria accounts for 55 percent of the total 
private sector investment in the sub-region and the biggest single deal is the container 
terminal Apapa in Lagos, Nigeria, which attracted over $300 million. These transactions 
further attracted $1.7 billion in royalties to governments in the sub-region with over $1billion 
associated with the Apapa terminal concession (Ocean Shipping consultants, 2008). Also, 
Nigeria is the only country to concession all her ports in one scoop and the pace of 
concession (20 concessions within a year) is unprecedented worldwide (Ocean Shipping 
consultants, 2008). Therefore, it becomes imperative to study the outcome of the programme 
that attracted such huge investment in the sub-region. The study will also be crucial for 
governments in the sub-region seeking to embrace port concession, to learn from the 
successes and mistakes of Nigeria. Globally, the study of the Nigerian ports concession is a 
good example to demonstrate the effects of national port concessions on port performance.  
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Although the number of studies measuring ports performance is flourishing, several gaps still 
exist. For instance, a review of the studies in port economics, policy and management 
conducted by Pallis, Vitsounis, and De Langen (2010) discovered a total of 395 published 
journal papers between 1997-2008. A breakdown of the 395 publications by continent 
revealed that 266 belong to European ports, 99 to North America, 87 to Asia, 20 to Oceania, 
and 14 to South America, while Africa has only 3. The review indicates that the studies are 
lopsided in favour of the developed world. It is commonly acknowledged in global network 
inclusive logic, that ―a chain is as strong as the weakest link‖. As each country‘s individual 
port performance will affect the functioning of the chains that make-up the logistic network 
directly. Therefore, the need to study the outcome of the reform programmes that are targeted 
to improve the country‘s performance and overall competitiveness of its ports cannot be 
overemphasised.  
 
In addition, there are many studies on seaport efficiency measurement, as evident from the 
surveys of DEA studies by Panayides, Maxoulis, Wang, and Ng (2009); González and 
Trujillo (2009) and a synthesis by Wang, Song, and Cullinane (2002). The surveys analysed 
over 26 journal papers on efficiency measurement from 1993-2006. It could be argued that to 
increase the efficiency of ports, the results of other research can be applied directly. 
However, as observed by Hall (2002), studies from different countries are hardly comparable, 
due to the timeframe, entities, the structure of ports, or the countries‘ social systems differ. 
However, there are no port efficiency studies devoted solely to productive efficiency, or the 
effect of privatisation on the operational performance of the Nigerian seaports, despite its 
strategic position trade-wise, in the sub-region. Hence, the motivation for this study to fill this 
identified gap.  It makes the study crucial to all maritime players. 
 
1.6 An Overview of the Nigerian Economy and Seaports 
Nigeria occupies an area of 923,768 sq. KMs and is one of the largest countries in Africa. It 
is located on the west coast of Africa, bordering Benin, Niger and Cameroon. The country 
has a rich maritime history and a coastline of 850km which is littered with natural harbours 
and sandy beaches. Nearly 170m people live in Nigeria, making it the most populous nation 
in Africa and the 7th largest in the World. It has a GDP per capita of $3010.3 and a GDP of 
$522.6 billion and an annual GDP growth rate of 7.3% in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). The UN 
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forecast that by 2050, the Nigerian population will reach 289 million following only India, 
China, the USA and Pakistan in global population ranking. Lagos is the second largest city in 
Africa (after Cairo) with a population of 10.2 million and 60% of Nigeria manufacturing is 
located in Lagos. The economy is the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, having just overtaken 
South Africa; the economy grew by 7.69% and 6.5% in 2011 and 2012 respectively 
 
Nigeria‘s biggest export is crude oil, and the country‘s economy is supported by the revenue 
it generates. Oil accounts for 80% of the country‘s domestic product. Prior to the discovery of 
petroleum, agriculture used to be the mainstay of the nation‘s economy. As the revenue from 
oil increased, agriculture was neglected. As a result, food production could not keep pace 
with the expanding population and Nigeria has to import food to supplement local 
production. Nigeria also imports refined petroleum products despite being the 11th largest oil 
producer in the world (2,682,000 bbl/day as at 2012). This is due to inefficiency and 
unreliability of the three big refineries refineries, coupled with economic sabotage in the form 
of petroleum product vandalisation.   
 
Nigeria is a major advocate of healthy sub-regional ties and trade, after the formation of the 
Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS) in 1975. Nigeria maintains non-
discriminatory foreign trade relations with all the five continents of the world as a member of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO).  It has entered into many bilateral trade agreements 
with various countries. Nigeria‘s principal trading partners include Belgium, Brazil, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the USA. There also exists a thriving trade between 
Nigeria and her neighbouring countries in the west and central African sub-region, while 
concerted efforts are being made to reach out to southern Africa and the rest of the world.  
Nigeria is a member of ECOWAS and with the introduction of a single passport and a single 
market, subsequently other barriers that limited the flow of goods, services and capital flow 
between Nigeria and her neighbours, have disappeared. The removal of these barriers, made 
it impossible for ports in other West African countries previously to load/unload Nigeria 
cargo by sea, ushered in competition among the ports in the sub-region. This meant the 
decision and choice variables to use any of these ports Apapa port in Lagos, Cotonou Port in 
Benin,  Lome Port in Togo or Tema Port in Ghana is total cost, speed and reliability of 
transport. Consequently, Nigerian ports began to lose cargo, because many shippers 
responded to these scenarios by diverting their containers to other countries for transhipment 
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to Nigeria in smaller vessels. Nigeria‘s loss has become its more competitive neighbouring 
ports‘ gain. 
 
 
As the drift of cargo meant for Nigerian ports continued unabated to ports in neighbouring 
countries, the government came up with a more radical approach to public sector reform in 
Nigeria. The main thrust of the new approach is a shift from commercialisation to transfer of 
operational activities of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), from the public to the private 
sector, through partial or outright privatisation. For the port industry, the primary goals of this 
reform were to increase competitiveness and efficiency of national ports. In order to achieve 
these goals, the government defended an increase of private participation in port 
management. Nigerian ports moved from a tool port model, where the public sector holds the 
infrastructure and superstructure, to a landlord port model (Kieran, 2005). In this model, the 
port authority retains the infrastructure ownership, but private operators provide the services 
through a licence or concession (Brooks, 2004). The operators are responsible for hiring 
workers and for investing in equipment and superstructure. The port authority is responsible 
for the construction and management of infrastructures associated with navigation, such as 
piers, dams and access channels (Marques & Fonseca, 2010). There are two principal reasons 
for the adoption of the landlord port model in Nigeria. The first one is related to the need for 
funding. The Nigerian Port Authority as a public entity was not able to finance the operations 
alone. The second one concerns the neo-liberal thinking that have characterised the 
governments in Nigeria since the inception of the present democratic rule (left and right 
wings), that defend the minimum state intervention. 
 
1.6.1 Nigerian seaports 
Figure 1.1 shows the location of the six major Nigerian seaports under study. They are 
located in the southern part of the country. Two in Lagos State, Apapa and Tin Can and 
another two in Rivers State, Port Harcourt and Onne, while Warri and Calabar ports are in 
Delta and Cross River states respectively.  Prior to concession, Nigeria had eight ultra-
modern ports split into two zones for administrative purposes i.e. Western and Eastern zones 
under the control of the NPA. The Western zone consists of Apapa port, Container terminal 
port, Tin Can Island port, and a Roll on-Roll off (RORO) port. The Eastern zone comprises 
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of the Port Harcourt port complex, Delta port complex, Onne port complex, and the Calabar 
port complex. These eight ports constitute the primary port system, although there are smaller 
ports and oil terminals that operate under the ports‘ complexes. After the concession, the 
ports operate as six complexes: Lagos port complex, Tin Can Island port complex, Rivers 
port complex, Delta port complex, Onne port complex and Calabar port complex, each 
complex having ports under its jurisdiction. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of Nigeria showing location of seaports understudy 
Source: Adapted from www.mapsofworld.com (2014)   
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Lagos Port Complex 
The Lagos port complex is located at the Apapa area of Lagos and consists of Apapa port and 
a container terminal now called APM terminal; it occupies a land area of about 120 hectares. 
Apapa port has conventional berths that service all cargo types. These include 24 berths for 
handling dry cargo, two harbour berths for loading and discharging petroleum products. It 
also houses 13 transit sheds with a total storage space of 78,869 sq.metres and eight 
warehouses with a total space of 58,042 sq.metres and support facilities for cargo on transit to 
ECOWAS countries. The container terminal is inside of Apapa wharf and occupies an area of 
44 hectares of land. The port terminal has six designated container berths, with a total quay 
length of 1km and a draught of 11.5m. 
 
There are four terminal concessions carved out of Lagos port complex for four terminal 
operators; ABTL, ENL and GDNL from the former Apapa port, while the old container 
terminal is now APMT. 
 
Tin Can Island Port Complex 
Tin Can Island port complex is situated north-west of Apapa Wharf Lagos. It is a fusion of 
Tin Can Island port (TCIP) and the RORO port. The merger was as a result of the terminal 
concessions in 2006 and the port occupies an area of about 73 hectares of land that 
complement the RORO port. The TCIP port is comprised of the Kirikiri and Ikorodu lighter 
terminals and related jetties, in conjunction with a residential estate. The navigable channel 
has a width of 200m and a depth of 10.5m, with a total quay length of 2189m. It has berths 
for different cargoes, for example, berths 1 and 1A specialised in handling dry and bulk 
wheat cargo. The RORO port occupies berths 9 and 10, specially equipped to handle a large 
number of vehicles, containers and general cargo. The facilities in the RORO port include a 
car park with capacity for 7987 vehicles. A 435m quay length with a draught of 9.5m, two 
warehouses of 6800 sq.m each for containers and a stacking area of 22,86 sq.m with a 
capacity of 6017 tonnes. 
 
There are four terminals and 1BOT terminal carved out of the Tin Can Island Port (TCIP) 
complex and operated by the following concessionaires; JOSD, FSL, PCHS, TICT and 
PTML, which is a BOT. 
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Delta Port Complex 
The Delta port complex, in the Eastern zone, comprises of the following ports: Warri, Burutu, 
Koko and Sapele. It also includes the crude petroleum oil terminals of Escravos, Forcados 
and Pennington, located in the Delta region of Nigeria. The major port in this zone is the 
Warri Old and New port. The Warri port comprises of the Old and New Warri port. The Old 
port began operations in 1969, while the new port started in 1979 as an extension to the Old 
port. The port facilities available in Warri port include hard quays, jetties and mainstream 
buoys capable of handling 2.5m tonnes of bulk and break-bulk throughput. There are also 11 
privately owned jetties. The depth of the approach channel varies between 6.4m-7m at high 
tide. The old port has a total quay length of 876m.  It comprises of 8 berths, four of which are 
major berths, 3 are canal berths and one customs jetty, and Ogunu wharf dedicated to 
Ajaokuta iron and steel industries.  The new Warri port comprises of 6 main berths, including 
one RORO berth, each with a length of 250m. The storage area of the old port consists of six 
transit sheds, warehouses. It is allocated to oil companies for storing their drilling equipments 
and warehouses ― A‖ and ―B‖ have capacities of 14,241 and 5,080 tonnes 1respectively. The 
new port has four transit sheds and two warehouses. Both ports have large stacking areas for 
outdoor cargo storage.  
 
Other ports under the Delta port complex are Sapele, Burutu and Koko ports. The Delta port 
complex concession comprises of the following operators; Intels, AMS and Julius Berger. 
 
 Rivers Port Complex  
The Rivers port complex, otherwise known as the Port Harcourt port, is the third largest port 
complex in Nigeria. The port was built in 1913 during the colonial period, to export coal and 
other cash crops from the eastern part of Nigeria to Europe. The complex comprises of Port 
Harcourt port; Okrika refined petroleum oil jetty, Haastrup/Eagle cement Jetty, Kidney Island 
Jetty, Ibeto Jetty and Macobar and Bitumen Jetties.  It is a natural port comprising of eight 
berths and a quay length of 121kms. The average draught along the quay is 8.97m which can 
berth vessels of 15,000 tonnes deadweight.  
 
                                                     
1
 1Tonne=1000Kilograms throughout this thesis 
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Port Harcourt port has two concessionaires, namely: Ports and terminal operators‘ limited 
(PTOL) and BUA ports and terminal limited (BUA). However, other services such as 
pilotage, towage, pollution and bathymetric surveys/ dredging of the channels are still the 
responsibility of the NPA.  
 
Onne port Complex  
Onne port started operation in 1982 under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangement. In 
other words, it began operation abinitio as a landlord port. The Onne port is situated on the 
Bonny estuary on Ogu creek, which is 25kms from Port Harcourt. It covers a land area of 
2,500 hectares. Onne port complex comprises of two main terminal facilities, i.e. Federal 
Ocean Terminal (FOT) and the Federal Lighter Terminal (FLT). The Port jurisdiction 
includes the Nigerian liquefied natural gas (NLNG) jetty, NAFCON now known as 
NOTORE jetty and the midstream discharge at Buoy 9. 
 
In 1986, the Port was designated an oil and gas free zone by the Federal Government via 
Decree No. 8 of 1986. Presently, over 120 companies operate in the zone, and it is a hub of 
and oil gas operations and logistics in West and Central Africa. All the major oil companies 
maintain a presence at Onne port. 
 
The FOT comprises of three berths with a quay length of 750m. The draught alongside the 
quay is 12m, and the channel is 11.5m, while the turning basin is 530 metres. The FLT has 
four berths and a total quay length of 1670 metres. Intels and Brawal operate the terminal. In 
2010, another container terminal was carved out called West African Container Terminal 
(WACT) and located in the oil and gas free trade zone; it was concessioned to AP Moller 
Terminals. It has since commenced operation to cater for the greater Port Harcourt area and 
eastern Nigeria, including the local lucrative oil industry. 
 
Calabar Port Complex  
Calabar port is located 55 nautical miles from the Fairway buoy to the Calabar River, at 
latitude 4055‘N and longitude 8015.3‘E. The history of Calabar could be traced to the 15th 
century, as the pre-medieval merchants entered the eastern part of Nigeria for trade. Different 
shipping companies, such as M/S Palm Line Agencies limited, Elder Dempster Agencies, 
UAC and John Holts operated the port. The Federal Government of Nigeria took over the 
14 
 
operations of the port in 1969 and handed it over to the Nigerian ports authority, due to the 
inability of the private companies to provide adequate facilities for the functioning of the 
port. Thereafter the modernization of the port of Calabar was included in the 3rd national 
development plan of 1975-1980, to provide port facilities that will cope with the increasing 
demand of the domestic economy. The new Calabar port was commissioned in 1979. 
 
The port comprises a land area of 38 hectares, with four quays measuring 215m long and 
40m wide, and the channel width is 150m. The port has six operational berths, two 
warehouses measuring 150m x 40m and 175m x 40m. The operational area has been 
delineated into two terminals, A & B. Terminal A (2 berths) is allocated to Intels Nigeria 
Limited (Intels) and terminal B (4 berths) to Ecomarine terminals limited (ECM) and the Old 
port is a concession to Addax Nig. Limited.  
 
1.7 Yearly Traffic Pattern and Trends of Nigerian Seaports 
Table 1.1 shows the traffic growth pattern of Nigerian seaports for the period under study. 
The highest growth rate of 34.05% and 24.53% were observed between 2006 and 2007 for 
GRT and throughput respectively in the year terminal operations were transferred to the 
private operators. It is followed by a growth of rate of 26.27% and 24.22% for GRT and 
throughput respectively, achieved between 2000 and 2001. The period is both economically 
and politically remarkable in the annals of the country. It is the time that democratic rule 
returned to the country after a prolonged rule by the military, which restored confidence in 
the country by the international community. The new democratic administration increased 
wages by over 500%, which increased the purchasing power of many Nigerians. Nigeria 
being an import dependent country, this boosted trade and the flow of all types of imports to 
Nigeria. Almost all the imports pass through the ports; therefore, this increases traffic flow 
and the volume of cargo that passes through the ports. 
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Table 1.1 Gross registered tonnage (GRT) of vessels and throughput 
Year GRT (tonnes) Annual 
percentage 
change in 
GRT 
Throughput 
(tonnes) 
Annual 
percentage 
change in 
throughput 
Number 
of 
vessels 
Annual 
percentage 
change in 
No. of 
vessels 
2000 44,432,370   28,932,880   4087  
2001 56,106,345 26.27 35,940,692 24.22 4473 9.44 
2002 53,267,921 -5.06 36,987,241 2.91 4143 −7.37 
2003 60,622,666 13.81 39,765,945 7.51 4315 4.15 
2004 61,384,221 1.26 40,816,947 2.64 4553 5.51 
2005 60,541,810 -1.37 44,952,078 10.13 4586 0.72 
2006 63,267,047 4.50 46,150,518 2.67 4800 4.67 
2007 84,806,792 34.05 57,473,350 24.53 4849 1.02 
2008 89,505,702 5.54 64,372,749 12.00 4623 -4.66 
2009 90,603,611 1.23 65,775,509 2.18 4721 2.12 
2010 108,621,872 19.89 76,774,727 16.72 4881 3.39 
2011 122,614,716 12.88 83,461,697 8.71 5232 7.19 
The small percentage increase observed between 2008 and 2009 is due to the high level of 
congestion experienced at the Lagos ports. As terminal operators increased their capacity 
without a commensurate improvement in other related transport infrastructure, this gave rise 
to cargo build up at Apapa and TCIP. The congestion was so intense that the then NPA 
managing director, Oman Suleiman, suspended ship entrance into the Lagos ports from 
February to April 2009, to remove what was described as an ―alarming backlog‖. This 
affected the growth of traffic for the period. However, the increase in the number of ships that 
call at Nigeria is below 10 percent for the period. Although that throughput grew by 12% 
between 2007 and 2008, the number of ships that called at Nigerian ports decreased by -
4.66%. A cursory look at the GRT and the number of vessels shows a progressive increase in 
the size of ships that call at the ports from 2008-2011. For example, bigger container ships of 
4,500 TEUs (WAFMAX) have started calling at Nigerian ports with the dredging of the 
Apapa channel and Bonny channel to a depth of 11.5metres. The structure of the remaining 
parts of the thesis is as follows: 
 
16 
 
1.8 Organisation of Thesis       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 examines the theoretical underpinnings surrounding privatisation, competition, 
regulation and their relationship to efficiency, with particular emphasis on the port industry. 
The literature on studies dealing with the outcome of privatisation as it relates to the port 
industry is explored, and the gap in the literature will be revealed in order to situate this 
research.  
 
Chapter 3 aims to review the literature on performance measurements, with a focus on 
efficiency and productivity evaluation techniques. The chapter also evaluates the different 
efficiency and benchmarking approaches available in the port industry with particular 
emphasis on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the Malmquist Productivity Index 
Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Chapter 2 Review of Theories, 
Concepts and Literature 
Chapter 3 Performance Measurement 
/Literature Review 
Chapter 4 Research Design and 
Methodology 
Chapter 5 Benchmarking Operational 
Efficiency of Nigerian Ports  
Chapter 6 Role of Ownership on 
Nigerian Ports Performance 
Chapter 7 Discussion of 
Results/Policy 
Implications/Conclusion 
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(MPI). These will be the two methods employed in the analysis of the efficiency and 
productivity of Nigerian seaports.  
 
Chapter 4 will describe the research design and strategy used to explore the influence of 
concession on the port industry in Nigeria. A number of analytical techniques, such as DEA 
and MPI, will be used in variable operationalisation.  The survey design and analysis used to 
test the specific hypotheses will be explained. It elucidates the data collection methods and 
the criteria employed in this study. 
 
Chapter 5 will utilise DEA variants of Inter-temporal, Contemporaneous and Window to 
analyse the efficiency of the ports for the 12 years under study and report on the results 
obtained. Also, the DEA-CCR (Variable returns to scale) with sets of panel data of six years 
(2000-2005 and 2006-2011) will be used to analyse the pre- and post-concession efficiency 
of the Nigerian seaports. The results obtained in the two analyses will be used to test the 
hypothesis. Equally, the chapter will explore the productivity change in the ports over the two 
periods by underpinning the sources of inefficiency.  
 
Chapter 6 synthesises the findings of chapter 5 with competition and other exogenous factors 
to determine the role each plays in determining port operational performance. It is to assess 
the influence of ownership on efficiency and to model the performance of Nigerian seaports.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the summary of the key findings and draws conclusions based on 
the results obtained from the various analyses. It also highlights the policy and managerial 
implications of the study, based on the findings. In addition, recommendations will be 
proffered based on the outcomes of the research. This chapter brings out the limitations of the 
study and the areas of focus for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Review of Theories, Concepts and Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the various theories and concepts that underpin this research focusing 
on port privatisation and ownership. It also discusses economic attributes of ports and 
compares different port ownership and administrative models. It Considers that different 
management structures exist, and the quality of governance varies across countries. 
Additionally, for the fact that ports exhibit both public and private goods characteristics, the 
chapter argues for the need to adopt an appropriate ownership and regulatory framework 
which is country specific. It also discusses the different privatisation options and the trend in 
selected countries and Africa in particular, within the context of port management models 
presented previously. Equally it explores the relationship between privatisation, 
competitiveness, regulation and economic efficiency, theoretically. The final section of the 
chapter examines the empirical evidence of this relationship from previous studies. 
 
2.2 The Concept of Port Services 
In broad terms, a port can be defined as an entity (organisation) that provides services and 
facilities for ship turnaround (Trujillo & Nombela, 1999). In short, it provides facilities for 
loading and offloading cargo from vessels. Although this pedestrian view of ports may not be 
an up-to-date view of the contemporary port today, it captures the critical role of a port that 
has not been undervalued. The significant interest in ports and the services they provide 
revolves around efficient loading and unloading of cargo. However, the role of modern ports 
as of today is captured in the United Nations conferences on trade and development‘s 
(UNCTAD) definition;  
“Seaports are interfaces between several modes of transport, and thus they are centres for 
combined transport. Furthermore, they are multi-functional markets and industrial areas 
where goods are not only in transit, but they are also sorted, manufactured and distributed. 
As a matter of fact, seaports are multi-dimensional systems, which must be integrated within 
logistic chains to fulfil properly their functions. An efficient seaport requires, besides 
infrastructure, superstructure and equipment, adequate connections to other transport 
modes, a motivated management, and sufficiently qualified employees” (Trujillo & Nombela, 
1999, p. 4).  
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Furthermore, other definitions by authors such as Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001b) 
focused on the role of logistic networks while De Langen (2002) added the role of ports in 
industrial networks to the definition. 
 
The later definitions show that the functions of modern ports have become complex and 
diversified, i.e. they have become centres of agglomeration of economic activities. 
Nevertheless, the primary role of seaports remains ―loading and unloading‖ cargo; the other 
activities are regarded as value-adding, as they are not the main activities. Therefore, the 
importance of seaports to the economy hinges on the ability to facilitate international trade 
flows as the bulk of domestic and international trade is carried by sea. Seaborne trade 
depends on ports for its operations, as it acts as maritime/land transport (railways, road or 
inland navigation) interface. It implies that for efficient maritime transports, ports need to 
perform the core role of ―lifting up‖ and ―putting down‖ of cargo efficiently. Despite the 
complex and diversified nature of modern ports, they render the following services: cargo 
services, vessel services, infrastructure, marketing, management and security. Table 2.1 
shows the different services and the activities involved in each category.  
 
Table 2.1: Port functions  
Service Activities 
Cargo 
services 
Stevedoring, Long shoring, Equipment operations, Transit storage; 
Receiving and delivery, Cargo tracking, Assembly and processing 
(consolidation, bagging, packing, mixing); Storage and warehousing; 
Transfer to land transport. 
Vessel 
services 
Navigational aids, Pilotage, Towage, Mooring, and Bunkering, Utilities, 
Reception facility (garbage removal), Stowage, Anchorage, Buoys, Launch 
services and Vessel repair. 
Infrastructure Hydrographical surveys, Dredging, Repair and maintenance, Engineering 
design, Port construction, Equipment procurement. 
Marketing Market research, Promotion and sales 
Management Billing accounting, Data processing, Staffing 
Security Security forces, Fire and rescue, Pollution control 
Source: Adapted from Cheon (2007b). 
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The functions reveal that multiple services are provided within the port area. More often, 
these services can be provided by independent firms working in the port and the services can 
also be provided by a single firm in the case of small ports. The space limitation reduces the 
number of feasible operators within a port area. Sometimes, only a single operator can be 
accommodated in the case of small ports in remote locations (Trujillo & Nombela, 1999). 
The agency that normally coordinates the activities and ensures the proper use of common 
facilities takes care of safety and general design of port facilities is called the port authority. 
The next section discusses the role that port authorities play in the port industry. 
 
 
2.2.1 Port authorities 
The governing body in-charge of ports is often referred to as a port authority, port 
management or port administration. The administration or governance of ports is of crucial 
importance for the organisation, coordination and control of port activities (Cullinane & 
Song, 2002). A commission of the European communities, 2001, defined a port authority as 
“the  entity, which whether or not in conjunction with other activities, has its objective under 
national law or regulation, the administration and management of port infrastructures, and 
the coordination and control of the activities of the different operations present in the port”.  
De Monie (2004), observed that the term port authority connotes a public form of port 
management. However, it is used  as a generic term to describe the body with the statutory 
responsibility of managing a port‘s water and landside domain. While Verhoeven (2010) 
argued that, irrespective of the ownership and management entities to which port authorities 
belong, they are hybrid entities that contain some elements of both public and private law. 
Therefore, they are conferred with an exclusive right of administrative action and in some 
cases even criminal law competence and at the same time they are undertakings that compete 
(Verhoeven, 2010). These far-reaching attribute flow from the fact that seaports possess both 
public utilities and private enterprise characteristics (Meersman & Van de Voorde, 2002). 
 
Port authorities can exist at all tiers of government, be it national, regional, provincial or 
local. Although the most prominent is the local port authority, that is an authority that 
exercises jurisdiction over the port area. National port authorities exist in countries such as 
Aruba, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Tanzania (World Bank, 2007b). The traditional roles or 
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functions of port authorities are classified into three categories; landlord, regulator and 
operator (Baird, 1995; Baltazar & Brooks, 2001). These three broad classifications are in 
tandem with the legal status of port authorities (Van Hooydonk, 2002). Other classifications 
do exist, but they are still linked to the three major broad categories. Regardless of whether 
the port authority owns the land, or manages it on behalf of the national or local government, 
the functions of ports outlined previously in Table 2.1 are carried out or coordinated by the 
port authorities. For instance, the landlord port authority performs the duties of the landlord 
of the port. As the administrative responsibility of the Landlord port is vested with the 
Landlord port authority (Baird, 2000; Baltazar & Brooks, 2001; Van Hooydonk, 2002). 
Likewise the operational and regulatory roles of ports, although the landlord function is 
regarded as the most important function of a modern-day port authority from the value chain 
perspective (Dooms & Verbeke, 2007). 
  
The statutory roles of national port authorities, as listed in the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Handbook for Port Planners in Developing Countries  
UNCTAD (1985) are as follows: (a) the approval of a port investment plan in line with the 
national plan maintained by the authority; (b) setting of the port‘s financial policy which will 
bring a return on investment; (c) infrastructural funding and to advise government on funding 
alternatives; (d) regulation of rates and charges by setting a tariff policy that will protect the 
public interest; (e) set the labour policy, which is impartial, to minimise friction between 
labour unions and management; (f) licensing of third parties to provide certain services to the 
port; (g) collect, collate, analyse and disseminate information on port activities and sponsor 
port research when necessary and (h) provide legal advice to local port authorities. 
 
The changing role of the port environment, due to privatisation, has altered the traditional 
role of port authorities. It has been so much, that Goss (1990a) has questioned the need for 
port authorities, recommending repositioning and development of new strategies. 
Notwithstanding the necessity of establishing public ports‘ authorities have been called into 
question. The prevailing situation globally favours having one, either at a local or national 
level, depending on the size of the country (Juhel, 2001). It is necessary to have a clearly 
identifiable public partner that represents the public interest, to act as a partner to the private 
sector in negotiating and implementing new operational strategies for the port industry. The 
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absence of such authority, that can be accessible locally, could be an obstacle to the 
development of a viable public-private partnership. Moreover, the new envisaged roles apply 
mainly to port authorities in developed countries, as the developing countries are still 
struggling to fulfil the traditional roles. 
 
2.2.2 Port operators 
As there are roles for central governments and port authorities, so also port concessionaries 
(such as stevedoring firms, cargo handling companies, and terminal operators) play key roles 
in the port communities. Terminal concessions are granted to companies with different 
backgrounds. The award of the concession to private entities expands their activities to 
terminal operations, so they become terminal operators. The private entities form an 
important strand in the concession process, as its success, or otherwise, depends on the 
experience, behaviour and the performance of the private parties (Theys, Notteboom, Pallis, 
& De Langen, 2010). There are many classifications of terminal operators in the literature; 
the most recent is Farrell (2012), which identified 11 groups based on the geographical reach 
and activities of the entities involved in concessions. They include: Global terminal operators 
(GTO), Regional terminal operator (RTO), Stevedores (STE), Shipping lines (SL), Freight 
transport companies (FT), Construction companies (CC), Equipment manufacturers (EM), 
Property developers (PD), Industrial conglomerates (IC), Public authorities (PA) and 
Financial institutions (FI).  
 
There is another proposed classification of terminal operating companies by Bichou and Bell 
(2007), namely: terminal operating shipping shippers (TOS). This group engage mainly in 
bulk cargo operations, examples include oil companies such as Shell, or cement companies 
such as Dangote. Another group is the terminal operating shipping lines (TOSL) that operate 
port facilities by acquiring long-term concessions or leases. An example of this is APM 
terminals, where the parent company is the Maersk shipping line. There are also terminal 
operating port authorities (TOPA), which have expanded their activities by operating ports or 
terminals in other countries as their base. Lastly in this classification, is the terminal 
operating companies (TOC). This group are made up of companies that undertake activities 
in logistics, property development, or related business ventures and have extended to 
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international port operations and management. Companies in this group include HPH, ICTSI 
and SSA Marine. The TOCs are also regarded as transnational terminal operating companies 
(TTOs) by Slack and Frémont (2005). Parola and Musso (2007) categorised terminal 
operating companies into three broad groups, the pure stevedores, integrated carriers and 
hybrid terminal operators. 
 
Nevertheless, the two most outstanding concession participants are the GTOs and the 
shipping lines involved in concessions. The role of GTOs is critical to port operation as 
literature has revealed that international terminal operators are the dominant players in the 
cargo handling industry, especially of containers. The top ten terminal operators handle 
64.4% of total world cargo (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2012). The GTOs successful inroad into 
port operations can be attributed to the strategic importance of seaports and the need to secure 
reliable supply chains (Farrell, 2012). Also, Farrell (2012) was of the view that due to size, 
reputation and independence, the international terminal operators are better placed to attract 
business to ports. The presence of GTOs in many ports provides the ease of switching 
equipment and management resources around the world, hence the flexibility to respond to 
market changes. In addition, Notteboom and Rodrigue (2012), described GTOs as market 
seekers that pay particular attention in selecting their locations.  
 
Furthermore, the market segment for single-user terminals operated by global container 
carriers is expanding rapidly (Wiegmans, Hoest, & Notteboom, 2008).  The growth is 
possible because shipping lines strive to secure terminal capacity at major locations globally 
through vertical integration of shipping lines into port operations. It provides the shipping 
lines the control of their global door-to-door services. The assumption is that the operation of 
terminals by shipping lines will result in efficiency gains, delivery of better service and 
reduction in port charges (Slack & Frémont, 2005). Another advantage derivable from 
shipping lines operating port services is throughput guarantee, resulting from the vertical 
integration in the supply chain. According to Farrell (2012), although many new companies 
have entered the terminal operation market, only very few outside the shipping companies are 
successful. That notwithstanding, shipping lines are keener on locations with the potential for 
high-value additions in the overall supply chain (Notteboom & Rodrigue, 2012).  
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Typically, most port operators are private firms that pursue conventional microeconomic 
objectives, such as profit maximisation, growth and additional market share. The creation of 
an enabling environment for port operators to freely pursue such objectives ensures the 
achievement of benefits of a market-orientation in ports. The nature of a port service confers 
it with unique economic characteristics, explained in the following section. 
 
2.2.3 Economic characteristics of port service 
2.2.3.1 Public versus private goods characteristics 
Sloman (1997, p. 349) defined public good as: “a good or service which has the features of 
non-rivalry and non-excludability and, as a result, would not be provided by the free market” 
According to Coase (2005), it is impossible for suppliers to exclude potential consumers in 
public goods. While Goss (1990a, p. 265) views public goods as; ―those which are unlikely to 
be provided sufficiently, satisfactorily, or at all, by competitive industries‖. Thus, public 
goods should be provided where there is some market failure. However, a good or service is 
regarded as a public good if it fulfils the following conditions: joint or non-rivalrous 
consumption; inability to exclude those who refuse to pay and non-rejectability of 
consumption (Goss, 1990a). The basis of classifying public goods by modern economists is 
―the practical impossibility to charge for the use of the goods‖ and ―the indivisibility of the 
cost of the goods, so the marginal cost is zero" (Baird, 2004). 
 
 In terms of ports, the economic characteristics of non-divisibility and the high cost of 
providing port infrastructure is the impetus for traditionally regarding ports as public goods, 
although some port services can also be provided privately. Ports are regarded as public 
goods due to the significant role they play in facilitating trade growth and associated 
economic developments. These economic multiplier effects have been used to justify direct 
public sector investment in ports, as the narrow, non-rivalry and excludability theory of 
economics has been rendered ineffective as a result of advancements in technology (Baird, 
2004; Song, Cullinane, & Roe, 2001).  In support, Abbes (2007) argued that the model of 
regarding ports as public goods is fast disappearing.  Due to institutional reforms in the port 
sector, it is gradually being replaced by the model that allows the sharing of the functions in 
the port between the public and the private sector.  
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Another argument for government engagement in the provision of port services directly, is 
that port services are considered as merit goods. Rosen and Gayer (2008) described merit 
goods as services that are required to be supplied even if the public do not demand them 
directly. Another reason adduced by governments for engaging in the provision of port 
services publicly is externalities associated with the production of the service. Carlton and 
Perloff (2005) are of the view that externalities occur when the user of the service does not 
incur the full cost of the harm their actions do to others. Alternatively, they enjoy the full 
benefits the goods have brought to others. It means that externalities can be negative or 
positive depending on its effects on others. For instance, the negative impact of pollution 
caused by shipping is being borne by individuals who did not participate in creating the 
pollution. 
 
Carlton and Perloff (2005) define private goods as those that if consumed by one, cannot be 
consumed by another. Ports can also be viewed as private goods because of the direct 
economic benefits generated from their operations. Market transactions between private 
parties exert influence on the value of the majority of private goods. On the contrary, a 
considerable value of public services is not obtained from a transaction, because the buyers 
and sellers act independently and have no direct relationships. Therefore, private firms have 
no motivation to produce them. The positive externalities and social benefits generated by 
public goods are in excess of the price the private sector can charge for them. Therefore, 
some public intervention is necessary to ensure the adequacy of production. Sechrest (2003), 
provided examples of private provision of public goods in the maritime industry, as cargo 
handling, towing and mooring. 
In summary, it can be argued that although some port facilities have been viewed as public 
goods, seaports considered as a whole do not exhibit public goods‘ characteristics. It is not 
possible to exclude users and it is not feasible to produce the same quantity of services to 
more users without increasing costs. Therefore, seaports from an economic perspective do not 
necessarily have to be in the public domain, as it is possible to operate them as commercial 
organisations. However, considering the strategic importance of seaports to the overall 
national economy, the objective of governments should be geared towards ensuring that 
efficiency gains are achieved through private participation. It is these configurations and how 
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to balance public and privates interests that make port ownership and administration 
cumbersome. 
 
2.2.3.2 Perfect competition and natural monopoly 
The classic and common argument for classifying all ports as natural monopolies is fast 
fading, as ports possess both public and private goods characteristics. In support, Perez-
Labajos and Blanco (2004) argued that the separation of infrastructure and superstructure 
(vertical disintegration) and segregation of services (horizontal disintegration of activities), 
shows the extent that competitiveness can be introduced. According to Perez-Labajos and 
Blanco (2004), the only reason to justify the separation of port activities, and the introduction 
of competition, is the perceived efficiency gain. However, it is not clear whether the 
production and provision of a private good publicly will lead to a more efficient service. 
Although economic theory suggests that assuming perfectly competitive market conditions, 
the marginal cost will equal marginal revenue, and the perfectly competitive quantity of 
goods will be supplied and purchased (Shepherd & Shepherd, 2003).  
 
Figure 2.1 shows a perfectly competitive market condition for a privatised firm; here the 
market equilibrium would be at a price of 100GBP for a quantity of 20,000 seats per year. 
The assumption is that in a perfectly competitive market, the buyers and suppliers face the 
same price. At that point (―a‖ in our case), marginal revenue (benefit) is equal to marginal 
cost. The market is considered economically efficient at that point, as all participants in the 
market act selfishly and independently without any government intervention. The above 
scenario is based on the assumption that firms supply the same product, using the same 
resource and compete only on price. In essence, the profit-maximising Pareto equilibrium 
then does not promote competition, which is highly unrealistic. 
 
 
Therefore, if the natural monopoly argument is upheld and the public operates seaports, the 
SOEs (PAs) may with time be confronted with increasing competition, arising from the 
introduction of new products and processes. The situation may arise due to either delayed 
investment by the public port authorities or alternatively, the private entities find alternative 
ways of funding capital investments (Baird, 2004; Haralambides, Cariou, & Benacchio, 2002; 
27 
 
Shepherd & Shepherd, 2003).  Ports in the public domain are less proactive in embracing new 
technology compared with their counterparts in the private sector (Notteboom & 
Winkelmans, 2001b; Shepherd & Shepherd, 2003).  
 
  
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Perfectly competitive market   
Source: Newman (2013)  
 
Taking into account that ports are private services (goods) that can be provided publicly, 
there have been suggestions as to why ports exhibit monopolistic behaviour. Newman (2013) 
argued that the provision of port services requires massive investments in developing 
infrastructures, such as construction of quay walls and berths; provision of hinterland 
linkages e.g. rail and road and continuous dredging. Thereby constituting a significant barrier 
to entry, as well as limiting the number of viable locations for establishment of a port. 
However, Fischer (2007) and Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic (2013) give an interesting 
description of natural monopolies as being existent in the presence of increasing returns to 
scale. In the provision of services such as electricity, water and mass transit, over time, 
average cost diminishes at a rate that only a single provider can be sustained at a certain point 
in time. At this point, positive profits are no longer feasible because price equals marginal 
cost (Engel et al., 2013). Hence, the provision of port services could be regarded as having 
increasing returns to scale due to the massive capital investment required. 
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Therefore, the provision of port services may be seen as a natural monopoly. However, that 
does not mean the state should provide it, neither does the presence of increasing returns to 
scale mean that a government monopoly should exist. There are three options open to 
government as suggested by Fischer (2007), to handle natural monopolies: firstly sale of the 
monopoly rights to a private entity, while the government regulates taxes payable by the 
private monopolist. Secondly, government could provide the initial capital outlay for 
infrastructure investment. Then, the provision of port services is open to competitive bidding 
for many suppliers to undertake the production of port services so as to improve the quality of 
service to the consumer. Finally, in the case of a natural monopoly, the state should either opt 
to set prices or regulate the profits of the private operator in order to protect consumer 
(Ferguson & Ferguson, 1994). 
 
Nowadays, the model of regarding ports as natural monopolies is only relevant where inter-
port competition is imperfect, observed, mostly with ports that serve captive hinterlands. 
Even then, monopolies tend to disappear with the introduction of intra-port competition 
through privatisation. For ports with contestable hinterlands, inter-port competition reduces 
economic rents for competing ports. As a result, the trend these days is towards the sharing of 
responsibility between the public and private sectors by granting operational rights through 
concession agreements. Then the role of government should be to ensure that the consumers 
of the service are not unduly exploited. This could be achieved by putting in place a robust 
regulatory framework in the form of price setting or profit regulation (Farrell, 2002; 
Lambertides & Louca, 2008; Notteboom, 2006, 2007b; Theys et al., 2010). Therefore, the 
economic characteristics of ports give rise to different port ownership models, as discussed in 
the next section.    
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework for Classifying Port Ownership and Administrative Models 
The economic characteristics of ports discussed above show that there are many activities 
performed concurrently within the limited space of the port area. The agency that normally 
coordinates the activities and ensures the proper use of common facilities takes care of safety, 
and the general design of port facilities, is called the port authority. The configuration of most 
port authorities is public, but there are instances of purely private authorities. However, 
depending on the role assumed by port authorities, different models of organising ports do 
exist. In other words, different port ownership and administrative structures arise as a result 
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of the distribution of property rights of infrastructure, superstructure and services. Alderton 
(2005) provided a traditional classification of port ownership as; state ports, autonomous 
ports, municipal ports and private ports. Goss (1990b), Heaver (1995) and De Monie (1996), 
identified three types depending on the role played by the port authority. The World Bank 
Port Reform ToolKit (WBPRTK), World Bank (2007a) outlined four administration models. 
The four WBPRTK administration models are the Service port, the Tool port, the Landlord 
port and the Private Service port. The models differ in terms of whether services are provided 
by the public sector, the private sector or mixed ownership providers, their orientation (local, 
regional or global), the ownership of superstructure and who provides dock labour and 
management. However, it is not unusual to find hybrid models that combine the features of a 
number of other types  (Bichou & Gray, 2005).  
 
Mangan and Cunningham (2000), provided four models. Likewise, Baird (1995) and Baird 
(1997) identified four models as an alternative framework for analysing port administration 
and ownership, which are referred to as ―Port Function Matrix‖ (Table 2.2). The conceptual 
framework of the two approaches is the assumption that a port, whether in private or public 
hands, provides three essential functions within the port area, namely; the regulatory 
function, the landowner function and the operator function. Regulation clearly describes the 
control of port land areas and the responsibility to manage the port estate. As well as the 
planning, implementation of policies and strategies for the port‘s physical development of 
superstructure and infrastructure and management of other stakeholders operating at the port. 
It can be regarded as the primary role of port authorities, as they are mainly statutory powers 
granted to the public or private ports‘ management (Nagorski, 1972). The operator function 
involves physical handling of cargo and passenger tasks between sea and land. Mangan and 
Cunningham (2000), described the operator function as a cargo handling function which 
entails loading and unloading of vessels, cargo storage and provision of value-adding 
services. The landowner function concerns the management and maintenance of physical assets, 
such as quay walls, berths, terminals and parking areas. 
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 Table 2.2: Port function matrix 
Port Functions 
PORT MODELS Regulator Landowner Operator 
PUBLIC Public Public Public 
PUBLIC/private Public Public Private 
PRIVATE/public Public Private Private 
PRIVATE Private Private Private 
Sources: Baird (1995) and Baird (1997) 
 
The arrangement of the basic functions of the port by the matrix makes it possible to ascertain 
the level of influence exerted by the public or private sector in a given port. Depending on 
which of the functions is the responsibility of public or private organisations. The Baird‘s 
port function matrix and the WBPRTK (World Bank, 2007) classification are the same, the 
difference being in the nomenclature. In the PUBLIC model, the three functions are 
undertaken by the public port authority, or under the control of any agency appointed by the 
government. It is synonymous with a comprehensive port service model in the World Bank 
classification. The challenge with this model is that it could lead to inefficiencies in service 
provision, as the port regulates itself in the provision of services. The PUBLIC/private port 
depicts the model in which the operator function is the responsibility of the private sector, 
and the government controls the regulatory and landowner function. It is the Landlord port or 
model, according to the WBPRTK. This model allows the government to retain control over 
land, infrastructure and regulation so as to safeguard public interest, while the expertise of the 
private sector is brought to bear on the operations. Baird (2002) study of ownership of the top 
100 World container terminals demonstrated that this model could lead to improved 
efficiency. The PRIVATE/public port is a variant of the Tool port model in the World Bank 
classification. Here both the operator and landowner function is in the hands of the private 
sector, while the regulatory function is under the public domain. This model could ensure a 
good return on investment for operators who assumed all the risks involved in investing in an 
unpredictable port environment. On the contrary, the ownership of land and operation of all 
services by the private sector may result in the transfer of a public monopoly to a private 
monopoly. Last but not the least; the PRIVATE port is a port in which the three primary 
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functions of the port are controlled by the private sector. The concern with this model is that 
it may create a monopoly and lead to market failure, as the private is left to provide all 
services without oversight. 
 
Although traditionally ports were publicly owned, the global trend nowadays is to move from 
purely public ports towards a port with greater private sector participation. Thus, making the 
public/private the most widely preferred model (Baird, 1995, 1999). Other authors, such as  
Saundry and Turnbull (1997), Notteboom, Pallis, and Farrell (2012) were also of the view 
that the landlord model is the most widely applied. Although the method of application 
differs within or between countries, even Europe with strong central administrative bodies for 
ports, differences exists between Latin and Anglo-Saxon countries. Additionally, Van Reeven 
(2010), is of the view that the Landlord port model is the dominant model in large and 
medium-sized ports. This is due to the unique attribute of vertical separation of port authority 
and service provision, which allows competition between different service providers in a port. 
Another factor that make the Landlord model the natural choice for most port privatisation 
programmes, is the long-term nature of concession contracts (Baird, 2002; Kent & Ashar, 
2001; World Bank, 2007a). This makes it relatively easy to attract investment to the port. In 
addition, there is rapid response to market fluctuations, as the private sector is in charge of 
cargo handling operations and at the same time owns, operates and maintains all the 
equipment used in cargo handling.  
 
On the other hand, Brooks (2004) warned that the Landlord model despite the enthusiasm for 
it, could lead to over-capacity and duplication of marketing efforts, as operators try to 
expand. Additionally, there is an inherent risk of underestimating the time for additional 
capacity. Tull and Reveley (2001) argued that the broad acceptance of the model should not 
shield it from the fact that within the port utility function, the private sector may or may not 
be investing in port superstructure. As the model allows for private investment in 
superstructure. Baird (2004) admonished that, although the matrix provides a theoretical 
understanding of different types of port ownership models, the degree of public involvement 
should naturally be dependent upon national ideology. In support, Cass (1996) and Heikkila 
(1990) cited the example of the United States, where the municipal authority plays a 
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significant part in the operation of the port. Thi is in contrast to Taiwan, where administration 
of ports is centralised.  
2.4 Port Privatisation 
2.4.1 Definition 
The diversity of privatisation is not unique to the port sector. The structures and policies vary 
not only in developed economies, but also within developing economies. The term port 
reform has become analogous to privatisation, whereas it is an aspect of port reform. 
Likewise, other terms, such as Devolution, Corporatisation, Commercialisation and 
Deregulation have frequently been used in literature in place of privatisation since the 
popularisation of the term by Thatcher‘s government in the early 1980s (Baird, 1997; 
Cullinane, Ji, & Wang, 2005a; Ircha, 2001). Many authors have described the difficulty in 
defining port privatisation. Ircha (2001) defines port privatisation as all manner of steps taken 
to enhance the commercial orientation of port operation. While Cass (1996) defines it as the 
actual transfer of ownership of port properties from the public to the private sector, or as the 
application of private capital to fund investment in port development and maintenance, as 
well as in certain port activities. However, a more apt, precise and encompassing definition is 
captured in the guideline for port authorities on privatisation of port facilities as; ―the transfer 
of ownership of assets from the public to the private sector or the application of private 
capital to fund investments in port facilities, equipments and systems‖ (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 
1).  In economics parlance, without actual private ownership or the private funding of port 
assets or services, there can be no privatisation. 
  
 
This definition captures the essence of port privatisation, because the increased participation 
of the private sector in the provision of port services, without corresponding private 
investment, can only be viewed as port devolution, not privatisation. This distinction is 
necessary because seaports, due to their size and strategic importance in the global trade 
supply chain, have been the target of neo-liberal reforms. The 1980s witnessed many 
countries, especially in the Western World, adopting various economic concepts, such as 
commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation, in reforming their port authorities. 
However, many of these approaches overlap, for instance in terms of privatisation there is an 
array of techniques, or combination of techniques, that the concept embodies. Although the 
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three different concepts may seem the same, as they involve ways of injecting private sector 
principles into the public port authorities, they are different in economic terms. For instance, 
commercialisation means making public port authorities aware of the needs of its public and 
private clients, by making them more accountable for their decisions, operational 
performance and financial results. It also presupposes non-interference of government, or 
other public institutions in the activities of the port authority (Tull & Reveley, 2002; 
UNCTAD, 1998). In West Africa, commercialisation ranges from the reforms to improve 
efficiency and profitability, to financial independence from the state (Iheduru, 1993). On the 
other hand, corporatisation entails given public organisation the legal status of a private 
corporation or company while government still owns the shares of the company. Despite that, 
the land and other assets are legally transferred to the newly formed company but the port 
remains in the public domain. The establishment of a clear-cut accountability process and 
competitive neutrality i.e. a situation where the public company faces the same market forces 
as the private counterpart is an essential requirement of corporatisation (Tull & Reveley, 
2002; UNCTAD, 1998). 
 
  
Another term used in literature to describe privatisation is deregulation which represents the 
elimination or liberalisation of rules and regulations that inhibit a free market and which can 
have negative and positive consequences (UNCTAD, 1998). Although the elimination of 
restrictive port rules and regulations in order to usher in a free market and promote efficiency 
is a welcome development, there is a need for at least a minimum level of regulation to 
ensure that the management and operation of ports respect international codes, rules and 
regulations about safety, environment, security and employment. 
  
 
Nevertheless, UNCTAD (1998) refer to privatisation, commercialisation, corporatisation and 
deregulation, as concepts as they involve the process of assigning a greater role to the private 
sector in the management of economic activities, or granting greater freedom for the private 
sector to operate.  Coltof (1999), called them strategies of port reform. In order to realise 
these concepts, various instruments are employed to ensure implementation. Trujillo and 
Nombela (1999) and Guasch (2004) identified 7 different instruments that can be used to 
engage the private sector in the port industry as: full privatisation (outright sale); Build 
operate and own (BOO); concession contracts (Build/Rehabilitate, operate and transfer, 
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BOT/ROT); Joint venture, Leasing, Licensing and Management contracts (Figure 2.2).  
However, it is the type of privatisation that is adopted that determines the instrument to be 
used. The primary objective of port privatisation is to improve the efficiency and flexibility 
of doing port business. In any case, no matter the type of privatisation, the primary objective 
should be to substitute the less efficient, bureaucratic and often politicised operations in the 
public sector with more efficient port operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Array of Privatisation Options in the Port Industry 
Source: Adapted from Guasch (2004) 
―Concessions
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2.4.2 Concession agreement as an instrument of port privatisation 
A concession from an economic perspective is in the form of a public-private partnership 
arrangement, used to engage the private sector in the port business. Brooks and Pallis (2008) 
describe a concession contract as a legal instrument used to assign roles and responsibilities 
between the private and the public. Concession can be described as;  
 
―An arrangement whereby a private party – the concessionaire – leases assets from a public 
authority for a given, usually extended, period and has responsibility for new fixed 
investments during the period and for providing services associated with the assets. In return, 
the concessionaire receives specified revenues from the operation of the assets. At the end of 
the contracted period, the assets revert to the public sector or a new concession is awarded‖ 
(Aronietis, Monteiro, Van de Voorde, & Vanelslander, 2010, p. 3). 
 
In broad terms, a concession contract is a legal agreement in which the government grants a 
firm the right to provide services with significant market power. It allows the government to 
retain the ownership of portland and at the same time license operators, engage in 
construction activities and ensure that public interests are protected.  It also frees government 
from operational risks and financial burden Farrell (2012). It equally allows for competition 
between different operators within the port, for ports with considerable size. However, for 
small sized ports, concession as a means of introducing competition for the market in the 
absence of competition in the market may not be feasible. It is a widely used tool by port 
authorities to improve the fortunes of ports through the award of port services to private 
international terminal operators (ITOs) (Notteboom, 2007a; Pallis, Notteboom, & De Langen, 
2008). The attraction of the policy is that, through the contract award procedure, the port 
authorities can in principle retain some control over the organisation of the port and the 
structure of the supply side of the terminal market. At the same time, making sure that the 
portland resource is put to optimal use (Notteboom, Verhoeven, & Fontanet, 2010). 
 
 
Concessions are extensively used in the port sector and may include the rehabilitation or 
construction of infrastructure by the concessionaire. For example, the World Bank private 
participation infrastructural database published in WBPRTK, (2007), shows 299 port projects 
for the period 1990-2006. A breakdown of the number indicates that 151 were direct 
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concessions, 107 greenfield projects mostly land concessions, 23 management and lease 
contracts and 18 divestiture projects. In 2006 alone, there are 59 seaport projects, 40 of which 
were concessions. 
 
According to Notteboom (2006) and UNCTAD (1995a), concession contracts can be in the 
form of Build-Lease-Operate (BLO); Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT); Rehabilitate-Operate-
Transfer (ROT); Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (BROT) and Build-Operate-Share-
Transfer (BOST). Although long-term leases and operating licenses are most often regarded 
as a concession they are not the focus of this study. The different concessions can be 
classified into two categories, Brownfield and Greenfield projects (Farrell, 2012).  Greenfield 
concession contracts refer to agreements for newly built facilities, or port development at new 
locations. Brownfield project concessions involve either the rehabilitating of facilities already 
in operation, or the granting of expansion rights.  However, most national port concession 
programmes involve mixed structures i.e. the transfer of an existing operational terminal 
along with a commitment for building of a new Greenfield terminal by the operator. Mixed 
concessions can be found in the Frihamnen/Norvikudden terminals at Stockholm, the Rajiv 
Ghandi/Vallapadam terminals at Kochi, the Dakar/Port du Futur in Senegal, the 
Djibouti/Doraleh and the Tincan Island/Nigeria. Invariably, concession is not only the most 
applied privatisation instrument in the port industry; it is also the most capable of maximising 
the operational efficiency of ports with less friction between the PAs and the terminal 
operators. 
 
2.4.3 Justification for port privatisation 
Ports are complex organisations with responsibilities devolved to the port authority, 
government and the private sector. Arguments for public ownership of ports revolve around 
the natural monopoly attribute of ports. Hence, it is theoretically assumed that public 
ownership will deter ports from exploiting monopoly rents. Although there have been other 
motives adduced for public ownership of ports, such as: the inability of the private sector to 
undertake costly investments of a long term nature, the desire to prevent or perhaps create 
preferential treatment between different port users (for example, cheaper charges for exports), 
the need to put the activities of the ports in cycle with those of hinterlands; and national 
security and regional economic developments, are typically some of the arguments against 
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privatisation (Haarmeyer & Yorke, 1993; Tull & Reveley, 2002). However, there is no 
compelling empirical evidence to prove that efficiently run private ports will endanger these 
concerns.   
 
On the other hand, the privatisation of ports is implemented based on the objectives of the 
programme, and it is the potential for achieving the goals that provides the justification for 
the exercise. UNCTAD (1995a) outlined the general objectives of privatisation as:  
encouraging efficient port services, branching out port services and improving competition, 
minimising cost of port services streamlining processes and organisation, reduction of 
government financial and administrative burden and minimising of bureaucratic/political 
interference. The argument for port privatisation hinges on the perceived benefits that accrue 
to stakeholders (government, transport and terminal operators, shippers, exporters, importers 
and consumers) from the implementation of these objectives. It is derived from the widely 
held belief that the private sector is inherently more efficient than the public sector (Eyre, 
1990). 
  
Governments at national or state level embrace port privatisation, due to the perceived 
macroeconomic benefits: improvement in external trade competitiveness by reducing the cost 
of port services that impacts on overall transport cost. Reductions in the financial burden of 
governments (budgets) as part of port investment and the operating costs, are transferred to 
the private sector, thus raising revenue for the government through sale of port assets (asset 
divestiture). At the microeconomic level, the belief is that the discipline of the private sector 
will be brought to bear on the ports, culminating in improved operational efficiency 
(Haarmeyer & Yorke, 1993). 
 
From the transport and terminal operators‘ perspective the argument is that privatisation 
benefits them, as it leads to more cost-efficient port operation and services, resulting in 
effective use of transport assets and greater business opportunities. The shippers, exporters 
and importers benefit from privatisation through reduced costs that imply a lower cost of 
imported goods and intermediate products and enhanced competitiveness of exports. 
Moreover, for the consumers, privatisation means lower prices for goods and a broad access 
to a broad range of products from the improved access and increased competition between 
suppliers (WBPRTK, 2001). 
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It is in line with these benefits associated with privatisation that Tongzon and Heng (2005) 
suggested that, privatisation, even without a change in competition, leads to improved 
efficiency. As a result, many ports worldwide in the last three decades have reformed their 
ports through privatisation. 
 
 
2.5  Survey of Global Port Ownership, Privatisation and Administrative Structure 
United Kingdom 
There are three different types of ownership models in the UK port system. Some ports are 
either under private ownership or under municipal control, while others are managed by a 
trust. All of them are autonomous, self-financing, open to market forces and do not rely on 
government support or subsidy. There is no governmental or regulatory control over tariff 
policies and commercial strategies, although aggrieved users may appeal on policies that 
affect them adversely. The Government of the United Kingdom do not grant subsidies to 
ports, in contrast to other European ports. Ports are expected to set their charges to cover 
operational costs and also charge lump costs to include investment and maintenance. The UK 
pursues a hands-off, or non-interference policy, in terms of economic regulation (Baird & 
Valentine, 2006). The United Kingdom experience is the most advanced form of port sector 
privatisation worldwide. 
 
 
Several studies of the model criticised the model as falling below a market ideal (Baird, 1995; 
Saundry & Turnbull, 1997; Thomas, 1994). According to Baird (2000), the approach 
employed in devolving British ports posed a unique challenge, because prior to the sale of the 
ports, no market existed for the sale of portland. As a result, the author maintained that the 
base values used by the government to calculate the selling prices of the land were inadequate 
and suggested a regulator to prevent monopolistic tendencies by operators. On the other hand, 
Gilman (2003) argued that the new model shows that the UK government does not want to be 
involved in port management. Therefore in the UK, port regulation as distinct from port 
management, is almost non-existent. This experiment has been working well in Britain, 
though no other country has embraced the UK, or ―Anglo-Saxon‖ model of port 
management, as called by Suykens and Van de Voorde (1998). 
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Baird and Valentine (2006) were of the view that the privatisation model adopted by the UK 
has only improved total throughput by only 75%, as at 2003. Although some cargo segments 
have witnessed astronomical growth in throughput, for example containers, and RORO cargo 
have increased by fivefold after privatisation. In the same vein, the study of the performance 
of British ports by Liu (1995) shows that the privatisation of British ports did not improve the 
performance of the ports. It shows that the high degree of privatisation does not imply a high 
level of efficiency. This observation is supported by Tongzon and Heng (2005), that the 
relationship between privatisation and efficiency is not linear, rather it is a U-shaped 
relationship.   
 
     
United States of America 
The history of the evolution of the USA ports, as traced by Ircha (1995),  started from the 
private sector (as railroad ports) to the current status as public enterprises managed by local 
and regional administrative structures.  The administrative framework consists of both public 
and private organisations involved in port management at national, regional and local levels, 
each with differing priorities, requirements and procedures (Newman & Walder, 2003). 
Olson (1992) identified 10 different forms of ownership system used in the USA ports and 
concluded that this approach has led to intense competition among the USA ports. Ircha 
(2001), agreed, by asserting that the decentralised system has proven effective in promoting 
local economic interest. Ircha (2001) concluded that the introduction of port reform and 
privatisation in North America has improved the performance of the port industry. However, 
Brooks (2006) and Helling and Poister (2000) criticised the system for allowing unfair 
subsidies and creating an uneven playing field between ports, both locally and internationally. 
Furthermore, Helmick, Wakeman III, and Stewart (1996) concluded: ―subsidised competition 
may have created excess port capacity in the US. The US port system does not suffer from 
the ‗Bandwagon effect‘ . As it adopts methods that suit the constitution, because there is no 
universal system of port governance, each country should be allowed to develop a system 
appropriate for their environment. 
 
 
However, unlike many countries, there is no national port authority, rather authority is 
diffused throughout three levels of government; federal, state and local. It stems from the 
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federal character of the US constitution, that reserves powers for the national, and others 
strictly for the states (Sherman, 2000). Nowadays, several USA ports, especially the Anglo-
Saxon are applying the concession system. For example, Tacoma port in 2008, where 
concessions represent 75 percent of the total port revenue (Aronietis et al., 2010). The lack of 
a central port authority implies that in the USA unlike in other countries, the decision to 
privatise ports is not a national issue; rather it rests with the different authorities responsible 
for port administration. As a result, privatisation of ports has not taken root in the country. 
This portends negative consequences for the future competitiveness of the USA port industry. 
However, Khan (2013) is of the view that those ports that have embraced privatisation have 
shown significant improvement in performance. In the same vein, the study of the relative 
efficiency between privatised and publicly operated USA ports by Goulding (2005), revealed 
that the involvement of the private sector impacted positively on the efficiency and financial 
performance of USA ports.  
 
Hong Kong 
Port management in Hong Kong operates as a three-tiered hierarchy, (Cullinane & Song, 
2001, 2002; Song & Cullinane, 2006). At the top is the government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administration Region (HKSAR), which leases land to the terminal operators. The 
second tier is the Marine Department, which acts as a port authority and performs regulatory 
functions and strategic planning. To assist these two tiers is the Hong Kong Maritime 
Industry Council (MIC) and the Hong Kong Port Development Council (PDC). The two 
departments are created from the Port and Maritime Board and charged with the 
responsibility of promoting the territory‘s maritime and port industries. While the third tier 
consists of the four privately owned companies that own and operate all the container 
terminal facilities and perform all activities associated with the cargo handling. Hong Kong‘s 
public-private arrangement is being used as a model of private sector participation. Despite 
the fact that Hong Kong ports have a relatively small land mass compared to the volume of 
cargo it handles, Hong Kong is one of the world‘s biggest ports (Brooks, 2004). Though it is 
apparent from the Hong Kong example that private sector competition is associated with 
better asset utilisation, it does not confirm that the model is appropriate for all situations. 
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Singapore 
 
Prior to 1997 the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), was a public port authority under the 
government of Singapore, which owned facilities and operated the container terminal. On 1st. 
October, 1997 the PSA was corporatised. The corporatisation involved the transformation of 
the PSA from a government body, to one where government plays no role. It has a 
commercial objective and takes decisions on a commercial basis, like a private sector 
company. At the same time, it is an entirely owned government entity, because the 
government owned subsidiary Temasek Holdings (private) Ltd, holds 100% of the shares of 
the PSA corporation (Song & Cullinane, 2001). The corporatisation marks the separation of 
terminal operations from the functions of the port authority. The PSA Corporation is 
entrusted with terminal operations, while the Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) performs 
the statutory roles of the port authority. These changes in the administrative structure are 
necessitated by the need to enhance the commercial flexibility of the PSA Corporation to 
operate and invest more efficiently in the competitive environment of the emerging regional 
port market. In other words, it is the PSA strategy of going global (Juhel, 2001).  
  
 
In December 2003, the PSA Corporation was restructured again to operate only on 
Singapore‘s domestic container terminal. At the same time, this newly downsized entity 
became a 100% subsidiary of a new holding company, PSA International. It is still a 
government entity because Temasek Holdings owns 100% equity of the company (PSA 
International, 2003c). Earlier in 2003, the PSA Corporation‘s other business interests 
transferred to Hazeltree Holdings Pte Ltd, still a subsidiary of Temasek Holdings to allow 
PSA International to focus on its core competence of port development and terminal 
operations. Since then, PSA International operates over 17 terminals in 11 countries, 
including Singapore port. The Port of Singapore is a success story having maintained the 
number one position in global port rankings until 2011, when it was overtaking by the port of 
Shanghai, China and has remained in second place to date. Thus, a corporation turned around 
the fortunes of PSA, from a national port authority to an international company and a global 
player in the container market. It shows that corporatisation as a way of injecting private 
sector ideas into the port industry, can improve performance if well managed. 
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Australia 
Everett and Robinson (1998) were of the view that port reform commenced in Australia in 
the 1980s and prior to this period, ports were administered as state statutory authorities.  Dick 
and Robinson (1992) claimed that the port reforms did not get it right, because the 
government failed to alter the fundamental structure of port authorities, which discouraged 
innovation and initiative. The ports ownership approach in Australia is a mixed one, 
depending on the locale. While most opted for a corporate structure, the State of Victoria 
ports of Geelong and Portland were privatised, and the government of Western Australia 
opted for a commercial model (Everett, 2003). 
 
 
Everett (2003) observed that there was confusion in implementing Australia‘s corporatised 
model. While the ports are expected to perform as a private sector, the law allowed the 
Minister of transport to interfere in the day-to-day decision making. The ministerial 
intervention may lead to sub-optimal performance, or the non-realisation of commercial 
objectives, as a result of conflict between corporation laws and statutes establishing the 
entity. Thus, government ministers can exercise power over the activities of the corporation, 
whether or not they are in consonance with the goals and objectives of the organisation as 
suggested by the Matching Framework and the concept of fit (Brooks, 2004). In conclusion, 
Everett (2003) called for a legislative framework compatible with the port‘s appropriate 
corporate structure, for optimal performance.  
 
 
Everett and Robinson (1998) further observed that the Australian port reforms have 
challenges, such as: the government inability to remove non-core assets from ports, fund 
public service obligations outside of port budgets and control staffing.  Staff strength is 
always in excess of that necessary for core port activities. In these cases, they argued, the 
ownership of the port is not relevant to the performance outcome. Everett and Robinson, 
(1998) too noted that governments are not just seeking port efficiency, but also national 
competitiveness that has not materialised due to the confusion of practising different 
ownership models at the same time. 
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Argentina 
In Latin America, port reform was synonymous with the introduction of the private sector 
and the change of port operational structure from Service or Tool port model to the landlord 
model (Baird, 2002; Hoffmann, 2001). Argentina was among the first in this region to 
embrace private sector participation in its port system, through concessions (Serebrisky & 
Trujillo, 2005). These involved the liberation of all contractual arrangement with stevedoring 
companies, deregulation of pilotage and towage services and freedom to establish tariffs. As 
well as the abolition of the previous labour agreement and all other practices that discourage 
port productivity, by decree 817 of 1992, it set the tune for port reform in Argentina. The end 
of restrictions to entry into the sector increased competition, because it allowed operators to 
manage and operate ports in public or private sectors for commercial, industrial or 
recreational usages. The only condition attached was compliance with the standard 
supporting services requirements, such as customs, safety and environmental regulation 
(Ibid). 
 
The deregulation of port services was done in phases; firstly, antitrust laws were enacted to 
protect users against anti-competitive behaviour. Secondly, decentralisation; transfer of small 
ports to provinces with freedom of operation, concession or closing. Thirdly, the major ports 
(Santa Fe, Rosario, Buenos Aires, Quequen and Bahia Blanca), excluding Puerto Nuevo of 
Buenos Aires, were created. Also, an independent, autonomous company ‗Sociedades de 
Administacion Portuaria (SAP)‟ was established, for the maintenance of port‘s infrastructure 
and common user areas, including waterways and access area. 
 
 
The port of Buenos Aires was divided into two areas, with different functions and 
administrations. The area called Puerto Nuevo, located in the capital city Buenos Aires is 
under the national jurisdiction; the port was divided into six container terminals and 
concessioned to private operators to promote inter-terminal competition. While the area 
called Dock Sud was transferred to the province of Buenos Aires as a specialised port for 
liquid bulk (petrochemical).  The concession of Puerto Nuevo was followed by the 
construction of a new container terminal in the zone in 1995. The proximity of Dock Sud 
(only 50kms from Puerto Nuevo) created intra-port competition.The Dock Sud concession 
was granted by Buenos Aires province without competitive bidding for 30years (Estache & 
Carbajo, 1996; Serebrisky & Trujillo, 2005). 
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According to Estache and Carbajo (1996), the Argentine port reforms led to improved labour 
productivity involving reductions in port charges and other ship charges, of between 30 to 70 
percent for containers and 10 percent for other bulk cargo, in less than two years. The study 
of  the impact of Argentina‘s port reforms which focused on Puerto Nuevo of Buenos Aires 
by Serebrisky and Trujillo (2005), using standard partial indicators (labour productivity, 
capacity utilisation and quality of service), revealed steady improvement. On the other hand, 
the employment figures have significantly dropped, though there was a change in labour 
relations and decentralisation of workers' unions from the national level to the port level. 
Furthermore, it reduced government fiscal burden and eliminated all cross subsidies. In 
summary, although the performance of post-reform ports in Argentina has been very 
impressive, more needs to be done in the areas of institutional reforms. For example, sixteen 
years into the reforms the port of Puerto Nuevo still does not have an independent regulator 
(SAP) which impacts on monitoring port activities. 
 
2.5.1 Port ownership and administrative models in Africa 
2.5.1.1 Administrative models 
Most African ports lack autonomy, as administration is centralised with the direct 
involvement of the Ministry of Transport in the supervision of port services. Table 2.3 shows 
the near absence of a robust regulatory framework. The majority of the ports in this region 
are still regulated at the Ministry of Transport level and in one or two countries by the port 
authorities, except South Africa, which has an independent regulator. The issue is how a port 
authority can be an unbiased umpire, in a conflict in which it is one of the parties. The 
Landlord port model is dependent on broad institutional reforms and may function better in 
the presence of an independent regulator (Cullinane & Song, 2002; Trujillo & Nombela, 
1999). Furthermore, the concession of container terminals to the private sector, or 
independent terminal operators, is a partial step towards adopting the Landlord model. 
However, more needs to be done in the area of governance, if ports in the sub-region are to 
deliver efficient services of the type found in the developed world. 
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Table 2.3: Port management models and regulatory agencies in selected African countries  
Country Management Model Agency Responsible for Regulation 
Djibouti Management Concession Ministry of Transport 
Sudan Service port Sudan Seaport Corp. 
Kenya Service port Ministry of Information, Transport 
and Communication 
Tanzania Part landlord, part service port Tanzania ports authority 
Madagascar Part landlord, part service port NA 
Namibia Service port Namibian ports authority 
South Africa Service port Independent Regulator 
Angola Part landlord, part service port Ministry of Transport, Merchant 
Marine and Ports Division 
DR Congo Service port NA 
Congo 
Brazzaville 
Service port Port Autonome de Pointe Noire 
Cameroon Part landlord, part service port National ports authority 
Nigeria Landlord port Nigerian ports authority 
Benin Service port Ports Autonome de Cotonou 
Ghana Landlord port Ghana ports and harbour authority 
Cote d’Ivoire Part landlord, part service port The Autonomous Port of Abidjan 
Senegal Part landlord, part service port Director of Ports and the Interior 
Maritime Transport 
Cape Verde Service port NA 
  Source: Cameron (2008) 
2.5.1.2 Ownership Models 
African countries have been slow in embracing port privatisation compared to other regions 
of the World (AfDB, 2010). The prevalent model of port ownership is the service port 
(Comprehensive) model. Although Table 2.3 shows that most ports in Africa are tilting 
towards the Landlord model, like other parts of the world, the level of implementation is still 
in the infancy stage. In the majority of the countries, only container terminal activities have 
been concessioned. The other terminals are being operated by the port authorities, except 
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Nigeria, which, has achieved full concession (Trujillo, González, & Jiménez, 2013). The 
practice of public ownership is considerable in a number of African ports, whereby port 
infrastructure and superstructure, as well as operation, are still in the public domain. In terms 
of institutional reforms for port organisations, the globally preferred model is the Landlord 
model, but this is not the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.3). The retaining of the 
Service model by most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa implies that the public sector, with its 
attendant inefficiencies, is the manager and operator of ports in the region.  
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Figure 2.3: Different port Management Models in African Ports  
Source: Adapted from Ocean Shipping Consultants (2009) 
 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) report outlined several factors that have contributed 
to the smaller involvement of the private sector in African seaports. First, the small size of a 
vast number of the ports makes them commercially unattractive to investors. It is evident in 
the list of Top 50 World container ports in 2012, that Durban port in South Africa is the only 
African port in the list. It is ranked 50 on the list and handled 2.59 million TEUs (World 
Shipping Council, 2013). The second factor that deters private investment is the chaotic and 
volatile nature of the institutional and political environments pervading several African 
countries, which lead to commercial and political uncertainties. Thirdly, many ports operate 
in a monopolistic environment due to cumbersome cross-border procedures, which limit 
inter-port competition between neighbouring countries. For instance, most traders in 
Tanzania use Dar es Salaam port and shippers from Kenya use Mombasa only. It is different 
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to what is obtainable in Europe. Some of the cargoes meant for Germany, use Rotterdam in 
the Netherlands. Likewise much of the Norwegian cargo use Gothenburg in Sweden and 
Polish cargo transits mainly through Hamburg in Germany. In addition, there is stiff 
opposition to reform from trade unions and vested interests, the reason being that the private 
investment may reduce direct employment in the ports (AfDB, 2010). 
 
  
The primary motive that drives port reform in Sub-Saharan Africa and generates interest from 
the private sector, is port capacity and regional competition for transit and transhipment to 
neighbouring landlocked countries (UNCTAD, 2003). Plus, it is the raising of funds through 
the sale of port assets on the government‘s part. Reforms involving private sector 
participation in Africa is more intense in ports on the international shipping routes such as in 
Egypt and Moroccan ports as they have vast hinterlands and fierce regional competition 
(Trujillo et al., 2013). The characteristic of these regional gateways is high transit activity 
with a case in point being the port of Djibouti, where 75% of shipments presently are 
destined for Ethiopia. Ocean Shipping consultants (2008) and Kostianis (2004) have observed 
that ports in North Africa are rapidly reforming, with a few exceptions. Nevertheless there are 
still some hurdles to cross in terms of institutional and regulatory aspects. 
  
As previously observed, concessions have become the preferred method of privatisation in 
the port sector, rather than an outright sale of port infrastructure assets, and Africa is no 
exception. The World Bank AICD report (2008) and Trujillo et al. (2013) underscored the 
need to keep granting concessions as 90 of the top 100 ports follow the Landlord model, 
characterized by public-private partnership (Baird, 2002; Cullinane & Song, 2002). Many 
African port authorities have embraced this trend especially in the container port market 
(Trujillo et al., 2013)  . In Sub-Saharan Africa, 26 container terminal concessions have 
successfully being awarded in 24 countries with only one cancelled contract at the Mombasa 
container terminal (see Table 2.4). Foster (2008) is of the view that the concessions are 
yielding positive results in terms of productivity. Overall, the level of private sector 
participation in ports in Sub-Saharan Africa, based on the World Bank‘s Private Participation 
in Infrastructure (PPI) (2008) database, is 42 transactions affecting 26 ports in 19 countries. 
Most of them are concession contracts, the majority in Nigeria (Table 2.4).  A review of the 
concessions by Ocean Shipping consultants (2008) and Trujillo et al. (2013), revealed that the 
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concessions have been partial in many cases. The port authorities are reluctant to divest of 
operating assets, for example, the whole concessions in Mozambique and the Tema container 
terminal concession in Ghana. Most of the transactions are won by the leading names in the 
World in container terminal concession; APM Terminals, DP World and ICTSI. This 
scenario may create private monopolies and hinder the much-needed competition, which is 
one of the main reasons for concession. Despite this scenario, private sector involvement in 
the port industry is desirable.  The question is how best to introduce private participation in 
Sub-Saharan African ports to yield the maximum benefit (Ocean Shipping consultants, 2008; 
UNCTAD, 2003). This is so that Africa will benefit from the enhanced productivity, 
efficiency, cutting down on port costs and improved quality of service, like in other regions 
of the World.  
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Table 2.4: Private sector transactions in African countries  
Transaction Countries Ports NO. of 
Transactions 
No of Cancelled 
Transactions 
Management or 
Lease contract 
Cameroon, 
Kenya, 
Mozambique 
Douala, Mombasa, 
Maputo 
4 1 
Concession 
Contract 
Algeria, Angola, 
Comoros, 
Egypt, 
Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, 
Ghana, 
Madagascar, 
Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Sudan, 
Tanzania 
Luanda, 
Mutsamudu, Luba, 
Owendo, Tema, 
Toamasina, Beira, 
Maputo, 
Quelimane, Apapa, 
Calabar, Port 
Harcourt, 
Lilypond, Onne, 
Warri, Tin Can, 
Juba, Bejaya, 
Alexandria 
34 0 
Greenfield 
Projects  
Cote d‘Ivoire, 
Egypt, 
Equatorial 
Guinea, Ghana, 
Kenya, 
Mauritius, 
Morocco 
Abidjan, Luba, 
Tema, Mombasa, 
Free port, Sokhna, 
Suez canal, 
Tangier 
11 0 
Total   42 1 
Source: World Bank (2008) 
2.5.2 Port ownership and administrative model in Nigeria  
Under the 1999 constitution, Nigerian seaports are on the exclusive list that implies they are 
under the jurisdiction of the Federal (Central) Government. The NPA which oversees the 
ports is a statutory agency under the Federal Ministry of Transport (FMOT). It is charged 
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with the responsibility of regulating the shipping and navigational activities, port planning, 
development and construction, tariff determination, regulation of the private operations at the 
ports and the operation and management of port activities. Thus, Nigerian ports were 
administered as public ports because of the crucial role ports play in the country‘s economic 
development and to protect public safety and security  (Ndikom, 2004). However, with the 
commercialisation of the ports in 1992 and the Port Act of 1999, the NPA adopted the Tool 
port system of administration. 
 
 
Prior to 2006, all ports in Nigeria practised the Tool port model of port administration, except 
Onne port, that leaned towards the Landlord model. Under the Tool model, the Federal 
Government through the NPA provides the port infrastructure and superstructure, as well as 
cargo handling equipment, such as quay cranes and forklifts, which are operated by port 
authority staff.  However, cargo handling on board vessels, aprons and quays are the 
responsibility of cargo handling companies contracted by shipping agents, or other entities 
licensed by the port authority. As observed by the World Bank (2007a), the sharing of 
responsibility between the PAs and stevedoring companies creates operational problems and 
inefficiency in the Tool port model. Although private firms play some role in cargo handling 
in this model, they are not obliged by agreement to bring in new investments. Thus, pre-
concession Nigeria seaports were littered with a small number of private firms involved in 
cargo handling with a weak capital base and lacking innovation. It resulted in chronic 
underinvestment in the Nigerian port system. Therefore, the port system could no longer cope 
with the rapid global development in the shipping sector and regional competition from the 
Cotonou port in the Benin Republic as well as Lome in Togo, Tema port in Ghana and 
Douala port in Cameroun, due to infrastructural decay. In order to mitigate the general 
dissatisfaction with the Nigerian port system by stakeholders, a massive port reform was 
initiated from 2003-2005, which culminated in the adoption of the Landlord model of port 
administration and the handing over of terminal operations to the private sector in May 2006. 
  
 
The belief is that the adoption of the Landlord model will attract the much needed investment 
in the Nigerian port sector, as terminal operators are encouraged by the long-term contract 
between them and the Federal Government to invest. The reform programme includes the 
deregulation of port labour and privatisation of terminal operations. Thereafter, the terminal 
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operators took over the terminals in accordance with the terms of the concession agreement. 
Almost all cargo handling activities are under the jurisdiction of the terminal operators; 
however services such as pilotage, towage and warehousing are still being handled by the 
NPA. 
 
Furthermore, the NPA is still involved in operating some port businesses and although most 
of them have been transferred to the private sector, such roles have been criticised by Wu and 
Lin (2008). In other words, port authorities as regulators are also directly engaged in 
operating port activities, which is a contradiction, as they self-regulate their activities.  
 
2.5.2.1 Administrative structure of the NPA 
Figure 2.4 shows the current administrative structure of the NPA, 8 years into the 
implementation of the concession program that began in 2006. The managing director (MD) 
who is responsible for decision-making is appointed by the President on the advice of the 
Minister of FMOT and also the board members. The executive directors (ED) (Marine, 
Engineering, Finance & Admin) assist the MD with administrative affairs, port management 
and operation, and port construction and maintenance. In addition, the EDs are assisted by 
general managers (GM) that deal with the day to day running of the ports. The organisational 
structure of the NPA shows that the administration is top-heavy. For instance, the ED Marine 
is assisted by 5 GMs, the ED Engineering by 4 and ED Finance and Admin by 4. This 
massive number of high profile personnel is still being maintained by the NPA after 
relinquishing most of the operational responsibilities to the private sector. 
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Figure 2.4: Organisational structure of Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA)  
Source: NPA Website   
 
The administrative structure of the NPA resonates as a public enterprise structure and its 
accompanying shortcomings. The adverse effect of running the NPA as an agency under the 
FMOT, with the attendant political patronage, is evident in the rate of turnover of MDs of the 
authority after the concession program. As at July, 2012, 6 different Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) have been in control of the NPA after concession started in 2006. The running of port 
authorities as public enterprises has been criticised by  Chen (2009) in the study of Taiwanese 
port authorities. The study highlighted the irregularities due to government intervention, 
financial restrictions, bureaucracy and civil servants‘ attitudes towards institutional change. 
Goss (1999), questioned the rationale for the involvement of public authorities in ports, as 
they are not responsive to market forces and hence do not act commercially. For example, the 
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Nigerian ports authority is still an agency under the Federal Ministry of Transport as such 
lengthy procedures are still involved for the budget approvals. It impacts on the efficiency of 
responding to the needs and requests of customers. As such the Nigerian ports authority lacks 
the flexibility to respond to any changes in the market environment and the proactiveness 
required to ensure contestable markets. That is necessary to tame the anti-competitive 
behaviour of operators and ensure that the gains from the concession are transferred to the 
stakeholders. 
  
 
The present administrative structure still maintained by the NPA after the introduction of the 
Landlord model of port administration, poses a significant challenge to the success of the 
reform process. Since the Royal Haskoning BV of the Netherland, the concession adviser, 
observed prior to the concession that, the over-centralisation of the NPA administration is not 
suitable to run an efficient port it as is enmeshed in too much public sector bureaucracy and 
political interference (Palsson & Leigland, 2007). Therefore, it recommended the unbundling 
of the NPA into two autonomous port authorities, alongside the adoption of the Landlord 
model of port administration, as part of the concession programme. 
 
 
Eight years after the reforms took effect, Nigeria has not gone beyond the proposition stage.  
The two most important bills, the New Ports and Harbours and the Transport Commission 
Bills are not yet passed into law by the national assembly. The non-passage of these bills 
implies that the transfer of terminal operations to the private sector could be considered 
illegal, as the New Ports and Harbours Bill which redefined the duties of the NPA has not 
been passed into law. It constitutes a major challenge as observed by the terminal operators 
(Oghojafor et al., 2012).  
 
It is evident from the analysis of the different ownership and privatisation models that port 
ownership and administration differs from country to country. It is also obvious that no 
country concession its entire national ports at once. The trend shows that only container 
terminals in most of the countries are transferred to the private sector while the other cargo 
types remain in the public domain. It is also observed that the pace of privatisation is gradual, 
even the UK with the most advanced forms of port reform phased its privatisation process. 
Another observation is that the governance structure of ports differs and in most countries it 
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is devolved to state and local authorities. Again in some countries, for example, the Port of 
Singapore it is corporatisation that is being practised. No country still maintains public 
national port authorities after concession; rather responsibility is devolved to autonomous 
municipal, regional or provincial port authorities. However, the Nigerian port concession was 
regarded as the most ambitious and far-reaching concession that have taken place globally by 
Ocean Shipping consultants (2008), as the operations of the national ports were transferred to 
the private sector within a year. 
  
 
This review also shows that both corporatisation and privatisation as methods of injecting the 
private sector ideals into the ports can be successful, if well managed. For example, the Port 
of Hong Kong and Port of Singapore, with similar geographical and cultural backgrounds 
adopted opposite approaches to privatisation. While Hong Kong is private sector dominant, 
the Singapore port authority is corporatised and performs all the port operations. However, 
the two ports are among the top 5 efficient ports globally. Therefore, it is evident that the 
primary decision factor is that the port system should tally with the general system of 
government and the beliefs of the people, for an efficient port operation, not the type of 
privatisation per se. Liu (1995) argued that the concept of ―best port‖ that is applicable to all 
situations does not exist and therefore port organisations should not be treated as if they were 
mechanical, rather than social bodies. In conclusion, due to different port governance 
configurations, privatisation, though a universal concept, should be modelled to suit the 
socio-economic characteristics of each country. 
 
2.6 Port Reform in Nigeria  
The pre-1999 period when Nigeria‘s port system was under public ownership and operation, 
was marked by inefficient operations. In order to overcome the observed deficiency, Nigeria 
embarked on a number of reforms that culminated in the transfer of port operations to local 
and international terminal operators. Table 2.5 shows the timeline of the various development 
initiatives undertaken by the government to turn the fortunes of Nigerian ports around.  
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Table 2.5: Timeline of port reforms in Nigeria 
YEAR DEVELOPMENT 
1999 Creation of the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) and the Bureau of 
Public Enterprises (BPE) by Privatisation and Commercialisation Act No. 
28/1999. 
2000 Formation of the Transport Sector Reform Committee (TSRC) an arm of the 
NCP. 
2001 Commissioning of Ports Modernisation study project by the BPE with funds 
from the World Bank. 
2003 Contracting of third-party transaction advisors by the BPE to perform due 
diligence, prepare bidding documents and advise on negotiations. 
2004 Initiation of the first four bidding and negotiation rounds. 
2005 Effective date of the first concession. 
2006 Transfer of terminals from the NPA to concessionaires. 
Source: Adapted from Pallis (2012) 
Prior to 1999, the six major ports were under public ownership and operation, with the 
exception of Onne that practised the landlord model that is allowing private operations in the 
terminals. The pre-1999 Nigeria port was characterised by poor performance compared to 
other West African ports. The port system was characterised by an over bloated workforce, 
corrupt practices, insecurity of cargo, underinvestment, limited integration with inland 
transport and excessive charges  (Mohiuddin & Jones, 2006). In addition, there were serious 
ship delays, cumbersome and bureaucratic clearing procedures and limited storage space. In 
order to decongest the ports, ships bound for Lagos ports were diverted to the Eastern ports of 
Port Harcourt, Calabar and Warri and even to other neighbouring West African countries‘ 
ports. It did not go down well with the local and international shipping community and other 
stakeholders in the ports. It resulted in steady agitation to change the status quo and this led 
the government to a drastic decision to reform the port system. 
 
The government sought clear-cut objectives that could improve service delivery in the ports. 
The processes employed to achieve improved delivery included: a) enhancing management 
capabilities, b) creating a competitive institutional, legal and regulatory framework, c) 
developing private participation in financing, management and operations of port facilities, d) 
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achieve operating targets, including decreased costs to users, faster cargo clearance and 
vessel turnaround and e) reduce pressure on government finances (Pallis, 2012). 
 
The reform involved series of activities. Firstly, the Nigerian Ports Act was enacted in 1999, 
to further strengthen and streamline the activities of the ports. The Act retained the NPA as a 
public entity, but granted it power to unbundle some aspects of its activities and pass them to 
the private sector, to provide through agreements. As a result of the new powers bestowed on 
the NPA by s.8 (1) (l)2 of the 1999 Act, it leased out some terminals and engaged the private 
sector in industrial activities, stevedoring and warehousing. Thus, the NPA remained as a 
parastatal under the Federal Ministry of Transport (FMOT). However, the new 
responsibilities overwhelmed the NPA and due to poor management and infrastructural and 
institutional deficiencies, it could not perform these activities efficiently. The inadequacies of 
the NPA were evident from the damning report of PORTCON, 2003, that reviewed cargo 
handling procedures in the ports of Apapa, Tin Can Island, Port Harcourt and Onne ports. 
The report revealed that the activities at various ports, with the exception of Onne, were 
failing to facilitate trade efficiently. The exoneration of Onne, the only port that was then 
under private operation, from poor performance, set the tune for the experimentation of other 
reform alternatives. 
  
Secondly, the concession of the ports, which is hinged on Public-Private Sector Partnership 
(PPP), where the private sector is in-charge of operations, while the ownership of portland 
and regulations are retained by the public. The restructuring and reform of Nigerian ports 
were consistent with the Government‘s overall economic objective of invigorating private 
sector participation in the economy. Thus, the port reform policy was rooted in the 
disengagement of the public sector in the operation of ports and constraining it to regulation 
and provision of an enabling environment for the private sector economic growth to flourish.  
The port reform policy is crafted to achieve the following objectives:  
• To increase the efficiency of port operations 
• To decrease the cost of port services 
                                                     
2
 s.8(1)(l) in the1999 Act to, ‗enter into agreement with any person for the operation or provision of any of the port facilities 
which may be provided by the Authority‘ 
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• To decrease the flow of funds from limited Government resources 
• To boost economic activity and accelerate development 
• To make Nigeria the hub for international freight and trade in West and Central Africa 
 
 
2.6.1 The concession structure 
Section 36 of the Infrastructure Concession and Regulatory Commission Act (ICRCA) of 
2005 defines the basic principle of public service infrastructure concession in Nigeria. 
However, for ports, section 168 of the draft Ports and Harbour Authorities Bill defines a 
general framework for the concessions, the operations and the contractual obligations of 
parties. The Bill provides for international competitive bidding as a means of selecting 
terminal operators for available concessions. Private companies are allowed to bid for 
concessions that involve terminal operations, cargo handling, warehousing and delivery. It 
also provides for the delineation of the ports into terminals to encourage intra-port 
competition. In other words, it provided for the carving out of several terminals handling 
similar cargo in order to create a competitive environment.     
 
 It also empowers the NPA to transfer operating rights in Nigerian ports to the private sector 
while still retaining ownership of portland. The arrangement confers Landlord status on the 
NPA and in addition empowers it to license operators and regulate their activities. Many 
ports in both developed and developing countries have adopted the concession arrangement 
for their ports, such as the Argentina Port Authority, the Antwerp Port Authority (Belgium), 
the Brazilian Ports Authority, the Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority and the Ports Authority 
of Chile.  
     
A new institutional structure to provide the operational basis for the Landlord model and 
concession programme has been devised. Under this new structure, two new autonomous port 
authorities, namely Lagos and Port Harcourt, are to be created (NPA Brand Manual, 2005). 
The autonomous authorities will have a number of functions, including:  Ensuring safe and expedient access for ships within the port limits  Concession and licensing of private operators to provide cargo handling and marine 
services  Collecting port authority tariffs 
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 Acting as a landlord on behalf of the Federal Government  Planning and developing the port infrastructure, including acquisition of new land for 
port use where required  Facilitating the financing and construction of new port infrastructure through build-
operate-transfer (BOT) arrangements 
 
It is envisaged that after the implementation of the reform process, the NPA will be wound 
up, and the functions will be undertaken by the Transport Services Commission, to act as an 
independent regulatory body. The port regulator will be responsible for providing economic 
regulation of the ports, including rates charged by private operators and autonomous port 
authorities. As well as ensuring equal access to port facilities, adjudicating disputes, ensuring 
competition and compiling and publishing a statistical review. 
 
The role of the lead department, the Federal Ministry of Transport, has also been revised as 
part of the reform process. The new functions of the Ministry are as follows:  
• Establishing national port and maritime policy 
• Initiating port and maritime related legislation 
• Planning for adequate port capacity and inland multimodal transport 
• Reporting on port performance and contributing to the National Transport Plan 
• Liaising with state authorities as necessary 
• Representing Nigeria in international bodies 
• Playing a role in choosing federal-appointed directors of the port authorities, with the 
approval of the President. 
 
 
The role of the unbundled NPA, under the Landlord port model, entails performing only 
landlord and regulatory functions, while the private operators are responsible for all 
operational activities in the ports. These include cargo handling, stevedoring, warehousing 
and delivery, as well as towage, mooring, bunkering supplies and ship repairs. In this regard, 
the terminal operators will have contracts with the shipping lines without interference from 
the landlord. Each autonomous port authority will determine the tariffs for marine services 
and the use of the harbour. However, the tariffs for cargo handling are set by the terminal 
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operators in a free and competitive setting. The original concession sets the initial maximum 
tariff chargeable by the concessionaires (Pallis, 2012). 
 
   
The terminal operators will be responsible for the safety, security, liability and insurance in 
their areas of the concession. They will also be responsible for investments and maintenance 
of superstructure, equipment and vessels. Under the BOT arrangement, the superstructure and 
equipment will be transferred to the Government after the agreed number of years. In this 
way, concessioning not only enables terminal operators to provide terminal services to 
carriers, importers and exporters, but also to invest in the infrastructure development of the 
ports. The responsibility for the provision of nautical services, such as channel conservancy, 
pilotage, stowage, pollution control and general access management is vested in the NPA and 
not the concessionaires. The NPA may decide to privatise these activities outright, or go into 
a joint venture with the private sector for their provision. Part of the NPA restructuring 
involves the transfer of core assets to the new autonomous port authorities and sale of non-
core assets. 
 
 
2.6.2 The concession process 
The appointment of CPCS Transcom as the consultants to advise to the handling of the 
concession programme set in motion the Nigerian seaports concession process. The Bureau 
of Public Enterprises (BPE) called for expression of interest (EOI), by placing advertisements 
in both local and international media on 5th December, 2003. The submission deadline for the 
EOIs was 20th February, 2004. 110 EOIs were received; 94 scaled through the pre-
qualification stage. Successful applicants placed bids on individual concessions of interest 
from the 24 separate concessions, delineated from 10 seaports. The ports were grouped into 
four based on the time of concession. The concession involved series of rounds, which 
commenced from the first quarter of 2004 and ended in the third quarter of 2005 (NPA Brand 
Manual, 2005). 
   
Round one consisted of twenty-six bids which commenced on 24th September, 2005 and 
covered the Apapa container terminal and the Apapa break-bulk terminals C & D. The bids 
were opened in January 2005 and technical evaluation followed in February 2005. Financial 
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proposals were called for, for bids that scaled through the technical assessment. Afterwards, 
the financial proposals were opened, and the organisations with the highest financial bids 
were declared winners. Bids for round two started in January 2005, from the prequalified 
bidders for Port Harcourt terminals A and B. By February 2005, calls for financial and 
technical bids were sent out and the bids were opened in April 2005. The competitive bidding 
for round three, which comprised of the Tin Can Island terminals bulk and break A, B & C, 
the Ro-Ro terminal and the Lily Pond inland container depot (ICD), started in June 2005 and 
was concluded in August 2005.  Lastly, the round four concessions which consisted of 
Calabar Old port, Warri (old and new port) and Koko port commenced on September 2005 
and were concluded in January 2006. 
 
However, some concessions were negotiated rather than open bids (Table 2.6). Negotiations 
were applied only to existing tenants in the ports that were invited to enter into a new 
concession agreement based on the new reform programme. If new agreements were not 
reached with existing tenants through negotiations, the bids were opened to other bidders in 
respect of those terminals. The ten terminals that were opened for negotiation includes: the 
Apapa break bulk terminals E, A and B, the Kirikiri phase 1and 2, the Onne Federal Lighter 
(FLT) terminals A and B, the Onne Federal Ocean terminals (FOT) A and B and Calabar new 
port (Kieran, 2005).     
  
2.6.3 Implementation of the concession programme 
The post-bidding negotiations with the highest bidders followed international standards of 
transparency and fair competition (NPA, 2005). The various agreements were sent to the 
President for approval. Afterwards, the NPA and the BPE confirmed the compliance of the 
agreement with the overall strategy as the ―confirming party‖, thereafter the understanding 
was conveyed, and the contract signed between the NPA and the private investors. 
 
Although the nitty-gritty of each agreement remains confidential, some of the general issues 
covered in the agreements were discussed in order to boost the commitment and confidence 
of the signing parties, other stakeholders and the public at large. One of the general issues 
discussed was project lifespan, which is usually found in most concession agreements (Pallis, 
2012; Pallis et al., 2008). Others include clear-cut definition of transition terms, execution 
dates and conditions. Likewise, general implementation issues i.e. obligations to finance 
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operations and submitted development plan execution, maintenance obligations, provision of 
utilities, safety and security requirements plus environmental issues. Additionally, worthy of 
discussion were general performance standards and requirements i.e. development plans and 
marketing plans to promote cargo throughput. As well as other cargo-related business to 
achieve maximum utilisation and quality of service conditions for tracking and evaluation of 
performance. In other words, the rights of the NPA to monitor and inspect; obligations of 
operators to submit reports on planning and investment, volumes of traffic and number of 
vessels. This is a means of clarifying the risk sharing assumed between the investor and the 
Government. 
 
Agreement was reached on three central issues of utmost importance, because they are fertile 
grounds for potential conflicts. First is pricing of operations; the maximum cargo dues 
chargeable for each cargo was provided for and for a transparent, non-discriminatory pricing 
policy. It includes publication of rates, announcement of any preferential rates and 
transparent handling of complaints. Additionally, agreed upon was the setting up of a pre-
defined free storage time for the different types of cargoes, (import/export, in transit to 
neighbouring countries, or transhipment) before charging the demurrage. 
 
The second is labour issues. To ensure a hitch-free transfer the government terminated all the 
stevedoring contracts and requested all stevedores to vacate the port premises before the 
effective handover date for each new operator. In addition, the NPA revised restrictive labour 
practices that may constitute a hindrance to hiring of personnel by the terminal operators, 
giving the investors room to organise their terminal management and operations. Labour 
reform was crucial to the success of the concession programme and needed to be carried out 
expeditiously to demonstrate political commitment. The downsizing of the workforce by 75% 
is one of the contentious issues because the NPA is highly unionised and overstaffed. The 
Government initial plan to give the terminal operators the power to ―hire and fire‖ was 
strongly resisted by the unions and was reversed through dialogue. Afterwards, a 
multidisciplinary committee, comprising of Ministries of Transport, Finance and Labour, the 
NPA and the representatives of the trade unions was set upt o handle the downsizing of the 
workforce and to avoid exacerbating the already charged work environment. Furthermore, 
experts were involved in the negotiations via an unofficial group of international peers, for 
agreement on a voluntary scheme. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) also 
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participated in the discussions and recommended structures for the agreement. Terminal 
operators were also not left out as they mounted pressure for a deal with the unions and the 
development of a dockworkers minimum standard agreement. At the end of the negotiations, 
an agreement was reached for $110,000 for the voluntary scheme. The severance package 
cost the Government US$ 400 million to downsize the ports‘ workforce from 14,000 to 4,000 
staff (Borha, 2010). 
  
The practice today is that concessionaires are allowed to employ their workers. However, 
they are bound to give details of employment policies (organogram and expected staff 
strength of the terminal), training schemes and the job opportunities for host communities. 
They are also allowed to employ expatriates (Non-Nigerians) in management positions, if 
reasonable efforts to employ a Nigerian yielded no eligible candidate. It has helped 
international operators to bring in their management staff, with prerequisite experience in 
their other operations outside the country (Pallis, 2012). 
  
The third issue is Lease fees; another important point that is necessary to gain entry into the 
market is that operators must agree to a commencement fee. It is a fixed amount payable 
annually for each operating year and a throughput fee (Pallis et al., 2008). An addendum to 
the third issue is the submission of a performance bond. Terminal operators are under an 
obligation to submit an unconditional and irrevocable bond, guaranteeing full and timely 
compliance to performance obligations. 
  
In addition, the terminal operators are required to submit detailed development plans for their 
various terminals, showing the scheduling of investments in infrastructure, equipment, tug 
boats and barges. Likewise, the plans for land use allocation and provision of any dedicated 
areas i.e. for oil related cargoes vs general and containerised cargo handling, or stacking areas 
and warehouses primarily dedicated to companies. Additionally, there is provision for mutual 
consultation in case of disputes, with the assistance of experts and international arbitration in 
London or any other place mutually agreed by the signing parties to disputes that need 
arbitration. 
 
The NPA retains the responsibility for harbour services. It includes the maintenance of the 
berths, canals, breakwaters and navigation aids, the timely and efficient provision of maritime 
63 
 
services i.e. pilotage, towage and channel dredging.  These services could be provided 
directly by the NPA, or licensed competent operators, who will compete to provide these 
services in such a way that guarantees efficient performance of the operations. 
 
In terms of tariff structure, in several instances the maximum tariffs chargeable are set in the 
concession agreement, but competition was endorsed as the primary tool for ensuring 
reasonable tariffs (Notteboom, Verhoeven, & Fontanet, 2012; Pallis, 2012; Pallis et al., 
2008). However, the NPA is responsible for determining the tariffs for marine services and 
the use of the harbour according to the recommendation. 
   
The winners of the different concessions (Table 2.6) entered into an agreement with the NPA 
(representing the Government), to operate the terminals allocated in line with the conditions 
of their contracts. The operations of the Nigerian ports have been the responsibility of the 
concessionaires since the handover date.  
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Table 2.6: Concession transactions and handover dates 
S/N Transactions Terminal Operators Local/Foreign Participation Name of Port Concession 
Rounds 
Concession 
Duration 
in years 
Bid 
Amount 
(NPV@10
% Discount 
rate) Value 
in US$ 
million 
Handover 
Date 
1 Apapa Container 
Terminal 
A.P. Moller Terminal 
Ltd. 
APM Terminals as Lead with 
Local participation 
Container 
Terminal Apapa 
Round 1 25 1061.14 3rd April, 
2006 
2 Apapa Terminal A Apapa Bulk Terminal 
Ltd. 
Local lead with Atlantic Bulk 
Carriers Mgt. from Greece as 
Technical Partners 
Apapa,  Lagos Direct 
Negotiation 
25 18.10 3rd April, 
2006 
3 Apapa Terminal B Apapa Bulk Terminal 
Ltd. 
Apapa Direct 
Negotiation 
25 12.07 3rd April, 
2006 
4 Apapa Terminal C ENL Consortium Ltd. Local lead with Dublin Port 
Company and ICIL from 
Ireland and Civil & Coastal 
from South Africa 
Apapa Lagos Round 1 10 13.58 3rd April, 
2006 
5 Apapa Terminal D ENL Consortium Ltd. Apapa Lagos Round 1 10 12.25 3rd April, 
2006 
6 Apapa Terminal E Greenview  Dev. Nigeria 
Ltd. 
Local Dangote Group Apapa Lagos Direct 
Negotiation 
25 25.07 3rd April, 
2006 
7 Port Harcourt A Ports & Terminal Local Lead with P&O Port Harcourt Round 2 15 90.81 23rd June, 
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Operators Nig. Ltd. Nedlloyd 2006 
8 Port Harcourt B BUA International Ltd. Local Lead with Apec 
Antwerp Port Consultants 
Port Harcourt Round 2 20 12.36 23rd June, 
2006 
9 Tin Can Island Port A Josepdam & Sons Ltd. Local Lead with Techserve 
and South Africa Sugar 
Company 
Tin Can Island  Round 3 10 14.05 10th May, 
2006 
10 Tin Can Island Port B Tin Can Island Container 
Terminal Ltd. 
Bollore Group as Lead with 
Zim Integrated Shipping 
Services and Local 
participation  
Tin Can Island Round 3 15 83.31 10th May, 
2006 
11 Tin Can Island Port C Port & Cargo Handling 
Services Ltd. 
Local firms as lead with 
Bremen ports  
Tin Can Island Round 3 10 104.42 10th May, 
2006 
12 Tin Can Island Port 
RORO 
Five Star Logistics Ltd. Local Lead with Eurogate Int. 
and MSC 
Tin Can Island Round 3 15 86.63 10th May, 
2006 
13 Lilypond ICD A.P. Moller APM Terminals as Lead with 
Local Participation 
Lagos port 
Complex 
Round 3 10 9.65 3rd April, 
2006 
14 Onne FLT A Brawal Nig Ltd Local Group Onne Direct 
Negotiation 
25 16.66 21st June, 
2006 
15 Onne FLT B Intels Nigeria Ltd. Local Group with 
International Partners 
Onne Direct 
Negotiation 
25 29.06 21st June, 
2006 
16 Onne FOT A Intels Nigeria Ltd. Local Group with Onne Direct 25 38.13 21st June, 
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International Partners Negotiation 2006 
17 Calabar Old Port  Addax Ltd International company with 
Local base 
Calabar Direct 
Negotiation 
25 2.01 26th May, 
2007 
18 Calabar New A Intels Nigeria Ltd.  Local Group with 
International Partners 
Calabar Direct 
Negotiation 
25 2.51 23rd June, 
2006 
19 Calabar New B Ecomarine Ltd West African Group Calabar Round 4 10 30.03 1st August, 
2007 
20 Warri Old A Intels Nigeria Ltd. Local Group with 
International Partners 
Warri Direct 
Negotiation 
25 2.55 23rd June, 
2006 
21 Warri Old B Associate Maritime 
Services 
Local Group with 
International Partners 
Warri Round 4 10 1.90 12th June, 
2007 
22 Warri Old C Julius Berger Nigeria 
Ltd. 
Local Sub. Of an Int. firm 
with Bremen Ports 
Warri Direct 
Negotiation 
25 5.50 4th May, 
2007 
23 Warri New A Global Infrastructure 
Limited 
An Indian Group based in UK Warri Direct 
Negotiation 
25 2.00 Negotiating 
24 Warri New B Intels Nigeria Ltd. Local Group with 
International Partners 
Warri Direct 
Negotiation 
25 6.60 23rd June, 
2006 
25 Koko Port Greenleigh Limited Local Group with 
International Partners 
Koko Round 4 10 2.90 12th June, 
2007 
Source: (BPE, 2006) 
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Therefore, to support this volume of trade, the Nigerian government through the NPA 
engaged the private sector; through concession contracts to improve efficiency in seaport 
operations and to ensure that port services are internationally competitive. As seaports are a 
vital link in the overall supply chain, seaport efficiency contributes to a country‘s overall 
competitiveness (Jiang & Li, 2009). Thus, monitoring and comparing ports against one 
another, or at different periods, to see the effect of reform programme in terms of productive 
efficiency, has become an important strand of a country‘s macroeconomic reform. Hence, the 
purpose of this research to evaluate the operational performance of Nigerian seaports after a 
major reform programme. This involves understanding if the ports are on the path of 
efficiency and to identify the operators that are making efficient use of the resources allocated 
to them. Also, to examine other factors that affects the performance of the ports. This 
research concentrates on evaluating pre- and post-concession technical and scale efficiencies 
and the identification of efficiency sources to determine the influence of change of ownership 
on operational efficiency. For ports, the study concentrates on identifying the datum 
performers (benchmarks).  
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2.7 Perception of Port Users to the Concession Programme 
The object of this section is to assess the perception of port users to the concession 
programme, to determine their level of satisfaction with the implementation process. The 
implementation of the concession has elicited a barrage of opinions and criticism from port 
users, civil society, workers unions and policy makers, as evident from so many newspaper 
articles on the subject (Appendix 1.2). In order to obtain a hands-on view, the research sought 
the opinion of players in the industry through interviews. The perception of users illustrates 
whether the expectations from the programme have been met. If the perception of the actual 
services delivered by the private sector (terminal operators) falls short of expectation, port 
users will shift patronage to neighbouring ports, negating the purpose of the concession.  The 
port users‘ views were solicited from the representatives of the various pressure groups that 
operate at the port. The chairmen of ANCLA, NAGAFF and CMDLCA were interviewed as 
representatives of freight forwarders. While the executive vice chairman of ENL, who 
doubles as chairman of STOAN, chairman of PTML and APMT operations, represents 
STOAN, and the general manager public affairs of NPA was interviewed for the opinion of 
the landlord. Finally, a representative from ISAN was included for the perspective of the 
shipping lines, and a representative of the maritime union was interviewed for the views of 
port workers. A checklist of ten questions was used as a guide for the semi-structured 
interview which was crafted based on the objectives of the concession. 
 
Table 2.7 shows the analysis of the interview responses. The analysis shows that from the 
perspective of port users and terminal operators, the implementation of the concession is on 
average moderately successful. The various stakeholders operating in ports are of the opinion 
that both the government and the terminal operators have reneged in fulfilling some parts of 
the agreement. It has resulted in the increase in port charges that has spiralled into the 
economy to the high cost of consumer goods. The stakeholders were unanimous in calling for 
an independent regulator if the gains of the concession programme are to be harnessed in the 
medium to long term.  
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 Table 2.7: Level of compliance to concession objectives from the port users' perspective 
Issues Success Comments 
Compliance with  Concession 
Agreement 
    Both the NPA and terminal operators accuse each 
other of complacency in keeping to the contract 
terms. The NPA has reneged on providing and 
maintaining common user facilities: access roads 
to the port and reactivating the rail lines for easy 
evacuation of cargo. Terminal operators have not 
brought the required investment in facilities 
(cargo handling equipment) as provided for in the 
agreement.  
Achievement of Concession 
Objectives 
     Moderate improvements in terms of cargo 
throughput and ship turnaround time. However, 
the cost of doing business in Nigerian ports has 
increased instead of reducing. As a result, 25% of 
imported goods still come into Nigeria through 
ports of neighbouring countries. In terms of 
investment in modern equipments and terminal 
equipment, the level of compliance by the 
terminals is below 40%. Although some operators 
have invested more than the others especially 
ABTL, PTML and APMT. Lack of clarity in the 
interpretation of objectives creates conflicts 
between the NPA and terminal operators, 
meddlesomeness from the FMOT, which may 
have discouraged proper intervention.   
Fair Distribution of Benefits 
from Privatisation 
      Lack of the institutional framework to ensure that 
gains accruable to a well-implemented concession 
trickle-down to stakeholders. All the actors in the 
port were unanimous in calling for an 
independent regulator. They believe that the NPA 
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as presently constituted, lacks the requisite skills 
in dispute and crisis management as it intends to 
avoid issues relating to equity and subjective 
judgement.  
Compliance with Government 
Policy 
 The Government is yet to implement the 
regulations on a 24-hour cargo clearing policy. 
As importers fail to genuinely make honest 
declarations leading to 100% physical 
examination of imports. The Government 
directive to reduce the number of agents involved 
in cargo clearing from 14 to 7 is yet to be 
implemented. The NPA is not an independent 
regulator, but rather under the FMOT, which 
exerts tremendous political pressure on the 
organisation which impinges on its ability to 
discharge its role to the cargo community. 
Protection Against Abuse of 
Monopoly Power 
    The inability of the National assembly to pass the 
relevant laws 6 years after concession, coupled 
with the unwillingness of the FMOT to set up an 
independent regulator means operators are not 
protected. In other words, the government 
insisting on the NPA as a quasi regulator means 
there is no institution to address issues of anti-
competitive behaviour. As the NPA lacks the 
requisite skills to handle complaints involving 
operators and port users, this has led to frictions 
between the various stakeholders in the port.    
Protection of the Investor from 
Government Interference 
    The Concession agreement has clauses that deter 
government interference embedded in it. 
Therefore, there are few instances of regulatory 
intervention to protect investors. 
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Increased Competition 
     No inter-port competition because the NPA is yet 
to be unbundled. There is evidence of entrants 
into the Nigerian port industry by way of 
Greenfield projects. The construction of a deep 
seaport at Lekki, Lagos is a public-private-
partnership (PPP), between the Federal 
Government of Nigeria (FGN), the Lagos State 
Government (LSG) and the Tolaram group in 
Singapore. It is projected to be delivered by 2017. 
There is a bigger seaport being planned for 
Badagry, Lagos, another PPP between AP Moller, 
FGN and LSG.    
Creation of Efficient Markets 
     Focus has been on intra-port, rather than inter-
port competition. Action has just begun to create 
a level playing field for ports privatised on 
different terms. 
Replication of the Outcomes 
that would Result from 
Competition 
     No action towards this area because it seems too 
technically and/or beyond the NPA‘s 
responsibility.  
Cost Effective Provision of 
Non-commercial Services 
     The provision of non-commercial services has 
remained an NPA responsibility, with no 
requirement for competitive outsourcing. 
Terminal Operators 
Performance 
    The views of the NPA and freight forwarders, 
that some are performing well in terms of service 
delivery, ethical considerations and are customer-
oriented. PTML was particular singled out by 
port users while others are performing below 
average. 
Note:   (a)    most successful,    moderately successful,  and least successful 
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2.8 Determinants of Port Operational Performance 
There are conflicting views among authors on why ports outperform one another. The United 
Nations Conferences on Trade and Development published a monograph in 1976 and another 
in 1987 dedicated to indicators of port performance. The document provided several 
indicators of operational and financial performance. The authors of the UNCTAD monograph 
were of the view that the performance of a port cannot be determined on the basis of a single 
value or measure (UNCTAD, 1976, 1987). According to the authors, indicators of a port‘s 
operational performance should cover areas relating to the duration of a ship‘s stay in port as 
well as the quality of cargo handling and the quality of services to inland vehicles that call at 
the port. The implication of port performance having a multivariable behaviour entails the use 
of many operational indicators simultaneously. These include; the number of ship calls and 
amount of cargo handled per year as well as financial performance indicators of the Port 
Authorities (PAs).  
 
There is evidence in the literature of studies that have applied several of these indicators to 
evaluate port performance. Some of these key indicators include; total throughput in tonnes 
or TEU (Twenty-foot equivalent unit) and the frequency of ship calls aggregated by cargo 
type. That is RORO, containerised cargo, break bulk, dry bulk and liquid bulk. Many authors 
have used only absolute value of total throughput as the output variable in performance 
analysis (Garcia-Alonso & Martin-Bofarull, 2007; Herrera & Pang, 2005; Park & De, 2004; 
Trujillo & Tovar, 2007). These are the regular indicators that appear in port websites, annual 
reports, container international yearbooks and other trade journals. The indicators capture 
only controllable variables under the PAs' control. As a result, they are referred to as partial 
indicators; although they were the only indicators considered by early studies on the subject, 
as comparisons between ports were mainly endogenous. However, with globalisation and the 
viewing of ports as a node in the global logistics network, external variables begin to appear 
in port performance and competitiveness evaluations. The other factors that have been used 
by other authors include; geographical location of the port, port size, investment in 
infrastructure, port specialisation, efficiency, competitiveness and ownership (Caldeirinha, 
Felício, & Coelho, 2009; Tongzon, 2002). Additionally, other factors such as port handling 
charges, waiting times and direct-call by liners are among the indicators highlighted by 
Tongzon (2002) as influencing port performance. 
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  Geographical location  
The geographical location of the port has been suggested by Liu (1995) and Tongzon (1995) 
as a factor in port choice, efficiency, throughput and competitiveness. This factor is quite 
significant, as ports are often located close to centres of economic activity, except possibly 
ports dedicated solely for transhipment. According to Song and Yeo (2004), there is a strong 
relationship between the volume of cargo a port handles and its geographical location. 
Likewise, Caldeirinha et al. (2009) were of the view that it is the primary decision variable 
for the choice of Bangkok as a port of call for shipping lines. Location has become vital 
because the demand for port services is driven by the traffic generation and consumption 
volumes of the region (Cheon, 2007a; Tongzon, 2002). In other words, the proximity of the 
port to small economies impacts negatively on throughput and by extension its performance. 
While the location of a port in the proximity of developed regions influences the level of 
infrastructure, equipment and accessibility, thereby improving performance. 
 
Port size  
A key variable that is put into consideration in determining performance is port size as the 
port sector seems to be affected by agglomeration economics and economics of scale 
requiring high initial investments. In the literature there has been evidence suggesting that 
port size influences the operational performance of ports (Liu, 1995; Wiegmans, 2003). 
However, there are disagreements among authors as to the direction of this influence. 
Furthermore, port size is considered an indicator of port performance, as there is evidence 
from studies to show that productivity increases with port size. After all, that is the main 
reason suggested by Neufville and Tsunokawa (1981) for concentrating investment in larger 
ports, than in smaller ones. In support, other authors affirmed that the learning curve effect 
experienced by larger ports leads to improved performance (González & Trujillo, 2009; 
Trujillo & Estache, 2005; Turner, Windle, & Dresner, 2004). Furthermore, Herrera and Pang 
(2005), argued that the size is an instrumental variable to efficiency. On the other hand, 
Barros and Peypoch (2007), were of the view that environmental factors, such as location and 
regional concentration, as well as economies of scale and scope, can lead ports to operate 
below their capacity as the infrastructure is used as a proxy for size during operationalisation. 
This position is affirmed by Cullinane, Song, and Wang (2004), who argued that it is an 
increase in a competitive environment, rather than size, that influences efficiency. 
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Port Specialisation 
The specialisation rate refers to the weight of cargo, or the rate of traffic attracted to a port in 
all cargo types (Merk, Ducruet, Dubarle, Haezendonck, & Dooms, 2011). The 
containerisation rate is mainly identified as influencing the performance of ports (Laxe, 2005; 
Medda & Carbonaro, 2007; Trujillo & Tovar, 2007). However, Tongzon (2002) argued that 
the unitisation rate (weight of general cargo in total throughput)  is equally important as it 
shows the stage of development of the port, from industrial to modern commercial port. In 
addition, Tongzon and Heng (2005) observed that port choice by shipping lines is affected by 
global alliances and logistic networks. It is the reason for ports integrating with global 
terminal operators aligned to shipping networks. The World‘s chief ports and inland global 
logistics companies are in alliance with GTOs and with parent companies as shipping lines. 
For instance, APMT, a global terminal operator is aligned to a shipping company the 
Maeserk line. The influence of shipping services and equipment on port performance has 
been studied by Turner et al. (2004). All these factors impact on frequency and transit time of 
ships, terminal handling charges, freight charges and inland transport charges, which in turn 
impacts on the performance of ports. 
 
Ownership 
 Traditionally, the organisational model of ports globally follows the similar a pattern. That is 
the ownership of property rights is with the state, that delegates power to the PAs to develop, 
organise and operate the ports. The PAs in turn transfer operating rights to the private sector 
through privatisation. The transfer of ownership of infrastructure and superstructure to the 
private sector, through concession contracts, gives rise to the Landlord model of port 
administration. According to Liu (1995), port ownership is among the port characterising 
factors that influence performance. The author suggested that the profit motive of the private 
management is the driving force towards efficiency, while there is not enough incentive to 
propel public management to improve performance. Thus, there is no consensus among 
authors on which one performs better between public and private management. However, 
Estache et al. (2001), argued that the Mexico port reforms resulted in the efficiency gain. 
Furthermore, Barros and Athanasiou (2004) assert that the privatisation enhances the 
efficiency of ports. 
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In addition, Liu, Liu, and Cheng (2006) suggested that reform programmes involving 
partnerships between local and foreign terminal operators have contributed greatly in the 
performance of Chinese ports. However, terminals that operate inter-continental services are 
more efficient than those that operate only regional routes. In support, Notteboom, Coeck, 
and Van Den Broeck (2000), argued that hub ports have higher efficiency levels than feeder 
ports as they are usually managed by local authorities and are not linked to global operators. 
On the contrary, González and Trujillo (2009) were of the view that there is no evidence to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between ownership and port efficiency. 
   
Therefore, this research argues that privatisation has a direct influence on efficiency and 
throughput of ports (scale of production). It is consistent with the findings of Tongzon 
(1995), Tongzon and Heng (2005), Tongzon, Chang, and Lee (2009) and Caldeirinha et al. 
(2009) that identified port throughput as one of the factors that determine port efficiency. 
Another gain from privatisation is that it leads to the provision of port services that are 
globally competitive, which can result in an adjustment of port charges.  It also leads to 
improved competitiveness between terminals or ports, or between countries with adjacent 
hinterlands. The adoption of the Landlord model of port due to privatisation implies that the 
port authority is no longer responsible for port operation and provision of port services. The 
role of the port authority becomes that of the regulator, policy making, planning, marketing 
and promotion and performance monitoring. The relationship between privatisation, 
efficiency and throughput is depicted in Figure 2.5. The diagram shows that efficiency is 
influenced by throughput levels and vice versa, while there is a direct relationship between 
both and privatisation. 
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Figure 2.5: Relationship between privatisation, efficiency and throughput  
2.9 Port Competition 
Winklemans and Van de Voorde (2002), define port competition based on three broad categories. 
First, as competition among terminal operators within the same port called intra-port competition. 
Secondly, there is competition between operators from different ports, known as inter-port 
competition at operator level. This second tier of port competition occurs mainly between ports within 
the same range, serving more or less the same hinterland, for instance the Apapa and Tin can Island 
ports in Lagos. It implies that competition can or may occur within port ranges. Such as competition 
within the Hamburg-Le Havre range in Europe and within the Lagos, Cotonou and Lome range in 
West Africa which are only restricted to those ranges. It is rare to see ports outside the range being 
involved, because there is little or no overlap between hinterlands of ports from different ranges. 
Thus, operators in a particular range do not feel threatened by operators from another range and 
therefore there is no evidence of competition at that level. Thirdly, there is competition between port 
authorities, regional or local, which directly affects the determinants of port competition, particularly 
the infrastructure in and around a port. It is, of course, vital to the competitive position of operators 
and it is called inter-port competition at port authority level.  
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Figure 2.6: Conceptual definitions of port competition  
Source: Adapted from Winklemans and Van de Voorde (2002)  
Figure 2.6 indicates the different levels and complex nature of port competition. Even 
competition within the same port, say Port M or Port N, intra-port competition, can only 
occur between operators handling the same cargo category. Intra-port competition also exists 
between the same cargo types in different ports sharing the same hinterland (shown in Figure 
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2.8 as ―1‖). While the competition between ports or between port authorities is labelled ―2‖ 
and ―3‖ respectively in Figure 2.8. 
 
2.9.1 Port market and intra-port competition 
Intra-port competition does not imply many firms competing at the same time, rather it 
denotes a deregulated port market with free entry and exit (Goss, 1990a). The debate on intra-
port competition revolves around port ownership and administration, as there is no   
competition within a single port under the management of a public port authority (Cullinane, 
Teng, & Wang, 2005c). Different port ownership arises as a result of the distribution of 
property rights of infrastructure, superstructure and services. It is in this context that this 
research treats port competition, because of the focus on private participation in terminals 
through concession. Theoretically, the concept of contestable markets entails that the ease of 
entry and exit to markets leads to efficiency. In short, contestable market implies low entry 
barriers, while a perfectly contestable market assumes the total absence of such barriers 
(Baumol, Panzar, Willig, & Bailey, 1982). The belief is that the threat of competition will 
force operators to act in a competitive manner; therefore barriers to entry render markets non-
contestable. 
 
 
Leveraging from this economic theory, the cargo handling business could be regarded as a 
non-contestable market for the following reasons: entry is difficult because expensive and 
specialised equipment is required for operation and concession agreements are of a long-term 
nature, normally 20 years or more. In addition, the option to enter or exit the market requires 
that capital invested by concessionaires be liquated without any loss, or removed for 
alternative use. The market is also characterised by high sunk cost, unless on anticipation of a 
reasonable rate of return, the motivation for entry is limited (Notteboom & Winkelmans, 
2001b). Despite that the cargo handling, business lacks contestability i.e. existence of an 
imperfect market, but workable competition can still be introduced. 
 
According to Clark (2001) in industries with small economies of scale in terms of market 
size, operated by a few firms the competition among terminals can be innovative and also 
lead to efficient service over time. The positive outcomes of competition are achieved 
through rivalry among a few terminals that are allowed to operate independently. The nature 
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of the port market is such that there are many buyers in the market for port services. 
However, it is not feasible to structure the supply side into many sellers with equal 
opportunities (Van Niekerk, 2005). Therefore, some sort of government intervention is 
necessary to create workable competition. In order to derive the benefits of competition, 
regulate supply in order to avoid exploitation of monopoly rents and to plan resource 
utilisation to prevent excess or under capacity. 
 
 
The ability to introduce a workable competition in cargo handling is influenced by the 
following: the volume of cargo, the potential traffic growth and the amount of debt that can 
be allocated to the business units. As well as cross-subsidisation of essential uneconomic port 
services, employment requirements and the potential to raise productivity with 
technologically obsolete equipment (Van Niekerk, 2005). Investment in small businesses that 
cannot guarantee the advantages of economies of scale and margins of return on investment is 
little, requiring other cost saving measures, for example on labour issues. It sometimes leads 
to policy somersaults where ports are considered as social tools to create employment and at 
the same time competition is promoted. 
 
 
However, it is a consensus that competition is needed to improve productivity through market 
forces. For small terminals to introduce private participation on a competitive basis requires 
strict regulation, if such units are too small to attract public interest. To avoid transferring 
public monopoly into a private monopoly and at the same time ensure that the goals of 
private participation are met, the crafting of regulation should be done with great caution. 
Private operators will have to be subjected to both price and performance regulation, to 
control monopolistic pricing and to ensure that operators do not unproductively occupy and 
monopolise portland (Van Niekerk, 2005).  
  
Government and port users prefers intra-port competition, although it is not always 
practicable in all ports. It depends on the volume of the cargo, which may be inadequate to 
allow the delineation of the port into two or more terminals and therefore unprofitable to 
operators to run an efficient business. Establishment of competition in the port sector requires 
an assessment of the economic and financial viability of creating more than one terminal to 
handle the same cargo as well as adoption of a new port management model if not already in 
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existence. Plus, conclusion of concession and lease agreements including tariff regulation 
mechanism in ports where lack of intra-port is envisaged and finally, enactment of port 
competition law that deals with issue of tariffs in a monopolistic market situation, which will 
help the government in regulatory oversight. 
  
In the port industry there is a keen debate on the correlation between intra-port competition 
and performance, as in other sectors. The proponents of competition assert that it encourages 
modernisation, enhances accountability among staff and frees a port from bureaucratic 
administrative bottlenecks and in so doing paves the way for higher efficiency. As a result, 
governments all over the world support policies that encourage inter-port competition, 
competitive market structure and decentralisation (Heaver, 1995). On the other hand, there 
are certain economists and governments that support a centralised and monopolistic market 
for the port industry. Their arguments are hinged on the fact that central planning for the port 
industry reduces the problem of over capacity. Ports may experience excess capacity due to 
the quest for ship owners to minimise delay and the over extrapolation by port management 
of cargo growth and the long life nature of port infrastructure and terminals. 
  
Numerous studies on traditional industrial organisation theory (Megginson and Netter (2001);  
Tirole (1988);  Vickers and Yarrow (1988)) suggest that competition can have both positive 
and negative effects on any organisation. Other studies by Goss and Stevens (2001); 
Cullinane et al. (2005c), have on the contrary, a unanimous agreement that intra-port 
competition improves port performance and should be encouraged. It is becoming increasing 
difficult to ignore the influence of intra-port competition on efficiency, as Goss (1990a) 
points out that landlord ports achieve efficiency by introducing intra-port competition. 
Therefore, the primary role of port authorities should be encouraging within port competition. 
This is supported by Heaver (1995), who expounded that encouraging competition should be 
a new policy direction. Among other advantages, privatisation is a useful approach to 
introducing intra-port competition. It is what is pushing ports globally to adopt privatisation 
as a way of improving their economic efficiency. However, caution should be applied, as 
introducing privatisation without appropriate regulation to enhance inter-port, or intra-port 
competition, may not guarantee improved performance and rather a new monopoly could 
emerge. It is especially necessary in port concessions as it involves long-term contracts 
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between operators and port authorities, or the Government. Port infrastructure investments 
are expensive and are of a long-term nature so it takes a long time for operators to recoup.  
 
This research argues that competition is a market-based regulation to curb monopolistic 
tendencies of terminal operators. Competition prevents the private operator from pricing port 
services too high and above the long-run marginal costs. However, if the environment is non-
competitive, as is the case with Nigeria, the private operator is encouraged to put price 
continuously above marginal costs, or institute a system of regulating prices. In the absence 
of competition, the transfer of port services from the public to the private becomes a mere 
exercise, which in the end may not bring the much anticipated change in service quality and 
pricing. 
 
2.10 Why Regulate a Privatised Port? 
Thus, for ports and maritime services to function efficiently and competitively in a privatisation 
environment an appropriate regulatory framework covering the labour management and the regulation 
of fees that create a conducive environment for contestable markets, must be put in place. The 
framework should encompass various aspects, such as the functioning of markets, setting of tariffs, 
revenues, or profits. As well as controlling market entry and exit and ensuring fair and competitive 
behaviour practices within the port sub-sector (World Bank, 2007a). 
 
However, the advancement of ports into Landlord Port Authorities entails a reduction in monopoly 
powers in certain port services, allowing free entry by private service providers due to liberalisation 
and deregulation. For services where there is a high inclination that private service providers will 
engage in monopolistic practices and other anti-competitive behaviour, a regulator is needed to 
oversee pricing practices to improve efficiency. Also, regulatory institutions are necessary to exert 
control over the infrastructural assets used by private terminal operators. 
 
 
Regulatory systems are also required for contestable services formerly run by public port authorities. 
It includes pilotage, tug assistance, stevedoring activities, cargo handling, storage and yard services, 
which as a result of deregulation could fall within the purview of private operators. Private 
participation in these activities reduces subsidies, as operators can recover costs directly from users 
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(Notteboom & Winkelmans, 2001b). According to the authors, the profit maximisation objective of 
the private sector calls for regulatory oversight over the exercise of market power, to ensure that they 
public goods attributes of many port sector activities are not in short supply and to safeguard public 
interest. 
 
In developing countries, especially those in Africa, where there is a need to surmount challenges 
negating the competitiveness of the ports, the need to strengthen the institutions in charge of 
regulating the port sector becomes paramount. Therefore, the need for transparent rules that will 
nurture the administration‘s capabilities to regulate terminal operators and services becomes 
necessary. Only a well-endowed institution can develop a data collection mechanism to promote inter-
port and intra-port competition and to adopt an innovative regulatory instrument, such as yardstick 
competition.  
 
2.11 Relationship between Port Privatisation, Competition and Performance 
The impact of whole concessions of a nation‘s ports, on the operational performance of the ports, has 
become necessary, as it is less evident in the literature. Most port efficiency studies in the literature 
focused on the effects of privatisation on the container ports/terminals, or worldwide ports where in 
most cases the operations of these ports are already adjudged successful. For example a study of the 
top 100 container terminals by Baird (2002), as well as Cheon, Dowall, and Song (2010) study of the 
influence of institutional changes on 98 major ports in the World. Figure 2.7 shows the relationship 
between port privatisation and performance. 
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Figure 2.7: Relating port privatisation, competition and performance  
From Figure 2.7, it could be deduced that port privatisation does not on its own bring about 
performance improvements. That is why there is a general belief among researchers that it is 
rather intra-port competition that leads to improved performance and therefore should be 
encouraged.  Cullinane et al. (2005c), observed that public ports achieve efficiency by having 
skilful and competent management, while ports practising the Landlord model of port 
administration derive their efficiency by introducing intra-port competition. Thus in a 
landlord setting, the primary role of port authorities is to guarantee and sustain intra-port 
competition within the port system (Goss, 1990b). Likewise, Baird and Valentine (2006) 
argue that the reason for privatisation is the introduction of profound competition. Therefore, 
the overwhelming global interest in port privatisation as a means of improving economic 
efficiency is hinged on competition. 
 
However, the issue of port privatisation as a viable way of introducing within port 
competition should be treated with caution, because privatisation may not always guarantee 
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improved performance as depicted in Figure 2.7. It is as a result of the lumpiness of port 
investment and the long life of most port infrastructure. Thus, port privatisation is always 
accompanied by long-term contracts between port authorities and the private investors. It 
may create a new monopoly within the port. Therefore, in the absence of inter, or intra-port 
competition, it is virtually impossible to categorical conclude whether public or private-sector 
management is superior to the other, in terms of performance. 
 
Thus, it could be said that some controversies exist as to the relationship between port 
ownership and performance in the absence or limited competition. It is as a result of these 
circumstances that economists such as Vickers and Yarrow (1988), argue that economic 
efficiency is better in public management than private management.  As in an oligopolistic 
market, private sector port operators may not be motivated to improve performance, because 
in such markets uncontrolled high port charges, inefficiency and excessive costs abound. As a 
result public management could perform better than their private counterparts. 
 
On the other hand, if public ports are characterised by bureaucratic red tapes, lack of clear-cut 
objectives and excessive government intervention and meddling in operational decisions, 
introducing private participation could improve performance. Taking from this perspective, 
some economists argued that public enterprises are inherently less efficient than private 
enterprises. It is through this prism that privatisation is perceived as ushering in improved 
performance (Song et al., 2001). 
 
Figure 2.7 indicates that with the introduction of inter-port competition, which is an attribute 
of ports, especially container terminals in developed countries which are mostly Europe and 
Asia, some of a today‘s private sector port operators should more likely perform better than 
their public peers. Cullinane et al. (2005a) argued that private enterprises, in order to 
maintain profitability and self-perpetuation, are motivated to seek viable options to survive in 
a competitive market. 
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Thus, this research will demonstrate that the introduction of privatisation through concession 
contracts leads to port efficiency by exploring this primary hypothesis, ―The efficiency of 
Nigerian seaports improves with increased private sector participation‖.   
 
2.11.1 Ownership and efficiency 
The debate on which has the greater efficiency between private and public entities has 
reached the port sector, just like other economic sectors and the results are inconclusive. Most 
of the studies that analysed this relationship are based on container terminals. Even though 
there is no clear-cut agreement on the relationship between privatisation and efficiency in this 
cargo segment, most evidence point to improvements in efficiency after the introduction of 
the private sector in cargo handling operations. 
 
The study of the world‘s top 100 container terminals revealed the wide range application of 
privatisation policies in ports globally- Juhel (2001), Baird (2002), and Cheon et al. (2010). 
Likewise, detailed implementations in Asia, North America, Europe and Latin America- 
Cullinane and Song (2001), Ircha (2001), Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001a), Hoffmann 
(2001) and Cullinane et al. (2005a). In contrast, there is no study detailing the effects of 
privatisation on African ports. Baird (2002) further revealed the variations in private sector 
involvement because of the diverse methods employed to bring about private participation in 
the port industry. In summary, Baird (2002) observed that, despite the enthusiasm for 
privatisation, the role of the public sector i.e. the port authorities will still be considerable. 
 
Despite the clamour for port privatisation and many studies by experts on the subject, there is 
no consensus on the relationship between privatisation and port performance, mainly as a 
result of the approach employed by different authors. For example, Cullinane, Song, and 
Gray (2002) assessed the influence of administrative and ownership structures on major 
container terminals in Asia, using the Stochastic Frontier Model. The study revealed a 
positive relationship between privatisation and enhanced productive efficiency, although the 
study was not able to determine the degree of private sector participation and the level of 
productive efficiency. Tongzon and Heng (2005) show that privatisation is indeed an 
effective way of improving port efficiency. However, for ports with full privatisation, 
operational efficiency did not improve. Hence, the relationship between privatisation and 
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efficiency is non-linear; rather it is a U-shaped relationship. In addition, Tongzon and Heng 
(2005) also showed that the best model of private participation that can maximise efficiency 
is the private/public ownership model. In other words, it is better for the port authority to 
restrict private participation to ‗landowner and operation private‘ functions and take over the 
regulatory function. Cullinane, Wang, Song, and Ji (2006) studied top container terminals in 
the world and showed that the ports with the greatest level of private participation are the 
most efficient, with the exception of the port of Singapore. Cullinane and Song (2003) used 
cross-sectional data to demonstrate that the higher the level of private property, the greater 
the level of efficiency. The study also showed that the introduction of competition in the 
South Korean port sector increased terminal efficiency, although the study made use of only 
five terminals. In addition, Cheon et al. (2010) analysed the effect of ownership on the 
efficiency of 94 seaports worldwide. In 39 that have gone through ownership transfer from 
public to the private sector, they found a positive impact of privatisation on efficiency and 
productivity. 
 
On the contrary, Valentine and Gray (2001b) examined the subject of efficiency and the 
ownership structure of 31 World container ports, using cluster analysis and discriminant 
analysis. They classified the container ports into three types of models: Public, Private and 
mixed. The result of the analysis of the 31 container ports investigated showed no correlation 
between ownership structure and efficiency. Additionally, the study of European and Asian 
terminals found no relationship between privatisation and efficiency   (Cullinane et al., 2005a; 
Cullinane et al., 2002; Notteboom et al., 2000). In addition, the study of the Myanmar ports‘ 
performance based on privatisation, shows that for those ports practising BOT there is no 
positive correlation between efficiency and port ownership (Lin & Hualong, 2010). 
 
2.11.2 Efficiency and port size 
The suggestion in most literature on ports is that larger ports have a greater level of efficiency 
as a result of the learning curve effect, due to greater activity. However, ports provide for 
future demand growth, by investing in a large amount of infrastructure and equipment. It may 
result in excess capacity at the time these investments are made and therefore to achieve 
higher efficiency in terms of economy of scale may not be possible (González & Trujillo, 
2008). Also, some large ports may be at the physical limit of their growth, which makes an 
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increase in efficiency difficult, while smaller ports find it easier to grow to optimum scales. 
According to González and Trujillo (2008), it is the preponderance of these issues that makes 
a definitive relationship between size and efficiency difficult. Thus, there is also no clear-cut 
and conclusive view regarding the effect of port size on efficiency for container terminals and 
port authorities. 
 
 
Tongzon and Heng (2005) indicated a positive relationship between port size and technical 
efficiency. In the same vein, Wang and Cullinane (2006) suggested that most container 
terminals with higher production scales are likely to be more efficient. Cullinane et al. (2002) 
also concluded that the efficiency of a terminal is directly related to its size, when it is a non-
temporal (non-sequential) comparison among terminals. However, if temporal effects are 
taking into consideration in the comparison, the result is inconclusive. Contrarily, Cullinane 
et al. (2004) showed that the efficiency of terminals is not influenced by size. Likewise, the 
results of the study by Notteboom et al. (2000) did not indicate that small terminals are less 
efficient than larger ones. Rather, they concluded that high levels of competition among small 
terminals within a port lead them to greater efficiency. The corollary to this finding that is 
supported by Cullinane et al. (2006), is that the mean efficiency level of terminals in hub 
ports is greater than in feeder ports, although there is a higher level of dispersion within each 
group. This may not be surprising, as hub ports are always faced with high competitive 
pressure. The study of Spanish ports, using panel data from 1985-1989 for a frontier cost 
function model, concluded that smaller ports under central control are more efficient than 
their counterparts under private control (Coto-Millan, Banos-Pino, & Rodriguez-Alvarez, 
2000). Turner et al. (2004) used 14-year (1984-1997) panel data for 20 ports in North 
America and the study found out that on average, larger ports are more productive than the 
smaller ones. They concluded that there are economies of scale in container terminal 
production. In the same vein, Laxe (2005) study of 16 Asian ports found that larger ports are 
more efficient than smaller ports. Likewise, Al-Eraqi, Mustafa, Khader, and Barros (2008) 
study of 22 major ports in the Middle East and East Africa, shows that bigger ports are more 
efficient than smaller ones. However, Rajasekar, Sania, and Malabika (2014) analysis of the 
operational efficiency of selected Indian ports from 1993-2011, revealed that size has no 
influence on the efficiency of ports and that both big and small ports are efficient. 
 
88 
 
2.12 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has surveyed the various theoretical concepts underpinning privatisation and the 
application in developing countries, with a focus on Nigeria‘s port concession. The chapter has 
presented a theoretical framework for port privatisation through concession contracts and ownership 
models, which form the basis of this research. The chapter has also introduced the various arguments 
on the interplay of intra-port competition and regulation on port performance. A survey of selected 
port privatisation programmes worldwide was undertaken and the various outcomes highlighted. A 
review of the literature on privatisation and performance in the port sector yielded an inconclusive 
result, with some reporting a positive relationship, while others were of a contrary view. 
 
Finally, the chapter examined privatisation in Africa and found that Africa lags behind other regional 
groupings in embracing privatisation. As at 2008, about 65% of African ports practise the service 
model of port administration. Even in the countries that adopted the Landlord model, it is mainly for 
container prts/terminals, except in Nigeria where the concession was for all ports in one go.  However, 
there are no studies detailing the outcome of these privatisation programmes, as is the case in the 
Caribbean, Asia and Europe. Hence, the assessment of the influence of privatisation on the 
performance of ports of the top reformer in the region becomes paramount in order to encourage 
others to follow the trail. Chapter 3 discusses the review of different approaches that have been 
employed in the literature to measure performance and the method chosen for this research. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Reviews on Performance Measurement 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review the alternative approaches employed in the 
measurement of port performance, with emphasis on the two main methods used by the 
researchers: productivity and efficiency.  The two concepts are related, but they differ 
conceptually, as will be explained later in the chapter. The structure of the chapter follows 
thus: first the various benchmarking and performance measurement approaches employed in 
the port industry, such as performance metrics and frontier techniques will be reviewed. It 
also highlights the advantages and disadvantages of each method. Secondly, it discusses the 
various productivity measures and spotlights the merits and demerits of each approach with 
particular emphasis on the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI). Thirdly, the chapter focuses 
on the methods employed in this research; the frontier techniques and total factor productivity 
(TFP) measures. The literature on the two frontier techniques, parametric and non-parametric, 
will be reviewed. It also explores the applications of the two modern methods of;  parametric, 
the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and non-parametric, the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) and highlights the weaknesses and strengths of each approach. Fourthly, the chapter 
discusses the different DEA methods and models and their applications in the port industry.  
Finally, it undertakes an in-depth review of DEA applications in seaports globally and 
discusses the shortcomings of some of the various studies.  
 
3.2 Port Performance Metrics and Productivity Measures 
“You cannot manage it if you do not measure it” (Pallis & Vitsounis, 2008). It is an old 
management proverb that has not changed with time. Performance refers to the degree of 
success in achieving intended goals and objectives (Devine, Lee, Jones, & Tyson, 1985; Song 
et al., 2001). In other words, performance is a concept that focuses on the status of outcomes 
that are achieved through certain behaviours (production and service), as a result of pursuing 
goals. In contrast, the efficiency concept is based more on the behaviour of production and 
service activities. 
 
Performance measurement involves presenting metrics numerically to quantify some 
characteristics of the object, product, process, or any other applicable factor. It usually 
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incorporates comparison and evaluation of goals, benchmarks and/or historical figures 
(Bichou, 2008). There are three categories of performance metrics; input measures (time, cost 
and resource), output measures (throughput, production and profit) and ratio indices 
(productivity, efficiency). The ratios are presented in the form of input-output that may have 
input minimisation, or output maximisation, as the overriding objective. Depending on the 
approach and dimension, the ratio could be looked at from two perspectives: engineering and 
production economics. The engineering perspective from the literature, includes both cost 
efficiency (low production) and capital efficiency (low investment) Wheelwright (1978) cf. 
Bichou (2008). While from the production economics perspective, efficiency is broken down 
into technical, allocative and scale efficiencies. It is the economic point of view that is 
relevant to this research. To measure performance both the productivity and efficiency 
approaches are employed. The following sections review these techniques. 
 
3.2.1 Port financial performance metrics 
Financial metrics is mainly used in costing and management accounting to estimate a firm‘s 
financial performance, but it has also been widely quoted in published annual reports of port 
authorities and terminal operators. For example, the annual survey of financial performance 
of US public ports MARAD (2003) is widely cited. The regularly used port financial 
indicators include; operating ratio, the operating surplus, the return on investment (ROI) and 
the return on assets employed (RAE). Other financial indicators used by UNCTAD (1976) for 
benchmarking seaports include; capital and labour expenditures per ship/cargo unit handled 
and the revenue per cargo tonne handled. 
 
The use of financial metrics for performance benchmarking may not be the best. However, 
there may not be any diminutive correlation between financial performance and efficient use 
of resources. Higher profitability, for example, could be driven by cost deflation or price 
inflation, or other external factors, rather than efficient resource utilisation or productivity. 
This is supported by Kaplan (1984). The author argued that superior financial performance 
may be a result of other factors, such as adoption of new financing and ownership methods, 
rather than the outcome of efficient operation and management systems. Additionally,  
Bichou (2012) viewed financial ratios as inappropriate, because of the inability to assess 
intangible activities such as innovation. In the same vein, Holmberg (2000) argued that 
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financial metrics show results of past actions and are designed to meet external evaluators 
needs and expectations. Based on this, Bichou (2008) argued that the use of logistics costing 
approaches, such as activity-based costing (ABC) and direct-profit profitability (DPP), have 
taken precedence in recent years over traditional financial performance.  
 
In the case of ports and terminals, the secrecy in which financial data is held, coupled with 
the absence of cost and price information in most financial reports, makes the use of financial 
performance in port benchmarking difficult. In addition, financial ratios focus mainly on 
short-term profitability, while port investments are in the long term. In terms of comparisons 
between ports from different countries, financial benchmarking becomes a herculean task 
because of the dissimilarity in costing and accounting procedures between countries. Even if 
ports are in the same country, the financial and institutional structure of different port 
administrative models (public, private, landlord, tool.) may differ, rendering them 
incomparable. In addition, port financial performance may be influenced by other factors 
such as; price regulation, statutory freedom and access to private equity (Bichou, 2008). As 
stated previously, the scope of this research is based on the objectives of the Nigerian port 
concession, which focused on efficiency and productivity. Therefore, financial performance 
is not considered.  
 
3.2.2 Partial indicators/snapshot measures 
There is a broad range of indicators regarded as port performance indicators, as presented in 
the UNCTAD classic monograph, UNCTAD (1976). As well as in other literature: Bendall 
and Stent (1987); Fourgeaud (2000); Frankel (1993); Talley (1988) and UNCTAD (1987). The 
performance indicators presented in these studies can be described at best as partial 
indicators, or snapshot measures, as only a single port resource is measured, such as labour, 
capital, facilities (crane, berth, warehouse) and/or operation (handling, movement, storage). 
The throughput volume of cargo is an example of a snapshot measure that is widely used to 
rank ports globally, though misleading. Throughput volumes also feature prominently on 
websites of port authorities and growth in throughput is regarded as evidence of performance. 
Though the use is widespread, it is fraught with limitations. Firstly, throughput volumes do 
not tell much about the economic impact of ports. Secondly, growth in throughput volumes is 
an indication of international trade flows and not the performance of the port. There are also 
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non-quay activities that are used as performance indicators. For example, cargo dwell time 
that gives an indication of the time duration cargo spends from unloading from a ship, till, 
when it leaves the port gate and vice versa. At times, a partial indicator is a measure of the 
relationship between two partial indicators. For instance, berth throughput per square-of-
metre capacity and the number of TEUs per hour versus ship‘s size (Drewry Shipping 
Consultants, 2005). Likewise, the net crane rate by liner shipping trade (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2003).  
 
The difficulty with using partial measures is that it gives activity measure, instead of 
performance measurement.  Performance index is defined as the ratio of output quantity to 
input quantity. Depending on the definition and scope of selected outputs and inputs and the 
approaches employed for the estimation, there are two broad categories of port productivity 
measurement. They are single and partial productivity indices and multi-factor and total 
factor productivity indexes. 
 
3.2.3 Single and partial productivity indexes 
―A single productivity index or single factor productivity (SFP) compares the volume 
measure of an output to a volume measure of an input use‖ (Bichou, 2006b). Inputs are 
measured based on resources employed in port production (land, labour and capital), while 
outputs are expressed in the form of a quantity index, or value-adding index. The use of a 
quantity index is mostly preferred in economic impact and productivity growth studies, 
because it is not very sensitive to processes of substitution between factors of production. The 
application of a single input and single output model allows for the computation of the 
average productivity (P) of the firm or port, by differentiating between the port‘s output and 
input quantities or values. A single productivity index for two ports A and B could be 
computed to measure their productivity over time             or relative to one another     
in the same period, as expressed in Bichou (2008), Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, and Battese 
(2005)  and Wang et al. (2002) thus:                                                        
 
Equation 3.1 
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                                                  Equation 3.2                         Equation 3.3 
Partial factor productivity (PFP) is similar in concept to single factor productivity (SFP). The 
only difference is PFP tends to compare a subset of outputs to a subset of inputs when dealing 
with multiple outputs and inputs. The purpose is to construct a performance index that 
compares one or more outputs to one or more inputs. It can be illustrated using a hypothetical 
example of two ports, A and B, each using multiple inputs and multiple outputs. We will 
compare the use of subsets of two inputs       , to produce a set of two outputs       , in 
each port. Assuming availability of market prices, we can use input prices      and output 
prices      to compute a total index of average productivity from the following equations:                                         Equation 3.4                                            Equation 3.5               Equation 3.6 
In the estimation of single and partial factor productivity indexes, either monetary or physical 
units can be used. However, in using monetary units to calculate SFP and PFP, it is more 
appropriate to use data on market prices and cost while quantities of production (tonnes, 
TEUs, moves) and resources (time, workers.) are classified as physical units. The secrecy 
surrounding divulging port financial data leads to unavailability of market prices for ports. It 
creates a problem for researchers interested in monetary units. As a result, physical units are 
preferred in relation to monetary units in most port studies, despite the difficulty involved in 
establishing a relationship between variations in number and type of physical indicators in the 
port industry. 
   
Wang, Cullinane, and Song (2005) have argued that there is a variety of SFP and PFP index 
in use to capture one aspect of port productivity or the other. Although, there is no agreement 
among researchers and professionals as to which indicator(s) best reflects actual port 
production process or physical performance, even for a single operation or port. Besides, 
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there is difficulty involved in trying to aggregate SFP and PFP measures (UNCTAD, 1987). 
Another problem is that the concept of productivity measured by one or a subset of output-
input volume(s) is compromised when SFP and PFP indicators are used for multiple-input 
and multi-output port production (Bichou & Gray, 2004; Cullinane, 2002). Furthermore, in 
order to capture change in productivity over time, or between ports, some port studies tend to 
compare SFP and PFP indicators, for instance equipment or labour productivity. However, 
comparisons of a SFP and PFP used to capture total factor productivity may not be desirable, 
because they do not take into account other input and output quantities involved in port 
production. 
    
In general, partial factor productivity indicators do measure productive efficiency, but not 
economic efficiency, or cost efficiency. They reflect aspects of the application of labour or 
capital resources on the production of ports and terminals. They thus do not indicate whether 
cargo handling rates are achieved using the most economically efficient mix of the resources, 
given their relative costs. In addition, since the partial indicators demonstrate limited views of 
port operation, they do not often produce analytically consistent results. In most cases, since 
one single measure cannot suffice for the purpose of productivity evaluation, multiple indices 
are examined. However, in analysis when using partial productivity indicators, it is common 
to observe conflicting indexes at the same time, which makes it difficult to show benchmarks 
(Zhu, 2003). Furthermore, partial indicators are often used for simplicity so that internal and 
external stakeholders can understand. 
In conclusion, in assessing productive efficiency, even the benchmarks based on partial 
indicators can be misleading. Port productivity stems from the joint contributions of various 
inputs and the use of a single factor may ignore the effects of interaction, substitution and 
trade-off among input factors on production (Estache et al., 2002). 
 
3.2.4 Total factor productivity measures: 
Total factor productivity (TFP) can simply be defined as the rate of change of total output in 
relation to total input. The concept of TFP is used to measure or decompose change in 
productivity over time, or between firms, by aggregating multiple inputs (M) and outputs (S). 
The concept can metamorphose into multi-factor productivity (MFP) when used to relate a 
single output to a collection of inputs. Song and Cui (2013) identified three major indexes 
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that are used in productivity studies. TFP is derived by computing the ratio of the weighted 
sum of outputs to the weighted sum of inputs, expressed as:                          Equation 3.7 
Where    and    are output and input weights respectively, whose summation must be equal 
to unity (1). If we assume the input and output markets to be productively efficient, then the 
weights represent cost shares for inputs and revenue shares for outputs.  
Equation 3.7 assumes the input and output markets to be productively efficient, therefore, the 
weights represent cost shares for inputs and revenue shares for outputs. That is the 
assumption adopted in Tӧrnqvist index and Fisher index, Estache (1997) and Estache and 
Carbajo (1996) respectively, which have been used extensively in productivity studies. 
  
Therefore, the basis of TFP derived from the Tӧrnqvist and Fisher indexes is quantity data 
and market prices, which are neither available in most cases, nor well suited for weight 
aggregation. Most port research, especially at ports globally, is bogged down by inadequacy 
of data for effective comparison. In addition, price may not be meaningful economically in 
the estimation of productivity of non-market activities, such as port operations in certain 
countries and under some institutional arrangements and management systems. Furthermore, 
the application of non-frontier TFP requires that firms should be competitive and efficient, 
but in reality this assumption does not always hold. Another problem with this approach is 
the inability to differentiate between scale effects and efficiency differences. Grifell-Tatjé and 
Lovell (1995), identified these assumptions as major drawbacks of the above indices. 
  
In order to overcome the limitations inherent in a non-frontier TFP approach researchers rely 
on the Malmquist TFP Index, which is estimated from a distance frontier. The Malmquist 
Productivity Index MPI, measures TFP change of data points by computing the ratio of 
distances of each point relative to a common technology. To remove the uncertainty that 
surrounds which technology to adopt as the reference technology, it is suggested in Fare, 
Grosskopf, and Lovell (1994), that the geometric mean of the two indexes is evaluated 
between periods   and    , as the base and reference technology periods respectively. This 
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approach removes the need for price data and the assumption of the efficient behaviour of the 
firm (i.e. profit maximisation or cost minimisation). 
 
3.2.5  TFP estimation techniques 
Conceptually, the measure of efficiency is directly related to the measure of productivity. 
Although the two concepts are considered equivalent, Figure 3.1 distinguishes the two terms. 
To conceptually determine the sources of efficiency and productivity change, let us assume a 
production for the port industry. The efficient ports are located on the frontier, while 
inefficient ports are below the frontier. There are at least two ways of improving port 
productivity; technical progress and change in previous efficiency. Though, in an industry 
characterised by variable returns to scale, productivity can also improve due to changes in 
scale efficiency. The former can be achieved by introducing modern cargo handling 
equipment, thus shifting the frontier upwards. For the latter, improvement can be the result of 
the port industry acquiring a higher level of efficiency that could be conferred by improved 
work processes. In Figure 3.1, point A, the frontier, is defined by the fraction f(x, t), and the 
productivity is Pt, where x is the input employed to obtain the output y. In the following 
period (t+1), the firm operates now at point B, as a result of improved productivity (Pt + 1). It 
is due to technical change (shift of the frontier to f(x, t+1)) and an improvement in the 
technical efficiency (firm approaching the frontier). The distance from point A to the frontier 
in time, t, is greater than the distance from B to the frontier in t+1. Logically, it implies that a 
technological improvement as well as increase in efficiency, will lead to higher productivity 
(González & Trujillo, 2009; Wilson, Johns, Miller, & Pentecost, 2010). However, for a firm 
operating at decreasing returns to scale, this positive behaviour is undermined as production 
has increased by a lower proportion than the input (Pastor & Lovell, 2005). 
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Figure 3.1: Productivity change: efficiency change, scale and technical change  
Source:  González and Trujillo (2008) 
3.2.6 Productivity change over time (Malmquist productivity indexes (MPI) Concept) 
Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) have demonstrated that productivity change can be 
measured relative to two time periods, t and t+1, as depicted in Figure 3.1. The productivity 
index developed, based on distance functions is called the Malmquist Index. Färe, Grosskopf, 
Norris, and Zhang (1994) applied it to decompose the productivity growth into two mutually 
exclusive components: technical efficiency change and technical change over time. It 
measures the change in efficiency; the frontier shift and the catch-up effect, respectively 
(Froot & Klemperer, 1989).  If MPI is expressed based on DEA efficiency measures, it is 
defined as the ratio of the efficiency measures for the same production unit in two different 
time periods or alternatively, between two different observations for the same period (Odeck, 
2000; Rezitis, 2008). 
 
Hence, the measurement of port efficiency changes and the identification of sources of 
technical change are achieved by employing the concept of DEA and the Malmquist Total 
Factor Productivity Index or Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI). MPI can be calculated 
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from standard DEA scores to benchmark port efficiency between two-time periods. The basic 
idea is that if efficiency change has occurred over an extended period, temporal changes in 
efficiency can be attributed to two different sources related to port conditions, planning and 
management. These are: (a) frontier shift effects and (b) catch-up effects (Cheon, 2007a; 
Estache, De La Fe, & Trujillo, 2004; Estache et al., 2001; Nishimu & Page, 1982). The 
frontier shift effect involves the shift of the productive efficiency frontier and occurs as a 
result of significant changes in technological progress. Port efficiency gains from the frontier 
shift effects is attributable to the ability to keep up with the latest technologies. It is driven by 
institutional reforms, such as concession to increase, or decrease, market competition. To 
continuously keep in touch with the latest technology requires effective long-term strategic 
planning and timely capital investment at the port and policy making level. 
 
Conversely, the catch-up effect, also known as technical efficiency change, is represented by 
a port movement along the production frontiers, which can occur even within a short period. 
The catch-up effect is so named because the concept implies the capacity of ports to 
managerially follow best practices in order to operate on the frontiers at any point in time. 
The efficiency gains emanating from the catch-up effect can be mainly attributed to the 
managerial capacity of ports to respond to port demand by flexibly adjusting production 
scales (changes in scale efficiency). Additionally, to adjust input factors in a timely fashion ( 
changes in ―pure‖ technical efficiency). Not only incentive changing policies, but also many 
other management systems and conditions could promote this type of behavioural change. 
 
The time periods under measurement for this research are the pre- and post-concession port 
efficiency of Nigerian ports over a 12-year period (2000-2011). Nigerian ports during this 
time have undertaken a major port reform programme, described as the most ambitious and 
far-reaching port reform to be conducted in Africa or the World by the African Infrastructural 
Diagnostic Study (2008). Therefore, in order to determine the influence of port concession on 
port efficiency, it is meaningful to decompose the efficiency change into different primary 
sources of efficiency in order to determine among the factors which one is responsible for 
technical progress or deterioration. Then the MPI model is adopted to separate temporal 
changes in productive efficiency into technological progress and change in technical 
(managerial efficiency) as shown in Chapter 4, equations 4.12 & 4.13. The differentiation has 
99 
 
policy implications, because it identifies the different sources of inefficiency. For example, if 
a port does not efficiently utilise its existing assets and input factors, but tries to attribute its 
inefficiency to the level of technology and lack of long term investment. The result of the 
courses of action would be the creation of ineffective and unreasonable policies. Based on 
this, examining sources of inefficiency not only enriches the efficiency analysis, but also 
helps to examine the influence of port concessions on port efficiency.  
 
3.2.7 MPI applications in the port industry 
There have been some early attempts in the literature to measure the TFP index of port such 
as Kim and Sachish (1986), who used a combination of labour and capital expenditure as 
inputs and throughput in metric tonnes as output, to derive the aggregate TFP index. 
Thereafter, the index was decomposed into measures of scale economies and technical 
change. Afterwards, in Sachish (1996), weighting was introduced in the estimation of partial 
productivity, while Talley (1994) suggests calculating a TFP index using a shadow price 
variable.  
  
Recent studies have however, mostly employed MPI to measure efficiency change in the port 
industry such as in Liu, Liu, and Cheng (2007), they estimated the productivity of major 
container terminals in mainland China from 2004-2006, using MPI. The study discovered that 
the most efficient are the large ports and in terms of ownership, that Sino-foreign joint 
ventures performed better than domestic companies. De (2006) investigated the total 
productivity growth of Indian ports from 1981-2003 using MPI and the study revealed that 
there was no substantial impact on TFP for Indian ports after reform. In assessing the 
productivity change after Mexico‘s port reform, Estache et al. (2004) found short-term 
improvement in technical efficiency after the reform. Likewise, Guerrero and Rivera (2009) 
study of the total productivity of principal container terminals in Mexico showed 
improvement in all the ports. Barros, Felício, and Fernandes (2012) employed the Malmquist 
Index with a technology bias, to analyse the productivity of Brazilian ports. The result of the 
analysis suggests that Brazilian ports on average became less productive, with improvements 
in efficiency and deterioration in technological change. Díaz-Hernández, Martínez-Budría, 
and Jara-Díaz (2008) used MPI to measure the productivity of cargo handling in Spanish 
ports and attributed sources of productivity change to technical change, rather than efficiency 
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change. In the same vein, Haralambides, Hussain, Barros, and Peypoch (2010) employed the 
Malmquist Index and a Luenberger Indicator, to assess the productivity of 16 Middle East 
and East Africa seaports. Luenberger is a productivity indicator that can contract inputs and 
expand outputs simultaneously. The study concluded that ports in the region declined in 
technical efficiency, despite positive developments in the adoption of new technology. 
Additionally, Song and Cui (2013) used the DEA-based Malmquist Index approach to 
measuring the productivity of Chinese container terminals from 2006-2011 and found 
improvement in productivity and the source of the growth to be technological progress.  
Cheon et al. (2010) assessed the productivity of 98 World ports in 1991 and 2004 and 
concluded that the change in ownership improved the operation of container terminals, 
especially the large ports. Yuen, Zhang, and Cheung (2013) analysed 21 container terminals 
in China, South Korea and Singapore from 2003-2007, using the MPI approach. The research 
found that foreign participation in the terminals has a positive impact on their productive 
efficiency. 
 
The merits of a TFP index lies in its ability to reflect the joint impacts of changes in 
combined inputs to output(s). This feature is absent in single or partial productivity. As the 
TFP approach is a non-statistical method, it does not consider uncertainty (noise) associated 
with the results. In addition, as results obtained from the TFP are sensitive to the technique 
used and the definition of weights, it implies that efficiency results could be different 
depending on the TFP indices employed for the investigation. In any case, an econometric 
approach is better suited for studies involving large datasets, while researchers adopt the TFP 
approach due to the simplifying assumptions associated with the index number approach. 
 
However, in applying productivity index techniques, it is of utmost importance to consider 
the fundamental differences between productivity and efficiency. The two phenomena may 
be similar, but each denotes a different performance measurement concept. Productivity is a 
descriptive measure, while efficiency is a normative measure (Bichou, 2008). In other words, 
a productive index compares two firms without a reference technology for a benchmark, 
while efficiency measures are used to benchmark firms based on the underlying technology. 
Lastly, a TFP approach uses technology for aggregation; it derives from the estimation of 
cost/production or distance functions. As a result of this the TFP approach is not used as a 
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stand-alone technique in performance benchmarking. It is used in conjunction with efficiency 
techniques or other qualitative measures. 
 
3.3 Efficiency Measures 
The process of production involves ways of converting individual inputs into outputs. The 
relationship between the quantity of input and output is usually expressed by a production 
function, Y= f (K, L). It illustrates the maximum amount of the product that can be produced 
by using alternative combination of inputs, such as land, labour and capital (Nicholson & 
Snyder, 2011). The maximum amount of the product, given the inputs, can define a 
production frontier that sets a limit to the range of possible production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Production function and frontier  
Source: Adapted from Cheon (2007b) 
Figure 3.2 is a hypothetical illustration of the production function and the frontier. Line OA 
represents the efficient frontier and a firm, or an industry‘s productivity, cannot exceed limits 
set by the frontier. Firms that lie below the production frontier (such as p1, p3, p4 & p5) are 
regarded as inefficient. According to Cheon (2007b), the variation  in productivity could be  
attributed to the differences in the environment in which production occurs and differences in 
the efficiency of the production process, as well as differences in production technology. In 
Figure 3.2, the point P2 lies on the frontier and is considered efficient.  
 
However, the modern discussion of efficiency concepts is based on the pioneering works of 
Farrell (1957), that followed from the works of Debreu (1951) and (Koopmans, 1951). The 
seminal work of Farrell (1957) identified two  different ways of defining an inefficient unit. 
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The two distinct concepts of production efficiency identified by Farrell (1957) are: technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency.  
 
 
Technical Efficiency (TE): A firm (port) is said to be technically efficient if it achieves 
maximum potential output from given amounts of inputs, taking into consideration physical 
production relationships. The measurement can be performed by assuming either an input or 
output orientation. In the input-oriented approach, the technical efficiency measurement gives 
the potential input reduction a port could apply, without reducing the output level. Whereas 
the output-oriented framework provides the potential output increase a port could achieve, 
without increasing the use of inputs. Both the input and output oriented approach can be 
calculated by assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS) 
models. In the case of constant returns to scale, both orientations give very close results. On 
the other hand, in the case of variable returns to scale, which could be increasing or 
decreasing returns to scale, the scale efficiency needs to be taken into consideration in 
computing technical efficiency. 
  
 
Allocative Efficiency (AE): Refers to a measure of the distance between the port and the 
point of maximum profitability, given market prices of inputs and outputs. In other words, 
allocative efficiency gives an indication of whether the different proportions of port 
production factors guarantees the attainment of maximum production with a particular market 
price. 
 
Economic Efficiency (EE): Also known as overall efficiency. It is a product of technical and 
allocative efficiency. In other words, it is the potential reduction in production costs (cost 
efficiency), or the potential increase in revenue (revenue efficiency) that a port could apply in 
order to be both technically and allocatively efficient. It gives an insight into whether the port 
is operating at optimal or suboptimal scale. It is measured by assuming either an input or 
output-oriented approach, depending on whether the port is constrained in input reduction or 
output expansion. In any case, the measurement of adjustments necessary for the port to be 
technically efficient should be limited to economically viable points which implies taking the 
price structure into account (Cesaro & Sonia, 2009).  
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Scale efficiency 
The scale efficiency of the firm (port) is an indication of the size and activity level of the 
firm. The scale efficiency index is the ratio of constant and variable returns to scale 
technologies. 
The seminal work of Farrell (1957) on efficiency measurement followed an input-oriented 
framework, while Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell (1985) introduced the output-oriented 
approach which is applied in this research. Figure 3.3 illustrates the two concepts. 
 
A: Input-Oriented Model                                              B: Output-Oriented Model 
                                                                                            
 
                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Figure 3.3: Economic efficiency 
Source: Adopted from Cesaro and Sonia (2009)  
In Figure 3.3, B shows the efficiency estimation by assuming output orientation. It shows 
how much output quantities can be proportionally increased without changes in given inputs. 
The input orientation reflects how much input quantities can be reduced by the firm without 
change in output produced. Assuming constant returns to scale, the two orientations provide 
the same efficiency scores, but will give unequal scores in the presence of increasing or 
decreasing returns to scale (Färe & Lovell, 1978). In figure 3.3 B, let qq‘ represent a production 
possibility curve for a port. Y1 and Y2  are two outputs produced with one input. While PY and 
P‘Y  is the output price line; the slope is the ratio of output prices (-PY1/PY2). It implies that 
ports that lie on the curve such as Q and S are regarded as thoroughly efficient, while port P 
is  inefficient because it is below the curve. The radial output ratio line which projects P to 
the frontier exactly at point Q, estimates the technical efficiency. The distance PQ reflects the 
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proportional amount by which both quantities could be increased. The ratio OP/OQ gives the 
technical efficiency score of port P. The allocative efficiency can be computed from the 
output price line (PP‘), by projecting the technically efficient ports to this line. It also shows 
the allocative efficiency of port P and Q, as OQ/OR. In the same vein, economic efficiency is 
achieved by ports operating at the point of tangency, between the production possibility curve 
and the price line (port S). The ratio OP/OR gives the port aggregate efficiency (economic 
efficiency) score for P. It is also a product of technical and allocative efficiency (EE= 
TE*AE=OQ/OP*OR/OQ=OR/OP). From the diagram, it is obvious that efficiency is a 
relative term that can only be evaluated by the process of benchmarking. 
 
In figure 3.3, A, II‘ represent a production frontier that is the Isoquant II‘ that captures the 
minimum combination of inputs needed to produce a unit of output.  X1 and X2 are two inputs 
used to obtain one output, while PXP‘X  is the Isocost line; the slope is the ratio of input prices 
(-PX1/PX2). Any combination of inputs along the Isoquant is regarded as technically efficient, 
while any point above and to the right of the Isoquant is considered technically inefficient. 
Consequently, technical efficient DMUs are located at the frontier, while the technically 
inefficient DMUs appear below the frontier, because the actual outputs they produced are less 
than the target output. Therefore, the technical efficiency measure is computed as the 
relationship between actual output and the potential output the unit would have produced, if 
operating on the frontier.  
 
3.3.1 Frontier techniques 
Figure 3.3, A and B present a formal illustration of Farrell efficiency measures. Both 
orientations measure the extent of inefficiency at which a firm‘s actual input usage, or output 
production, can be radially decreased (increased) in the direction of the frontier (or boundary 
of the production possibility set) and still allow the firm to produce the same amount of 
output (or using the same amount of inputs). In implementing the above measures, it is 
necessary to identify the frontier a firm faces in order to determine how far it is from the 
frontier. The frontier concept just refers to the lower or upper limit of a boundary-efficiency 
range. This approach defines efficient firms as those that operate on the frontier and 
inefficient firms as those that operate away from the frontier that could be below for a 
production frontier and above for a cost frontier. Depending on the method used to construct 
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the frontier, it could be absolute or relative, or parametric versus the non-parametric 
estimation. The parametric approach uses econometric techniques to measure the frontier, 
with the residual considered as a measure of inefficiency, and the non-parametric method 
involves linear programming techniques. The application of the frontier method has gained 
acceptance in the last two decades, due to its application in various production sectors. Bauer 
(1990) deduced three reasons for this development. First, the concept is consistent with the 
economic theory of optimising firm behaviour. Secondly, the deviation from the frontier can 
readily be interpreted as a measure of the efficiency through which the firms achieve their 
objectives. Thirdly, the information provided in terms of the relative efficiency of firms can 
have significant policy implications and is of high value to regulators and administrators. The 
next section of this chapter reviews the two methodologies, starting with a parametric 
approach. 
 
3.3.2 Parametric approach 
The parametric approach involves econometric specification of the model represented and 
interpreted by parameters. The first version of the parametric production function assumed all 
firms share common fixed frontier lines, the so-called deterministic model (Afriat, 1972; 
Aigner & Chu, 1968). It is however, criticised in the sense that the assumption is 
unreasonable. It ignores the possibility that the observed efficiency of the economic unit may 
be affected by exogenous (i.e. random shocks), as well as endogenous (i.e. inefficiency), 
factors (Song et al., 2001). The econometric point of view, instead of questioning it, 
generalises these factors into a single disturbance term by referring to them as inefficiency. 
 
In order to address this anomaly, the stochastic frontier model was introduced, as a 
replacement for the deterministic frontier models. Unlike the deterministic model, this 
approach takes into account the fact that the production frontier is not entirely under the 
control of economic units. The approach develops further to refined econometric techniques 
that apparently split an error term into two different error structures. One part represents 
inefficiency of firms with a negative skewed half-normal distribution, while the other part 
indicates normally distributed noise. Measuring stochastic frontier models requires several 
conditions. There should be one single overall output measure, or relative complete price data  
(Nishimu & Page, 1982). It is not often the case for many analysts, researchers and planners in 
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port authorities, given the limitations of compatibility, comprehensiveness and quality of data 
in the sector. In addition, the models require two critical methodological conditions; the 
distributions underlying productive inefficiency should be either half-normal or exponential. 
However, the distribution of statistical noise has a normal distribution. Additionally, the 
regressors, i.e. input variables and productive inefficiency are mutually independent. The 
latter is an unrealistic assumption. However, if a firm knows its level of inefficiency, it will 
normally take actions that influence its input choices in management and production 
processes Cullinane et al. (2002). Unless it is inhibited by external conditions and forces. The 
most common parametric frontier method is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Generally, 
the SFA constructs a production frontier based on input and output variables, to give a 
technical efficiency assuming econometric principles. As an econometric technique, it relies 
on restrictive assumptions that ports use efficient technology regularly, which is not always 
the case. Secondly, the production frontier follows a predetermined function.  
 
3.3.2.1 Applications of SFA in the port industry 
The SFA methods have been applied several times in seaport efficiency studies. The survey 
of port efficiency studies that covers the period 1993-2006 by González and Trujillo (2009),  
showed 14 studies employed the SFA. The argument for the use of the SFA is that it 
considers random noise. Thus, it separates the measurement errors from efficiency estimates 
and allows hypotheses to be contrasted. However, in the cost frontier version or distance 
function, it estimates frontiers that consider more than one output. Some of the recent studies 
in the port industry are  Yang, Lin, Kennedy, and Ruth (2011) and Trujillo and Tovar (2007). 
The latter assessed the efficiency of 22 European ports based on the TENT-T reform 
(European future plan for an integrated network), as short sea shipping will be competing 
with the railway. The study used cross-sectional data and could not identify clearly the 
factors that need improvement. The former looked at the efficiency of 5 Asian ports after 
privatisation; the results indicated that technical efficiency increased with the level of 
privatisation. The study concluded that the relationship between privatisation and efficiency 
is non-linear, but rather a U-shaped pattern, pointing out that the best privatisation option is 
public-private. In terms of size, they concluded that larger ports are more efficient than 
smaller ones.  
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Despite previous studies, the SFA methods do not allow for relative comparisons with best 
practice, as this requires the specification of functional forms. In terms of port operations, the 
burden of having to specify a functional form is restrictive and may not be consistent with the 
nature and operational characteristics of port production technologies. Another drawback of 
the parametric approach is that it may create additional errors in trying to specify error terms, 
which complicate the analysis. The frontier and efficiency value depends on the choice of 
functional form for each bundle of input/output variables used, coupled with the sensitivity of 
parameter estimates to the probability distribution specified by error terms. In addition, the 
use of single outputs of most SFA models contravenes the multi-output nature of port 
production.  
 
 
Plus, the use of parametric techniques may not be appropriate in benchmarking ports with 
different operational, management and institutional features. It is because the application of 
the SFA models is most useful in situations involving a single overall output measure or 
complete price data, but this is not the case in the port context. Sachish (1996) and 
Braeutigam, Daughety, and Turnquist (1984) argued that the structure of ports‘ production 
may reduce the econometric estimation of cost or production function to the level of a single 
port or terminal. In the same vein,  Bichou (2007) argued that the theoretical assumption 
underlying the use of econometric approaches to efficiency measurement are not consistent 
with operations and management structure. Therefore this may be more significant in studies 
with strong policy bias. 
 
3.3.3 Non-parametric approach  
The Non-parametric Approach uses non-stochastic and mathematical programming 
optimisation methods to determine the efficiency frontier. Unlike econometric models, it is 
deterministic in nature and does not require specifying a functional form. The most popular 
of the non-parametric approaches is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Another non-
parametric technique that has been used by researchers is the Free Disposal Hull (FDH). It 
assumes strong input and output disposability. In other words, any given level of outputs 
remains feasible if any of the inputs is increased. Conversely, with given inputs, it is always 
possible to reduce outputs (Wang, Song, & Cullinane, 2003). According to the authors, DEA 
adds convexity to the FDH assumption i.e. it allows for linear combinations of observed 
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production units. All linear combinations of observations are feasible. Hence, FDH‘s main 
difference from the DEA is that it does not allow for inclusion of linear combinations of 
production units in the analysis (Wang et al., 2003). The main attraction of using DEA is its 
ability to yield results with a relatively small amount of data, for the DMUs under analysis. 
 
 
3.3.3.1 Introduction to DEA technique 
The seminal work of Farrell (1957) is the foundation for the DATA ENVELOPMENT 
ANALYSIS (DEA), although it is applied in the evaluation of DMUs with multiple inputs 
and only one output. It was Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) that coined the name DEA. 
However, it was extended to include multiple outputs and multiple inputs in the model 
popularly known as the CCR model, which is an acronym obtained from the first letter of 
their surnames. The model popularised the use of DEA in performance evaluation (Wilson et 
al., 2010). Subsequently, the variable returns to scale model was introduced by Banker, 
Charnes, and Cooper (1984), popularly called the BCC model after the surnames of the 
pioneering authors. The former computes aggregate or overall technical efficiency (AE), 
while the latter measures pure technical efficiency (TE). The ratio of AE and TE (AE/TE) 
gives the scale efficiency (SE). The process allows for the identification of sources of 
inefficiency. Panayides et al. (2009), defines technical efficiency as relative productivity over 
time or space or both. Whereas scale efficiency is a measure of the deviation of actual and 
target production size (Wang et al., 2005). 
 
The DEA is a linear programming technique that converts multiple inputs and outputs into a 
measurement of efficiency. The conversion is carried out by analysing the resources (inputs) 
used and the results (outputs achieved for each decision-making unit (DMU). Then the inputs 
and outputs of each DMU are compared to the same quantities for all the remaining units. 
The process involves the identification of the most efficient unit in the sample and the 
provision of a measurement of inefficiency for the remaining units by the DEA. The measure 
of efficiency provided by the DEA is not absolute efficiency, rather a relative or comparative 
efficiency (Thanassoulis, 2001). In other words, it applies the concept of ―pareto 
optimization‖ that implies that an increase in the output variable can only be accomplished by 
an increase in the volume of inputs.  
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DEA is classified as nonparametric, because it provides for the analysis of input–output 
efficiency relationships without specifying production functions for the organisations. The 
primary objective of the DEA is to compare a sample of DMUs that perform the same task, 
but differ from each other in the amount of inputs they use and the outputs they generate 
(produce) (Lins, Gomes, Soares de Mello, & Soares de Mello, 2003). In addition, the DEA 
identifies not only efficient DMUs, but also measures and locates inefficiency and estimates 
linear production that provides a benchmark for the inefficient DMUs. It has been used to 
measure the relative efficiency of both profit and non-profit organisations, such as banks, 
restaurants, schools and hospitals.  
 
 
Since the introduction of the DEA by Charnes et al. (1978), the methodology has gained wide 
acceptance within the research community. Such that between 1978 and 2000, over 3,000 
articles have been published on the subject Tavares (2002), while Emrouznejad, Parker, and 
Tavares (2008) discovered 4,000 articles published in journals and book chapters in the first 
three decades since the introduction of the DEA (1978-2008). The versatility of the DEA is 
due to the definition of a DMU which is quite flexible; it can be individuals, branches of an 
organisation or entire organisations. It only operates on the basic assumption that all DMUs 
exist in the same environment and convert the same set of inputs and outputs. In other words, 
it is concerned with measuring the relative efficiency of homogenous units. Officially, the 
DEA approaches focus on frontier rather than statistical central tendencies. That is it assumes 
a piecewise linear surface display to all observations, as an alternative to fitting a regression 
plane through the centre of the data as in regression statistics. Viewed from this angle, the 
DEA has proved useful in revealing hidden relationships, more than previous methodologies 
(Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011c). In the area of benchmarking DMUs, the DEA accomplishes 
this task explicitly without requiring formulated assumptions and recourse to alteration of 
other models, as is the case in linear and non-linear regression models. Therefore, the DEA‘s 
relative efficiency model fits the definitions of an efficient unit put forward by Cooper et al. 
(2011c), that assumes no a priori weights to any input or output: 
 
 
A) Extended Pareto-Koopmans Definition: A DMU is said to be 100% efficient, if and only 
if, an improvement of any one of its inputs or outputs will not lead to a worsening of its other 
inputs or outputs.  
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B) Relative Efficiency: A DMU is to be rated as fully (100%) efficient on the basis of 
available evidence, if and only if, the performances of other DMUs do not show that some of 
its inputs or outputs can be improved without worsening some of its other inputs or outputs. 
These two definitions circumvented the use of price, assigning of weights to inputs and 
outputs and the expression of formal relationship between input and output. Efficiency 
measures described by the above definitions are referred to as ―technical efficiency‖ in 
economics. To encourage its application to different activities, the phrase ‗Decision Making 
Unit (DMU)‘ is adopted as a reference to any entity that has the capability of converting 
inputs into outputs. Based on the fact that the DEA defined above measures only the technical 
efficiency, it can be used to evaluate the operational efficiency of both private and public 
organisations. As well as profit and non-profit organisations, as far as the entities can convert 
inputs to outputs. Also as each DMU chosen for evaluation is measured against each other, 
thus the efficiency concept is regarded as being measured relative to the best performing 
DMU in the selected sample, hence the name relative efficiency. Any DMU that lies on the 
efficient frontier is regarded as DEA efficient and is accorded a value of 1 or 100%. 
 
3.3.3.2 Other DEA models 
This research applied other DEA models, apart from the traditional CCR and BCC models, 
there are also the DEA super-efficiency and window models. The CCR and BCC separate 
DMUs into efficient and inefficient DMUs, based on the efficiency score. All the DMUs with 
a score of 1 or 100% are termed efficient, making it difficult to distinguish between the 
efficient DMUs. As a result, Andersen and Petersen (1993) proposed the super-efficiency 
model for ranking efficient DMUs. The super-efficiency model follows the pattern of the 
traditional DEA models described previously. However, it excludes the DMU under 
evaluation from the reference set. It causes DMUs to be located above the efficient frontier, 
resulting in the concept of super-efficiency. It implies that a super efficiency score can take 
any value greater than 1 or 100%. Thus, the ranking of efficient DMUs becomes possible. 
That means the higher the super efficiency index, the greater the rank.  However, the index 
for inefficient DMUs is the same as the standard models. 
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3.3.3.3 Window analysis  
Windows analysis is a time-dependent version of the DEA. In order to capture the variations 
in efficiency over time, Charnes, Cooper, Golany, Seiford, and Stutz (1985) proposed the  
‗window analysis‘ version of the DEA.  The Window Analysis Method is adopted for this 
study to overcome the constraint of using a limited number of DMUs. Window analysis 
evaluates the performance of a k DMU over time, by treating it as a different DMU in each 
reporting period. This approach allows for tracking the performance of a unit or a process 
(Soltanifar & Hosseinzadeh Lotfi, 2011). The Window Based DEA adopts the principle of a 
moving average, but each k DMU is treated as if it was a different k DMU at each of the 
reporting dates. However, in the analysis, each k DMU is compared with alternative subsets 
of panel data, rather than the whole data set. The window analysis operates on the underlying 
assumption that what was feasible in the past remains feasible forever. Therefore, time is only 
treated as an average over the periods covered by the window (Chou, Sun, & Yen, 2012; 
Khodabakhshi, Gholami, & Kheirollahi, 2010; Tulkens & Vanden Eeckaut, 1995). Some of 
the initial studies that adopted the DEA used cross-sectional data for analysis, thereby 
ignoring the role of time. Using only a year‘s data in the estimation of efficiency of a k DMU 
may be misleading, because of the fluctuation in production due to dynamic environments. 
However nowadays, the use of panel data prevails over cross-sectional data. The use of panel 
data not only allows a k DMU to compare with other DMUs under study, but the 
performance of each DMU can be traced over time.  In essence, panel data gives a better 
reflection of the real efficiency of a kth DMU (Lin, 2010; Lozano, Villa, & Canca, 2011; 
Odeck, 2000). 
 
 
The window DEA model allows the tracking of performance of a unit or process. Authors 
have applied this method to measure port efficiency in literature, such as Pjevčević, Radonjić, 
Hrle, and Čolić (2012) to benchmark five ports along the Danube River in Serbia. Al-Eraqi et 
al. (2008) applied it to study the efficiency of Middle East and East African seaports, while 
the Cullinane et al. (2005a) study was based on 30 largest world ports. Cullinane et al. (2004) 
applied the same model to 25 leading container terminals around the World. This study 
employed the contemporaneous and Intertemporal DEA Window analysis over 12 years 
(2000-2011) of panel data to assess the efficiency of six Nigeria ports.  
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In a DEA model, it is not necessary to convert inputs and outputs variables to either monetary 
or physical units as each variable is measured in its original unit e.g. tonnes, pounds, hectares. 
The DEA identifies efficient peers for the inefficient units. It indicates the efficient DMUs in 
the sample closest to an inefficient DMU, in terms of combinations of inputs and outputs. 
The data requirement in a DEA is put to three times the number of DMUs (Bowlin, 1998), 
but it is less than the number required for the SFA analysis. The application of the DEA 
makes it possible to determine potential improvements that can be provided to inefficient 
ports in order to be efficient (Barros, 2006). All these features have made the DEA a choice 
model for efficiency in the port industry and the number of studies using the DEA model 
attests to that. For the formalization of the different DEA concepts and the returns to scale 
types see section 4.5.1 of this thesis. 
 
3.3.4 Problems with DEA application in port efficiency literature 
In the last two decades, the DEA has been applied extensively in the measurement of seaport 
efficiency. The survey of the previous studies in seaport using DEA by González and Trujillo 
(2009) and Panayides et al. (2009), identified 15 major journal papers between 1993 and 
2006. However, 10 out of the 15 papers analysed by the authors were the same. There is a 
notable synthesis by Cullinane (2002), while a review by Wang and Cullinane (2005)  
focused on the container port industry. A review by this researcher, has identified over 30 
publications from 1993-2013 (Appendix 1.1). Most of these papers have been reviewed 
repeatedly by different authors.This study highlights the common conclusions from the 
previous surveys and reports in-depth on the most recent, in order to put its application in the 
present research in perspective. 
 
There have been issues raised about the use of a frontier approach with both parametric and 
non-parametric, in seaport efficiency measurement. Most of these criticisms stem from the 
difficulties and controversies surrounding the discussion of the limitations of the selected 
methodology, or difficulty in modelling port operations. This section presents some of these 
misgivings associated with the use of frontier methods in the literature and despite the 
drawbacks identified, why most researchers still find them very attractive. 
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I)  a crucial aspect of reliable port performance measurement and benchmarking is to ensure 
the appropriate definition and selection of homogenous DMUs (ports). However, most port 
literature does not adhere to it. Although of late, some port studies have tried to address the 
issue by restricting their investigation to ports with similar traffic, as failure to do so will 
make typically specialised units, such as oil and cruise ports, to appear as outliers. While 
González and Trujillo (2009) have argued that the inability of researchers to define precisely 
the activity being studied creates confusion. Some authors based their evaluation on the 
operations performed by the port authority, which is vague (Cullinane & Wang, 2010; 
Cullinane & Wang, 2007). There are many activities performed by the port authority based 
on the ownership and the administrative style adopted by the port. However, segregating 
ports based on traffic type, is not enough to constitute homogeneity (Bichou, 2006a; 
Cochrane, 2008). In the context of ports, the lack of homogeneity may arise due to 
differences in production, handling technologies and the accounting methods between 
ports/terminals in different countries. This research addressed this by studying ports in the 
same country and by treating port and terminal benchmarking separately. 
 
II) The selection of variables is very crucial in a DEA analysis, as badly selected variables 
can cause the system to go in the wrong direction (Wang et al., 2003). However, most studies 
using the DEA techniques do not justify their variable selection. At best variable selection is 
haphazard, subjective, or based on existing literature. Justification based only on variables 
used in previous research may not be able to address the objectives of a particular study, or 
give a clear-cut definition on which factors should be used as inputs or outputs. The studies 
on container terminals define the output variable appropriately as TEU; Estache Estache et al. 
(2004), and others (Cullinane et al., 2005a; Cullinane et al., 2004; Cullinane & Wang, 2010; 
Cullinane & Wang, 2006b). On the other hand, studies based on ports combine unrelated 
variables as output, for instance Barros and Athanasiou (2004) distinguished number of ships, 
movement of merchandise, cargo handled and containers, as output. Park and De (2004), 
identified number of ships, income and customer satisfaction as outputs combining both 
physical and financial indicators. González and Trujillo (2009) argued that identifying the 
cargo specialization requires special infrastructure, in terms of equipment to suit the 
differentiated goods. In this study, the DMUs are explicitly defined as the major Nigerian 
seaports and terminals excluding oil terminals. Variables are clearly defined based on the 
aspect of port being researched, which is pre- and post-concession operations and therefore 
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only operational factors were considered. The inclusion of each variable is justified in 
Chapter 4. 
 
III) The hallmark of most port benchmarking studies is to estimate the frontier (efficiency) 
and the extent of deviation from the frontier (a measure of inefficiency) of ports and 
terminals, based on current technology. However, it is not the whole story; another aspect of 
the assessment is the frontier shift effect i.e. how the frontier might change over time. The 
measurement of the shift in port frontier over time can be achieved by employing the DEA 
window analysis and the Malmquist productivity index techniques. However, only a few 
studies have used the former (Al-Eraqi, Mustafa, & Khader, 2010; Cullinane et al., 2005a; 
Cullinane et al., 2004).  Other studies (Cheon et al., 2010; Choi, 2011; Fu, Song, & Guo, 
2009; Halkos & Tzeremes, 2012; Lozano, 2009; Núñez-Sánchez & Coto-Millán, 2012) have 
made use of the latter. This study employed CRS, VRS and the window analysis to ensure 
diversity and reliability of results. 
 
IV) Application of the DEA method requires that an increase in the input should lead to a 
resultant increase in output and not a decrease, this property of the DEA is referred to as 
isotonicity. In the context of port efficiency, isotonicity may occur due to the way input and 
output variables are recorded, or inbuilt characteristics of the port industry. For instance, 
turnaround time of ships is recorded in such a way that a lower value is an indication of 
superior performance by the port or terminal. Secondly, port operational process is structured 
in such a way that a glitch in one sub-system may compromise the performance of the whole 
system. For instance, an increase in inputs, such as berth and the number of cargo handling 
equipment, may affect yard output negatively and likewise an increase in the terminal area 
may not have any effect on quay throughput. To test variables for compliance with the 
isotonicity requirement, correlation analysis is carried out to show that all the variables are 
suitable for inclusion in a DEA analysis, but this is hardly the norm in most port studies. 
 
 
V) In a DEA model, another essential requirement is that all input and output values of 
variables should be non-negative, but this attribute may not hold in port efficiency for 
variables with zero values. Instances abound in port operations where input and output 
variable may take zero values. First, if ports handle different types or mix cargo (wet bulk, 
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dry bulk, container, passengers), which are not aggregated to a single output in the analysis, 
then zero output values may occur, or a port handles negligible or zero quantity of a 
particular cargo output relative to the other DMUs. Secondly, the differences in production 
technology and handling equipment, especially if DMUs are selected globally, as is the case 
with most container port studies (Cheon et al., 2010; Cullinane et al., 2005a; Valentine & 
Gray, 2001a). These imply that some ports due to their level of operation may have little or 
no need for some inputs, thus their values will either be zero or tending to zero. It is the case 
of terminals designed exclusively to operate with certain equipment, if the number of 
equipment is not aggregated then certain DMUs in the analysis could have negligible or zero 
value for certain equipment. That is the main reason this study used aggregated output i.e. 
total throughput in tonnes for all the port analysis.  
 
 
VI) Furthermore, there is no consensus among authors in terms of model specification and 
orientation. Although the proponents of the input-oriented model argue that the port industry 
is typically associated with long-lived infrastructure and facilities and a long-term planning 
horizon. In essence, once a port is built, its output could be predicted in the short run because 
ceteris paribus a port can determine the shipping lines that call at its terminal. Additionally, it 
could predicate throughput based on historical data. Therefore, a port should be concerned 
with how to utilise its inputs efficiently, as a cost saving measure in production. However, as 
a result of the increase in international trade due to globalisation. As well as, the re-
organisation of traditional ways of administering ports worldwide to a more pragmatic 
approach that will usher in competition and less dependence on government for funds. There 
is also a need to design an adequate regulatory framework to guarantee efficient outcomes in 
the absence of government support, especially in developing countries. Therefore, ports 
should often review their strategies in order to provide satisfactory services to their customers 
and maintain a competitive edge in these changing circumstances. To achieve these, ports 
need to access their existing capacity to find out if the output has been maximised in the 
presence of available input. Taking into account the above scenario, the output-oriented 
model provides a more appropriate benchmark for the port industry. 
 
 
VII) Another limitation of the frontier model in port literature is that it focuses mainly on 
container ports/terminals. In fact, it has become a common denominator for most port 
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efficiency measurements. The problem is that evaluating the efficiency of one particular type 
of port traffic cannot be equated to an overall assessment of performance of the whole 
country‘s port system. To assess the overall performance of the ports under study after 
concession, the entire cargo terminals based on cargo type (DBC, Container and GC) were 
evaluated. 
 
The above inconsistencies and controversies constitute the drawbacks of the use of frontier 
techniques in port efficiency measurement and accounts for the discrepancies and differences 
in results obtained by various studies. For instance, in the study of the relationship between 
port size and efficiency Coto-Millan et al. (2000) and Cullinane et al. (2002) obtained 
different results. In terms of ownership structure, Liu (1995) and Estache (2002) also came 
out with differing results. 
 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter looked at the different performance categorisations and dimensions to 
productivity and efficiency measurement. It observed that, depending on the design of the 
productivity and efficiency measuring instrument, it could be used to capture the performance 
of an activity, a process, or both. Efficiency and productivity measurement could be extended 
to various fields of human endeavour, because it depicts different dimensions, but their 
definition and particular application has been inconsistent among researchers or disciplines.  
This chapter has presented a literature review of the various efficiency benchmarks and 
measurements available to the port sector and the merits and demerits associated with their 
application.  
The reviews reveal some level of inconsistency in the application of these techniques. Some 
of these discrepancies stem from the definition of the unit of study. Some studies do 
aggregate ports and terminals together in a single study, while others benchmark ports from 
different parts of the World, without recourse to the homogeneity assumption inherent in a 
DEA application. 
There is also disagreement among authors in the definition and application of the following 
terms: efficiency, productivity, utilisation and effectiveness in relation to port performance. 
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The multi-institutional nature of port stakeholders (Port authorities, terminal operators, 
regulators, shipping companies and customers/users) creates perception differences in the 
reviewed literatures. It impacts on the design, objectives and implementation of the 
performance and analytical models. 
Additionally, complexities arise in other areas, such as operational (types of cargo handled, 
ships serviced, terminals managed and systems operated), as well as institutional differences 
(landlord, tool and service) and spatial (quay, yard, terminal, port, cluster etc), in terms of 
what to measure and benchmark. This chapter argues for the need to study ports in a 
particular country that are comparable, in order to maintain the homogeneity assumption in a 
DEA application. 
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Chapter Four: Research Design and Methodology           
4.1 Introduction 
There are two expressions used by many authors interchangeably to refer to the research 
process: research ― methodology‖ and research ― methods‖, however the terms have been 
distinguished by Greener (2008). The research methodology, or design, deals with the overall 
strategy chosen by the researcher to answer the research questions. Therefore, the research 
design shows how samples are selected, the units to be included, the distinctions that should 
be made and the variables to consider and measure and how the measures are related to other 
external factors. The research design is a guide on how to generate precise answers to the 
research questions. It is also defined as the overall procedures involved in the research 
process, which includes theoretical underpinnings, data collection and analysis (Hussey & 
Hussey, 1997; Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). While, research methods refers to techniques 
employed for data collection, collation and measurement, to ensure that the instruments are 
reliable, appropriate and valid. 
 
This chapter, therefore, provides the structure of the research process which includes the 
development of a suitable research philosophy, identifying an appropriate approach and 
strategy.  As well as the data collection methods upon which data collection and analyses are 
based and implications of the methods adopted. This chapter also discusses the 
operationalisation of concepts to enable facts to be measured quantitatively and justifies the 
variable selection. 
  
The primary objective of this research is to assess the influence of the transfer of port 
operations from public to the private sector through concession agreements, on the 
operational performance of the ports. However, as the two main approaches applied to the 
measurement of performance are efficiency and productivity, the methodology develops a 
multivariate model for assessing the efficiency and productivity change. 
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4.2 An Overview of Methodological Approaches 
Figure 4.1 is an illustration of the various methodological considerations available to the 
researcher when conducting research (Saunders, Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2011b). The 
layers of the onion indicate the different aspects that have to be determined and completed for 
an acceptable research project. The following subsections explain the philosophical positions, 
research approaches, strategies and the time horizon of the present research.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Research Onion  
Source: Saunders et al. (2011b) 
4.2.1 Research philosophy (Paradigm) 
The view of research from a paradigmatic perspective is used to manipulate the research 
process in all study disciplines. It is applied in such a way that each paradigm has a particular 
research strategy and method associated with it (Näslund, 2002). A paradigm has been 
described as ― a set of basic beliefs, or Worldview, that defines, the nature of the ―World‖ and 
the individuals placed in it. It also shows the range of possible relationships to that World and 
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its parts‖ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 107). A paradigm is viewed as the basic belief system 
that guides the research investigation in answering the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological questions (Krauss (2005),  Collis et al. (2003) and Sauders, Lewis, and 
Thornhill (2007). In other words, in order to understand the nature and concept of research 
and discuss the limitations and potentials of each research method, the starting point should 
be the research paradigm also known as the research philosophy, as depicted in the first layer 
of the research onion in Figure 4.1. Ontology considers what constitutes reality, while 
epistemology considers views about the most appropriate ways of enquiring into the nature of 
the World.  
 
According to Creswell (1994) and Mangan, Lalwani, and Gardner (2004) there are two broad 
philosophical perspectives that underpin a research process; positivism and non-positivism or 
the phenomenological approach. Saunders et al. (2011b) identified four research paradigms:  
positivism, interpretivism, realism and pragmatism (Figure 4.1). The authors classified all 
research that is anchored in the belief of the existence of an objective real World, and applies 
procedures and approaches used in natural science as a positivistic approach. The positivistic 
paradigm has been described as traditional, quantitative and empiricist, hypothetico deductive 
and social constructionism in nature (Creswell, 2013; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Jackson, 
2012; Gill & Johnson, 2002) 
 
However, based on the seminal works on social paradigms and organisational analysis, 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identified four paradigms: functionalism, interpretivism, radical 
structuralism and radical humanism. In their framework, radical realism is associated with 
assumptions about the nature of society, while radical structuralism is concerned about social 
science. Mangan et al. (2004) argued that research in business is more aligned towards radical 
structuralism and researchers tend to anchor their research along interpretivism and 
functionalism beliefs. Thus, in Burrell and Morgan (1979), framework interpretivism is a 
subjective approach and is concerned with understanding the World, as it is based on 
subjective experience. On the other hand, the functionalist paradigm approach explains the 
research from an objective point of view. It tends to provide a rational explanation of a 
phenomenon by applying models and methods of natural sciences to human affairs (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). 
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Generally, most management research is basically discussed in terms of two opposing 
schools of philosophy (Gummesson, 2000; Hussey & Hussey, 1997). Loosely referred to as a 
positivism and phenomenology paradigm, which is  also consistent with the Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) framework of interpretivist and functionalist. However, Woo, Pettit, 
Beresford, and Kwak (2012) adopted the Burrell and Morgan (1979) framework in the 
structural review of methodological issues in seaports studies from 1980-2000s. The analysis 
indicated that the functionalist paradigm, which is aligned to positivism, is the most widely 
used philosophy in seaport research. In fact, Woo et al. (2012) reviewed 840 papers, out of 
which 830 papers are classified under the functionalist paradigm. The interpretivist paradigm, 
which tend to seek understanding of the real World within the ambit of individual 
consciousness and subjectivity, has 6 studies. While the structuralist paradigm that is focused 
on the structure and analysis of economic power relationships has four papers. Most of which 
were on industrial relationships in the port industry (Carter, Clegg, Hogan, & Kornberger, 
2003; Herod, 1998). It shows the dominance of the functionalist paradigm for the three 
decades 1980-2000s. 
 
On the other hand, the non-positivistic or phenomenological paradigm is based on the belief 
that the World is socially constructed and subjective. Researchers try to understand the World 
from the inside, rather than the outside (Näslund, 2002). Different methods are employed by 
researchers to actualise this paradigm, but basically they are qualitative (Mangan et al., 
2004).  
The phenomenological paradigm has also been described as qualitative, subjectivist, 
humanistic, interpretivist/hermeneutic and inductive (Collis et al., 2003; Hussey & Hussey, 
1997; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2007). 
 
In line with the discussion, the essential characteristics of the positivist and 
phenomenological paradigms are summarized as follows (Table 4.1): 
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Table 4.1: Key characteristics of the Positivist and Phenomenological paradigms 
Features Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm 
Basic notions The world is external and 
objective 
Observer is independent 
 
Science is value-free 
The world is socially constructed and 
subjective 
Observer is part of object of 
observation 
Science is driven by human interests 
Responsibilities of 
the Researcher  
Focus on facts 
Look for causality and 
fundamental laws 
Reduce phenomenon to 
simplest events 
Formulate hypotheses and 
then test them 
 
Focus on meanings 
Try to understand what is happening 
 
Look at totality of each situation 
 
Develop ideas through induction from 
data 
Preferred 
methods include 
Operationalising concepts so 
that they can be measured 
Using multiple methods to establish 
different views of phenomena 
 
Sample size Large samples Small samples investigated in-depth 
over time. 
      Source: Adapted from Easterby-Smith et al. (2012)  
Discussions show that different names are used to describe apparently similar paradigms, 
which may be partly due to the development of similar approaches in parallel across various 
branches of the social sciences.  
 
Based on the discussions of the research questions and the objectives of this study, it is 
evident that this research is tilted towards the positivist perspective, rather than the 
interpretive perspective. The study is anchored in the ontological belief that the essence of 
knowledge is simply to describe the phenomenon we experience, while the purpose of 
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scientific investigation is to observe and measure the phenomenon around us, on the 
epistemological understanding that the World and Universe are deterministic and operate by 
laws of cause-and-effect that are observable, if the unique approach of the scientific method 
is rigorously applied. The research, therefore, is positioned within the functionalist 
philosophy, which is aligned with a positivist paradigm. It understands research from an 
objective point of view and seeks to provide a rational explanation of a phenomenon by 
applying models and methods of natural sciences to human affairs. Moreover, it has been 
judged as a very successful research perspective when adopted in seaport studies (Woo et al., 
2012). 
  
In addition, the influence of port ownership change on operational performance is a ―cause-
and-effect‖ phenomenon. It involves an enquiry into the impact of the process (transfer of 
port operations from public to private hands) that has already taken place (ex-post). Then 
measures the outcome of the process in terms of efficiency and productivity of the ports. 
Therefore, it is natural to choose the positivist approach for this type of investigation. The 
interpretist, which is associated with a phenomenological approach, was considered, but it 
was not adopted because it is subjective. Firstly, it tends to interlock the researcher and the 
object of research in such a way that the outcome of the investigation just mirrors the enquiry 
process (Krauss, 2005). The criticisms of the phenomenological approach stem from the fact 
that it is rather expensive to conduct research using the process. Secondly, it involves 
sophisticated interpretation of data that often requires special skills, a lack of a well-thought-
out hypothesis and finally the validity and reliability are often called into question due to 
researcher bias. 
 
4.2.2  Research approach 
Mangan et al. (2004) and Saunders et al. (2011b) argued that the choice of philosophy in 
logistics (port) research, like in other disciplines, has implication for the whole research 
process. As strategy, time horizon and approach to the study is attached to the paradigmatic 
preferences of the researcher. The adoption of the positivist paradigm by the researcher 
implies that this research is bound by the features of the positivist framework. Except in the 
aspect of data collection, where mixed methods of quantitative and qualitative data collection 
techniques were applied to better the understanding of the phenomenon.  
124 
 
In Figure 4.1, there are two main research approaches that could be considered when 
undertaking a research project, the quantitative (deductive) or qualitative (inductive) 
approach (Saunders et al., 2011b). A deductive approach as depicted in Figure 4.2  involves 
developing a hypothesis (hypotheses) from existing theory and designing a research strategy 
to test the hypothesis (Wilson et al., 2010). Deductive reasoning means working from the 
more general to the more specific. It is a ―top-down‖ approach and follows the path of logical 
reasoning. The deductive approach emphases causality and it is commonly associated with 
quantitative data. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Deductive approach process 
On the contrary, an inductive approach uses the ―bottom-up‖ approach; the researcher begins 
with specific observations to broader generalisations and then theory (Figure 4.3). In other 
words, inductive research is based on generating theory from observed data; it uses research 
questions to narrow the scope of the study. Its focus is on exploring new phenomena or 
observes new phenomena from a different perspective and it is associated with qualitative 
data. According to Babbie (2013), there are no set rules and some qualitative studies may 
have a deductive orientation.   
 
     
Figure 4.3: Inductive approach process  
It is clear from the explanation of the two methods, that this study of post-concession 
Nigerian ports performance is best fitted to the deductive approach. This study involves 
exploring the relationship between the changes in ownership of port operations from public to 
private (privatisation theory) on the operational performance of Nigerian ports. This research 
involves the generation of quantitative time series data, encompassing both the pre- and post-
concession periods from the major ports under study.     
 
Observations Theory Pattern 
Theory Hypothesis Confirmation/Rejection Observation 
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4.2.3  Research strategy 
Saunders, Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2011a) identified the strategies available to the 
researcher to undertake a research project as: experiment; survey, case study, action research, 
grounded theory, ethnography and archival research. According to Yin (2009) and Babbie 
(2013), each of the strategies can be used for exploratory, descriptive or explanatory 
purposes. Some of the strategies are mainly associated with the deductive approach 
(experiment, survey) while others are commonly associated with an inductive approach 
(grounded theory, ethnography).  However, Saunders et al. (2011a) observed that no strategy 
is superior or inferior to the other. Rather the choice of a strategy should be based on the 
research questions, objectives and extent of existing knowledge, the amount of time and other 
resources available and the philosophical underpinnings of the research.    
 
Experimental research is more associated with studies in the natural sciences. In its purest 
form, it is laboratory-based and seldom used in management research. According to Saunders 
et al. (2011a), experiments are used in exploratory and explanatory research to answer the 
―how‖ and ―why‖ questions in research. However, it may not be suited for this study on post-
concession evaluation.  
 
Survey has been described by Butts (1983) as a significant way of generating knowledge 
about existing phenomena. According to Saunders et al. (2007), survey is the most common 
strategy employed in business and management research and it is more often associated with 
deductive research. The authors were of the view that survey strategy is used to answer the 
―who‖, ―what‖, ― where‖ and ―how‖ questions in the research process. Survey strategy allows 
for the collection of quantitative data that can easily be analysed using descriptive and 
inferential statistics. The data collected from the survey can be used to suggest possible 
reasons for particular relationships between variables and to produce models for the 
relationships (Saunders et al., 2011a). Applying the survey strategy gives the researcher more 
control over the research process. As observed previously, the survey strategy can be used for 
explanatory, exploratory and descriptive purposes. Exploratory strategy can be employed at 
the initial stage of research to gain a first insight into the topic of study, before an in-depth 
study of the subject (Babbie (1990) and Kerlinger (1986)). While descriptive survey strategy 
is used when research aims to understand the relevance of the phenomenon. It describes the 
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distribution of the phenomenon in the population in order to ascertain facts. The third survey 
strategy is explanatory, which is deployed to discover causal relationships among variables in 
theory testing or confirmatory research. The Explanatory strategy is theory-based and uses 
well-defined concepts, models and phenomenon to investigate causal relationships between 
variables. According to Malhotra and Grover (1998), it is hard to establish or draw causal 
inferences based on cross-sectional evaluation in survey design, without putting into 
consideration the temporal changes in the phenomenon. The authors advocated explanatory 
survey to be accompanied by longitudinal design, in order to capture changes in the 
phenomenon of interest over time.  
 
The explanatory survey strategy with the longitudinal design seems most suitable for 
addressing most of the objectives of this research, as the study is based on examining the 
effect of privatisation theory on the performance of seaports. In addition, to make sure that 
the change observed is not a one-off thing due to some inexplicable factor, the study made 
use of 12 years (2000-2011) of series data. This approach is chosen as the researcher has no 
control over the variables of the pre- and post-concession, nor can manipulate them. This is 
because the concession programme is already in place and not only that, a researcher is not in 
a position to implement this change. In these circumstances, to tease out the possible events 
that have taken place in the past, the study attempts a reconstruction by surveying the 
operational statistics for the ports under study. This was done by examining factors that 
influence port performance and also solicit for the perceptions of port users on the concession 
programme, through interviews. In addition, the research adopted the survey strategy as it is 
field-based and data is gathered from the port (business) context in which the practice of 
privatisation occurred. Data is collected from the real World. The study ties the privatisation 
of ports in practice, to theory. It has been used in supply chain management studies to 
document the state of the art, as well as baseline data for longitudinal studies (Gable, 1994).  
 
A case study strategy is used in research for its ability to capture reality and detail by 
studying the phenomenon in its natural context. It gives impetus to study of different aspects 
of the phenomenon that may not have been previously determined, because it allows for 
inclusion of a vast number of variables (Galliers, 1985; Yin, 2009). Thus, the purpose of 
using a case study is to have an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon. So, a case study 
127 
 
investigates a pre-defined phenomenon although it may or may not Apriori define constructs 
and relationships. According to Saunders et al. (2011a), a case study can be used in exploring 
or in challenging existing theory, as well as providing a source for new research questions. 
The standard techniques used for collecting data for a case study are interviews, observation, 
documentary analysis and questionnaires. However, a triangulation of different sources is not 
only possible, but also advantageous to ensure the validity and reliability of the research 
process (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). However, the use of the case study has been criticised, 
that research findings from a case study are not statistically generalisable to the entire 
population. This is due to the inability of the researcher to control the independent variables 
which may limit the internal validity of conclusions obtained from the research. Finally, 
although, a case study may establish relationships between variables, it does not show the 
direction of causation (Cavaye, 1996).  
 
Action research strategy is mainly employed in research that involves the resolution of 
organisational issues and the study of those who experience the issues directly (Saunders et 
al., 2007). Grounded theory is described by Goulding (2005) as helpful in research in 
predicting and explaining behaviour, with focus on developing and building theory. Both may 
not be useful strategies for this research, as they are leaning towards the phenomenological 
paradigm and involve the use of inductive approaches.  
 
It is clear from the strategy discussions that this study, which is based on establishing whether 
there is a relationship between privatisation through concession contracts and port 
performance, using Nigerian ports concession as a case study, incorporates some elements of 
both case study and explanatory survey strategy. Therefore, the use of survey strategy as part 
of the case study is most appropriate for this type of study. 
 
4.2.4 Time horizon 
In terms of time, there are two perspectives: cross-sectional and longitudinal. In cross-
sectional view, the data is collected from research participants at a single point in time, or 
over a relatively short period, referred to as a contemporaneous measurement (Johnson, 
2001). The data is applied to each case at that point in time and comparisons are made 
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between variables of interest. Whereas, the longitudinal technique implies collecting data at 
more than one point in time and comparisons are made across time. It also allows for the 
collection of data on one group or multiple groups. 
  
The longitudinal technique is further categorised into trend studies and panel studies. In trend 
studies, independent samples are from a population over time, using the same questions, 
while for panel studies, the same companies/individuals/organisations are studied at 
successive points over time. Johnson (2001) suggested that panel studies are very useful in 
establishing evidence of causality, because data on variables could be collected at different 
periods that help build a proper time order. Panel studies could also be retrospective as the 
name implies; this involves looking backward in time to collect data on the dependent and 
independent variables that will help explain current differences in the independent variable. 
Thus, in retrospective research, comparison is made between the past, as estimated by the 
data and the present for the cases in the dataset. This technique is used by researchers to 
approximate or simulate a longitudinal study, to obtain data that is representative of more 
than one period (Johnson, 2001). 
 
Finally, this research made use of the longitudinal time horizon. As the study is causal-
comparative, that involves tracking the performance of the ports (DMUs) for a 12-year 
period, which are panel evaluations. In other words, evaluating the performance of the system 
involves tracking the efficiency and productivity over time that requiring the use of 
contemporaneous and intertemporal analysis, whic means longitudinal examination. 
   
4.2.5  Research methods 
The last layer of the research onion is called data collection methods, which simply entail 
techniques that are used to collect empirical research data. In other words, it is how 
researchers ― get‖ their information (Johnson & Turner, 2003). According to Saunders, 
Lewis, and Thornhill (2009), there are two methods used in collecting research data: mono 
method and the multiple methods. Mono method as the name implies, means employing a 
single data collection technique and its corresponding analytical procedure in a research 
process. On the other hand, multiple methods refer to the use of more than one data collection 
and analysis method for answering the research questions. However, there is also the mixed 
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methods‘ research, which uses quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. It 
undertakes the analysis either in parallel (at the same time), or sequentially (one after 
another), but does not combine them (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
Johnson and Turner (2003) identified two types of mixed methods of data collection i.e. intra-
method and inter-method mixing. They defined intra-method mixing as; ―the concurrent or 
sequential use of a single method that includes both quantitative and qualitative components, 
e.g. the concurrent use of open- and closed-ended questionnaires in a single research‖. 
Conversely, inter-method mixing involves concurrently or sequentially mixing of two or 
more methods. The use of secondary data and interviewing in a single study is an example of 
inter-method mixing. Intra-method mixing is also known as ―data triangulation‖, while inter-
method mixing is also called ―method triangulation‖ (Denzin, 1989). Denzin has argued that 
for intra-method to be achieved, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
must be included within a single method, or the use of a method that is neither purely 
quantitative nor purely qualitative. In contrast, inter-method mixing requires the use of 
multiple (different) methods of data collection in a single research. The multiple methods can 
be only quantitative approaches, qualitative approaches, or a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. The mixing of qualitative and quantitative methods results in the 
most accurate and complete depiction of the phenomenon under investigation (Johnson & 
Christensen, 2008; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Patton, 2005; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). The reason for triangulating data collection methods is to obtain convergence or 
corroboration of findings. As well as to eliminate or minimise key plausible alternative 
explanations for conclusions drawn from research data and to elucidate the divergent aspects 
of the phenomenon (Johnson & Turner, 2003).  The authors further argued that triangulation 
can be applied at different stages of the research process.  
 
For this research, mixed methods (inter-method mixing) are considered the most appropriate, 
as the different data collection methods (secondary data and interview) were used. The 
researcher recognises that all methods have inherent limitations as well as strengths. 
Therefore, the combination of methods could provide the convergent and divergent evidence 
to the research questions. The use of the quantitative approach allows for the collection of 
numerical data of the ports operational statistics, while the qualitative approach is used to 
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collect information on the perception of stakeholders to the privatisation programme. Thus, 
the objective of adopting mixed method is to balance efficient data collection and analysis, 
with data that provides context. In other words, the qualitative data collected from 
stakeholders provides the contextual information and facilitates the understanding and 
interpretation of the quantitative data. It has been argued by Gillen (2001) and Tashakkori 
and Teddlie (1998) that the inclusion of quantitative and qualitative data in research may 
deepen the results more than one type of data can allow. 
 
4.3 The Research Design 
Having undertaken an overview and discussion of the various methodological approaches 
involved in carrying out a research project, the researcher decided on the appropriate research 
philosophy as well as the research approach, the research strategy, the research methods and 
the time horizon that underpins this study. The various methodological approaches the 
researcher adopted for the study are presented in Figure 4.4.   
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Figure 4.4: Selected methodology for the research  
A step-by-step process is followed by the researcher to adapt the study to the selected 
research design, in order to understand the complicated issues of port operations, port 
ownership, competition and regulation in a national port context. In addition, the 
methodology of linking the outcome of this understanding to measurement of operational 
efficiency of ports and providing comparative benchmarks of productive changes before and 
after the change of ownership. Afterwards, the influence of concession on efficiency is then 
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assessed, based on efficiency gains or losses over time and across ports. There are two main 
types of theoretical models providing an explanation for within-industry variations in 
efficiency. Firstly, the strategic group theory by Caves and Porter (1977), which sees 
differences in efficiency scores as being a result of differences in structural characteristics of 
the units within the industry. It equally brings about differences in performance. Furthermore,  
Porter (1979) explains that units with similar asset configurations pursue similar strategies, 
which in turn leads to similar performance. For this research, it could be argued that there are 
different strategic options available to the various ports in the Nigerian port industry. 
However, due to certain encumbrances, not all options are available to each port and this 
gives rise to varying efficiency scores among ports. The second is the resource-based model; 
it explains that different scores are due to the heterogeneity in resources and skills on which 
seaports base their strategies (Barney (1991), Rumelt (1991) and Wernerfelt (1984)). That is 
to say that the resources and competencies are in continuous flux in the industry, resulting in 
the best performing ports having a competitive edge over the others. 
 
4.4 Defining Concepts and Research Design 
The research design adopted for this study is based on these two precepts which have been 
expounded in chapter 2 and are given below: 
 Although changes in the performance level of ports may be traceable to market 
forces, the production scale and some location factors; there is a relationship 
between ownership of port infrastructure and superstructure and performance.  The process of competitive bidding of port terminals, the delineation of ports into 
terminals to be operated by different concessionaires and the creation of autonomous 
port authorities, creates intra-port and inter-port competition, which induces 
efficiency. 
It is based on these two precepts, this research attempts to answer the central research 
question:  
 What is the influence of privatisation through concession contracts on the efficiency 
and productivity of Nigerian ports? 
Five research questions were created to capture the problem more aptly and to address the 
specific objectives of the study: 
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1. Are ports with terminal operations in the hands of the private sector more efficient?  
2. Are ports under intense intra-port competition more efficient?  
3. What factors influence port efficiency and productivity?  
4. What role does ownership of port institutions play in influencing operational port 
performance?  
 
4.4.1 Research hypothesis 
It is based on the above questions; the study seeks to test the hypothesis that productive 
inefficiency is associated with public ownership, in comparison with private ownership, using 
Nigerian ports as a reference. This is because performance measurement techniques are also 
known as: comparative efficiency technique, total factor productivity method or multi-factor 
productivity technique. Therefore, the study proposes that the introduction of private 
participation in seaport production, through concession contracts, influences the operational 
performance of the ports through the following hypotheses:  H0: There is no relationship between the transfer of the port terminal operations from 
public to the private sector and port performance.  H0: There is no relationship between port size and port efficiency  H0: There is no relationship between port efficiency and port competition. 
 
It is in an attempt to investigate these null and corresponding alternate hypotheses that the 
applicable research tools and analysis techniques discussed above were selected. Then, based 
on the conceptual framework of this study, privatisation is captured through the port 
ownership models based on the practice in the Nigerian port system. Thereafter, it is related 
to the measurement of operational performance efficiency, providing a benchmark 
comparison of productive changes before and after concession. Consequently, the influence 
of concession can then be evaluated in terms of efficiency gains or losses over time and 
across Nigerian seaports. The research employed four analytical techniques to execute this 
design: 
1. Modelling port efficiency and throughput variables and relating them to the 
ownership change using regression 
2. Analytical benchmarking of Nigerian ports‘ efficiency  
3. Productivity change analysis for assessing the influence of concession 
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4. Competitiveness analysis to ascertain the relationship with efficiency   
 
4.5  Port Performance Measurement Processes 
The study employed multi-approach performance evaluation, using a multivariate two-stage 
regression model based on determinants of port production scale (throughput) and efficiency, 
to test the hypotheses in section 4.4.1. The factors that determine port production scale in the 
Nigerian port context were regressed against throughput, to obtain the projected throughput. 
In the second regression, efficiency was regressed against ownership, the port production 
scale (represented by projected throughput from the first regression) and competition, to 
determine their influence on Nigerian port performance. The processes are explored in 
Chapter 6.   
 
4.5.1 Analytical benchmarking for port and terminal efficiency 
The main purpose of benchmarking is to compare the efficiency of carrying out a particular 
activity or group of activities, either at a particular point in time or over time. This study has 
reviewed several benchmarking methods applicable to the port industry in chapter 3 and has 
shown that it is better to set benchmarks relative to best practice i.e. measured relative to the 
efficiency frontier. From the discussions of the various performance measurement techniques 
in Chapter 3 and putting into consideration the peculiarities of port operating systems, it has 
been demonstrated that the programming techniques are most appropriate for benchmarking 
the operational efficiency and evaluating the influence of Nigeria‘s ports‘ privatisation 
through concession contracts on the operational performance of the ports. Especially as the 
Nigerian ports under consideration are multipurpose ports, with different operational and 
handling systems.  Additionally, the small number of ports under study makes the application 
of the SFA technique difficult in the context of Nigerian seaport terminals‘ benchmarking. 
The programming techniques are less sensitive to sample size than econometric models and 
could estimate technical efficiency for both individual ports and whole production processes. 
In addition, the multi-output nature of port production, coupled with the lack of detailed data, 
may render the use of econometric techniques unreliable. Based on this, the study argues for 
the use of the programming techniques in the form of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
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A contemporaneous and intertemporal DEA analysis was carried out in order to compare the 
pre- and post- concession efficiency scores, using cross-sectional and panel data. The 
contemporaneous analysis compares observation sets within the same period. Thus, it makes 
use of cross-sectional data, while the inter-temporal analysis deals with panel data and pools 
data over the period of the study. The application of the two approaches ensures that a DMU 
is benchmarked against varying sample sizes and at the same time assumes a constant 
technology over time. Furthermore, the contemporaneous, inter-temporal and window 
approaches were employed to analyse the efficiency of observation sets relative to alternative 
DEA models for the pre- and post-concession periods. Application of different DEA models 
to data sets is consistent with the objective of this study, in terms of analysing the relationship 
between institutional changes. In this case, the handing over of port terminal operations to the 
private sector and the performance efficiency of the ports. It is necessary, as port production 
exhibits both constant and varying returns to scale, which require alternative DEA models 
that can track the variations in handling and production technologies between and within 
ports/terminals. 
 
4.5.2  Productivity change analysis: Total factor productivity (Malmquist Index) 
In order to understand the productivity concept and measurement and the causes and 
consequences of productivity change, so that the appropriate policy to raise productivity can 
be made, the concept of TFP is employed. According to Fabricant (1974), total factor 
productivity (TFP) is the best single measure of productive efficiency, as it is a measure of 
real output per unit of actual resources expended. TFP is used in finding the sources of 
economic growth. The early economist in trying to decipher the sources of productivity 
growth and how to measure them grouped the sources into two. The first, a change in 
resources available for use in production, that was termed total factor input. The second is a 
change in the efficiency with which available resources are used in the production, called 
total factor productivity. Therefore, TFP is used to observe patterns of change in productivity, 
and identifying sources of change in productivity especially change due to technological 
innovation. To measure TFP, the MPI described in Chapter 3 is used. Although the MPI 
requires the estimation of the distance function, this can be specified directly under the DEA. 
The approach opted for by this research is to apply ordinary DEA based on the MPI, both on 
a year-by-year basis and pre- and post-concession period basis. 
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The application of the DEA-based Malmquist Productive Index (MPI), allows for the use of 
the panel data for both efficiency estimation and analysis of TFP growth. The computation of 
the MPI gives an indication of whether productivity has improved or deteriorated over time, 
especially after the privatisation through concession contracts. A further reason for choosing 
the MPI is its ability to decompose TFP into different sources of efficiency change: total 
technical efficiency change (EFFCH), which represents a catch-up effect and technological 
change (TECHCH), that is a measure of change in frontier technology. The total technical 
efficiency change (EFFCH) can further be decomposed into pure technical efficiency change 
(PECH) and scale efficiency change (SECH). The result obtained from this analysis gives an 
insight into sources of observed increase or deterioration in efficiency over time, particularly 
after the introduction of the Landlord port model through concession contracts. 
 
4.6 Operationalisation of Concepts 
Operationalisation is the process of converting concepts (constructs) into empirical reality or 
variables (Jonker & Pennink, 2010). In this section, theoretical, empirical and methodological 
aspects of measuring port performance will be explored. In researching port performance, 
two interrelated and overlapping concepts; efficiency and productivity are employed as 
depicted in Chapter 3.  It involves identifying the factors responsible for a port‘s operational 
efficiency and productivity and converting the same to variables. The two techniques the 
DEA and the MPI used for measuring efficiency and productivity are formalised. Finally, the 
sampling frame and variable selection are identified. This is followed by the description of 
the methods and sources of data collection. Thereafter, the definition and choice of the 
datasets are validated based on the DEA and MPI analyses. 
 
4.6.1  Formalising the DEA methodology 
Formally, the analytical techniques selected in this research for benchmarking efficiency and 
productivity change analysis are introduced. Many models have been used to estimate 
operational performance as identified in Chapter 3. This study has identified why the model 
that uses data from the input, output and production function theory, by means of the DEA to 
generate production frontier across port-year observations, is the most appropriate for this 
study. The DEA is used to benchmark the operational efficiency of ports and terminals under 
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study. It also allows for the assessment of the influence of scale and technical factors on the 
efficiency of those ports under consideration. 
  
The DEA attempts to measure technical efficiency using physical quantities to specify the 
functional forms. However, in the presence of price and cost data, it allows for the estimation 
of allocative efficiency. The fractional or linear programming formulation is started by 
defining some of the notations. Let n =  DMUs (in our case ports) for evaluation and the 
DMUs make use of m, different inputs (controllable inputs), to produce s, different outputs 
(controllable outputs). In other words,      consumes          of inputs            
and produces          of outputs           .  The matrix of outputs        and inputs        is denoted as Y and X respectively.  The DMUs are assumed to have at least one 
positive input and one positive output i.e.       and      . Putting into consideration the 
fractional formulation of measuring the relative efficiency of DMU0 for any one of the n 
DMUs, then the relative efficiency of      is measured as the ratio of outputs to the inputs, 
subject to the constraint that no DMU can obtain a relative efficiency value of more than 
unity, or 100%.  
 
Max                            Where       = weight assigned to 
output r and input 
                 Equation 4.1                              
 
Subject to                   for                             Equation 4.2                                          For all i and r   
 
The above equations are a fractional programming problem and will yield an infinite number 
of optimal solutions if additional constraints are not added. 
Assuming that           is optimal, by implication             will also be optimal 
for    . To resolve the problem, Charnes and Cooper (1962) developed a transformation 
that allows for a representative solution i.e. the solution       for which              
yields an equivalent linear programming problem, in which the Charnes-Cooper 
transformation changes variables from       to      , thus we‘ve: 
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Max Z =                                 Equation 4.3 
Subject to                                  Equation 4.4                            
For which the linear programming dual problem is             
Subject to                                                       Equation 4.5                                              
The model in Equation 4.5 is also referred to as the ―Farrell model‖, as it was popularised by 
Farrell (1957). In economics, the DEA model is said to conform to the assumption of ―strong 
disposal‖, because it ignores the presence of non-zero slacks. The phenomenon is referred to 
as ―weakly efficient‖ in operational research DEA literature (Cooper et al., 2011c). 
By the nature of dual theorem of linear programming      , thus either of the problems 
can be used to solve Equation 4.1 to obtain efficiency scores. Hence if      is a feasible 
solution to 4.1, the solution implies       However if     , this means that the current 
input levels cannot be reduced further proportionally and this implies that the      is on the 
frontier. However if     , then      is dominated by the frontier (Cheon, 2007b). The 
optimal solution    gives an input oriented efficiency score for a particular DMU. To obtain 
all the efficiency scores, the process is repeated for each    . Hence, DMUs for which      are inefficient, while DMUs for which     are boundary points. 
From the evaluation of 4.5, some boundary points appear to have non-zero input and output 
slacks:                                                                    
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Where     = input slack and    = output slack 
The following linear programming formular is employed to determine the slacks in Equation 
4.5, assuming the maximal value of the slacks: 
Max                    
Subject to                                                                     Equation 4.6                                                              
 
Furthermore,      is efficient if and only if      and              for all        . This 
condition is referred to as ―DEA efficient‖. However      is regarded as weakly efficient if      and       and/or       for all     . In other words a DMU is said to exhibit a 
condition of ―weakly efficient‖ if it has an efficiency score of 1 and some non-zero slacks. 
Therefore, to account for slacks in a DEA model requires solving a linear programming 
problem in two stages i.e. combining Equations 4.5 and 4.6 thus:                              
Subject to                                                                           Equation 4.7                                                             
Where     is normally referred to as a non-Archimedean element, smaller than any real 
positive number. This is the same as solving Equation 4.5 in two stages; first minimising   
and secondly setting     . This type of formalisation is equivalent to granting ‗pre-
emptive‘ priority to the determination of  . By so doing, the non-Archimedean element    
described as being smaller than any real positive number, can be accommodated without 
specifying the value of   (Cooper et al., 2011c). 
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The Equation 4.3 represents the input-oriented constant returns to scale (CRS) envelopment 
model. In input orientation, there is an assumption that DMUs improve efficiency by input 
reductions and output is fixed at their present levels. In contrast output orientation, efficiency 
is enhanced through output increase and fixing inputs at their current level. The DEA 
orientation concept is illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.5: DEA-CCR model input and output orientation projection to the frontier  
                  Source: Adapted from Cooper, Seiford, and Zhu (2011b) 
Therefore, the output-oriented model can be formalised thus:                             
Subject to                                                                                 Equation 4.8                                                                
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In Equation 4.6, slacks were notable, as they are put into consideration in the calculation. To 
optimise the Equation, the linear programming problem can be solved by fixing slacks as      to arrive at the following: 
Max                    
Subject to                                                                                Equation 4.9                                                                   
 
Hence      is considered efficient if and only if      and             for all        . 
On the other hand,      is weakly efficient if and only if      and        and/or        for all        . While it is relatively inefficient if    . 
The models are evaluated under constant returns to scale otherwise called the CCR model 
named after the authors (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes) that developed the model (Charnes et 
al., 1978). 
 
4.6.1.1  DEA model extensions and returns to scale 
The constant return to scale (CRS) assumption does not regard the size of DMU as a factor in 
estimating port efficiency. So, under the CRS model for smaller DMUs to be considered 
efficient, they must produce outputs with the same ratios of input to output as larger DMUs 
can, or vice versa (Cheon, 2007b). This model is considered in this study, just due to the 
reason that there is no economy of scale at the industry level. Theoretically, ports should be 
able to operate at a point where a doubling of inputs should lead to doubling of all outputs                     as it is the most efficient point to operate. Considering the attributes 
of port production, this assumption may be on the extreme side if economies of scale do exist 
in the port sector at some point (Turner et al., 2004). In other words, if ports are allowed to 
produce at increasing returns to scale, for instance a doubling of all inputs would lead to more 
than a doubling of all outputs                   . This normally occurs when 
organisations take the opportunity of certain managerial and external market advantages, such 
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as stronger purchasing power and the spreading of the overhead over different products over 
time. On the other hand, ports sometimes become too large and unwieldy and operate at 
decreasing returns to scale, or diseconomies of scale. In this type of scenario, a doubling of 
all inputs will lead to less than a doubling of all outputs                    that is there 
are diseconomies of scale at that production level. Instead of the CRS model, the DEA can 
also assume the varying returns to scale (VRS) model, which allows the measurement of the 
output to input ratio to vary in accordance with the size of the DMUs in the sample. The 
difference between the two different approaches is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Let OBC 
represent the CRS frontier line, which is the highest ratio of outputs to inputs obtainable, 
irrespective of the size of the DMUs. Additionally, let VABDE be the frontier under the VRS 
assumption, where VABDE passed through the points where the DMUS can achieve the 
highest ratios of output to input, according to their respective sizes. It can be observed that 
some parts of the frontier (VA and DE) are parallel to the respective axes, further than the 
extreme points. The technical efficiency of a DMU is the distance from the CRS and VRS 
frontier to the DMU respectively. The technical efficiency/inefficiency of a DMU obtained 
from the VRS measurement is a result of factors other than the scale of production.  
Generally, this implies that technical efficiency obtained from the VRS model will be greater 
or equally to those calculated from the CRS model, implying that inefficient ports under the 
CRS model could become efficient under the VRS assumption. 
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Figure 4.6: Production frontier and returns to scale 
Source: Adapted from Herrera and Pang (2005) 
Scale efficiency is measured by the distance between the CRS and VRS frontiers, while the 
point at which the CRS and VRS frontiers meet is regarded as the optimal level of 
production. In Figure 4.6, the point is B; therefore DMU B operates at optimal efficiency i.e. 
B has both the scale and non-scale efficiency. Points A, D & E are said to be scale inefficient, 
but non-scale or pure technically efficient, as they constitute the VRS production frontier. 
The scale efficiency of DMU A is measured by the ratio of the distances YAAD to YAA 
(YAAD/YAA). If the ratio is less than one or hundred percent, that implies that the scale 
efficiency is less than unity, the DMU is regarded as operating at an increasing return to scale 
assumption. Therefore, if the DMU increases its size it could operate at optimal production 
level relative to the peers in the sample. On the other hand, DMUs D and E are operating at 
decreasing returns to scale. As a result of large and unwieldy production scales they could not 
achieve efficiency under the CRS model, but they are considered efficient under the VRS 
model. In addition, the technical efficiency F under the CRS assumption can be determined 
by the ratio of YFFD/YFF. As it consists of both scale inefficiency (YFFD/YFFV) and pure 
technical inefficiency (non-scale inefficiency) (YFFV/ YFF). 
To incorporate scale of operation to the CRS model, it has to be transformed to the VRS 
model and a constraint has to be added to the original CCR model (Banker et al., 1984). To 
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relax the constant returns to scale assumption, a constraint         is added to equations 
4.5 and 4.6, making the sum of the weights equal to one. The resultant model after the 
transformation is the BCC model, which allows ports to operate at varying (increasing, 
constant and decreasing) returns to scale. Table 4.2 is a summary of the different DEA 
models based on surface orientation of the envelopment and returns to scale. 
 
There have been a lot of various enhancements (extensions) to the DEA model literature 
since the seminal works of Banker et al. (1984) and Charnes et al. (1978). The models 
discussed so far in this section work under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
variable returns to scale but there is also the additive model introduced by Charnes et al. 
(1985). The additive model uses the piece-wise linear envelopment, similar to the variable 
returns to scale methodology. The difference is based on the projection path and the additive 
model surface orientation is based on the concept of Pareto minimum function, while the 
BCC model is based on input-output orientation. 
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Table 4.2: DEA model, surface orientation and returns to scale assumption 
Frontier 
Type 
Input-Oriented Output-Oriented 
Constant 
Returns-to-
scale   
                          
Subject to 
                                 
                                                    
 
                 =1   +  
 
Subject to 
 
 
                                
 
                                                                  
1,2, , ;                        
 
Variable 
Returns-to-
scale 
Add             
Non-
increasing 
Returns-to-
scale 
Add            
g Returns-to-
scale 
Add            
Efficient 
Target                                                                                                    
Source: Cheon (2007b) 
4.6.2 Malmquist productivity index decomposition  
The measurement of changes in port efficiency and identifying sources of efficiency gains 
and losses can be achieved by employing the MPI concept. The Malmquist productivity index 
measures the total productivity change between two time periods, t1 and t0 (pre- and post-
concession). It calculates the ratio of the distances of each data in each period relative to a 
common technology. The technology in period t1 is regarded as the reference technology and 
146 
 
the base year for the comparison is period t0. The Malmquist or total factor productivity 
change index between t0 and t1 is represented as the following:                                          Equation 4.10 
Where               represents the distance from the observation in period ‗t0‘ to the period 
t1 technology a value of the above index greater than one indicates a percentage improvement 
in total factor productivity during the two periods, t0 and t1. 
 Fare et al. (1994) redefined this index, suggesting the alternative practice to avoid having to 
choose between technologies in period‘s t0 and t1. The alternative concept is based on the 
geometric mean of two indices that are comprised by two times of benchmarking of one 
period in comparison to the other. The first is evaluated with respect to the period t1 
technology and the second with respect to time t0 technology.  
                                                                         
                                                                                           Equation 4.11 
 
Equation 4.11, represented by the distance functions, can be mathematically rewritten as the 
following; which is represented by output-oriented scores ( ), since the efficiency scores are 
the ratios of distance in the production frontiers: 
                                                                                   Equation 4.12 
              A                          
Where,            , represents the output-oriented efficiency scores produced by the 
benchmarking of a DMU in the year    in comparison to the year of  .  
The part of ―A‖ in equation 4.12 represents change in technical efficiency (catch-up effect) 
between periods t0 and t1. While ―B‖ measures technological change (frontier shift effects) 
during the same period. It has been argued that in order to measure total factor productivity 
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properly using this concept, constant returns to scale (CRS) distance functions are required. 
This is because, a change in technical efficiency, representing catch-effect, consists of 
changes in scale efficiency and changes in non-scale technical efficiency, or ‗pure‘ technical 
efficiency. As the DEA under the VRS do not measure the impact of production scale 
efficiency, the MPI with the VRS distance functions cannot measure change in scale 
efficiency (Fare et al., 1994). It thus leads to the misspecification of size of frontier shift 
effects. 
By introducing some variable returns to scale DEA models, Equations 4.11 and 4.12 can be 
turned into a more refined index in Equation 4.13 (Cooper et al., 2011b; Färe et al., 1994; 
Zhu, 2003). It has also been applied in some recent port production studies (Cheon, 2007b; 
Estache et al., 2004). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Equation 4.13 
 A‘                         A‘‘ 
Where   is output-oriented efficiency scores under the VRS and    is output-oriented 
efficiency scores under the CRS. 
In equation 4.13, the changes in technical efficiency, A equation (4.12) , is separated into 
change in ―pure‖ technical efficiency (A‘) and the change in scale efficiency (A‖) and 
technological progress (B). The product between ―pure‖ technical efficiency (A‘) and scale 
efficiency (A‖) is called total technical efficiency change (TTEC), representing the total 
catch-up effect. This decomposition is interesting, because the changes in scale efficiency of 
ports are often determined by variations in external demand driven by the economic size and 
strengths of port hinterlands. Port authorities and managers may not have active control over 
them, while it is possible to do something about it, through port planning and strategic 
management in the long run. It is possible to carefully examine the influence of different 
factors on port productive performance, by decomposing the sources of inefficiency. 
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In summary, applying the above MPI equations in measuring TFP requires CRS, a distance 
function. It is so, because the technical efficiency obtained from CRS is an amalgam of scale 
efficiency and pure technical efficiency. Secondly, the DEA-BCC measures only non-scale 
efficiency. Therefore, the MPI distance functions obtained from the VRS approach does not 
capture changes in scale efficiency. 
 
Fare et al. (1994) and Lovell (2003) introduced the enhanced decomposition that allows for 
relaxing the CRS model in order to measure scale efficiency. Thus, to further decompose 
technical efficiency, VRS distance function is introduced, to obtain pure technical efficiency 
(PECH) and scale efficiency change (SECH). This particular feature of the Malmquist 
Productivity Index lends itself as a measurement option for decomposing changes in 
production. 
 
4.6.3  Model orientation 
A DEA model can be classified based on whether it is minimising inputs for a given level of 
output (input-oriented), or maximising output for a given level of input (output-oriented).   It 
should be noted that both the CCR and BCC models have a dual input and output orientation. 
The focus of an input-oriented model is on how to reduce input whilst maintaining the same 
level of output. On the other hand, the output-oriented model dwells on how to increase 
output whilst keeping the level of input constant. The difference between the two orientations 
lies on the projection path to the frontier; in the input-oriented model the projection path is 
horizontal. It is vertical in the output-oriented model. The orientation of the model depends 
on the nature of production and the given constraints. Each of the orientations has been 
applied to different studies in the port industry. The input-oriented model is closely related to 
operational management issues, while the output-oriented model is more associated with 
planning and strategies (Cullinane, Song, & Wang, 2005b).   
The proponents of the input-oriented model argue that the port industry is generally 
associated with long-lived infrastructure and facilities and a long-term planning horizon. In 
essence, once a port is built; its output could be predicted in the short run, because ceteris 
paribus, a port can determine the shipping lines that call at its terminal. Additionally, it could 
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predicate throughput based on historical data. Therefore, a port should be concerned about 
how to utilise its inputs efficiently as a cost saving measure in production. 
 
As a result of the increase in international trade due to globalisation, the re-organisation of 
traditional ways of administering ports to a more pragmatic approach will usher in 
competition and less dependence on government for funds. There is also a need to design an 
adequate regulatory framework to guarantee efficient outcomes in the absence of government 
support, especially in developing countries. Therefore, ports should often review their 
strategies in order to provide satisfactory services to their customers and maintain a 
competitive edge in these changing circumstances. For ports, to adapt to the changing 
environment requires accessing existing capacity, in order to find out if the output has been 
maximised in the presence of available input. Taking into account the above scenario, the 
output-oriented model provides a more appropriate benchmark for the port industry. 
 
In this study, output-oriented models are employed as the basis for the analysis. The 
fundamental reason for this choice is that the study is investigating the outcome of the 
privatisation policy as a performance enhancement tool. Since the primary interest of the 
research lies in investigating the results of a policy decision at national level, an output-
oriented model is deemed more suited to such an objective. 
 
4.7 Data Collection  
The primary goal of the data collection is to show the step-by-step approach used in sourcing 
the data that is employed in answering the research questions. The data collection is based on 
the survey of the six Nigerian ports to obtain the operational data required for the years under 
study. The data required is collected through multiple methods. The need to use multiple 
sources of data collection for theory testing in case study research is captured aptly by 
Leonard-Barton (1990): ―Survey research shows the history of past or current phenomenon, 
drawn from multiple sources of evidence. It can include data from direct observation and 
systematic interviewing, as well as from public and private archives. In fact, any fact relating 
to the stream of events describing the phenomenon is a potential datum in a survey research, 
since the context is necessary‖ (p249). 
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 The researcher first and foremost conducted a pilot survey at the premier Nigerian seaport 
Apapa from April 22nd to 6th May; 2011, to achieve the following objectives: 
 To familiarise with the modus operandi of the port system in Nigeria  To have an insight into the types of performance indicators that ports in Nigeria 
collect   To test the adequacy of the interview questions to elicit the desired answers based on 
the conceptual framework 
Secondly, since the purpose of this research is to study in-depth the influence of privatisation 
through concession contracts on operational performance of Nigerian seaports. Secondary 
data from a broad range of documents were reviewed. Plus, key port users were interviewed 
in order to understand the whole story from multiple perspectives. Reviewing and extracting 
data from relevant documents is of particular importance for an ex-post longitudinal field 
study. A longitudinal study in its purest form involves mainly daily participant observation 
Leonard-Barton (1990), which is not feasible for this study. Therefore, the operational data of 
the ports was obtained through retrospective reports, gathered after the events have occurred.  
Documents were retrieved from various print and internet sources, the Nigeria port authority 
website, terminal operators‘ websites, printed and online reports, manuals and handbooks. 
Additionally, from scientific literature, including books and peer-reviewed journal articles, 
maritime magazines and news reports.  
 
The literature review and pilot study provided a prior view of the general constructs or 
categories that needed to be examined and their relationships. During the pilot survey, the 
port users that needed to be interviewed were identified. In addition, the researcher undertook 
a semi-structured interview to solicit the views of the stakeholders on the concession 
programme, to supplement the operational data from the field. The interviews were 
conducted on 4 different port locations (Lagos, Port Harcourt, Warri and Calabar). The 
participants were selected in such a way that all categories of stakeholders were represented. 
For example, the shippers (exporters and importers) are represented by the freight forwarders, 
who as agents handle the day-to-day activities in the port on their behalf. The terminal 
operators were represented by two representatives from the Seaport Terminal Operators 
Association of Nigeria (STOAN), an umbrella body for terminal operators working in 
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Nigerian ports.  The shipping companies‘ participants were selected from the Indigenous 
Ship Owners Association (ISAN).  The landlord the NPA is represented by the General 
Manager (GM) Public Affairs and workers by a representative from the maritime union. 
Subsequently, the researcher made sure the interviews covered participants from the two port 
complexes i.e. the Lagos and Eastern port complexes, so that the opinions obtained were 
representative of the sample. 
 
4.7.1 Sampling framework 
Sampling deals with the criteria employed in selecting the units of analysis. Only two criteria 
guided the selection of the sample i.e. participation in the 2006 reform program and the ports 
must not be solely a dedicated crude port or terminal. A container terminal with a shorter 
history than the other terminals (West African container terminal WACT, Onne concession to 
APMT in 2010) was also excluded. In this study, each port-year is regarded as a distinct unit 
or DMU, in order to satisfy the homogeneity assumption inherent in a DEA analysis. As the 
focus of this study is to provide an in-depth understanding of the influence of wholesale 
concessions on the performance of a national port system, seaports in Nigeria were only 
considered for the analysis. 
 
Hence, the population of this study consists of 20 Nigerian seaports and the 20 terminals 
delineated from those ports, but only six ports that are multipurpose ports and part of the 
2006 concession program were chosen as a sample for the port analysis. The remaining 14 
ports handle only crude oil and other wet bulk cargoes and at the same time is not part of the 
2006 concession programme and is not considered for this study. Moreover, they are more 
aligned with the energy sector than the port system. The operations of the six ports are similar 
because they are all multipurpose ports i.e. they handle different types of cargo.  
 
Additionally, this research follows the suggestion by Bryman and Bell (2007) that the 
selection of the object of study should not be restricted to ports or terminals with high volume 
of throughput. Therefore, all ports that participated in the 2006 Nigerian port reform 
(concession program) no matter the size were selected. That is why the study included the 
biggest and oldest port in Nigeria the Apapa port and also small ports such as Calabar and 
Warri.  
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The sample size of this research is six seaports. Two (2) of the ports are located in Lagos 
State (Apapa & Tin Can Island port), two in Rivers State (Port Harcourt and Onne port), one 
in Delta State (Warri port) and one in Cross River State (Calabar port) and from the six ports, 
20 terminals were carved out during the concession programme. In the analysis, the six 
Nigerian ports operations are compared against each other, because they are multipurpose 
ports.  
 
For this research, the unit of analysis would have been port or terminal depending on which 
one is being analysed. However, consideration of the small sample size and satisfying the 
general rule of thumb for DEA application are required, as suggested by Raab and Lichty 
(2002) that; the minimum number of DMUs in a DEA analysis should be three times the 
combined number of inputs and outputs to ensure sufficient degree of freedom as well as to 
enhance the discriminatory power of the DEA. Additionally, as this study is a longitudinal 
study in which data is collected over a relatively long period (2000-2011), the particular unit 
of analysis is port-year, thus bringing the number of DMUs for the analysis to 72.  
 
In addition, another factor that could impair the integrity of the DEA analysis is the variations 
in traffic and operational arrangements between sampled ports as it may compromise 
homogeneity. However, it is reduced to the barest minimum as sampled ports are from the 
same operating environment and share common hinterlands. Though there may be instances 
of non-homogenous data in the set because the sampled contain large ports alongside small 
ones. The problem is tackled by using returns-to-scale model (BCC) and sensitivity analysis 
to identify different scale properties and performance levels of the production frontier.  
 
4.7.2 Variable selection 
The application of Frontier models such as the DEA in research, involves the identification of 
resources (inputs) and the transformation of the resources (outputs). There are two criteria 
employed in selecting the variables used in this research. The first one considered is 
availability. The second is a literature search to ensure validity and conformity of the research 
with the existing body of knowledge  This is necessary as misspelt variables could lead the 
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model to point in the wrong direction (Wang et al., 2003). Plus, the wrong choice of variables 
could introduce bias in the results.  
 
Therefore, care is taken in the selection of input and output variables so as to give accurate 
representation of actual objectives and processes of port production  (Cullinane et al., 2004; 
Norman & Stoker, 1991). In port production, the observed performance of the port is closely 
related to its objective. This research assumed the primary objective of the port is the 
minimisation of the use of input(s) and maximisation of the output(s). As a result of secrecy 
and difficulty involved in obtaining financial data, this assumed objective is not in agreement 
with profit maximisation. Therefore, financial variables will not be considered for this 
research. 
 
For this study, the researcher adopted the following procedures in the selection of the 
input/output variables to ensure objectivity as much as is possible. First, a review of the 
various port efficiency and performance studies, press reports and leading shipping tabloids 
was carried out and the types of input and output variables used in each case (Appendix 1.1). 
However, because most articles pertain to European, American and Asian ports, the selection 
of operational variables that is consistent with port operations in Nigeria presented a 
considerable challenge, since the study was not conceptualised to have a global character. 
Secondly, the available inputs and outputs were analysed and scrutinized from the pool of the 
resources used in previous studies. Thus, a selection of the inputs and outputs used for this 
study was made based on the objectives of the Nigerian port system. Finally, the verification 
of the pre-selected variables was carried out in order to find out which ones are available 
from the data sources. 
 
4.7.2.1 Output variables 
In the DEA application to the evaluation of port operations, there are many productive output 
indicators that could be considered, such as:  the volume of cargo (General, Container, Dry 
bulk, Wet bulk, RORO), including total number of passengers loaded/unloaded i.e. the 
throughput, the turnaround time of ships and the number of ship calls. From the synthesis of 
DEA applications in seaport (Appendix 1.1), it is evident that the total throughput is arguably 
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the most significant output measure. It is consistent with the objective of seaports. The total 
number of passengers handled is considered as an output variable, as ports also maintain 
infrastructure for passenger handling. However, for Nigerian seaports this data is not 
available, as passenger traffic is mostly on inland waterways that are not under the 
management of the NPA. Therefore, number of passengers is not included as an output 
variable in this research. Likewise, the number of ship calls is excluded due to collinearity 
between it and total throughput. Moreover, what is the benefit of having a higher number of 
ship calls if there is no increase in total throughput? It may be argued that it is an indicator of 
the frequency of service, but that is not enough to justify adding it as another variable in the 
model, as too many variables will reduce the quality of the result.  
 
However, the selection of suitable output variables for the present DEA analysis depended on 
data availability and correlations among these variables. On this basis, two output variables, 
turnaround time and total cargo throughput were chosen. The reason for the choice of total 
cargo throughput as an output variable is borne out of the wide acceptance of the variable as 
an indicator of port or terminal output production. The majority of port 
efficiency/performance studies have treated it as an output variable, as it is closely related to 
the need for facilities for cargo handling and services. In addition, it provides the basis on 
which ports are compared in terms of relative size, magnitude of investment, activity level 
and most importantly it forms the basis for revenue generation. The yearly average 
turnaround time is chosen to take care of service quality. Its inclusion is justified because 
there is a definite relationship between it and the objectives of the concession programme. So, 
only two output variables are selected for this study: total annual throughput and average 
annual turnaround time of ships. 
 
The choice is restricted to two output variables due to the frontier characteristic of the DEA, 
which implies that many variables give rise to many efficient DMUs. In other words, too 
many variables reduce the viability of a DEA analysis. If a higher number of variables in 
relation to the sample size are chosen, most of the DMUs will appear as efficient (Marques & 
Carvalho, 2009). This may not be desirable, as it reduces the DEA analysis to a worthless 
exercise. In order to circumvent the undesirable outcome of having too many efficient 
DMUs, it is advisable to consider fewer variables in a DEA implementation.  
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Another aspect that was discussed in the output definition is how to measure the variables. 
Some of the previous studies measured the quantum of cargo that is moved. While others 
used the capacity of ships that call at the ports as measured in gross registered tonnage (GRT) 
or dead weight tonnage (DWT), as a proxy for the quantity of cargo that is moved through a 
port.  It will be unreasonable and unnecessary to use a proxy variable when the real volume 
handled by each port under study is available. Though it may be argued that it will benefit 
ports to have large ships calling, the assumed objective of this study is how to efficiently 
handle cargo and not to receive bigger ships. Another crucial issue is on the definition of 
units for each category. For instance Ro-Ro traffic is measured in different ways in countries, 
but as a tonnage figure for all the cargo types is available, the study adopted tonnes as unit of 
measurement for throughput.  
 
4.7.2.2  Input variables 
The input variables consist of the various resources employed to produce the output, such as 
Land, Labour and Capital.  Economic theory implies that effective handling of cargo volumes 
depends mainly on the efficient use of port land, labour and capital (Dowd & Leschine, 
1990).  In port operations, terminal capacity, size of storage area, quay length, berth length, 
piers, handling equipment (gantry cranes, yard cranes, straddle carrier, forklifts etc) and 
warehouse capacity are suitable for consideration as possible input variables in a port‘s 
production. Other input factors that could be considered for efficiency estimates include: 
berth occupancy, berth accessibility, proximity to major trade lanes and crane operating 
hours. As well as different handling speeds of yard and ship-to-shore cranes, equipment age 
and maintenance, the capital invested in a terminal and associated equipment, average 
container interchange per ship and quayside water depth (see Appendix 1.1). The herculean 
task involved in obtaining practical data on each of these variables across the six ports for a 
twelve-year period (2000-2011) proved insurmountable. Plus, to consider all these factors as 
potential inputs in port efficiency, the multicollinearity among the factors must be significant. 
 
The issue of what type of labour to be considered as input to port production has been 
problematic due to availability and unreliability of direct data. As a result, Neufville and 
Tsunokawa (1981) and  Notteboom et al. (2000) proposed a predetermined relationship that 
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then number of gantry cranes and number of dockworkers are directly related in a container 
port. However, Cullinane and Wang (2006a) pointed out that although this relationship may 
be true in container terminal production, it may not be relevant to other types of ports or 
terminals because of different characteristics of production. In fact they pointed out the 
danger involved in applying the relationship to container ports or terminals with different 
production scales because different equipment and labour arrangements are employed. For 
labour input, stevedoring labour (dock workers) is arguably the most important in port 
production as they are directly involved in loading and offloading cargo. However, due to 
non-availability of this data across all the ports under investigation, this study employed the 
total number of staff employed in a port as a proxy for labour input, because the six ports are 
involved in handling heterogeneous cargo. 
 
Therefore, this study uses four input variables; Storage capacity and berth length were chosen 
for land input, the total number of equipment for capital input, whilst the total number of staff 
employed by each port/terminal represents labour input. There is no agreement among 
authors on the type of variables to be used in undertaking port performance benchmarking, as 
evident in literature review of input/output used in different port studies (see Appendix 1.1). 
Rather, each author selects input/output based on the purpose of the research. For instance, 
Tongzon (2001), and Cullinane and Song (2003) used number of berths to reflect berth side 
productivity. While  Cullinane et al. (2002), Wang et al. (2005)  and Notteboom et al. (2000) 
proposed the use of total berth length instead. The description of input and output variables 
selected for the analysis is presented in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Input and output variables of Nigerian ports 
Variables Descriptions 
 
Units of 
Measurement 
                                                   Inputs 
Number of berths Total berths available to a port or 
allocated to a terminal 
Units 
Number of staff The total staff strength of a port or 
terminal 
Units 
Storage capacity Total available cargo storage space 1000 Tonnes 
Number of equipment Total number of equipment 
available for cargo operation 
purposes 
Units 
                                                     Outputs 
Throughput Total cargo handled annually by a 
port or terminal 
 1000 Tonnes 
Turnaround Time The yearly average time a ship 
spends at port or terminal from 
arrival to departure. 
Days 
 
In summary, for the efficiency and productivity analysis, the samples size for this research is 
six major Nigerian ports and the twenty terminals delineated from the ports in 2006.  The 
period considered for each port is 2000-2011.  The study made use of four input variables and 
two output variables. The input variables are: Number of berths, total number of equipment, 
total storage capacity and the total number of staff in each port. The output variables used are 
total yearly throughput and turnaround time. 
 
However, as explained in Chapter 2, port performance is influenced by several variables, 
some of which are outside the control of the PAs such as level of economic activity, 
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geographical location and frequency of ship calls. To capture these variables, two structural 
equations representing the functional relationship between throughput and efficiency were 
formulated. A two-stage multiple linear regression is applied to the model for parameter 
estimation. The definition of these variables and the procedures for generating functional 
equations are presented in Chapter 6.    
 
4.7.3 Data justification 
To justify that the selected variables fit the model, the output variables throughput (THRUP) 
and turnaround time (TAT) were regressed against the input variables (Number of berths, 
number of equipment, number of staff and storage capacity of the ports). The results obtained 
are shown in Table 4.4. The R-square values show that 72 and 52 percent of the variance in 
throughput and turnaround time (output variables) respectively can be explained by the linear 
combination of the input variables (Number of berths, number of equipment, number of staff 
and total storage capacity). The remaining 28% and 48% of throughput and turnaround time 
respectively can be attributed to other factors (exogenous factors). However, as port size as 
represented by throughput has a higher R2 value and is also a significant factor in determining 
the efficiency as observed in Chapter 5, it is the only factor considered in the multivariate 
analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
Table 4.4: Summary statistics of regression of output variables against input variables 
SUMMARY OUTPUT   
 
  
Regression Statistics THRUP TAT 
Multiple R 0.8475 0.7235 
R Square 0.7183 0.5234 
Adjusted R Square 0.7015 0.4949 
Standard Error 3860.7079 3.3175 
Observations 72 72 
 
In order to apply the DEA for performance benchmarking, there are certain conditions that 
the data employed for that purpose should fulfil. In this section, the researcher justifies and 
validates the definition and selection of the variables in the dataset.  
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4.7.3.1 Validation and accuracy 
The need for factual data in a research of this nature cannot be overestimated and that is why 
the data for this study are carefully selected. First and foremost, articles or reports that were 
outdated were discarded, unless it is used to express an idea that is relatively constant. Also to 
ensure that the data obtained from internet sources are factual, editable sites (excluding 
Wikipedia), blogs and forms and non-copyrighted materials and sites that accept open 
contributions, were ignored. Secondly, the analysis considers all shades of opinions and 
relevant evidence. Thirdly, the port and terminal documents (annual reports) were not solely 
relied upon; both corroborating and contesting information were harmonised before inclusion 
in the analysis. 
 
Therefore, collection of accurate data for all DMUs is vital for the reliability of results and to 
ensure that data used for the DEA analysis is a representation of the operations of Nigerian 
ports. Data was collected from the individual ports/terminals operational reports to the NPA 
Headquarters, the terminal operators‘ annual reports and the compliance reports to the NPA. 
The data from the different sources was examined, scrutinised and compared for accuracy 
and conformity with one another. In the case of a significant discrepancy, clarification was 
sought from the port statisticians. For minor differences between figures from different 
sources, the average of the numbers obtained from the various sources was taken as the 
input/output value.  The researcher‘s knowledge of the Nigerian port system also came in 
handy in the review and adjustment of data that is not in conformity with the size and 
operational arrangements of the ports and terminals in the sample. 
 
Another phenomenon that can compromise data accuracy is what the economists describe as 
congestion which is attributable to the choice of input and output variables. Congestion is 
said to occur when reductions (increases) in one or more inputs generate an increase 
(decrease) in one or more outputs. For example, if an increase in the number of stevedores 
and other port labour leads to lower throughput and production levels (Bichou, 2008). The 
selected variables for this study were screened for congestion, in accordance with various 
models suggested by Brockett, Cooper, Wang, and Shin (1998) and Cooper, Deng, Seiford, 
and Zhu (2011a). Thus, the input and output variables are carefully selected to avoid 
congestion. However, in cases of congestion due to excessive use of inputs, as is the case in 
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some port-year operations in this study. The congestion is identified as the amount of input or 
output slacks and the influence on the efficiency benchmarks is discussed in order to help 
policy makers reallocate resources and avoid waste. 
  
4.7.3.2 Data scaling, exclusivity and exhaustiveness 
To avoid round-off errors inherent in the DEA measurements, the input/output variables with 
excessively large numbers compared to other variables, had their values scaled down. In this 
study, the values of throughput and storage capacity were scaled down and recorded in 1000 
tonnes instead of tonnes, as mentioned in Table 4.3.   
 
The rule of exclusivity and exhaustiveness as applied in a DEA measurement implies that 
only the inputs selected should influence output levels and that this influence should also be 
limited to the selected output variables. It is necessary to observe this rule so as to avoid 
assigning output and input resources tasks that have been exogenously determined. 
 
To ensure that there is exclusivity and exhaustiveness between variables used in this research, 
the researcher identified only the input and output variables that influence only a port‘s 
operational performance. In addition, only ports that have handed over terminal operations to 
the private sector were included. Furthermore, the analysis was carried out on two levels to 
explicitly determine the operational scope of each DMU under study and only utilised those 
factors that experts have described as influencing a port‘s operational performance to build 
the model. 
 
4.7.3.3 Positivity and isotonicity property 
In a DEA application, it is required that the value of all input and output variables should be 
positive and non-zero. As shown in Appendix 5.1, all data used for the DEA analysis is all 
positive, thereby satisfying the positivity requirement. 
 
The corollary to positivity is the isotonicity property. Before using a DEA model, the 
functions relating inputs to outputs must have the mathematical property called isotonicity 
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(Charnes et al., 1985). It implies that an increase in any input should be accompanied by 
some increase in output and not a decrease. In order to test compliance to this property by the 
input and output variables selected for this study, a Pearson correlation of the selected inputs 
and outputs was taken. The result of the Pearson correlation in Table 4.5 is positive and 
significant at a 5% confidence level, which means that the isotonicity assumption has not 
been violated.  
Table 4.5: Pearson correlation between variables 
Descriptive THRUP TAT NOB NOE NOS TSC 
Throughput 1 0.076 0.225 0.541* 0.599* 0.830* 
Turnaround 0.076 1 0.372 0.162 0.451 0.090 
No. of 
Berths 
0.225 0.372 1 0.384 0.219 0.430 
No. of 
Equip. 
0.541* 0.162 0.384 1 0.622* 0.592* 
No. of Staff 0.599* 0.451 0.219 0.622* 1 0.694* 
Capacity 0.830* 0.090 0.430 0.593* 0.694* 1 
 
4.8  Software 
Many standard optimization software packages such as Solver Pro, On Front, Warwick DEA, 
DEA Excel Solver, DEAP, EMS and Pioneer have been used in estimating efficiency scores. 
However, this study used the commercial software package, Frontier Analyst professional 
version 4 developed by Banxia holding, Banxia Frontier Analyst User Guide (2012) for 
efficiency and the Malmquist Productive Index analysis in this research. The Frontier Analyst 
from Banxia Software is a stand-alone Windows application which evaluates and documents 
most professional user interface. It organises analysis as projects and sample data could be 
accessible from a wide range of sources, including text, Excel, SPSS files, the Windows 
clipboard, the current Excel selection and direct entry.  It displays the input data of DMUs as 
a matrix, where individual DMUs and variable data can be easily edited. Each variable is 
classified as output, input, or uncontrolled input (non-discretionary); DMUs in the sample can 
be screened using filtering rules in the software, to form subsets for analysis. It allows for 
specification of bounds on individual factor weights. 
 
The frontier software Linear Programming models discussed previously are solved 72 times 
(number of DMUs), once for each of the ports in the sample. The software operates by 
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searching for a linear combination of ports in the sample that produces a maximum number 
of outputs, using less number of input resources for each port in the data set. For each port in 
the analysis, the software model identifies output slacks or excess input usage for each unit of 
the analysis. Prior to running the programme, the study specified the returns to scale, the 
valuation system and the orientation system. The programme presents the results of the 
efficiency analysis as a percentage; a DMU with a score of 100% is regarded as efficient, 
while a score of less than 100% is considered inefficient.  
 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the different research methods available to the researcher to undertake 
an empirical study. The various research philosophies were examined, and the reason for the 
choice of the positivist paradigm as the most appropriate for the study was established. 
Subsequently, a deductive approach is adopted based on survey in case study strategy. The 
study employed the survey in case study strategy to test the theoretical concepts of port 
privatisation, performance and competition using the practice in Nigerian seaports. Therefore, 
this study‘s survey in case study research is associated with the deductive approach and is 
conducted to advance scientific knowledge. As a result, the study adopted the explanatory 
research design, which is devoted to finding causal relationships among variables. As 
drawing causal inferences from a cross-sectional survey design is difficult, the study 
employed a longitudinal design which is more appropriate for studying temporal changes. 
 
The data collection uses mainly secondary data sources from documents obtained from the 
Nigeria Ports Authority and terminal operators. However, interviews are used to solicit the 
opinion of stakeholders about the concession program. The data collected was designated as 
either an input or output variable and that constitutes the database used for the analysis. 
 
Efficiency and productivity measurement were employed in answering the research questions 
and ascertain the relationship between concession and operational performance. The chapter 
equally justified the use of DEA for the analysis and benchmarking of port/terminal 
efficiency, MPI for analysing productivity and evaluating the influence of concession. 
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This chapter later dealt with the operationalisation and formalisation of the analytical 
methods and techniques selected for the research. It equally focused on other aspects of the 
methodology, such as a sampling frame, data collection and variable selection. 
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Chapter Five: Benchmarking Nigerian ports operational efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter undertakes a benchmark analysis of the six Nigerian ports for the period 2000-
2011. The chapter adopts the different DEA methodologies; inter-temporal, contemporaneous 
and window, for the analysis. This is because of the small sample size of six ports, so as to 
increase the discriminatory power of the DEA. This allows for identification of the sources of 
efficiency (technical, scale or both), which can be very useful as this will enable the right 
policy to improve the performance of inefficient ports. Thereafter, window analysis is 
employed to determine the efficiency over time (2000-2011) of the six ports. This chapter 
also evaluates the pre- and post-concession efficiency of the six Nigerian ports operations 
from 2000 to 2005 and from 2006-2011 representing pre- and post-concession respectively. 
To determine the change in productivity over the study period, the MPI was employed to 
decompose sources of efficiency into frontier shift effects and catch-up effects. 
  
 
The operational hypotheses are tested to examine the impact of scale (size) on efficiency of 
operation and also the influence of concession on efficiency.  The strategy employed in this 
chapter is to analyse data based on the specific objectives of the research, then, validate the 
empirical results that will help in the understanding of Nigerian ports production, with 
emphasis on the influence of concession. 
 
5.2 Analysis and Results  
5.2.1 Intertemporal analysis (2000-2011) 
The input and output data used for the analysis and the descriptive statistics is shown in 
Appendix 5.1-5.3. The primary objective of the inter-temporal analysis is to measure the port-
year efficiency of Nigerian seaports across the different time periods of the study (2000-
2011). As there is no clear-cut information on the returns to scale in the port production 
function, the dataset was subjected to both constant returns to scale and variable returns to 
scale models, by assuming output orientation. First, the overall efficiency index is computed 
from DEA constant returns to scale model (CCR) and the pure technical efficiency is isolated 
by applying the varying returns to scale model (BCC). Secondly, the scale efficiency index is 
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calculated from the efficiency score obtained from the CCR and BCC models, as scale 
efficiency is the ratio of overall and pure technical efficiency (CCR/BCC). Both exercises 
made use of the database for the 6 Nigerian ports for the period 2000-2011 (Appendix 5.1). 
The results obtained by applying the above models to the input and output variables in the 
dataset is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Nigerian ports pure technical efficiency scores (BCC) for 2000-2011 
YEAR PORTS 
 APAPA CALABAR ONNE PH TCIP WARRI MEAN STDEV 
2000 68.4 21.7 100 88.6 64 34.8 62.92 30.18 
2001 83.3 43.8 100 100 56 34.9 69.67 28.6 
2002 100 43.2 100 100 57.4 36 72.77 30.62 
2003 100 36 84.4 100 50.2 47.8 69.73 28.45 
2004 100 100 98.9 100 45.9 61.5 84.38 24.28 
2005 89.9 54.5 100 96 46.6 38.3 70.88 27.42 
2006 100 65.1 100 100 49.1 46.1 76.72 26.31 
2007 97.5 61.7 100 83.2 63.2 42.3 74.65 22.73 
2008 100 100 100 88.7 80.1 54.4 87.2 18 
2009 98.2 39.3 87.1 85.4 87.1 80.6 79.62 20.58 
2010 96.2 100 100 95.2 77.5 83.9 92.13 9.291 
2011 100 40.1 100 100 89.1 81.2 85.07 23.33 
MEAN 94.5 58.8 97.5 94.8 63.9 53.5 77.14 20.49 
STDEV 9.70 27.39 5.54 6.48 15.83 18.92   
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the DEA empirical analysis employs two output variables: total 
yearly throughput handled in tonnes and average yearly ship turnaround time in days. The 
inputs measures used are: number of berths in the ports and total cargo handling equipmen,t 
as a proxy for capital. Total number of staff employed by the ports as a proxy for stevedore 
labour and total storage capacity of the port represents land input. The result obtained from 
the analysis shows that the overall mean efficiency (CCR index) is 64.9% (Appendix 5.6). 
While the average pure technical (BCC index) and scale efficiencies are 77.14% and 82.78% 
respectively, for the period under study (Appendix 5.6). A comparison of the mean overall 
and pure technical efficiencies indicates the presence of inefficiency related to production 
scale. This is because the overall efficiency estimates and pure technical efficiency index 
differ in value. The gap in efficiency between the mean overall and pure technical efficiency 
is a measure of the degree to which production scale inefficiencies undermine technological 
efficiency (Merk & Dang, 2012). However, inefficiencies related to technology are 
determined by the gap in technical efficiency score in relation to a given port-year operation 
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and its efficient benchmark (the efficiency frontier). The higher the gap, the greater the 
adjustments needed to bring the given port-year operation towards efficiency. To bring 
inefficient port-year operations to be technical efficient, the detailed estimates to be made of 
input and output variables are shown in Appendix 5.3. While the potential improvements 
needed to bring all the ports under study to the efficient frontier based on the dataset, is 
shown in Figure 5.1. In Appendix 5.5 it is observed that for the efficient port-year operations, 
the input and output variables have no adjustments (slacks). In other words, there are no 
slacks because they are operating at optimal levels. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Nigerian ports’ BCC potential improvements 
Figure 5.1 indicates that for the ports under study to operate at optimal efficient level overall, 
total throughput has to increase by 56.59% and turnaround time improved by 25.5%, at the 
same level of inputs. Conversely, the inputs should be reduced by 5.08%, 6.22%, 0.49% and 
6.11% respectively, for the number of berths, total number of equipment, total number of 
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staff and storage capacity at the present level of output. The type of adjustment needed to 
bring the ports to efficiency depends on the returns to scale characteristics i.e. whether the 
ports are operating under increasing or decreasing returns to scale. For the sample, 35 port-
year operations are under increasing returns to scale and 25 under decreasing returns to scale 
(Appendix 5.6). For the port-year operations with increasing returns to scale to achieve 
benchmark efficiency, output levels should be increased, while those operating at decreasing 
returns to scale should reduce input consumption.  
      
Figure 5.2 shows the port-year efficiency score distribution frequency for both the CCR and 
BCC models. The pink and blue bars represent the number of port-year operations within the 
efficiency index range for the BCC and CCR respectively. For example, 12 port-year 
operations were efficient under the CCR model, whereas it is 24 for the BCC model. It is not 
surprising that the DEA-BCC model generates more efficient port-year operations than the 
CCR model, since the DEA model with constant returns to scale assumption provides 
information on technical and scale efficiency combined. While the variable returns to scale 
identifies only pure technical efficiency. The ANOVA of the efficiency scores obtained from 
the DEA-BCC and DEA-CCR analyses shows that the efficiency scores computed from these 
two models are significantly different at the 5% level (F=7.8; critical value of 3.91). The 
correlation coefficient between the efficiency scores derived from the DEA-BCC and DEA-
CCR analysis is 0.825. The positive and high spearman Rank Order correlation indicates that 
the efficiency scores of the port-year operations obtained from the two models, are highly 
correlated. However, statistically, the efficiency scores computed from the two models based 
on the data are different. A combination of the ANOVA and Spearman‘s Rank Order 
correlation coefficient leads to the conclusion that the efficiency estimates yielded by the two 
approaches are different and that they follow the same pattern across the port-year analysis. 
As observed, the result further confirms the presence of inefficiencies arising from scale of 
operation. That is why the 12 port-year operations considered inefficient under the DEA-
CCR have become efficient under the DEA-BCC (port-year efficiency score highlighted in 
yellow), when scale of operations is not taken into consideration (Appendix 5.6). This is in 
view of the fact that smaller ports may have some inherent disadvantages that could bar them 
from performing as efficiently as the larger scale counterparts. Therefore, assuming VRS 
suppresses this limitation and brings the smaller ports closer to the efficient frontier, if 
strategically managed and despite the size disadvantage.   
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Figure 5.2: Comparison of the DEA-CCR and BCC models port-year efficiency score and 
distribution frequency  
Table 5.1 shows the technical (DEA-BCC) efficiency scores of the six Nigerian seaports from 
2000-2011. For the period under review, none of the ports operated at 100% technical 
efficiency level throughout the period. Although the ports operated at high efficiency, as 
indicated by the mean efficiency of 77.15% for the whole period. It can equally be observed 
that the Onne port has the highest mean technical efficiency score of 97.5%. It may not be 
surprising, as it is located at oil and gas free trade zone and acts as a transhipment centre for 
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. It is the only port whose whole operation for the period 
under consideration is in the private domain, because it started operation as a Landlord port. 
It is followed by the PH port with a mean efficiency of 94.8%; the two ports are located 
outside the Lagos zone and are free from the perennial congestion associated with Lagos 
ports. The most efficient port-year operation is PH2006, with super-efficiency score of 207 
(Appendix 5.6 highlighted in the colour blue).  It is also observed that the TCIP and Warri 
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ports did not achieve efficient operation in any of the 12 years under consideration. The TCIP 
operated under IRS throughout the period i.e. it is operating below optimal scale in order to 
achieve efficiency relative to its benchmark, it needs to increase throughput and reduce ship 
turnaround time to attract shippers. On the other hand, the Warri port operated at both IRS 
and DRS. There is high variation in the efficiency scores of Warri port for the period 
(standard deviation 18.92%) and exhibited both IRS and DRS production characteristics for 
the period. It may not be unconnected with the security situation in the Niger Delta due to 
youth unrest. At the height of the youth militancy in the region (2000-2006), ships were 
scared away from using the ports in the Warri zone.  However, with the disarming and 
embracing of amnesty by the youths, the situation has been put under control and ships have 
started patronising the ports, hence the improved efficiency from 2007 when the amnesty 
programme came into effect. 
 
5.2.1.1 Influence of production size on port efficiency  
The Pearson correlation between the DEA efficiency scores and total cargo throughput, with 
a two-tailed t-test, is used to evaluate the effect of production size on efficiency.  Assuming 
the null hypothesis (HO): Port size has no effect on the efficiency of port operation. In 
order to determine the direction of influence of port size on port efficiency, an alternative 
hypothesis (H1): Port size influences the efficiency of ports (2-tail test). The DEA 
efficiency scores derived from the CRS and VRS were compared against throughput values. 
 
The result obtained is presented in Table 5.2. The mean BCC efficiency for the period is 
77.15%, and the correlation between the technical efficiency score and port size is 0.6222 
(Figure 5.3), which is significant at the 5 percent confidence level. The absolute value of the 
t-stat, 10.2457, is much greater than both the t-critical, one-tail (1.6666) and two-tail (1.9939) 
tests. It implies that port size has an effect on the efficiency of ports. In other words, even if 
the concepts of scale economies are not put into consideration, the larger ports with their 
DEA scores obtained from VRS intertemporal analysis are still more efficient. It is in tandem 
with global perception, as the larger ports can attract bigger ships and the skills to manage 
them more efficiently for higher productivity without scale advantages, by investing in 
modern equipment. It may not be surprising, as larger ports in the world today are technology 
leaders and have locational advantages. In addition, they can formulate better strategies, 
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because they have the requisite management skills to convert given inputs optimally to 
increase their outputs. The drawback of intertemporal analysis is in the treatment of time, as 
it treats the ports of the different years as if they exist and operate in the same period. The 
result that bigger ports operate more strategically and employ better managerial skills to 
become more efficient, as obtained from intertemporal analysis, should be treated with some 
degree of caution until similar results are verified by the window analysis. The reason being, 
that during the 12 years covered by intertemporal analysis, a significant reform (concession) 
has taken place in Nigeria. The concessions may have brought changes in technology, 
regulation, economic conditions or competitive situation, rendering comparisons of ports 
during such an extended period unfair and unrealistic. The Window analysis is the time-
dependent model of the DEA and compares the operations within a short time. The 
assumption is that within such a brief time, changes in port conditions may not be such that 
they can render the results obtained from the analysis unfair or unreasonable. 
Table 5.2: Relationship between DEA intertemporal scores and port size 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means    
 
   
  
CCR BCC Throughput 
Mean 64.88 77.15 8609.56 
Variance 797.34 591.28 49932873.16 
Observations 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation 0.613 0.622  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0  
df 71 71  
t Stat -10.2856 -10.2677  
P(T<=t) one-tail 5.1988E-16 5.6019E-16  
t Critical one-tail 1.6666 1.6666  
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.0398E-15 1.1204E-15  
t Critical two-tail 1.9939 1.9939   
 
    
171 
 
    
 
 
Figure 5.3: Relationships between Nigerian ports’ overall and technical efficiency scores and 
production scale 
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Table 5.3: Intertemporal BCC efficiency of the ports and production scale 
PORT SIZE 
(Tonnes) 
DEA SCORES 
 
DEA EFFICIENT 
DEA=100% 
N=24 
GROUP 1 
81-99% 
N=18 
GROUP 2 
61-80% 
N=9 
GROUP 3 
41-60% 
N=15 
GROUP 4 
21-40% 
N=6 
CATEGORY 1 
>10Million  
 N=27 
Apapa 2002-
2004, 2006, 2008 
& 2011, Onne 
2002, 2005-2008, 
2010-2011 
Apapa 2001, 
2005, 2007, 
2009 & 
2010, Onne 
2003, 2004 
& 2009, 
TCIP 2009 
& 2011 
Apapa 
2000, TCIP 
2007, 2008 
& 2010 
  
CATEGORY 2 
<10Million>5Millo 
N=16 
PH 2001, 2002, 
2006 & 2011, 
Onne 2000 & 
2001 
PH 2005, 
2009 & 
2010, Warri 
2010 & 2011 
Warri 2009 TCIP 2001, 
2003, 2005 
& 2006 
 
 CATEGORY 3 
<5Million>2Million 
N=11 
PH 2003 & 2004 PH 2000, 
2007 & 2008 
TCIP 2000 TCIP 2002 
& 2004, 
Warri 2008 
Warri 2002 
& 2005. 
CATEGORY 4 
2Million>300,000 
N=18 
Calabar 2004, 
2008 & 2010 
 Warri 2004, 
Calabar 
2006 & 
2007 
Calabar 
2001, 2002 
&  2005, 
Warri 2000, 
2001, 2003, 
2006 & 
2007 
Calabar 
2000, 2003, 
2009 & 
2011 
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Furthermore, to increase the discriminatory power of the DEA in the intertemporal analysis, 
each port operation in a particular year was regarded as a DMU in each of the operating 
years. To differentiate the yearly operations as unique ports, the year of operation is attached 
to the port name. In other words, Apapa 2003 means the operations of the Apapa port in 2003 
which is regarded as a separate DMU (port) from the Apapa port operations in say 2010, 
which is equally another port defined as Apapa 2010. Therefore, the yearly operations of the 
six Nigerian seaports for 12years (2000-2011), gave rise to the 72 datasets (DMUs) used for 
this analysis. 
   
 
A cross tabulation of the yearly efficiency of ports (DMUs) in relation to production scale 
was constructed in Table 5.3, based on production scales (throughput volumes). The ports 
were classified into 4 categories and placed under 5 groupings (DEA efficient, group1, 
group2, group3 and group4) according to their BCC efficiency scores. Generally, the 
expectation would be for small ports (Category 4 DMUs) to be in the inefficient group. 
However, the Table indicated that some small ports are performing efficiently for example 
Calabar 2004, Calabar 2008 and Calabar 2010. Table 5.3 shows that 25 out of the 27 DMUs 
that are in category 1 (i.e. ports with the largest production scales) fall into high efficiency 
groups (DEA efficient and Groups1-2). The DMUs where their operations are considered the 
least efficient in category1 are: Apapa 2000 and TCIP 2007. On the other hand, 11 out of the 
18 DMUs in category 4 (ports with the smallest production scales) are classified under the 
inefficient groups that is groups 3 & 4. However, 3 of the port-years under this group are 
fully efficient and also, 4 port-years in category 4, operate within the high efficiency realm of 
61-80%.  
 
 
Again, from the analysis of the 72 port-years, 24 port-years have a technical efficiency score 
of 100% are categorised as DEA efficient: Apapa (2002, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2008 & 2011), 
Onne (2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010 & 2011), PH (2001, 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2006 & 2011), and Calabar (2004, 2008 & 2010). However, only 12 port-year 
operations are considered overall efficient that is operating at optimal level based on 
available data (Figure 5.2). The three ports Onne, PH and Apapa which accounted for the 
most efficient operations, are the biggest ports in Nigeria. The Apapa port is the oldest port in 
Nigeria and is located in the heart of Lagos, the commercial nerve centre of Nigeria and 
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Africa‘s second most populous city after Cairo, the capital of Egypt. Additionally, the biggest 
container terminal (the Apapa container terminal, now named AP Moller terminals) in Sub-
Saharan Africa is situated in the Apapa port. Despite these, the port recorded an overall 
operational efficiency in 2008 & 2011 after concession. It could be that the takeover of the 
terminals by the private operators brought some relief to the notorious problem of the Apapa 
port‘s congestion. Though, evidenced by a reduction in the congestion surcharge two years 
into the concession, the problem is creeping back (AfDB, 2010; Oghojafor et al., 2012). Onne 
has an advantage of having started operations from inception as a Landlord terminal and has 
deep berths, with high draughts, at the federal ocean terminal, which can accommodate larger 
ships. The port is being packaged as a hub port for West and Central Africa because of the oil 
and gas services it renders to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. As a result of the ripple 
effects from the oil and gas sector, Port Harcourt has emerged as the second commercial 
centre in Nigeria after Lagos. So, the ports of PH and Onne are being positioned to service 
the Port Harcourt area and other commercial cities in the eastern zone, such as Aba, Onitsha, 
Nnewi and Enugu. Therefore, it could be deduced that the most efficient ports in Nigeria are 
those that support commercial hinterlands. On the other hand, the years that the PH port 
operated efficiently overall (both technical and scale) were during the pre-concession period. 
It indicates that the concession of the ports may not be a panacea for all the problems faced 
by the nation‘s ports.  The operations of some ports should have been left in the public 
domain, or other methods of incorporating private sector ideologies (corporatisation or 
commercialisation) could have been explored in such cases. 
   
 
The ports in group1 are those with BCC efficiency scores of between 81-99%. In the DEA 
frontier analyst version 4 developed by  Banxia Frontier Analyst User Guide (2012), 100% is 
considered efficient for DMUs in the data set. Therefore, any DMU in the sample with an 
efficiency of less than 100% is regarded as relatively inefficient in comparison to the other 
units in the sample. Hence, the inefficient ports should improve their throughput, or reduce 
their input mix for a given throughput, in accordance with their reference efficient peers in 
the sample, in order to operate efficiently. For instance, Apapa2000 port with a DEA score of 
68.4% in order to operate closer to the frontier of its efficient peer group (Apapa 2002, Apapa 
2011, Onne 2006 and PH 2004), should reduce the input variables: the number of equipment 
by 47.04%, the number of staff by 16.76%, increase the throughput by 46.24% and improve 
turnaround time by the same margin (Appendix 5.5). 
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Although it is observable that the 18 ports in group1 are not entirely efficient, but they are 
however, operating at a higher efficiency level than ports in groups 2-4. The port-years in 
group1 are ports with large production scales and commercial hinterlands. Apapa (2001, 
2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010), Onne (2003, 2004 and 2009), PH (2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 
2009 and 2010), TCIP (2009 and 2011) and Warri (2010 and 2011). It is worthy of note that 
some medium sized ports; TCIP and Warri have some of their operations after the concession 
classified in this group which shows some improvement towards efficiency after the 
concession. 
 
 
Port-years with efficiency scores of 61-80% are classified under group2, indicating a 
moderately (medium-high) high level of productive efficiency. Port-years in this category 
should increase their efficiency by 20-39% in order to operate on the frontier of their efficient 
counterparts. This group includes port-years with low levels of production scale, for example 
Warri 2004 and Calabar 2006 and 2007. The other port-years in the group are: Apapa 2000, 
TCIP 2000, 2007, 2008 and 2010 and Warri 2009.  These periods fall under post-concession, 
except TCIP 2000. Despite that, some of the years have low throughput levels and their 
efficiency is above average. It shows the efficiency level is attributable to technical rather 
than scale and that could mean that the private terminal operators have brought their expertise 
to bear on the operations.  
 
 
The third group includes port-years with DEA scores of 41-60%. In comparison to other port-
years in the sample, they are considered to be operating at medium to low efficiency levels. 
Thus for port-years in this group to catch up with best practice among their contemporaries, 
they need to increase their output levels by 40-59%, while maintaining the current input 
levels. Examples of port-years in this group are: TCIP 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2006, Warri 2000, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007 and 2008 and Calabar 2001 and 2002. As 
observed earlier, a port‘s efficiency improvement over time may be due to technological 
progress and acquiring better managerial skills. It is interesting to note that most of the ports 
in group3 are pre-concession operations except Warri port with its 3 years post-concession 
operations included that group. Although the amnesty has been introduced which has 
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improved security situation in the Niger Delta during the period under study, most shipping 
lines that patronise Warri ports are still sceptical and have not returned for operation.   
 
Lastly, port-years with very low efficiency scores of 21-40% are classified under group4. 
Therefore, for port-years in this group to compete with their efficient counterparts, they need 
to improve their efficiency by 60-79%. Most of the port-years in this category are small ports 
and pre-concession operations. They are ports located in remote and non-commercial 
hinterlands. The Calabar port‘s post-concession operations in 2009 and 2011 found in this 
group and show the problem that the port is having in improving efficiency, even with private 
participation in port operations. The port-years in this group are Warri 2002 and 2005 and 
Calabar 2000, 2003, 2009 and 2011. It may not be surprising that the Calabar port operations 
after concession (2009 & 2011) appeared in this group. Despite being strategically located to 
provide services for the Calabar export processing zone (EPZ) and North-east geo-political 
zone, its low draught coupled with the problem of the Ikom Bridge prevents bigger ships 
from accessing the port. The Ikom bridge is located in the central corridor to the port.  It is a 
covered bridge with low overhead clearance, which prevents heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) 
and container carrying vehicles from accessing the port from the north-east corridor. The 
concessionaires during the interview observed that the government, through the NPA, has yet 
to fulfill its part of the  concession contract. The dredging of the Calabar port as at 2011 and 
the reconstruction of the Ikom Bridge, have yet to happen even six years into the concession. 
Although the Calabar port has been concessioned, it has not overcome the problem of low 
utilisation. As a result, the over two hundred plus industries in the Calabar EPZ and the 
Tinapa business resort use the Onne and PH ports to import and export trade.    
 
5.2.2 Contemporaneous analysis 
Contemporaneous analysis involves constructing reference observation subsets at each point 
in time, with all the observations made at that point in time. Each reference observation 
subset for that point in time can be represented thus:                         Equation 5.1                  
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Over the whole period covered by the analysis, in this study 12 years, a sequence of T 
reference observation subsets are constructed, in such a way that there exists one for each 
period t. Thus, the efficiency of each port in the sample is analysed against only 6 
observations (number of ports in our study), for each of the 12 years covered by the analysis. 
The probability of having higher efficiency scores is greater with small samples (Cullinane, 
2010) and the means of each port‘s 12 years individual efficiency scores will be relatively 
high. 
 
Hence the relationship between intertemporal, contemporaneous and window analyses 
depends on the treatment of time. In intertemporal analysis the window width     (12 
years in this study), there are 72 observations (12 annual observations per port for 6 ports) 
and the efficiency is computed relative to each other. The individual efficiency estimates 
derived for each port in each year will obviously average out to a lower value than when the 
window width is smaller. The result obtained from the contemporaneous analysis assuming 
both the CCR and BCC models, is presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 respectively. 
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Table 5.4: Contemporaneous analysis: CCR efficiency scores 
PORTS YEARLY CCR EFFICIENCY  SCORES IN PERCENTAGES (100= 'EFFICIENT') 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 72.7 72.1 72.8 74.5 72.6 60.5 99.9 100 100 100 100 100 85.4 15.6 
CALABAR 58.6 100 92.6 61.5 70.1 29.2 38.3 37.9 100 73.4 100 100 71.8 26.9 
ONNE 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
PH 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
TCIP 69.1 55.9 50.2 42.6 37 41.5 52.1 79.9 100 100 92.9 97.7 68.2 24.7 
WARRI 56.2 54.5 45.7 50.3 97.3 45.5 53.7 47 68 100 100 100 68.2 23.8 
MEAN 76.1 80.4 76.9 71.5 79.5 62.8 74.0 77.5 94.7 95.6 98.8 99.6 82.3 22.9 
STDEV 19.5 22.3 24.6 24.6 24.9 30.5 28.9 28.4 13.1 10.9 2.9 0.9   
MIN 56.2 54.5 45.7 42.6 37 29.2 38.3 37.9 68 73.4 92.9 97.7   
MAX 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
Table 5.5: Contemporaneous analysis: BCC efficiency scores 
PORTS YEARLY BCC EFFICIENCY SCORES IN PERCENTAGES (100= 'EFFICIENT') 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
CALABAR 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
ONNE 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
PH 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
TCIP 100 78 65.1 53.5 47.7 54.9 57 87 100 100 96 100 78.3 21.3 
WARRI 56.8 100 45.9 51.5 100 46.1 58.3 60 70 100 100 100 74.1 23.8 
MEAN 92.8 96.3 85.2 84.2 91.3 83.5 85.9 91.2 95 100 99.3 100 92.1 17.0 
STDEV 17.6 9.0 23.8 24.5 21.4 25.7 21.9 16.1 12.2 0 1.6 0   
MIN 56.8 78 45.9 51.5 47.7 46.1 57 60 70 100 96 100   
MAX 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   
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Tables 5.4 & 5.5 shows the efficiency index computed from the CCR and BCC models 
respectively, for the contemporaneous analysis. However, as previously explained, the 
discussion is based on the BCC model. There are little differences in the efficiency scores 
obtained from the two models, although the difference is significant for some of the ports. 
For instance, Apapa and Calabar that are efficient in the BCC model are inefficient in the 
CCR model. It could be said that the efficiency of the two ports (Apapa and Calabar) are 
strongly influenced by port production scale, as they are subjected to increasing and 
decreasing returns to scale respectively.  
Table 5.6: Relationship between contemporaneous efficiency scores and port size  
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances  
 
   
  
AVECRS AVEVRS AVETHROUGHPUT 
Mean 82.283 92.058 8609.556 
Variance 142.732 38.823 8315505.618 
Pearson Correlation 0.819 0.666  
Observations 12 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0  
df 11 11  
t Stat -10.244 -10.232  
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.90479E-07 2.93823E-07  
t Critical one-tail 1.796 1.796  
P(T<=t) two-tail 5.80957E-07 5.87646E-07  
t Critical two-tail 2.2010 2.2010   
 
The impact of production size was re-assessed using the efficiency scores from the 
contemporaneous analysis, considering the observed drawbacks of the inter-temporary 
analysis. A t-test of the contemporaneous efficiency scores obtained from the CCR and BCC 
approaches and throughput, was carried out. This is was done in order to ascertain whether a 
worthwhile relationship actually does exist between port size and efficiency for the period 
covered by this study. For both the BCC and CCR there is a very high correlation between 
the DEA efficiency scores and throughput (that is the determinant of port size). Table 5.6 
indicates a high and positive correlation of 0.8194 and 0.6658. It is significant at the 5% 
confidence interval for the efficiency scores obtained from both the CCR & BCC respectively 
and for port size (measured in throughput values). Additionally at the 5% confidence level, 
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the absolute values of the t-statistics are much greater than the t-critical values for both one-
tailed (1.7959) and two-tailed tests (2.2010). 
The implication of this is that for the period under review and whether economies of scale are 
considered or not, the larger ports are more likely to obtain higher efficiency scores from the 
DEA analysis than the smaller ports. The analysis further gave credence to the results 
obtained from the investigation of the relationship between the DEA efficiency scores and 
port size, from the intertemporal analysis. Therefore, the relationship that exists between the 
time and port efficiency is not a bogus one. As the contemporaneous analysis connotes a 
cross-sectional observation, it shows the relative efficiency scores of the six ports in each of 
the years under study.  
 
 
In the contemporaneous analysis, each port is compared to 6 other counterparts and the 
frontier is defined by the ports in the same set. Due to the small number of DMUs that are 
involved in the contemporaneous analysis, only 6 DMUs, while it is 72 DMUs and 180 
DMUs for the inter-temporal and window analysis respectively, it indicated more efficient 
ports. For instance, under the contemporaneous analysis, 4 out of the 6 ports operated at 
100% efficiency for the 12 years under review, compared to none in the inter-temporal and 
window analyses. Table 5.5 shows a significant variation in the efficiency of the TCIP and 
Warri over the period, as indicated by the high standard deviations of 21.3 and 23.8 for the 
two inefficient ports respectively. From a cursory look at the trend of efficiency for the two 
inefficient ports (TCIP and Warri) in table 5.5; one may infer that the there is significant 
variation in efficiency of the two ports over time. It is equally interesting to note that the 
eastern ports (PH, Onne and Calabar) are performing more efficiently than the Lagos ports 
(Apapa and TCIP) and the Delta port (Warri). As explained previously, the broad variation in 
efficiency of the Warri port may be attributable to the unpredictable security situation in the 
Niger Delta region, which scared away shippers from using the port. 
 
 
5.2.3  DEA window analysis 
The DEA window analysis was carried out, assuming three years window width for the six 
ports for a 12-year period, which gives 180 DMUs for the sample used for the window 
analysis. The window analysis identifies the ports that have performed in relation to the other 
ports used in this research, as well as the most stable and variable ports in terms of the DEA 
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scores. The overall efficiency of each port is evaluated by assuming variable returns to scale 
and by applying the DEA analysis methodology. The efficiency scores reported above are 
from the intertemporal analysis using panel data, where the observations for six Nigerian 
ports in different years are treated as separate observations and measured against each other. 
This assumption may not be rational. Considering the changes in technology, regulation, 
economic conditions or competitive situations that may have occurred during the 12-year 
period under analysis, these may render the comparisons of ports in different years unfair and 
unrealistic. 
  
In order to evade the problem of unfairness when comparing observations from different time 
periods, a contemporaneous analysis would have been ideal, including observations from one 
time period. It is not applicable to our case, due to the small number of DMUs used in the 
study. The alternative would have been to use sequential analysis that includes previous 
observations and assume that what was feasible in the past remains feasible. This method 
leads to the same problem encountered in the intertemporal analysis, especially in the tail end 
of the study period, where observations are compared to other observations far away in time. 
In addition, the Nigerian port industry witnessed massive reform in 2006; therefore what was 
feasible in the past may not be feasible any more. 
 
The result of the window analysis, employing both the BCC and CCR models are shown in 
Appendix 5.7 and 5.8 respectively, while the yearly mean efficiencies obtained for the two 
models are in Tables 5.7 & 5.8. There are no remarkable differences in the overall efficiency 
ranking of the ports. Nevertheless, some ports exhibited some differences in the efficiency for 
the period. For example, Calabar and Onne with average efficiency scores of 70.8% and 81% 
under the CRS assumption, had their mean efficiency scores improved to 91.8% and 99% 
respectively when the VRS model was applied. The port-years Apapa 2003, 2004 and 2005 
and Calabar 2004, which operated at a very low efficiency level under the CCR model, are 
classified as efficient under the BCC assumption. The reason for this is not far-fetched, as the 
efficiency of these ports is strongly influenced by production scales, because they are still 
exposed to increasing or decreasing returns to scale. The efficiency scores for the ports under 
study, obtained from the window analysis, exhibited a similar pattern to those obtained from 
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the intertemporal and contemporaneous analyses. Again the TCIP and Warri showed high 
fluctuations, as indicated by high standard deviations. 
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Table 5.7: Window analysis: CCR yearly mean efficiency scores 
PORT YEARLY EFFICIENCY SCORES (100="EFFICIENT") 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 53.2 63.6 64.2 64.0 59.9 71.4 98.9 98.6 100 100 98.2 100 81.0 19.5 
CALABAR 47.3 87.7 77.2 56.5 59.4 39.9 72.1 61.6 100 76.1 94.4 82.8 71.3 18.7 
ONNE 73.1 95.8 100 92.9 99.5 100 100 100 100 96.1 100 100 96.4 7.7 
PH 85.8 100 100 100 100 100 100 88.7 97.8 100 100 100 97.7 5.0 
TCIP 55.8 53.8 45.4 37.6 34.9 55.7 54.8 72.4 92.1 97.2 87.6 97.7 65.4 23.0 
WARRI 45.3 41.7 40.8 49.3 63.0 33.2 49.0 37.1 61.6 95.8 97.8 100 59.5 24.7 
MEAN 60.1 73.7 71.3 66.7 69.5 66.7 79.1 76.4 91.9 94.2 96.3 96.8 78.6 22.8 
STDEV 16.0 24.1 25.8 24.7 25.5 29.0 23.7 24.4 15.2 9.1 4.8 6.9   
 
Table 5.8: Window analysis: BCC yearly mean efficiency scores 
PORT YEARLY EFFICIENCY SCORES (100="EFFICIENT") 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 78.1 98.35 100 100 100 100 100 98.9 100 100 98.8 100 97.8 6.2 
CALABAR 66.6 100 100 91.1 100 86.3 88.3 96.5 100 70.5 100 89 90.7 11.6 
ONNE 100 100 100 100 96.4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.7 1.0 
PH 88.6 100 100 100 100 100 100 91.6 100 100 100 100 98.4 3.9 
TCIP 74.1 62.7 60.2 51.9 47.5 52.0 54.0 70.9 94 97.5 89.6 100 71.2 19.5 
WARRI 45.4 42.1 41.4 49.9 74.3 43.2 53.9 51.9 65.6 96.2 99.7 100 63.6 23.2 
MEAN 75.5 83.9 83.6 82.1 86.4 80.2 82.7 85.0 93.3 94.0 98.0 98.2 86.9 19.4 
STDEV 18.8 25.2 26.1 24.5 21.5 26.0 22.7 19.4 13.8 11.6 4.1 4.5   
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Using the window analysis, the influence of port size on port efficiency is re-assessed in 
considering our earlier discussion on the shortcomings of the intertemporal analysis. To test if 
there is actually a relationship between the port size and port efficiency for the twelve-year 
period, the column mean from the window analysis is used. Thus, once the window is 
defined, the observations within that window are viewed in an intertemporal fashion, and the 
analysis of that window is assumed as locally intertemporal (Tulkens & Vanden Eeckaut, 
1995). Therefore, the column means represent the performance of the units in a particular 
year. 
 
Table 5.9: Relationship between the DEA’s window efficiency scores and port size   
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means   
 
   
  
BCC  CCR Throughput 
Mean 86.904 80.385 8609.5557 
Variance 377.567 449.589 49932873.16 
Observations 72 72 72 
Pearson Correlation 0.4646 0.4702  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 0  
df 71 71  
t Stat -10.2471 -10.2563  
P(T<=t) one-tail 6.1E-16 5.87465E-16  
t Critical one-tail 1.6666 1.6666  
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.22E-15 1.17493E-15  
t Critical two-tail 1.9939 1.9939   
     
The correlation between the CCR and BCC efficiency scores and port size is 0.465 and 0.470 
respectively, which is positive and significant at 5 percent confidence level. In Table 5.9, the 
absolute value of the t-statistics is much greater than the t-critical values for both the one-tail 
(1.667) and two-tail (1.994) tests. From the t-test values obtained from the CCR and BCC 
models, it could be suggested that no matter the DEA approach used, ports with large 
production scales obtain higher efficiency scores. In other words, they are more efficient than 
ports with smaller production scales. The results obtained from the DEA window analysis 
tend to confirm the relationship established between the DEA efficiency scores and port size 
with the intertemporal analysis, is not a false relationship between time and efficiency. 
Therefore, the results of the window analysis support the interpretation from the 
intertemporal analysis that rejected the null hypothesis. Hence, there is a relationship between 
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port size and efficiency of port operations for the period under review. Bigger ports around 
the world are leaders in port technology developments and the strategies for port 
development and management (Cheon, 2007b).     
Table 5.10: Window analysis: BCC efficiency scores and production scales 
DEA Scores Efficient                       2000-2011ports                 Inefficient 
Port size DEA efficient=100%  
N=36 
GROUP1 
81-99% 
N=16 
GROUP2 
61-80% 
N=8 
GROUP3 
41-60% 
N=12 
Category1 
>10million tonnes 
N=27 
Apapa (2002, 
2003,2004,2005, 
2006,2008,2009 & 
2011) 
Onne(2002,2003, 
2005,2006,2007, 
2008,2009,2010 & 
2011), TCIP  2011  
Apapa (2001, 
2007 & 2010), 
Onne 2004, 
TCIP (2008, 
2009 & 
2010) 
Apapa 2000, 
TCIP  2007 
 
Category 2 
<10million>5million 
tonnes N=16 
Onne (2000 & 2001) 
PH (2001,2002,2005, 
2006,2009,2010 & 
2011), Warri 2011 
Warri (2009& 
2010) 
TCIP 2001 TCIP 2003, 
2005, 2006) 
Category3  
<5million>2million 
tonnes N=11 
PH (2003,2004 & 
2008) 
PH (2000 & 
2007) 
TCIP 2000, 
Warri 2008 
TCIP 2004, 
2002)  Warri 
(2002, 2005) 
Category4 
<2million>300,000 
tonnes N=18 
Calabar (2001, 2002, 
2004, 2008 & 2010) 
Calabar (2003, 
2005, 2006, 
2007, 2011) 
Calabar 
(2000 & 
2009) 
Warri 2004 
Warri (2000, 
2001, 2003, 
2006 & 
2007) 
 
Table 5.10 represents the DEA efficient ports and three other groups based on the efficiency 
scores derived from the window analysis using the VRS approach. The production scales are 
classified into four categories based on the throughput values. Out of the 72 port-years 
employed in the analysis for the period 2000-2011, 36 are regarded as DEA efficient and 18 
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of which are in category1 i.e. ports with high production scale. It may not be surprising as the 
efficiency of ports improves with port size. It is worthy to note that some of the small ports 
such as Calabar 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2010, are under the DEA efficient group, despite 
their scale of operation. It signifies that small ports could operate efficiently, if managed 
strategically. 
 
The port-years in group1 are ports with efficiency scores of 81-99%, although they may not 
be operating wholly efficiently as efficient ports, but they operate at a higher efficiency level 
than the other two groups. For instance, Apapa 2007 and Onne 2004 with average window 
VRS efficiency scores of 98.9% and 96.4%, require only 1.1% and 3.6% to be at the frontier 
of their efficient counterparts. The group includes both ports of high and low production 
scales. It implies that small ports such as PH 2000 & 2007 and Calabar in 2003, 2005, 2006, 
2007 & 2011, are in Category 3 & 4,  the class of low production scale. It shows that these 
small ports are strategically managed. The ports in group2 are ports with medium to high 
efficiency scores of 61-80%. There are only two category1 ports in Group 2, Apapa 2000 and 
TCIP 2007 and one category2 port TCIP 2001, in this group also indicating that the ports in 
the group also operate mostly in the region of medium to low production scales. Group3 
comprises of ports with low to medium efficiency scores of 41-60%. There is no category1 
port in this group, which still buttresses our argument that port size influences efficiency. The 
ports in this group are mainly the inefficient ports, such as the TCIP in 2003, 2005 &2006. 
Although, in category 2, the region of high production scales are not strategically managed 
compared to their efficient peers (Apapa 2008 and PH 2004). For the ports in this group, to 
operate on the frontier closest to their efficient contemporaries they need to improve their 
efficiency by 59-40%. It is impressive to observe that there is no group4 in the VRS window 
analysis, because all the ports have improved their efficiency scores compared to the scores 
they obtained under the intertemporal analysis. The window analysis increases the 
discriminatory power of the DEA. 
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Figure 5.4: Yearly Average Efficiency of Nigerian Ports 
Figure 5.4 shows the yearly efficiency scores of Nigerian ports obtained from the three 
methods; the intertemporal, contemporaneous and window analyses. In terms of trends, it 
could be observed from Figure 5.4 that all ports show fluctuations in efficiency scores for the 
period under review. However, the fluctuations are highest with the intertemporal analysis; 
mean standard deviations of 20.49, 19.4 and 17.0 for intertemporal, window and 
contemporaneous respectively. In the intertemporal analysis, the DMUs exhibited 
fluctuations throughout the period compared to the window and contemporaneous analyses, 
which showed reasonable variations up to 2005 and from 2006, exhibited a gradual but 
steady increase till the end of the period. The wide variation in efficiency experienced in the 
intertemporal analysis could be attributable to the inconsistency in adopting technological 
innovation and best managerial practice, which drives productivity and efficiency 
improvements in the long run. In other words, there is no plan laid down for investment in 
infrastructure, and the adoption and deployment of technological and managerial expertise. 
The lower fluctuation in efficiency scores observed in the contemporaneous and window 
analyses can be explained by assuming that within the short periods of 3 & 1 years, the 
DMUs are more inclined to be deploying the same or similar technology and management. 
The implication is that the efficiency scores obtained during this relatively small period may 
not be substantially influenced by technology and managerial changes. 
 
In addition, Figure 5.4 shows that the efficiency scores obtained from the window and 
contemporaneous analyses are higher than the efficiencies obtained from the intertemporal 
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analysis. In fact, the highest efficiency scores are recorded for the contemporaneous analysis. 
It may not be surprising, as conceptually for the contemporaneous analysis each port is 
compared with six other counterparts and that defines the frontier for all the ports in that set. 
While for the intertemporal and window analyses, each port is compared with 72 port-years 
and 180 port-years respectively. 
 
To further investigate the fluctuation of the efficiencies over time, the relationship between 
the efficiency scores and the standard deviations was examined. The result indicated a high 
but negative correlation of -0.857, -0.959 and -0.859 for intertemporal, contemporaneous and 
window analyses respectively. It shows that the efficiency of all the ports in our observation 
set, both efficient and non-efficient, exhibit similar levels of fluctuations over time. 
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Figure 5.5: Efficiency trends of Nigerian seaports 
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Overall for the period under review, the most efficient port is the Onne port followed closely 
by the Port Harcourt port and the inefficient ports are the Calabar and Warri, which are the 
smallest in terms of size. 
 
5.3  Pre- and Post-concession Efficiency of Nigerian seaports 
5.3.1 Pre-concession analysis  
The objective of this section is to establish any patterns or trends in the performance of the 
ports, six years before and six years after concession. Though six year intervals may be 
considered too short for establishing trends. Nevertheless, it could give an indication of the 
efficiency levels attained by the ports prior to privatisation and whether the ports are on the 
path of efficiency as envisaged by the concession programme. The analysis applied both the 
DEA-CCR and BCC models, assuming output orientation for a panel data comprising of a 
sample size of 36 port-year operations (6 years of operation of 6 ports).  Therefore, pre- and 
post- Nigerian seaport efficiency was examined using intertemporal analysis; the study 
compared the operations of the ports for six years before (2000-2005) and six years after 
(2006-2011), concession. The results of the pure technical efficiency scores estimated for the 
two-time horizons; before and after concession are presented in Tables 5.11 and 5.12. While 
the outcome of the overall analysis, pure technical and scale efficiency scores, plus returns to 
scale, are shown in Appendix 5.9 and 5.10. 
 
Table 5.11: Pre-concession period: pure technical (DEA-BCC) efficiency scores  
PORTS 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 72.6 90.4 100 100 100 100 93.8 11.1 
CALABAR 48.4 100 100 82.5 100 100 88.5 20.8 
ONNE 100 100 100 88.7 99.2 100 98.0 4.6 
PH 88.6 100 100 100 100 100 98.1 4.7 
TCIP 64 57.2 57.4 51.3 47.4 51.5 54.8 5.9 
WARRI 34.8 34.9 36.9 49.1 61.5 44.7 43.7 10.5 
MEAN 68.1 80.4 82.4 78.6 84.7 82.7 79.5 24.1 
STDEV 24.4 27.8 28.1 23.0 23.8 26.9   
MIN 34.8 34.9 36.9 49.1 47.4 44.7   
MAX 100 100 100 100 100 100   
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Table 5.11 shows for the period under evaluation, that there is no year that all the ports 
operated efficiently overall, but the mean efficiency for each year is above average.  The 
most efficient year is 2004, with an average efficiency of 84.7%, followed by 2005 with 
mean efficiency of 82.7%. It is trailed closely by 2002 with a mean efficiency of 82.4. The 
year with the least efficient operation is 2000, with an average of 68.1%.  
 
 
The average technical efficiency score for the pre-concession period is 79.5%.  The most 
technically efficient operation for the period is the PH port with a mean efficiency score of 
98.1%, followed closely by the Onne port with 98%. The least efficient port operations for 
the period is recorded in the Warri port with below average efficiency of 44.7%, followed by 
the TCIP with an average of 69.3%. 
 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the yearly efficiency trend in pure technical and scales efficiencies for the 
pre-concession period, while Figures 5.7 & 5.8 indicate an individual port‘s pure technical 
and scale efficiency trends. Figure 5.6 shows that the mean scale and pure technical 
efficiency is almost equal (78.7 & 79.5 respectively). There is no year that all the ports 
operated at 100% efficiency both technically and in terms of scale. Therefore, the source of 
inefficiency of the ports can be attributed to both. However, as the mean pure technical 
efficiency is greater than scale efficiency, the primary source of inefficiency during the pre-
concession period is scale. Scale efficiency gap occurs as a result of ports not operating at 
optimal levels.  In other words, it could be said that the pre-concession Nigerian ports 
performance problem is due to underutilisation of available resources that means available 
input resources are not put to optimal use. 
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Figure 5.6: Pre-concession average yearly efficiency trends analysis  
 
Figure 5.7: Pre-concession pure technical port efficiency (DEA-BCC model) trends 
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Figure 5.8: Pre-concession port scale efficiency trend 
Figures, 5.7 and 5.8 show the pure technical and scale efficiencies‘ trends of the Nigerian 
seaports in the pre-concession period. Figures 5.7 and 5.8 reveal that the performance gaps 
observed in the ports of Calabar, Apapa and TCIP, during the pre-concession period are due 
to scale inefficiency. While the below average performance of the Warri port is more of a 
technical inefficiency rather than a scale inefficiency. The PH and Onne ports‘ performance 
level show the same trend in both. In other words, the ports exhibited the same performance 
in pure technical and scale efficiencies and therefore the efficiency gaps of the two ports in 
the pre-concession are attributable to both technical and scale inefficiencies. 
  
 
The Apapa and TCIP ports operated under increasing returns to scale in the six years under 
review. While the Warri port operated in the first three years under increasing returns to 
scale, and in the other three years of the pre-concession exhibited decreasing returns to scale 
(Appendix 5.9). Only the Onne and PH ports achieved constant returns for 4 and 5 years out 
of the six years under investigation respectively. On the other hand, the Calabar port 
operations throughout the pre-concession period, depicts decreasing returns to scale. 
Likewise, the Onne and PH ports , that did not operate under constant returns to scale for 2 
and 1 years out of the six years under investigation respectively (Appendix 5.9). Therefore, 
none of the ports achieved constant returns to scale overall during the study period. However, 
the Onne port operations in 2002 and 2005 and PH port operations from 2001-2005 are 
considered optimal, as they are operating under constant returns to scale (Appendix 5.9).  The 
implication of the ports operating at increasing returns to scale would have been to increase 
their budgets, or expand their input capacity, so as to increase throughput levels and improve 
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the vessel turnaround time.  Conversely, for ports experiencing decreasing returns to scale, 
they needed to outsource part of their operations in order to achieve optimum production 
levels. 
  
 
Finally, the mean technical efficiency (CCR score) of the ports for the pre-concession period 
is 62.0% (Appendix 5.9). The technical efficiency (TE) is broken down into pure technical 
efficiency (PTE), which is represented by the BCC score and scale efficiency (SE). The mean 
efficiency scores for TE and SE are 79.5% and 78.7% respectively. Judging from the average 
efficiencies, it could be inferred, as observed earlier that the overall inefficiencies 
experienced by Nigerian seaports during the pre-concession period are primarily as a result of 
scale inefficiencies, rather than pure technical inefficiencies. The high technical efficiency 
indicates that the cause of inefficiency is not poor management practices, but the inability to 
improve production scales given the available resources. The result further reveals that 
shippers were deserting the Nigerian ports due to congestion, poor service delivery and high 
cost of doing business (Leigland & Palsson, 2007; Oghojafor et al., 2012). For the ports that 
are operating under increasing returns to scale (IRS), increasing input levels should have 
improved their efficiency. While those operating under decreasing returns to scale require an 
increase in the output level or a reduction in the input level, as the inputs have been operated 
over optimal scales. 
 
5.3.2 Post-concession analysis 
The results obtained from the DEA-methodology for the post-concession period analysis is 
displayed in Table 5.12. They show that only 7 port-years obtained an overall efficiency 
estimate of 100%, but six port-year operations are considered optimally efficient (highlighted 
in green in Appendix 5.10). The operations of the Onne port in 2009 are weakly efficient, as 
it operates at decreasing returns to scale, indicating that the output produced given the 
available input resources is below optimal levels. The average overall efficiency for the 
period is 76.1%. The port with the highest overall efficiency is the Apapa port, which 
achieved a mean yearly score of 97.4%. It is closely followed by the Onne port with an 
average efficiency of 96.2% and the PH port with 94.7%. On the other hand, the least 
efficient port is, assuming the CCR model, Calabar, with a mean efficiency score of 36.3% 
(Appendix 5.10). The year that has the highest overall efficiency level is 2011, with an 
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average score of 81.6%, then 2009 with 80.3%, while the lowest average efficiency of 65.1% 
is observed in 2007. There is no clear and identifiable pattern in the yearly efficiency trends 
of the six ports under observation. However, what is noticeable is a series of peaks and 
troughs which indicates high variation (Figure 5.10). Figure 5.10 show that the overall 
efficiency scores obtained by the Apapa, Onne and PH ports are almost maximum, as they 
require only 2.4 to 5.3% to be on the relative frontier of their most efficient counterpart.  
 Table 5.12: Post-concession period: pure technical efficiency scores (BCC model). 
PORTS 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 100 97.5 100 98.4 96.2 100 98.68 1.6 
CALABAR 100 64.9 100 46 100 42.3 75.53 27.9 
ONNE 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 
PH 100 84.7 100 92.1 100 100 96.13 6.4 
TCIP 49.1 64.3 81 88.7 78.1 89.6 75.13 15.7 
WARRI 58.3 50 59.1 83.2 83.9 81.4 69.32 15.2 
MEAN 84.6 76.9 90.0 84.7 93.0 85.55 85.8  
STDEV 24.1 20.2 16.9 20.0 9.6 22.5 13.89  
5.3.2.1 Technical efficiency of post-concession Nigerian ports 
The empirical results in Table 5.12 show that the DEA-BCC yielded higher efficiency scores 
than the DEA-CCR model, as expected. The mean technical efficiency score for the period is 
85.8%. Onne is the most technically efficient port; its efficiency value is 100% and although 
it obtained 100% for the six years under consideration, its operation in 2009 is considered 
weakly efficient. It operated under decreasing returns to scale for that year, which implies 
that the increase in outputs fell below those of inputs. It is followed by the Apapa and PH 
ports with DEA-BCC score of 98.68 and 96.13 percent respectively, while the least efficient 
is the Warri port that achieved a score of 69.32%. All the ports have high, but fluctuating 
efficiency scores, as depicted in Figure 5.10. The year with the highest mean DEA-BCC 
efficiency score of 93% is 2010, followed by 2008 and 2011 with 90% and 85.55 
respectively, while the year with the lowest score of 76.9% is 2007. Despite the high average 
technical efficiency estimates, the result reveals that, except for Onne the other ports need to 
improve technical efficiency levels by between 1.3% and 30.7% in order to operate on the 
frontier. The direction of improvement depends on whether they are operating at increasing 
or decreasing returns to scale. Appendix 5.8 shows that 18 port-years operated at increasing 
returns to scale, the other (9) port-years each operated at decreasing and constant returns to 
scale.  
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Figure 5.9: Post-concession overall (DEA-CCR) port efficiency trends 
  
Figure 5.10: Post-concession port technical efficiency trends 
 
5.3.2.2 Post-concession scale efficiency 
The technical efficiency scores from the CCR model can be decomposed into pure technical 
efficiency (BCC) and scale efficiency (SE). Therefore, scale efficiency is the ratio of overall 
and technical efficiency. Applying this concept, this study determined the sources of 
inefficiency in post-concession Nigerian ports. 
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Figures 5.10 and 5.11 indicate a fluctuating trend for both technical and scale efficiencies for 
the post-concession period. However, the mean pure technical efficiency score (85.8%) for 
the period is slightly less than the scale efficiency score (88.2%). It could be said that the 
inefficiency experienced in post-concession Nigerian ports is more due to technical 
inefficiency than scale inefficiency. About the technical efficiency Figures 5.10 shows that 
post- concession Nigerian ports can produce the same level of outputs with 8-10% fewer 
inputs, without changing the current ratio of inputs. At least 50% of Nigerian ports, 
considering the six years of operation, need to reduce their input levels in order to be on the 
efficiency frontier (Appendix 5.10). It implies that actual throughput values are lower than 
target throughput and also that the turnaround time needs further improvement to meet the 
target values. The ports need to invest in schemes that could attract more shippers to the ports 
and also employ technology and skills that will improve the turnaround time of ships. The 
two options are related, as the reason for the low throughput may be that shippers are 
deserting the ports as a result of the high turnaround time of vessels. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Post-concession port scale efficiency trends 
This study examined the relationship between efficiency scores and their standard deviations, 
by evaluating the extent of the fluctuation in the efficiency of the ports over time.  The 
correlation between the intertemporal BCC efficiency scores and their standard deviations for 
the post-concession period is -0.1064, indicating a very weak negative correlation. It implies 
that all the ports in our observation set, no matter their efficiency status, either highly or less 
efficient, exhibit a similar level of fluctuation over the period. The negative correlation could 
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be interpreted as an indication of the truncation of the efficiency scores at unity (100%), 
rather than high efficiency being always accompanied by low variance (Cullinane & Wang, 
2010).    
 
 
Figure 5.12: Post-concession yearly mean efficiency trends  
Figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 shows that the ports of Apapa, Onne and PH exhibited a high and 
almost constant index for technical, pure technical and scale efficiencies. The mean 
efficiency scores for the period under review are: 97.4, 98.7 and 98.8, 96.2, 100, and 96.2 and 
94.7, 96.1 and 98.5, respectively. The pure technical and scale efficiency scores of the Apapa 
port are almost equal.  In other words, the operations of the Apapa port are indifferent to the 
scale of operation. The Onne port is technically efficient, but some scale inefficiencies still 
exist at the Onne port. While little inefficiencies that exist in the PH port are attributable to 
both scale and technical inefficiencies but as scale inefficiency is higher than technical 
inefficiency, technical inefficiency has an overriding effect. 
  
 
For the ports of Calabar, TCIP and Warri that operated at lower efficiencies the mean 
technical efficiency is classified into pure technical efficiency (BCC) and scale efficiency 
(SE). The average technical efficiency from the BCC model is 75.5, 75.1 and 69.3 for the 
Calabar, TCIP and Warri ports, while their mean scale efficiency scores are 54.2, 92.0 and 
89.6 respectively. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 further reveal that the primary source of inefficiency 
in the Calabar port is scale, while it is technical inefficiency for the ports of TCIP and Warri. 
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The low pure technical efficiency in both TCIP and Warri, compared to the scale efficiency, 
suggests that the inefficiency is most likely due to the low level of output compared to 
available inputs, as they are operating under increasing returns to scale. It implies that actual 
throughput values are lower than target throughput values and also the turnaround time needs 
further improvement to meet the target values. The ports need to invest in schemes that could 
attract more shippers to the ports and also employ technology and skills that will improve the 
turnaround time of ships. As observed previously, the two options are related, as the reason 
for the low throughput may be that the shippers are deserting the ports as a result of high the 
turnaround time of ships. 
 
 
 Hence, the need for port managers to concentrate resources on acquiring managerial skills 
that is in tune with the market requirements of the ports. It in turn encourages ports to 
improve on their scale efficiencies. The port of Calabar is grossly scale inefficient but this is 
not surprising as bigger ships do not patronise Calabar due to low draught of the approach 
channel. Another problem associated with the underutilisation of the Calabar port is the 
design structure of the Ikom Bridge, which is located at a major gateway to the Calabar port 
and does not allow for heavy goods vehicles. It implies that the Calabar port could not meet 
its target outputs, considering the resources available to it. 
 
 
The returns to scale properties of the six Nigerian ports‘ production are obtained from the 
DEA BCC model, indicates that the TCIP and Warri ports operated under increasing returns 
to scale and the Calabar port showed decreasing returns to scale (throughout).  Furthermore, 
despite the fact that the Calabar port exhibited 100% efficiency in all the six years under 
consideration, except in 2007, the port operations can be regarded as weakly efficient, as it is 
not operating at optimal levels. The more efficient ports Onne, PH and Apapa vacillate 
between three production scales. For example the Onne port production, although it obtained 
efficiency scores of 100% throughout, exhibited constant returns to scale only for 2006-2008. 
It showed decreasing returns to scale for 2009 and increasing returns to scale for 2010 and 
2011. It implies that for 2009-2011, the Onne port operations can be regarded as weakly 
efficient, because it is below the optimal level (Appendix 5.8).  The Apapa port production 
indicated constant returns to scale for 2007 and 2011 and increasing returns to scale for the 
rest of the period. Though it showed an 100% efficiency score for 2006, that year‘s operation 
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was regarded as weakly efficient because it was not operating at optimal production scale 
level. The PH port production indicated constant returns to scale for 4 out of the six years of 
operation and decreasing returns to scale for the remaining two years. Similarly, the 
efficiency scores for 2008 and 2010 are 100%. They are also considered, as weakly efficient 
because the production in those two years is not at optimal level. The results from the post-
concession efficiency revealed that, although there are more efficient operations, most of the 
ports had weakly efficient operations for the period under study, as they were not operating 
optimally. 
  
  
In addition, the results obtained from the pre-and post concession analysis revealed the 
tendency for ports in the post-concession to be more technically and scale efficient compared 
to the pre-concession period. The exception is the PH port that exhibited higher technical and 
scale efficiencies in the pre-concession period, more than the scores in the post-concession 
period. The port reform programme should have been carried out based on the peculiarities of 
each port, indicating that some ports are better left in the public domain. 
  
 
5.3.3 Comparison of pre-and post-concession efficiency 
Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 indicate the pre-and post-concession efficiency (overall, technical 
and scale) of the six ports used in the analysis, based on available data. The Apapa port 
exhibited a phenomenal growth in overall efficiency after concession (Figure 5.13). In fact, 
the mean DEA-CCR score almost doubled (mean efficiency of 51.6 and 97.4 for pre-and 
post-concession respectively) for the period. In the same vein, the TCIP and Warri ports 
showed a high increase in overall efficiency, while the Onne port indicates a slight 
improvement. On the other hand, the overall (DEA-CCR) efficiency of the Calabar port 
deteriorated appreciably (mean efficiency scores of 51.5 and 36.3 for pre-and post-concession 
respectively) and the PH port decreases slightly after concession. It shows that the efficiency 
gains from concession are not experienced in all the ports, especially for ports located outside 
the Lagos zone. It is a pointer that the wholesale concessions adopted by Nigeria, without due 
consideration of the peculiarities of ports in different zones, may not be best after all.  
200 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Pre- and post-concession overall (CCR model) mean efficiency scores distribution 
In terms of technical efficiency; the DEA-BCC scores of the Apapa, Onne, TCIP and Warri 
ports are higher in the post-concession than pre-concession periods (Figure 5.14). The TCIP 
and Warri ports indicated the most appreciable increase, while the Apapa and Onne ports 
demonstrated a slight rise. Onne port has a technical efficiency of 100%, which could be 
attributable to the learning curve effect (Wright, 1936). It has been operating as a Landlord 
port since inception in 1982, while the others have only operated as a Landlord port for only 
six years. In contrast, the Calabar and PH ports‘ technical efficiency scores (DEA-BCC) for 
pre-concession dominate their post-concession efficiency scores. However, the ports are 
operating under decreasing returns to scale (Table 5.13), indicating underutilisation of 
available  input resources. Policies geared towards attracting ships to the ports to increase 
throughput levels will bring the ports to the frontier of its most efficient counterparts.  
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Figure 5.14: Pre- and post-concession mean pure technical (BCC) efficiency scores distribution  
The average scale efficiency score distribution of the ports supports the point that the driving 
force of port efficiency after concession is improvement in production levels. As ports with a 
high margin of difference in overall efficiency scores also displayed a large margin of 
difference in scale efficiency scores between the pre- and post-concession periods (Figures 
5.13 and 5.15). It is because the overall efficiency is an amalgam of the pure technical 
efficiency (the DEA-BCC efficiency index) and the scale efficiency estimate (ratio of DEA-
CCR and BCC). When it is  decomposed into its components, the sources of efficiency 
emerge. The Apapa port displayed an astronomical increase in scale efficiency, almost 
doubling the pre-concession score; followed by the TCIP and Onne ports, which also 
exhibited a slight increase in mean efficiency after concession (Figure 5.15). On the contrary, 
the scale efficiency of the Calabar, PH and Warri ports declined after concession. Although 
the decrease in scale efficiency estimates between the two periods is tiny, the differences 
being only 5.12%, 0.8% and 4.9% for the Calabar, PH, and Warri ports respectively. To be 
on the frontier of the most efficient port; the Calabar and PH ports operating under decreasing 
returns to scale, require an increase in output levels, while Warri port which exhibits IRS 
characteristics, requires a reduction in input resources.    
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Figure 5.15: Pre- and post-concession mean scale (SE) efficiency distribution 
Table 5.13: The relationship between pre- and post-concession efficiency  
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
  
PRE-BCC PRE CCR POST-BCC POST CCR 
Mean 0.8213 0.6203 0.8959 0.7606 
Variance 0.0500 0.0660 0.0236 0.0607 
Pearson Correlation 0.7183 0.5330   
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 
0 0   
df 62 70   
t Stat -1.6485 -2.3646   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0522 0.0104   
t Critical one-tail 1.6698 1.6669   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1043 0.0208   
t Critical two-tail 1.9990 1.9944     
 
The DEA efficiency scores from the BCC and CCR models were subjected to a two-sample t-
test to explore the influence of concession on port efficiency.  The Pearson correlation 
between the DEA efficiency scores obtained from both the BCC and CCR models for the pre-
and post-concession period are 0.718 and 0.533, which are significant at the 5% confidence 
interval. The two-tailed t-test is evaluate under the null hypothesis: ―the transfer of port 
terminal operations from the public to the private sector, through concession contracts, 
does not influence the efficiency of Nigerian ports‖  The alternative hypothesis (one-tail 
test) “the concession of ports increases the efficiency of terminal operations” was also 
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tested. The result of the analysis is displayed in Table 5.13. The absolute value of t-statistics 
(1.649) obtained from the analysis of the pre- and post-concession periods, assuming variable 
returns to scale model, is less than the t-critical values for both the one-tail (1.670) and two-
tail (1.999) tests. In contrast, the absolute value of the t-statistics (2.365) derived from the 
pre- and concession taking the CCR approach, is greater than the t-critical for both one-tail 
(1.667) and two-tail (1.994) tests. It suggests, by adopting variable returns to scale, that there 
is no significant relationship between concession and efficiency of port operations. Probably 
because scale efficiency which is the driver of Nigerian ports‘ post-concession efficiency, is 
not considered under a DEA-BCC assumption. It underscores the need for good managerial 
practices and adoption of new technologies by the private sector to improve turnaround time 
and attract ships that, will in turn, impact on throughput levels. On the other hand, adopting 
the CCR model indicates that the transfer of port terminal operations from the public to the 
private sector, through concession contracts increases port operational efficiency. This 
finding could be explained from the scale efficiency perspective. As the port size is taken into 
consideration in a DEA-CCR model and because scale efficiency dominates technical 
efficiency in the post-concession period, its effect becomes overriding in the t-test analysis. 
That is to say that port concessions have increased throughput levels and improved the 
turnaround time of vessels, but in terms of technical efficiency as measured by the DEA-BCC 
scores, there is no significant improvement as a result of the concession. 
 
 
In summary, it could be argued that Nigerian ports performed better overall in the post-
concession than the pre-concession period, as depicted by pure technical and scale efficiency 
scores (mean efficiency BCC= 85.8% and SE= 88.2%) and mean efficiency (BCC= 79.5% 
and SE= 78.7%) respectively. However, the difference in efficiency between the two periods 
is statistically insignificant in the absence of scale and does not cut across all the ports. For 
instance, the PH port is both technically and in scale more efficient in the pre-concession 
period than the post-concession period while the Calabar and Warri ports have higher scale 
efficiency scores in the pre-concession than the post-concession periods. 
 
5.4 Productivity Change Analysis of Nigerian Seaports (2000-2011) 
This section of the analysis applies the Malmquist total factor productivity index (MPI) to 
assess the productivity change of DMUs (ports under study), between the pre- and post-
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concession periods. Port performance is viewed both from efficiency and productivity 
perspectives. This is investigation is carried out by adopting the DEA-based Malmquist 
productivity index (MPI). This research uses panel data from 2000-2011 to determine 
whether there has been growth or decline in the total factor productivity (TFP) of each port 
over time and across other ports in the observation set. An MPI value greater than 1 indicates 
growth in productivity change and an MPI less than 1 signifies deterioration, while a score of 
1 implies that there is no change. 
 
 
The principal merit of the MPI is the ability to decompose productivity change into different 
efficiency sources i.e. overall technical efficiency change (EFFCH), which captures the 
catch-up effect and the technical change which represents a shift in technology. EFFCH can 
further decompose into pure technical efficiency change (PECH) and scale efficiency change 
(SECH). That is why the MPI is employed in investigating efficiency and productivity 
changes occasioned by the introduction of private participation in the terminal operation of 
Nigerian seaports through concession contracts. 
 
 
The technique used in this research involves using the DEA-based MPI to measure the 
efficiency change on a year-by-year basis. Then the total efficiency of Nigerian seaports‘ 
terminal operation, between any two successive years, is benchmarked in order to track down 
short-term changes in efficiency. Secondly, the analysis is carried out based on the 
concession period to estimate productivity change between the pre- and post-concession 
periods‘ operations. 
 
5.4.1  Total factor productivity (TFP) analysis (2000-2011) 
The results of the TFP of the analysis of the year-by-year for the ports, indicates that 34 port-
years achieved productivity gains. While 16 port-years recorded productivity losses; another 
16 port-years showed no change in total productivity for the period under review. 
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Table 5.14: Descriptive statistics of the Malmquist Productivity Index and 
decompositions  
 INDEX DECOMPOSITIONS 
  MPI EFFCH TECHCH PECH SEC 
PERIOD N 66 66 66 66 66 
2000-2001 MEAN 1.501 1.080 1.412 1.090 1.048 
 STDEV 0.332 0.316 0.180 0.340 0.371 
 MIN 1.098 0.809 1.200 0.780 0.551 
 MAX 2.048 1.707 1.631 1.762 1.707 
2001-2002 MEAN 1.149 0.945 1.215 0.882 1.140 
 STDEV 0.217 0.070 0.201 0.218 0.339 
 MIN 0.902 0.838 1.005 0.459 0.926 
 MAX 1.524 1.010 1.524 1 1.826 
2002-2003 MEAN 1.037 0.939 1.110 0.991 0.95 
 STDEV 0.172 0.158 0.103 0.096 0.141 
 MIN 0.831 0.664 0.955 0.822 0.664 
 MAX 1.312 1.100 1.250 1.123 1.032 
2003-2004 MEAN 1.061 1.153 0.971 1.139 1.014 
 STDEV 0.201 0.392 0.256 0.395 0.063 
 MIN 0.772 0.869 0.602 0.892 0.975 
 MAX 1.337 1.934 1.337 1.941 1.140 
2004-2005 MEAN 0.81 0.806 1.020 0.935 0.873 
 STDEV 0.270 0.297 0.067 0.240 0.234 
 MIN 0.447 0.416 0.898 0.461 0.416 
 MAX 1.043 1.120 1.082 1.151 1.015 
2005-2006 MEAN 1.528 1.234 1.241 1.051 1.170 
 STDEV 0.361 0.242 0.199 0.106 0.234 
 MIN 1.024 1 1.024 1 0.932 
 MAX 2.131 1.651 1.580 1.265 1.651 
2006-2007 MEAN 0.832 1.066 0.770 1.092 0.974 
 STDEV 0.268 0.234 0.118 0.213 0.271 
 MIN 0.641 0.875 0.649 1 0.851 
 MAX 1.316 1.534 0.961 1.526 1.005 
2007-2008 MEAN 0.953 1.034 0.917 1.053 1.006 
 STDEV 0.253 0.239 0.131 0.082 0.061 
 MIN 0.536 0.734 0.731 1 0.734 
 MAX 1.284 1.471 1.098 1.167 1.430 
2008-2009 MEAN 1.317 1.390 0.971 1.071 1.317 
 STDEV 0.491 0.639 0.083 0.175 0.233 
 MIN 0.961 1 0.861 1 1 
 MAX 2.272 2.639 1.097 1.429 2.639 
2009-2010 MEAN 1.025 1.049 0.978 0.993 1.055 
 STDEV 0.157 0.156 0.034 0.016 0.655 
 MIN 0.922 0.929 0.922 0.960 0.968 
 MAX 1.338 1.362 1.019 1 1.362 
2010-2011 MEAN 0.968 1.009 0.959 1.007 1.002 
 STDEV 0.168 0.021 0.155 0.017 0.004 
 MIN 0.712 1 0.712 1 1 
 MAX 1.176 1.052 1.117 1.042 1.010 
MPI=Malmquist productivity index representing or Total factor productivity change (TFPCH), 
EFFCH=Efficiency change, TECHCH=Technical change, PECH=Pure technical efficiency change, 
SECH=Scale efficiency change, and N=sample size 
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The analysis of the mean from the year-by-year TFPCH shown in Table 5.14 indicates  total 
productivity gains TFPCH in 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2005-2006, 
2008-2009 and 2009-2010. While there was a deterioration in the years 2004-2005, 2006-
2007,2007-2008 and 2010-2011. The analysis also shows that Nigerian seaports experienced 
a decline in pure technical change in the following years; 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005 
and 2009-2010. On the other hand, there was a steady increase in the scale efficiency change 
for the period under study, except in the swing years 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. In terms of 
the technological change (TECHCH) the ports indicated deterioration in the following years; 
2003-2004, 2006-2007, 2007-2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011, denoting more 
years of productivity decline than of increase. 
 
 
Figure 5.16 shows the variations in average productivity of the combined MPI result from all 
the years. It illustrates that the efficiency changes from the MPI and its decomposition 
fluctuates without a definite pattern. For instance, Figure 5.16 revealed that pure technical 
efficiency (PECH) started with significant fluctuations and almost flattened out from 2004-
2005 to the end of the observation period. On the other hand, the total factor productivity 
change (TFPCH) and the scale efficiency change (SECH) depicted identical patterns of 
troughs and peaks.  The highest peak of TFPCH occurred in 2005-2006, which is the swing 
year. While SECH was highest during the 2008-2009 period. It is different from the 
observations from studies using ports from developed countries; where most ports in 
developed countries witnessed deterioration in throughput levels due to the economic 
meltdown. However, the ripple effect was not felt in developing countries until 2010-2011. 
Additionally, the technical efficiency change (TECHCH) as compared to other 
decompositions, exhibited a different trend for the observation period. 
 
 
Table 5.14 and Figure 5.16 indicate overall a general trend of fluctuations in productivity in 
all the indices. Though there were more years with positive changes in efficiency than 
decrease, except the TECHCH which has more years with deterioration in efficiency. There 
is an appreciable increase in overall efficiencies in 2005-2006, which is the swing year 
(transfer of terminal operations from public to the private sector through concession 
contracts), followed by a noticeable decline. It may be attributable to concessionaires 
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(terminal operators) trying to familiarise themselves with the new business environment and 
to build a customer base. 
 
 
Figure 5.16: Year-by-year averages of the MPI and sources  
Table 5.15: Malmquist Productivity Index summary of port means (2000-2011)  
PORT EFFCH TECHCH PECH SECH MTFPCH 
APAPA 1.044 1.088 1 1.044 1.150 
CALABAR 1.172 0.990 1 1.172 1.154 
ONNE 1 1.012 1 1 1.012 
PH 1 1.114 1 1 1.114 
TCIP 1.052 1.049 1.018 1.029 1.087 
WARRI 1.117 1.055 1.149 1.054 1.128 
MEAN 1.064 1.0514 1.028 1.050 1.107 
 
Table 5.15 indicates that the port industry in Nigeria has witnessed an overall positive TFP 
growth of 10.7% for the period 2000-2001 to 2010-2011. The overall positive TFP growth of 
the ports is attributable to frontier based capabilities. The technical efficiency change 
(EFFCH) is more than one signifying a positive growth of 6.4% in technical change, which 
contributed to boosting the TFP growth in the Nigerian port industry. Technical efficiency 
change is a product of pure technical efficiency change (PECH) and scale efficiency change 
(SECH). The result indicates that both PECH and SECH values are greater than unity which 
shows a positive increase of 2.8% and 5%. It implies that both have contributed to the 
technical efficiency change, with SECH having an overriding impact. 
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Productivity growth can also be viewed from the perspective of the level of utilisation of 
input and output factors. A low productivity growth implies a low growth rate in the output 
(throughput) and high or medium growth rate in the utilisation of the four input factors. The 
technical efficiency change involves the use of existing input levels to produce more of the 
same output. As ports gain experience in terminal production, efficiency sets in and new 
ways of using labour in terminal production is discovered through adjustments in cargo 
handling process, which contributes to higher productivity. Another aspect of TFP growth is 
the change in technology. To underscore this aspect of the TFP growth, it was posited by 
Squires and Reid (2004) that technological change entails the development of new 
technologies or new products to improve and shift production upward. 
 
  
The overall mean technical change (TECHCH) of the ports showed a positive increase of 
5.14% (Table 5.15). It equally shows that the total factor productivity growth observed in the 
Nigerian port industry for the study period is more due to efficiency change (EFFCH) than 
technical change (TECHCH), since the value of efficiency change is higher than technical 
change. The result of the MPI decomposition also reveals that four ports (Apapa, Calabar, 
Onne and PH) have stability in their pure technical efficiency change (PECH=1). While the 
Onne and PH ports also have stability in their scale efficiency change (SECH=1). Therefore, 
these two ports have zero efficiency change. The explanation is that these two ports are faced 
with the problem of using excessive inputs (especially storage capacity) in producing their 
outputs (throughputs). So the ports are confronted with inefficiencies arising from producing 
under decreasing returns to scale. 
    
 
The relationship between the multi-year MPI and its decompositions could statistically 
provide the explanation for the changes in the TFP, via the various sources of efficiency 
change. Table 5.16 shows the correlation between the multi-year MPI and the sources of 
efficiency in the sample. 
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Table 5.16: Correlation between the multi-year MPI and sources of efficiency change  
 MPI DECOMPOSITIONS 
YEAR MPI-PECH MPI-SECH MPI-TECHCH 
2000-2001 0.545 0.269 -0.051 
2001-2002 -0.011 0.166 0.909 
2002-2003 0.514 0.653 0.080 
2003-2004 0.306 0.277 0.427 
2004-2005 0.630 0.597 -0.623 
2005-2006 0.773 -0.037 0.512 
2006-2007 0.405 0.875 0.737 
2007-2008 0.825 0.633 0.627 
2008-2009 0.967 0.004 -0.656 
2009-2010 0.981 0.275 0.194 
2010- 2011 0.604 0.604 0.993 
MEAN 0.594 0.392 0.286 
 
The productivity gain achieved from pure technical efficiency has a strong influence on the 
improvement of the overall efficiency of Nigeria ports, as indicated by the mean of the year-
by-year correlation in Table 5.17. The substantial impact of the non-scale pure technical 
efficiency implies that terminal operators were more interested in improving the capabilities 
of productive units (terminals), to increase production with the set of given inputs and 
available technology. Nevertheless, in 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and 2006-2007, scale 
efficiency had a stronger impact on the improvement of the efficiency of Nigerian ports than 
PECH.  In 2001-2002 and 2005-2006, there is a weak but moderate relationship between the 
MPI and PECH and MPI and SECH respectively. The negative correlation between the MPI 
and the scale efficiency change observed in 2005-2006 highlights the presence of 
overcapacity, accounting for uneconomical scale sizes. Overall, scale has a statistically 
reasonable influence on the total factor productivity, though not as much as pure technical 
change. 
 
The overall average of the year-by-year correlation between the MPI and technological 
change (TECHCH) is 0.286, which indicates that the shift in frontier technology has a 
statistically meaningful impact on the total factor productivity. Again the effect of frontier 
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technology on the TFP is less than the scale and the non-scale components. The trend of the 
relationship indicates that the swing year 2005-2006 is marked by the lowest impact of scale 
efficiency change on the TFP. This is followed by a sharp rise in 2006-2007, a gradual 
decline in 2007-2008 and a sharp decline in 2008-2009. It is a period of declining trade 
volume globally, induced by the banking crisis and the suspension of ship entry into the ports 
of Lagos due to congestion.  
     
  
The transfer of the terminal operations of Nigerian seaports to the private sector is through 
concessions; the ports have been operating under private ownership for six years. The results 
obtained from the technical change component of the MPI may give an idea of the influence 
of concession on the operational efficiency of ports, using the Nigerian ports as a case study. 
The result of the MPI decomposition indicates that PECH has the lowest variance compared 
to the other components, followed by TECHCH. Pure technical efficiency implies that the 
ports can produce more by using existing technology and utilising available inputs efficiently. 
Therefore, a significant relationship between the MPI and PECH (correlation coefficient 
0.594), together with low variance, indicates that organisational and managerial factors 
associated with a better balance between inputs and outputs, is necessary for a port‘s 
productivity. Plus, a little, but moderate relationship between the MPI and technological 
change (TECHCH), together with small variance, suggests that the frontier shift effect does 
not yield substantial gains in the TFP, at least in the short run. It is because technological 
change is driven by the ability of ports to invest in modern cargo handling equipment, 
advanced ICT systems and also cargo tracking and scanning equipment. The relationship 
between the technological change and MPI further suggests the unwillingness of the port 
operators to bring in new technologies, as specified in the concession agreements. It 
underscores the need for an independent regulator to ensure compliance with the concession 
contract. 
 
5.4.2 Analysis of pre- and post-concession efficiency change 
The analysis of the year-by-year MPI, although useful in evaluating the short-term efficiency 
changes in productivity, does not provide an insight into the influence of concession on 
productivity. It is because the effect of transfer of operations from public to private could 
only be noticed in the medium to long term periods. Thus to explore the influence of 
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concession on the TFP growth, the study estimates and compares the MPI and its sources six 
years before the concession and six years after i.e. the pre- and post-concession period. It is 
necessary for tracking the overall effect of the different factors on the TFP. 
Table 5.17: Descriptive statistics of the pre- & post-concession TFP and its 
decompositions  
  MPI EFFCH TECHCH PECH SECH 
PERIOD N 30 30 30 30 30 
2000-2005 MEAN 1.112 0.985 1.146 1.007 1.015 
 
MEDIAN 1.119 0.985 1.143 1 1 
 
STDEV 0.079 0.051 0.042 0.081 0.039 
 
MIN 0.975 0.909 1.087 0.896 0.966 
  
MAX 1.204 1.062 1.204 1.149 1.074 
2006-2011 MEAN 1.019 1.109 0.919 1.043 1.061 
 
MEDIAN 1.021 1.077 0.909 1 1 
 
STDEV 0.111 0.138 0.077 0.067 0.140 
 
MIN 0.863 1 0.821 1 0.996 
 
MAX 1.146 1.3448 1.009 1.13538 1.345 
 
The MPI and its decompositions showed positive change for both the pre- and post-
concession periods, except the overall technical efficiency change or catch-up effect that 
deteriorated by 1.5% (MPI=0.985) during the pre-concession period. While technological 
change decreased by 8.1% (MPI=0.919) during the post-concession period (Table 5.17). In 
addition, the MPI and its decompositions achieved higher values during the post-concession 
period compared to the pre-concession period. In contrast, the technological change was 
greater during the pre-concession period, TECHCH=1.146, compared to the value of 
TECHCH=0.919 for the post-concession. The mean value of the index for the two periods 
indicates positive productivity change. However, the TFP percentage growth for the pre-
concession period is 11.2% (MPI=1.112) but it is only 1.9% (MPI=1.019) for the post-
concession period for the same number of years. In the case of technological change, it 
increased by 14.6% during the pre-concession period, and deteriorated by 8.1% during the 
post-concession period. Pure technical efficiency increased by 4.3% during the post-
concession period and recorded a slight increase of 0.7% during the pre-concession period. 
The scale efficiency indicates a small increase in productivity for the two periods, as it only 
increased by 1.5% (MPI=1.015) and 6.1% (MPI=1.061) for the pre- and post-concession 
periods respectively. 
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The analysis further reveals that both the pre- and post-concession productive efficiency is 
driven by scale, rather than by technical efficiency, as the values of pure technical efficiency 
change is less than scale efficiency change (Table 5.17). The result also indicates that the 
influence of the shift in the frontier technology in total factor productivity is overwhelming 
during the pre-concession era and barely significant after port operations are transferred to 
private operators. It suggests that the terminal operators have not brought in the much needed 
investment in ICT, tracking and other technologies, including modern cargo handling 
equipment, which are capable of fast tracking port development in the Nigerian port sector 
and reduce the turnaround time.  
Table 5.18: Correlation between the pre- & post-concession MPI and sources of efficiency 
change  
 MPI DECOMPOSITIONS 
PERIOD MPI/EFFCH MPI/TECHCH MPI/PECH MPI/SECH 
PRE-CONCESSION (2000-2005) 0.781 0.948 0.599 0.056 
POST-CONCESSION (2006-2011) 0.794 0.145 0.504 0.545 
 
The correlation between the pre- and post-concession MPI and its decompositions gives an 
indication of the trend of productivity change after the transfer of port operations to the 
private sector. The relationship shows that the TFP change during the pre-concession period 
is driven by the frontier shift effects rather than the catch-up effect, but the reverse is the case 
for the post-concession period. The weak but moderate relationship between the MPI and 
technical change indicates non-investment in technology by the terminal operators. In 
addition, the very weak but significant relationship between the total factor productivity 
change and the scale efficiency change during the pre-concession period signifies under-
utilisation of available resources. As the ports could not attract the much needed cargo. 
Therefore, it could be said that the scale efficiency change had an insignificant impact on the 
productivity of the ports. Thus indicating that the investments in technology during the period 
did not impact much on the scale of operation of the ports. Therefore, the efficiency change 
during the pre-concession is more due to improvement in managerial capabilities and skill 
than scale efficiency (Figure 5.17). Conversely, the post-concession productivity is driven by 
efficiency changes from both scale and non-scale factors, as the scale change is higher than 
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pure technical change, the post-concession TFP growth is considered to be a product of scale 
efficiency change (Figure 5.18). 
 
In conclusion, the adoption of the Landlord model of port operation by the Nigerian ports 
drastically increased the impact of the scale efficiency change on the TFP and slightly 
reduced the influence of the pure technical efficiency change in the TFP. In contrast, the 
wholesale introduction of the model in all the ports regressed greatly the influence of 
technological change (frontier shift effects) on the total factor productivity. It is at variance 
with the objective of the Nigerian ports concession, which is to attract investment in port 
infrastructure from the private sector. It is evident from Table 5.18 and Figure 5.16 that the 
driver of productivity increases during the pre-concession period is technical change, while it 
is scale efficiency change for the post concession period. 
 
 
The pre-concession period in comparison to the multi-year MPI suggests that the influence of 
technological progress on productivity is not quite evident in the short-run. This is as a result 
of the changes in global trade due to the introduction of bigger container ships and in 
preparation for the adoption of the Landlord model of port administration. The Nigerian ports 
invested heavily in infrastructure to attract reputable terminal operators to Nigerian ports. 
However, the insecurity experienced by the ports in the eastern zone, as well as endemic 
cargo pilferage (Wharf rat phenomenon) coupled with a high cost of doing business, made 
cargo diversion to other neighbouring ports an increasing phenomenon. Hence, the 
investment in port infrastructure was not matched with commensurate ship traffic and 
throughput levels. It led to underutilisation of port facilities in some of the ports. The 
resultant effect is observable in the relationship between the MPI and SECH in the last six 
years before the concession, which indicates that the scale efficiency change has almost an 
insignificant impact on the productivity growth for the period. 
 
However, comparing the relationship between the multi-year MPI and its components with 
relationship between the MPI and its decompositions in the first six years of the post-
concession period (2006-2011), the result indicates, that the relationship between MPI and 
SECH is the most significant., when compared to technological progress (TECHCH) and 
pure technical efficiency change, even in the long run. It suggests that the impact of 
technological progress on productivity can be noticed in the medium term. However, in the 
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long-run, the effect can only be felt through an increase in the scale of production which 
leads to an increase in the TFP. It can be explained by observing the relationship between 
pure technical efficiency change and the MPI, which is equally significant for the period. It 
implies that the terminal operators are using advanced managerial skills to utilise the 
available resources optimally to improve throughput, without investing in modern equipment. 
If this scenario continues unregulated, the resultant effects could be a higher turnaround time 
of vessels and loss of patronage. 
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Figure 5.17: Relationship between the pre-concession MPI and its decompositions 
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Figure 5.18: Correlation between the post-concession MPI and its components 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
The chapter benchmarked the overall efficiency of six Nigerian seaports for the period 2000-
2011, using different DEA models such as the intertemporal, contemporaneous and window 
analysis models. The results of the analyses indicated that the most efficient port is the Onne 
port and closely followed by the Port Harcourt port, while the least efficient ports are the 
Warri and Calabar ports. Plus, the relationship between port size and efficiency was 
demonstrated by testing the null hypothesis (Ho): There is no relationship between port size 
and operational efficiency. This hypothesis was rejected. Thus, port size has an influence on 
the operational efficiency of Nigerian ports. The comparison of the pre- and post-
concession‘s overall, technical and scale efficiency showed that the overall efficiency of the 
Apapa, TCIP, Onne and Warri ports indicated substantial improvement after privatisation, 
except for the port of Onne which recorded a slight increase. While the efficiency of the PH 
and Calabar ports deteriorated after concession. Thus, a blanket approach (transfer of all the 
ports to the private sector in one go) adopted during the concession could be considered 
inappropriate, as the results suggested that some of the ports are better off left in the public 
domain. 
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Furthermore, the chapter investigated the pre- and post-concession efficiency of the six ports 
under study to ascertain if there is a significant difference in the operational efficiency of the 
ports between the two periods. The relationship between the operational efficiency of the 
ports before and after concession was investigated by using a two-tailed t-test.  The result of 
the t-test is significant at the 5% confidence for the DEA-CCR, indicating that if the scale of 
operation is considered, concession has improved the operational efficiency of the Nigerian 
ports. The result demonstrates that the concession of Nigerian seaports has increased the 
throughput levels and improved the turnaround time. However, in terms of the much sought 
after infrastructure development through investment in modern cargo handling equipment, 
not much has changed between the two periods. 
 
 
To further explore the productivity perspective to performance and the reliability of 
efficiency results, the total factor productivity for the period under study was investigated 
using the Malmquist productivity index (MPI) derived from the DEA distance functions. 
Again, the result obtained is in conformity with the efficiency analysis. Though there is a 
growth in the TFP in both pre- and post-concession periods. However, the pre-concession 
period showed higher growth than the post-concession period. The decomposition of the 
sources of efficiency change revealed the driver of this increase in TFP is technological 
change for the pre-concession period and the scale efficiency change for the post-concession 
period.  
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Chapter Six: Role of Ownership on Nigerian Ports’ Performance 
6.1  Introduction 
The chapter examines the influence of ownership, intra-port competition, efficiency and 
production scale on the operational performance of Nigerian seaports. This chapter uses the 
output from the DEA efficiency analysis and the MPI, as the dependent variable. Ownership 
structure is endogenous, while competition is an exogenous factor to the DMUs (ports). This 
chapter first assesses the relationship between the transfer of port terminal operations from 
public to private through concession contracts and the efficiency of Nigerian ports. As well as 
the relationship between intra-port competition and port efficiency and finally the impact of 
government regulation or lack of it, on the efficiency of concession, in order to test the 
hypotheses proposed in this study. This chapter also discusses the impact of Nigerian port 
reform on the main performance indicators.  
 
 
In other words, this chapter addresses the impact of the wholesale concession of Nigeria‘s 
seaports to the private sector on the efficiency of port operations. The section in chapter 5 
that dealt with the influence of concession on port efficiency before and after, only gave a 
synopsis of the combined impact of introducing private participation in all the major ports in 
Nigeria. Although the concession, which involved four rounds, commenced on 24th 
September, 2005 and ended 1st January, 2006 (see Table 2.6), the operators did not mobilise 
to site at the same time. Therefore, a transitional period existed between the time the bids 
were won and the actual start of terminal operations by different operators. During this 
transitional period, some terminals were manned by private operators while the NPA 
operated others that the operators had not taken possession of. For the purpose of the 
analysis, this period is treated as one of mixed ownership. As a result, in 2006 all the ports 
practised mixed ownership.  In some ports, the mixed ownership extended into 2007, 
depending on the date terminal operators took possession, except for the Onne port which 
operated as a landlord port throughout the study period. In 2000-2005, the ports served as 
public ports except the Onne port that was privately operated. In order to allow for an 
unbiased assessment of the impact of the concession on port efficiency, the Onne port 
operations from 2000-2011 are excluded from the data set. As it is an outlier, the activities of 
the five ports (Apapa, TCIP, PH, Warri and Calabar) from 2000-2005 are regarded as 
publicly operated (Tool port model). By so doing, the aggregate data set used for analysis in 
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Chapter 5 is segregated into three datasets, each with the corresponding port-years (DMUs). 
For each ownership type, the study excludes from the original dataset the ports to which the 
particular ownership type does not apply. Thus, the ownership style of Nigerian seaports was 
compiled based on three categories, namely (I) publicly operated port (II) mixed ownership 
port and (III) Landlord port. In order to make the comparison as close in time as possible, the 
data for the publicly operated ports were taken from 2002-2005, the mixed ownership was 
between 2006-2007 and the landlord port 2008-2011. 
 
6.2  Port Efficiency and Ownership 
Table 6.1 depicts the descriptive statistics of the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA 
intertemporal analysis applying the BCC model to the port-year data obtained from Nigeria 
seaports, based on the ownership status. It is evident from Table 6.1 that the mean efficiency 
score of the Landlord port (0.938) is higher than those of mixed port (0.835) and publicly 
operated port (0.762). It is equally observable from Table 6.1 that the Landlord port has the 
lowest standard deviation compared to the Public and Mixed ports which are consistent with  
Charnes et al. (1985). Charnes et al. (1985) demonstrated that DMUs with high efficiency 
levels tend to have lower standard deviations compared to their peers with lower efficiency 
levels. The analysis shows that on average, the Landlord ports perform better than the Public 
and Mixed ports. It is also, consistent with  Estache et al. (2002)  study of Mexico‘s ports that 
showed short-term improvements in performance due to the reform. Likewise, González and 
Trujillo (2008) and Barros (2003) studies of Spanish and Portuguese ports‘ performance after 
privatisation, both showed significant improvement in performance after reform. Therefore, 
the hypothesis that there is a relationship between the ownership of port infrastructure and 
superstructure and the efficiency of operation is accepted, based on the comparison of the 
efficiency of Public, Landlord and Mixed ownerships. However, it should be noted that the 
mixed ownership port has only 7 observations and a small sample size which may lead to 
some bias in the result. On the other hand, the public has 30 data points while the Landlord 
ports have 24 observations; the relatively broad cross-section size of these two sets of port‘s 
type makes the comparison between them more convincing and tenable. 
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 Table 6.1: Comparison of mean efficiency scores for different types of ownership 
 DESCRIPTIVES PUBLIC MIXED LANDLORD 
 
   
Mean 0.76187 0.83457 0.93825 
Standard Error 0.04558 0.08315 0.02448 
Median 0.8555 1 1 
Mode 1 1 1 
Standard Deviation 0.2496 0.2200 0.1199 
Sample Variance 0.0623 0.0484 0.0144 
Kurtosis -1.6015 -1.5027 4.0727 
Skewness -0.3570 -0.7822 -2.2091 
Range 0.652 0.5 0.435 
Minimum 0.348 0.5 0.565 
Maximum 1 1 1 
Sum 22.856 5.842 22.518 
Count 30 7 24 
Confidence Level (95.0%) 0.0932 0.2035 0.0506 
 
  
Figure 6.1: Comparison of mean score efficiency of types of port ownership  
6.2.1 Analysis of the relationship between efficiency scores and ownership types 
A single factor ANOVA was carried out to see if there is a significant difference between the 
port ownership styles. A single factor ANOVA was chosen as only a factor ownership of the 
ports that is changing. The result of the ANOVA indicates a significant variability within the 
three ownership groups (p=0.0103).  
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To determine which ownership is different from the other, a post-hoc t-test was undertaken. 
The choice of a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variance is appropriate, as this study is 
not hypothesizing that the mean efficiency of a particular ownership style is greater or lesser 
than the other. That has been established from the descriptive statistics so  rather the study 
tests ascertain if there is a significant difference. The post-hoc t-test involved carrying out 
three separate two sample t-tests; first between public and mixed ownership, second between 
public and landlord and final between mixed ownership and landlord. The result of the post-
hoc t-test two-tail indicates there are no significant differences between public and mixed and 
between mixed and landlord ownership styles, p=0.461 and 0.271 respectively. On the other 
hand, there is a significant difference between public and landlord p=0.001, which is less than 
the default significance of p=0.05. To minimise the error associated with multiple 
comparisons, the study applied a Bonferroni correction to the results obtained from the post-
hoc t-test, by adjusting the confidence level. The threshold of the confidence level changed 
from p=0.05 to 0.0167. It is obtained by dividing the number of comparisons in our case by 3 
because the number of t-tests carried out was 3. That gives a p-value of 0.0167 which is the 
new significance level. The new significance level is used to compare the p-value two-tail to 
see if the P (two-tail) <p (0.0167). The result of the Bonferroni corrections indicated that 
there is a significant difference between the efficiency scores of Public and Landlord 
ownership styles. While there is no significant difference between the efficiency scores of 
public versus mixed and mixed versus landlord respectively (see Appendix 6.1-6.4).  In 
conclusion, the ANOVA is significant. The results of the Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc t-test 
indicates a significant difference in efficiency between the public ports and the Landlord 
system of port ownership as depicted in Figure 6.1. It is consistent with Cheon et al. (2010) 
and Tongzon and Heng (2005)  
 
However, as the interest is in evaluating the influence of the wholesale concessions on the 
performance of Nigerian ports, the subsequent analysis is restricted to the two ownership 
types. In this case, the public and Landlord which have exhibited a significant difference 
from the previous analysis. Moreover, prior to concession the Nigerian ports were under 
public ownership and after concession they practise the Landlord model of port ownership. 
Therefore, the mixed ownership was only a temporary measure which only existed during the 
transition period from public to private ownership. As a result, the hypothesis is further tested 
on two ownership styles. The period of the pre- and post-concession analysis covers the 4 
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years before (2002-2005) and the first four years (2008-2011) of the practice of the Landlord 
model by all the ports. The mixed ownership period (2006-2007) was excluded in order to 
match the port-year operations as near as possible and to avoid the effects of extraneous 
variations. 
     
The relationship between the port ownership structure and efficiency is further examined by 
carrying out a two-sample t-test on the efficiency scores of the Public and Landlord port 
ownership styles. The efficiency scores of the ports, when operations were under public and 
private ownership, were computed from the DEA intertemporal analysis produced from an 
output-oriented model and assuming both constant and variable returns to scale.  
Table 6.2: Relationship between public and landlord ownership of port operations and 
efficiency 
  t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  
PUBLIC-
BCC 
PUBLIC-CCR LANDLORD-
CCR 
LANDLORD-BCC 
Mean 0.7962 0.6728 0.9236 0.934 
Variance 0.0608 0.0602 0.0169 0.0166 
Observations 20 20 20 20 
Pearson Correlation 0.1723 0.5678   
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 
0 0   
df 19 19   
t Stat -2.391854 -5.545267   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.013631 1.19371E-05   
t Critical one-tail 1.729133 1.729133   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.027262796 2.38742E-05   
t Critical two-tail 2.093024 2.093024     
 
To understand the influence of privatisation through concession contracts on efficiency; the  
null hypothesis ‗there is no difference in operational efficiency of the Nigeria seaports 
between when it was under the public and private sector‟and the alternate hypothesis „the 
operational efficiency of the Nigerian seaports increased after they were transferred to the 
private sector‟ were explored using paired two-sample t-test. Table 6.2 shows the result of 
the analysis. It indicates that the absolute value of the t-stat for the BCC (2.392) and the CCR 
(5.545) models is greater than t-critical (1.729) and (2.093), for one-tail and two-tail 
respectively. The P-value is less than 0.05 (p<0.05), therefore the null hypothesis is rejected. 
It suggests that there is an increase in the efficiency of the Nigerian seaports when the 
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operation was transferred to the private sector i.e. when the ports adopted the Landlord port 
model of port operation. In other words, it only shows that the change of ownership of port‘s 
terminal operations from public to the private sector, through concession contracts, could 
encourage efficient port production. However, there is a complex relationship between port 
efficiency, production scales and other exogenous factors, such as competitiveness, port size, 
environmental issues and regulation that is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
6.2.2 Temporal changes in Nigerian seaports productivity (MPI) and ownership. 
The relationship between port ownership and productivity change and its sources (MPI, 
TECHCH, PECH, and SECH) is further explored in this section. Table 6.3 compares the 
productivity change and its decompositions in regards to Nigerian seaports, when operations 
were in public hands, and now they are in private hands. The comparisons made use of data 
from the last four years before (2002-2005) and four years after (2008-2011), the adoption of 
the Landlord model of port administration. The years 2006-2007 were excluded from the 
analysis because it was a transition period, where some terminals were operated by 
concessionaires, while others are operated by the NPA, as the owners had not yet taken 
possession. The result shows that the MPI of the ports under the Landlord system is higher 
than when it was under the public form of ownership. However, the difference between the 
two groups‘ mean ANOVA total factor productivity change (MPI: F=0.056, P=0.8I5) is not 
statistically significant at the five percent level. The results obtained from the t-test paired 
two sample for means shows that the MPI means for the public and Landlord port systems are 
not statistically different at the 5% level (p=0.731). Likewise, the absolute value of the t-
stat=0.351 is less than the t-critical one-tail=1.761 and the t-critical two-tail =2.145 
(Appendix 6.5 & 6.6). Therefore, a rejection that the means are statistically different based on 
the t-test. It is consistent with De (2006) study of Indian ports from 1981-2003, which found 
no substantial impact on the TFP for Indian ports after reform. On the other hand, Cheon 
(2007b) suggests that the means of the two groups are statistically different based on the 
results of the study of World top 94 container ports from 1991-2004, 39 of which have 
experienced private ownership. As explained earlier in the discussion of literature in chapter 
2, economic theories and existing empirical evidence have failed to establish a clear-cut 
relationship between ownership and performance. UNCTAD (1995b), observed that the lack 
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of a clear-cut empirical relationship may be to some extent a reflection of the socio-political 
environment in which these entities undertake their business. 
    
In addition, the means of the sources of efficiency change of the ports under the public and 
Landlord system were compared. The results indicate that the average scale efficiency change 
of the Landlord port system is higher than that of the Public port, while the mean pure 
technical efficiency change for both systems is equal. Conversely, the average technological 
change (frontier shift effects) of the Public port system is higher than the Landlord port 
system. In terms of efficiency change, scale efficiency (SECH: F=0.361, P=0.553) exhibited 
a more reasonable effect than pure technical efficiency (TECH: F=.0001, P=0.992), although 
not a statistically significant difference at both the 5% and 1% level between the Public and 
the Landlord ports. On the other hand, it could be said that technological change has an 
overriding impact on efficiency, although the technological change (TECHCH: F=1.558, 
P=0.222) is not statistically significant at the 5% level. It is also reconfirmed by a t-test 
paired two sample for means for the two groups for scale, for pure technical efficiency 
change and for technological change. The results reaffirm that the average scale efficiency 
change between the two groups is not statistically significant at both the 5% and 1% 
confidence level, as p=0.543 and the t-stat 0.623<t-critical one-tail=1.761 and two-tail 2.145. 
Likewise, for technical efficiency change, p=0.992 which is not significant at 5% level. The t-
stat=0.011<t-critical for one-tail=1.761 and two-tail=2.145. As well as the mean 
technological change for the two groups is not significant at the 5 percent level, as p=0.284 
and the t-stat 1.114<t-critical (one-tail 1.761 and two-tail 2.145), see (appendix 6.7-6.9). 
Therefore, rejection that the means are different based on the confirmatory t-test. From the 
results, it seems there are some improvements in productivity due to the ownership change, 
but it is not statistically significant, especially in the area of technological change. In 
summary, the transfer of the Nigerian ports‘ terminal operations from public to the private 
sector has not brought about the much touted technological change needed to drive 
productivity. It reflects that the operators may not have brought in the much needed modern 
equipment, as envisaged in the concession agreement. 
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Table 6.3: Port ownership change and productivity (MPI, TECHCH, TECH, SECH)  
 N Mean STD. ERROR MEDIAN STDEV MIN. MAX. 
PMPI 15 0.992 0.060 1.070 0.232 0.508 1.266 
LMPI 15 1.010 0.049 0.969 0.190 0.536 1.338 
TOTAL 30 2.002 0.109 2.040 0.422 1.044 2.605 
PTECHCH 15 1.034 1.034 0.043 0.168 0.602 1.250 
LTECHCH 15 0.971 0.971 0.025 0.098 0.731 1.140 
TOTAL 30 2.004 2.004 0.069 0.266 1.333 2.390 
PPECH 15 1.029 0.075 1 0.292 0.461 1.941 
LPECH 15 1.029 0.029 1 0.111 1.000 1.429 
TOTAL 30 2.058 0.104 2.000 0.403 1.461 3.370 
PSECH 15 1.015 0.088 0.982 0.342 0.499 2.093 
LSECH 15 1.107 0.096 1.018 0.371 0.478 2.002 
TOTAL 30 2.122 0.184 2.000 0.713 0.977 4.096 
 
PMPI= public ownership total factor productivity change; LMPI= landlord ownership total factor productivity 
change; PTECHCH= public ownership technological change; LTECHCH=landlord ownership technological 
change; PPECH=public ownership technical efficiency change; LPECH=landlord ownership technical 
efficiency change; PSECH=public ownership scale efficiency change; LSECH=landlord ownership scale 
efficiency change 
 
6.3 Measurement of Competition Level 
The adoption of the Landlord model of port administration, as a result of the concession 
programme, implies that ports cannot always be considered as single entities. Nowadays, 
modern ports contain several terminals operated independently by two or more operators and 
therefore to an extent, some degree of intra-port competition exists. In such circumstances, 
port users have several options for where to dock their ship and which terminal to use. In 
addition, there can be intra-terminal competition in those cases where multiple operators can 
provide competing services from the same terminal. The existence of intra-port competition 
implies that a port market can be defined narrower than a port, or where the port is defined as 
a market, competition within that port may exist (OECD, 2011). De Langen and Pallis (2006) 
claim that such competition can help to facilitate specialisation, because competitors are 
competing in the same conditions (labour market, regulation framework, suppliers). 
 
Port competition has been approached from different perspectives, such as concession 
granting, diversion, the concentration of port traffic, investment in port infrastructure and the 
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subsidisation of hinterland connections (Huybrechts et al., 2002). As discussed earlier, there 
was no competition between Nigerian ports prior to concession, because all the ports were 
under one operator, the Nigerian Ports Authority (NPA). Therefore, this study adopts the 
concession granting approach on a national level, which is closer to former studies by Cheon 
(2007b) and Tongzon and Heng (2005), although both studies were on a global scale. It is 
because bidding for concession contracts introduces competition for the market, as distinct 
from the competition in the market. The evaluation of the level of competition among the 
different ports (pre- and post-concession) is necessary before delving into the role of 
competition on port efficiency. There have been many methods used in measuring port 
competition, such as port the competitive index (PCI) in Tongzon and Heng (2005). There 
have been many methods used in measuring port competition, such as port the competitive 
index (PCI) in Tongzon and Heng (2005). In addition, Porter‘s five forces competitive theory 
(Lau, 2008), Factor analysis (Yeo, Roe, & Dinwoodie, 2008). As well as, Fuzzy methodology 
(Huang, Teng, Huang, & Kou, 2003), the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) (Hirschman, 
1964) and the hinterland accessibility index (Cheon, 2007b). However, this study adopts the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in evaluating the level of competition in Nigerian 
seaports. This method has been used to assess the relative competitiveness of ports within a 
particular market or region (Elsayeh, Hubbard, & Tipi, 2011). 
 
The HHI is inspired by the pioneering works of economists Orris C. Herfindahl and Albert O. 
Hirschman. It measures the sizes of the firms in relation to others in the industry and also 
indicates the level of competition. The HHI as an economic concept has extensive 
applications in  competition, antitrust and also technology management (Liston-Hayes & 
Pilkington, 2004; Shapiro, 2010). It is defined as the sum of the market shares of all the firms 
within the industry, if less than 50, or the 50 largest firms, if more than 50. The HHI index 
ranges from 0 to 1 i.e. from small firms to single monopolistic producers. An increase in the 
HHI indicates a decrease in market power and a reduction in competition and the reverse is 
the case for a decrease. Conversely, the index can range from 0 to 1002 or 10,000 if 
percentages are used as whole numbers. The beauty of the HHI lies in the ability to account 
for the entire size distribution of firms (ports) in the market. It achieves that by attaching a 
weight to both the number of ports in the market and the inequality of market shares. A 
market with a HHI of below 1000 is considered un-concentrated according to the US 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, while a HHI between 1000 and 
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1800 is moderately concentrated. Markets with a HHI above 1800 are regarded as highly 
concentrated (Cariou, 2007). The advantages of using the HHI are that it takes into account 
all firms in the industry and secondly, it gives extra weight to a single firm with an unusually 
large market share.      
    
The standard assessment for testing if ports are competitive should start by looking at factors 
such as the market share (Jolić, Štrk, & Lešić, 2007; OECD, 2011). This follows logically 
from the definition of a port market, because a port is more likely to be found to have market 
power if it has a persistent market share, than if it does not. Volatile market shares will be 
indicative of more competition, as price reductions, capacity expansions, or innovation by 
individual ports or terminals results in increased traffic. It is necessary because one of the 
deliverables of this research is to find out if privatisation through concession has induced 
competition among the ports under study. In achieving the primary goal of this research, the 
competitive position of the ports has to be determined. As the competition requires 
competitiveness, which means in the conditions in which competition exists in the market, 
terminals need to be competitive. In the case of competitiveness, Jolić et al. (2007) suggested 
that the most important aspect is to find out which port is competitive towards which other 
port. 
  
That is why this research employed the concept of the HHI to investigate the competition 
among the six Nigerian ports before and after the 2006 concession. The HHI method is based 
on the notion of market share of the ports. The method enables comparison of a single port 
with other ports within the competitive environment.  It allows for objective determination of 
the ports in relation to other competitors. Secondly, it is entirely based on realised throughput 
of the ports and not on difficult to get data, such as financial and confidential marketing data. 
Applying this method is important, because it is simple to assume that creating many 
terminals for each cargo type in the same port allows for competition and without putting into 
consideration the potential unequal distribution of services offered by the different terminals 
and the possible dominant positions of individual terminals. For instance, if there are four 
ports in a particular industry and operated by four different operators and one port handles let 
say 80% of the throughput, while the others control 6.67% market share each. Then it is 
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unwise to be speaking of competition in those circumstances. In order to ameliorate this type 
of problem, the concentration index is often used.  
 
6.3.1 The market structure of Nigerian ports 
Geographically, Nigeria is located in Western Africa; the southern edge is a coastline along 
the Atlantic Ocean in the Gulf of Guinea. The country borders four countries, Cameroon to 
the South-East, Chad to the North-East, Niger to the North and Benin to the West. Despite 
the strategic location, Nigerian ports and the ports of the neighbouring countries serve mainly 
the Nigerian market. Except the Onne port located in the oil and gas free zone that acts as a 
transhipment port for oil and gas traffic to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. The reason 
for the port market scenario described above is due to the country‘s large population, the 
inefficiency of the port system and the unwholesome practices of Nigerian shippers. As 
observed before, it has led to the diversion of Nigerian bound cargo to ports of neighbouring 
West African countries. 
 
The Nigerian port market for the period under study is characterised by fluctuating growth 
rates. The driving force of the recent growth can be attributed to privatisation and the 
dredging of the Lagos ports and Onne ports to receive bigger ships which have in turn led to 
improved throughput levels. Though there are other factors, such as the return of the country 
to democratic rule after a long military dictatorship, which improved the purchasing power of 
the citizenry. Plus the continued increase in oil prices globally have led to improvements in 
the economy, as the country depends mainly on the revenue from oil for sustenance. Figure 
6.2 shows the throughput of the six major Nigerian ports understudy between 2000 and 2011. 
Apapa is the principal port in the Nigerian port system, with a throughput of 11.01 million 
tonnes in 2000, which increased to 16.9 million in 2005 and decreased to 15.1 million tonnes 
in 2006, the swing year. It then rose sharply to 18.6 million tonnes in 2007 and a gradual 
growth to 23.4 million tonnes in 2011. Another big port is the Onne port which handled 7.2 
million tonnes in 2000 and a steady increase in throughput till 2007. Then the yearly cargo 
volume dropped slightly from 21.6 million to 21.4 million tonnes in 2008 and declined 
sharply to 17.4 million tonnes in 2009. The throughput increased again from 23.3 million 
tonnes in 2010 to 26.2 million tonnes in 2011. The sharp drop in 2009 could be attributed to 
the restriction on ship entry due to the dredging of the Bonny channel. The TCIP handled a 
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throughput of 3.9 million tonnes in 2000, followed by a gradual pattern of rise and fall until 
2005 with a throughput of 5.5 million tonnes. Afterwards, the throughput rose sharply in 
2006 to 7.4 million tonnes. A remarkable increase ensued until 2009 with a throughput of 
14.1 million tonnes, then dropped to 13.1 million tonnes in 2010 and a rise to 15.8 million 
tonnes in 2011. The ports of PH, Calabar and Warri showed a similar pattern of peaks and 
troughs. The Warri port showed a remarkable growth in throughput from 2008 to 2011 
likewise Calabar port. The PH port showed an increase and decrease in throughput 
throughout the study period.  
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Figure 6.2: Nigerian ports’ throughput in million tonnes (2000-2011) 
Figure 6.3 shows an increase in throughput in all the ports after concession. The port with the highest 
growth rate of 64.3% is Warri; it is followed by the Calabar port at 61.7% and closely by the TCIP 
60.1%. The Onne port increased by 47.6%, the Apapa port by 28.7%, the least is PH port with 8.8%. 
The high growth rate in throughput of Warri port is attributable to both the concession and the return 
of normalcy to the Niger Delta region due to the Amnesty granted to the militants, which led to 
shippers patronising the port again.   
The Apapa port is the biggest port in the country, with a total throughput of almost 85.9 
million tonnes between 2000 and 2005 (pre-concession period). It increased by 28.7% to 
approximately 120.6 million tonnes between 2006 and 2011 (post-concession period). 
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Notwithstanding that, the Apapa port grew by 28.7% after concession, though the yearly 
growth rate is lower during the post-concession period compared to the pre-concession. The 
main reason for the slow growth rate of the Apapa port is the creation of five new container 
terminals, four in the TCIP and one in the Onne port as a result of privatisation through 
concession contracts. Prior to concession, the Nigerian port market was served by one 
container terminal, the Apapa Container Terminal (CTL), now the A.P. Moller Terminals 
(APMT). As a result of the entrance of new operators into the market, some customers of 
Apapa container terminal switched a reasonable amount of container traffic to newly created 
terminals. This is evident from the post-concession throughput of 120.5 million tonnes, which 
is 4.2% lower than the Onne port‘s throughput of 125.8 million tonnes. The other ports 
achieved a growth rate of two-digits in throughput for the period under study, except the PH 
port where the growth rate was only 8.8%    
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Figure 6.3: Nigerian ports Pre- and post-concession throughput in million tonnes 
 
6.3.2 Nigerian ports market share                                       
Figure 6.4 shows the pre- and post-concession market share of each of the ports understudy, 
calculated as a percentage of the total throughput of the six ports understudy for the two 
observed periods. The Apapa port was clearly the market leader prior to concession and it is 
the Onne port after concession. As explained earlier the Apapa port has lost some its market 
share to the newly created container terminals in the TCIP. Onne has gained greater market 
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share as the main operator Intels has acquired two more terminals in the Warri and Calabar 
ports. As the operator has not started full utilisation of the newly acquired terminals, it 
handles cargo meant for these terminals in the Onne port thereby boosting the throughput of 
Onne. As Figure 6.4 indicates, the Apapa port‘s loss became the TCIP‘s gain and increased 
market share. The Calabar and Warri port market shares increased after concession, while the 
PH port decreased considerably. The operation of the PH port by indigenous terminal 
operators may have affected the fortunes of the port considerably. Although market share and 
throughput are important factors in determining the competitiveness of ports, however, port 
location also have a substantial impact in determining port attractiveness to shippers and 
competitiveness.  
       
Figure 6.4: Nigerian ports pre- and post-concession market share 
 
6.3.3   Nigerian ports market concentration 
As observed previously, the HHI is a measure of size of firms in relation to others in the same 
industry. It is also an indicator of the level of competition among firms in the market. Table 
6.4 shows that the port market is not concentrated as the HHI is below 1000, except the 
Apapa port before concession and the Onne port after concession which are moderately 
concentrated. According to Cariou (2007), a decrease in the HHI is an indicator of the loss of 
pricing and bargaining power among firms and an increase in the competition, while a 
decrease indicates the opposite. Table 6.4 shows that the post-concession HHI is relatively 
smaller (2450.65), which is a pointer that the port market in the post-concession period is 
moderately concentrated. The Apapa and Onne ports account for over 62% of the total 
market share which implies that the two ports are in an oligopolistic position. TCIP controls 
another 18.64% and the remaining 20% of the market share is controlled by the PH, Warri 
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and Calabar ports. The high HHI index for pre-concession reveals little or no competition 
between the market players during that period. It gave credence to the oligopolistic position 
of the Apapa and Onne ports with market shares of 37.9 % and 29.11% respectively, giving 
the two ports 67% of the market during that period. The PH and TCIP ports control 13.6% 
and 12.9% respectively, while the Calabar and Warri ports control 1.38% and 5.04% 
respectively. The weak competition among ports during this period may have had negative 
impact on port customers, in terms of service quality, port dues and terminal handling 
charges.  
Table 6.4: Nigerian ports pre-and post-concession market concentration 
PORT THRUP 
Pre-
concession  
THRUP 
Post-
concession 
MARKET 
SHARE  
Pre-
concession  
MARKET 
SHARE  
Post-
concession  
HHI HH1 
Pre-
concession  
Post-
concession  
('000 tonnes) ('000 tonnes) % % 
APAPA 85,874 120,478.40 37.93% 30.62% 1438.80 937.43 
CALABAR 3,123.00 8,151.00 1.38% 2.07% 1.90 4.29 
ONNE 65,896.24 125,779.40 29.11% 31.96% 847.23 1021.74 
PH 30,832.25 33,790.70 13.62% 8.59% 185.48 73.74 
TCIP 29,257.00 73,362.90 12.92% 18.64% 167.01 347.59 
WARRI 11,409.59 31,933.53 5.04% 8.12% 25.40 65.86 
TOTAL 226,392 393,495.93 100.00% 100.00% 2665.81 2450.65 
 
 
6.4  Conceptualization of the theoretical model for operational performance 
In order to investigate the determinants of operational performance for Nigerian ports, this 
study proposes two equations based on the two main factors that influence the performance of 
seaports i.e. efficiency and port size measured in throughput levels. The model is adapted 
from Cheon (2007b) and  Tongzon (1995).                        Equation 6.1 
Where:  
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EFF=Port efficiency 
TEU=Port throughput (economies of scale) 
COM= Intra-port competition at terminal level 
OWN=Port ownership 
e1=Error term 
We derive equation 2 from the determinants of throughput at port level: 
TEU = g (                                 ) Equation 6.2 
Where, 
EFFt-1 = Port efficiency at previous period 
WHR = Service flexibility (24-hours service) 
DEP = Berth depth 
NOS = Total number of ship calls 
PC = Port charges 
SEC = Security 
PCTR= Port city relationship 
e2 = Error term 
Equations 6.1 and 6.2 raise some econometric considerations which can be resolved by 
assuming that a port‘s output can be endogenous in the relationship among the variables. 
Thus, by taking this perspective, the complex relationship between port production scales, 
port efficiency, port ownership and other exogenous variables could theoretically be resolved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Causal path diagram: Recursive model 
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Figure 6.5 demonstrates that the port efficiency at a previous period could be a factor in 
determining port output increase at time t, by attracting more cargo. Shippers generally 
choose ports with high efficiency, superior service and lower port charges than their 
competitors, based on previous knowledge and experience. At the same time, large-scale 
output at time t could in turn result in higher efficiency at that moment, as a result of 
economies of scale from the DEA analysis in Chapter 5. Although there is the existence of a 
loop between port efficiency and port throughput in Figure 6.5, the time of occurrence 
differs. In addition, it is observed that the error terms from the different equations are 
independent; this puts equations 6.1 and 6.2 for port efficiency and port output in a recursive 
path.  
Therefore, to estimate the operational efficiency of Nigerian seaports is the hallmark of this 
section and the following structural forms are adopted for the models: 
First stage                                                        Equation 6.3 
Second stage                           Equation 6.4 
Where     refers to a projected value of TEU from the 1st stage, c refers to constant terms 
and the error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with constant variances.   
From the models, the equations exhibit non-linear relationship, for the equations to comply 
with the linearity assumption needed for multiple regression estimation the respective natural 
logarithms are taking. The conceptualized models show that port efficiency is determined by 
scales of production and change in ownership. 
 
6.5 Factors Influencing Port Efficiency  
6.5.1  Port ownership 
From Figure 6.5, the influence of port ownership is in two directions. First the creation of 
terminals from existing ports and the transfer to private operators has induced competition 
among and between the terminals, which in turn influences terminal efficiency. In other 
words, the separation of the public port authority from terminal operation, through 
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concession, could affect the efficiency of ports through behavioural changes in terminal 
operations and management. It is evident that the private sector participation through 
concession contracts impacted on the technical efficiency of Nigerian seaports from the DEA 
and MPI analyses in Chapter 5.  
 
Again port ownership could influence port efficiency by increasing production scales (scale 
efficiency). It is because through leasing and concessions, global terminal operators are 
attracted to bring in the much needed investment required to finance new construction and 
expand existing ones. It could lead to ports handling more outputs that will eventually 
increase economies of scale. Thus, port ownership could theoretically be conceptualised as 
one of the dependent variables, for both models of port efficiency and port throughput.  
 
In the efficiency model, port ownership is captured by dummy variables (0=Public Operating 
and 1=Landlord). Therefore, the sources of the Nigerian ports‘ efficiency could be attributed 
to intra-port competition at the terminal level as well as the concession of terminals to private 
operators and port size. 
   
6.5.2  Level of port competition 
Another factor that influences the post-concession Nigerian ports‘ efficiency is competition. 
It involves the assessment of the market power of the terminals. The degree of competition 
among or between the ports is captured by the HHI attempts to assess the market 
concentration of each port, as a yardstick for potential competition among or between the 
ports. Since the delineation of ports into terminals for privatisation induces intra-port 
competition among or between terminals, that enhances port efficiency. Another aspect 
envisaged by the Nigerian ports‘ concession is the introduction of inter-port competition. 
However, this has not been achieved as the unbundling of the NPA into autonomous port 
authorities is yet to take place. 
 
6.6 Determinants of Throughput 
Apart from ownership and competition discussed above, another factor that influences the 
efficiency of Nigerian seaports as suggested by the analysis in Chapter 5, is the scale of 
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production (throughput/cargo size). Ports tend to be more efficient when they have higher 
production scales and can enjoy the benefits of economies of scale. The scale of production is 
modelled in the first stage based on the factors that previous analyses suggest as affecting 
port size. It includes; terminal efficiency, frequency of ship calls, terminal depth/draught, 
location, port charges, measures to reduce ship turnaround time (introduction of 24 hour 
service) and security. 
 
Terminal Efficiency  
The operational efficiency of ports that is a measure of the ratio of output influences the 
efficiency of ports. A port could be considered efficient based on the previous knowledge and 
experience of port users. As a result, more shippers are attracted to the port, which in turn 
increases the throughput level.  
 
 Terminal depth/draught  
Depths of berth and approach channels determine the type of ship that calls in a terminal. 
Therefore, the berth depth is a factor in attracting bigger ships and Post-Panamax vessels that 
allow ports to reap the benefits of economies of scale. In West Africa, WAFMAX with a 
4500 TEUs capacity is the largest container ship that visits the region, but only calls at 
selected ports with a high draught (Apapa-Nigeria, Walvis Bay-Cote d‘Ivoire and recently at 
Onne-Nigeria). That is why a large chunk of infrastructural investment in ports is for 
dredging in order to increase the chances of attracting bigger vessels. Since the lack of deep 
water ports and facilities prevents large ships from calling at ports (Tongzon, 2002; Tongzon 
& Heng, 2005). 
 
 Frequency of ship calls  
The number of vessels that call at a port is a critical factor, as it influences the volume of 
cargo that can be moved through the port. Plus the increased frequency of ship calls is 
attractive to importers and exporters. The inclusion of frequency of ship calls as determinant 
of throughput is supported by studies carried out by Slack (1985)  and Bird and Bland (1988) 
on port choice criteria. In each of the studies, the increased frequency of ship calls was 
ranked first as the most important criteria that freight forwarders consider in port choice. 
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Port Charges  
Another important factor that influences cargo size is port charges, although shippers are 
more concerned with indirect costs associated with delay, loss of market or market share, loss 
of customer confidence and opportunities forgone due to inefficient service. In Nigeria, the 
issue of port charges has been particularly problematic due to multiple agencies involved in 
cargo clearing. It has contributed to the tag of Nigerian ports as one of the most expensive 
ports to do business in the World. The problem of multiple charges is captured by Niyi 
Labinjo,  the General Secretary of the Indigenous Ship Owners Association of Nigeria 
(ISAN), in the following statement:  
―Shipping cost contributes about 40 percent to the total import transaction, where the 
transport element is just 11.5 percent. The other costs are associated with the handling costs 
because there is a problem of double handling. So, our shipping cost is 40 percent, whereas 
Europe‟s cost is five percent, including the handling costs. The transportation element in our 
case is 11.5 percent of the total cost of goods. The other 28.5 percent comes in as a result of 
double handling, where more than one agency or contractor is doing one job”.  
Although it is an important factor, it is not included in the final model due to the 
unavailability of data. 
 
24-Hour Service  
Proactive measures to improve the turnaround time of ships, for instance, the 24-hour service,  
when adopted by ports, ensures that vessels are attended to, as they arrive. Such actions, 
attracts shippers to the terminals and improves the throughput levels. The effect of this 
service is captured by ordinal values, by assigning 1 if a terminal practices 24-hour service 
and 0 if the terminal does not.  
 
Security  
Another important factor that is considered by shipping companies in the choice of port of 
call is safety (Tongzon, 2002). As ships will not call at ports where the safety of the vessel, 
cargo and crew, is not guaranteed. If ships do not call, cargo will not be discharged, and this 
will impact on the throughput of the ports. The advent of militancy in the Delta region of 
Nigeria where some of these ports are located, makes security an important issue in 
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considering determinants of throughput levels in Nigeria. It is indicative of the low 
throughput of the Warri and Calabar ports, especially in the heat of the militancy in 2006 and 
2007. The influence of security is captured by a dummy variable. If the port is located in the 
Niger Delta region with a high incidence of kidnapping and youth militancy, a value of 1 is 
assigned, while ports located outside the security prone zone are assigned zero (0). 
 
Port-city Relationships 
The closest cities to a port are its direct economic hinterland. Moreover, efficiency could be 
conferred on ports as a result of the economic performance of the surrounding cities. 
Therefore, the social and environmental issues that accompany port cities influence the 
efficiency of ports located therein or nearby. Thus, a non-acrimonious and sustainable 
relationship between city and port is necessary for ports to achieve higher efficiency. In 
addition, the resources in terms of skilled labour that a port requires to enhance its 
competitiveness are sourced from port-cities. In line with this, for ports to increase their 
outputs, port-cities need to prosper in economic and demographic terms. Consequently, it is 
projected that the larger populations of port-cities could attract more cargo to ports.    
 
6.7 Result of the Regression Analysis 
The OLS result of equations 6.3 and 6.4 are presented in table 6.5. As the DEA efficiency is 
non-negative, and there are no zero values in the equation, therefore the dependent variable 
cannot be said to be normally distributed. Therefore, to allow for a parameter estimation by 
multiple linear regressions, both equations are made linear by taking their respective logs 
(Cheon, 2007b; Tongzon, 1995; Windle & Dresner, 1995).  
 
6.7.1  First Stage: Port output model 
Table 6.5 shows the result of the first-stage ordinary least square regression (OLS). It 
indicates that most of the variables are significant except for service flexibility, captured by 
the 24-hour service that is not statistically significant at the 5% level (Appendix 6.10 and 
6.11). Berth depth is one factor that influences the throughput level of Nigerian seaports, 
followed by terminal efficiency. Other factors include the number of ship calls, security and 
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also geographical factors captured by the population of the state in which the port is located, 
as the closest hinterlands are also significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
Table 6.5: Results of the OLS estimation 
                             Dependent Variables 
LNTHRU (Throughput) LNDEA (Port Efficiency) 
Explanatory Coefficients (a) Variables Coefficients 
CONSTANT 9.69 (-) CONSTANT 0.103 (-) 
LNEFF 0.610 (+)* LNTHRU_P 0.426 (+)* 
LNDEP 1.899 (+)* LNCOM 0. 085 (+) 
LNCALLS 0.490 (+)* OWN 0.403 (+)* 
SECURITY 0.390(+)*   
24HRS SERVICE 0.014(-)   
LNPCTR 0.541 (+)*   
LN (EFF=CCR efficiency scores, DEP=Channel depth, CALLS=Total number of ship calls, 
PCTR=Population of port city), Security= Dummy representing security challenge of port location (0, 
1), 24HRS service=Dummy which is 1 if a port has adopted 24hours service and 0 if it has not, LN 
TEU_P= Predicted throughput obtained from first stage regression, COM=competition level 
represented by yearly market share values, OWN=Ownership dummy, 0=public ownership and 1= for 
private (landlord), *=statistically significant at the 5% confidence level 
 
6.7.2  Second stage OLS: Port efficiency model 
To predict the effects of the concession (captured by change of ownership) on Nigerian ports 
efficiency, second stage OLS regression analyses were conducted on Equation 6.4. The null 
hypothesis is that the amount of explained variance is zero. The F-score that indicates the 
probability of arriving at a model based on the sample data under the hypothesis is almost 
zero (2.855E-23) (Appendix 6.13). The analysis shows that the efficiency of Nigerian ports is 
a function of throughput (measure of production scale), competition and ownership. The R-
Square indicates that the predictors (throughput, competition and ownership) taken together, 
explain more than 79.4% (R-Square value) of the variance in efficiency due to throughput, 
competition and ownership change. The F-score indicates that there is some element of a 
relationship between the predictors and the dependent variable (efficiency). To determine the 
influence of each predictor (throughput, ownership and competition) on performance of 
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Nigerian ports. The coefficients derived from the log-transformed regression model give an 
indication of the expected change in efficiency, relative to one unit change in the individual 
predictors holding all others constant, while the P-value gives the level of significance. 
 
The result of the second stage log-transformed regression (Table 6.5) shows that the 
coefficient of the three variables indicates a positive sign as expected. The coefficient of 
throughput indicates that a one percent change in throughput results in 53 percent 
(exponential of throughput coefficient 0.426) change in efficiency, holding ownership and 
competition constant. However, as ownership is an indicator variable, a switch from public to 
private ownership results in a 49.7 percent (exponential of ownership coefficient 0.403) 
change in efficiency, holding the other two variables constant. Additionally, a one unit 
change in competition leads to a 0.09 percent change in efficiency (exponential of 
competitive level coefficient 0.085), holding throughput and ownership constant. A focus on 
the p-values at the 5% significance level shows that p=0.027, 0.340 and 0.001 for throughput, 
competition and ownership respectively, indicating that competition is not significantly 
correlated to Nigerian ports efficiency at the port level. The researcher has demonstrated 
above that the HHI decreased slightly after concession, indicating that the adoption of the 
Landlord model of port administration has ushered in a semblance of competition in the 
Nigerian ports‘ market. However, taking the predictors (production scale, competition and 
ownership) together shows that the influence of competition on the overall efficiency is not 
statistically significant. 
   
Although there is a decrease in concentration index after concession, the effect of the induced 
competition is not significant in the presence of throughput and ownership. Therefore, it is 
included in the efficiency model (Equation 6.1), because it is part of the theoretical 
explanation for a seaport‘s efficiency. The researcher concludes on the basis of the data that 
the level of competition captured by the HHI does not appear to have a direct effect on the 
efficiency of the Nigerian ports. At the same time, we can say that production scale captured 
by the throughput volume and change of ownership from public to private, has an influence 
on efficiency, independent of competition.  
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Another important factor is the throughput (scale of operation) of the ports, in other words the 
economies of scale that accompany handling large amount of cargo is an important 
determinant of the Nigerian ports‘ efficiency. The fact that the size of the port expressed by 
throughput levels influences the efficiency of operation has been demonstrated in chapter 5, 
which indicated a high and positive correlation between size and efficiency. 
In the previous bivariate analysis it was reported that the Landlord port model was more 
efficient than the Public and Mixed port models, this assertion has also been confirmed by   
the results of the second stage OLS analysis. The results show that the influence of ownership 
on the Nigerian ports‘ efficiency is statistically significant. This is in conformity with 
previous studies of port ownership change in Asia, North America, Europe and Latin 
America by Cullinane and Song (2001); Ircha (2001); Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001a); 
Hoffmann (2001), and Cullinane et al. (2005a). The authors argued that the transfer of port 
operations from the public to the private sector improved the efficiency of the ports in those 
countries. 
   
In summary, the results indicate that the primary drivers of a Nigerian port‘s efficiency are 
port size captured by throughput levels and the change in ownership of cargo handling 
operations. The influence of competition as captured by the concentration index on efficiency 
of the ports is statistically insignificant. It shows that the mere transfer of terminal operations 
from public to private, without judicious implementation of the accompanying institutional 
reforms and an active regulatory oversight, will not induce competition in the ports‘ sector. 
Therefore, identifying the factors responsible for improved performance of the Nigerian ports 
after concession from the result of analyses, it is possible to identify the roles of ownership 
change, port size (economies of scale) and the statistically insignificant contribution of port 
competition. 
 
6.8 The Impact of Concession on Key Port Performance Indicators  
The interviews of the various stakeholders in the Nigerian ports‘ industry revealed general 
unhappiness, which stems from the failure of the NPA to regulate the terminal operators, so 
that the gains achieved from port concession, can be transferred to shippers and other 
customers in the form of reduced charges, or improved services. For example, six years after 
the concession, the cost of doing business is still higher than its rivals in the sub-region (see 
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Table 6.6). The shipping agency fee in Nigeria is more than that of Ghana by 33.5% and 
236.5% more than the Benin Republic. The container clearing fee in Nigeria is four times that 
of Ghana, while it is more than twice that of the Benin Republic. This list goes on and on. 
 
 Table 6.6: Comparison of port charges in West Africa  
Port Charges Countries (Naira) 
 
Benin Republic Ghana Nigeria 
Shipping line agency fee 7,875 17,600 26,500 
Manifest amendment fee 9,450 2,400 18,000 
Container Clearing fee 945 500 2,000 
Demurrage (First period) 
 (Second period)   (Third period) 
 1,512 
1,890 
1,890 
2,850 
3,000 
4,500 
No of days free of dwell time 7 7 3 
Source: Fieldwork (2011) 
6.8.1 Port Charges 
Adopting a business perspective for port systems implies that the optimal cost should be 
determined based on the level of port services (Mahrouz & Arisha, 2009). After all the port 
charge is a full recovery, that is applied to port users to cover port sunk costs (Luo & 
Grigalunas, 2003; Martin & Thomas, 2001). The need for continuous monitoring of port 
charges so that they do not spiral out of control cannot be overemphasised. In addition,  
service quality and time costs are the primary factors that determine the demand for port 
services (Dasgupta & Ghosh, 2000; Gardner, Marlow, & Pettit, 2006). Though port demand 
is also affected by other factors, such as an international trade pattern and the geographical 
location of the port with respect to sources and markets. As well as the availability of multi-
modal transportation networks and the associated general total cost (Luo & Grigalunas, 
2003). The most knotty issue after concession, between the shippers and terminal operators, 
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is port charges. As it has continued escalating without any sign of abating due to the lack of a 
commercial regulator to oversee the activities of the various stakeholders in the port. 
 
 
The interviews with the stakeholders (shipping companies, freight forwarders) revealed that 
the increase in tariffs after concession has seen an astronomical rise in the cost of doing 
business in Nigerian ports, mainly due to the costs of clearing and demurrage. Interviews 
with Chief Nweke, the National president of National Association of Government Approved 
Freight Forwarders (NAGAFF) and Mr. Olayiwola Shittu, the Chairman of Association of 
Nigerian Customs Licensed Agents (ANCLA) revealed a rising cost of clearing containers. 
For instance, the cost of clearing a 20-foot and a 40-foot container in the Lagos ports has 
increased by 5.97 and 6.61 times respectively. The interviewees were of the view that the 
astronomical increase cannot be explained away by inflation, as inflation has remained below 
2-digits for most of the period. Table 6.7 shows the pre- and post-concession costs of clearing 
containerised cargo and the accompanying demurrage (extra charge on goods for staying in 
the port beyond the grace period granted by law). 
Table 6.7: Costs of clearing containers at the Lagos ports  
Activity Pre-concession 
(Naira) 
Post-concession 
(Naira) 
Increase 
Total Clearing cost:  
20-Foot container 
11,715.50 70,000 5.97 times 
 40-Foot container 18,158.50 120,000 6.61 times 
Demurrage (First Phase after 6 days) 95 900 9.47 times 
                (Second phase after 12 days) 250 4200 16.8 times 
              (Third phase beyond 12 days) 1300 6000 4.61 times 
Source: Fieldwork (2012) 
6.8.2 Labour issues 
Figure 6.6 shows the total yearly staff strength on the NPA from 2000-2011. The figures 
from 2000-2005 indicate the staff strength of NPA before privatisation, while those for 2006-
2011 represent the total number after concession. The post-concession figures represent both 
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the staff of the NPA and the terminal operators. In 2006, 75 percent of the NPA staff was 
disengaged, which reduced the workforce from 12,716 in 2004 to 4,012 in 2011. The 
difference between the staff strength of the ports in 2006 (6,024) and the total number of the 
NPA employees (4,012), gives the staff strength of the terminal operators in the first year. In 
the short term, the number of staff was reduced drastically, as the terminal operators, take-
over the control of terminals. The number of staff started to increase, with the improvements 
in traffic levels, due to new recruitments by the terminal operators. This in tandem with the 
findings of Brooks and Cullinane (2007), which revealed that short-term employment 
suffered after the privatisations in Argentina, Columbia, Mexico, and Brazil. 
 
 
 Figure 6.6: Pre- and post-concession Nigerian ports’ labour force 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
 
6.8.2.1 Throughput  
All the three cargo types (Container, Dry Bulk and General Cargo) exhibited fluctuations 
after privatisation. Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 show an increase in the throughput levels for 
containers, dry bulk and general cargo. In terms of containers, the main container terminal at 
Apapa port, considered the highest single port concession transaction in the continent, was 
awarded to the APM terminals to manage. It has the mandate of increasing capacity from 
220,000 TEUs per annum to 1.6 million TEUs. Within months of taking over the terminal, 
the delays for berthing spaces at the terminal have been reduced significantly. It culminated 
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in shipping lines dropping the congestion surcharge from 525 to 75 Euro per TEU which has 
saved the Nigerian Economy US$200 million per year.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: Pre- and post-concession container throughput 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
 
By 2009, new gantry cranes had been brought in that triple the capacity of the port. The new 
equipment can handle more than 500 containers per day for customs examination and at the 
end of the day most of them are returned for stacking. By January 2009, the port was clogged 
with uncollected containers. By the end of February 2009, the situation had become so severe 
that the Managing Director of the NPA announced a temporary suspension of ship entry with 
immediate effect. The suspension that lasted until the middle of April was to clear what the 
NPA described as an alarming ―backlog‖ of uncollected containers. The customs controller in 
the Apapa port blamed the backlog on the 100 percent physical examination of cargo, due to 
false declarations and concealments by importers. However, this is not the only problem as 
even cleared containers were left uncollected. This is evident from the 9741 containers 
waiting for delivery to shippers by end of January 2009; 851 of these had been cleared by 
customs, all charges paid and all documentation completed. To force the importers to move 
their containers out of the port the NPA imposed a demurrage surcharge of US$ 4 per TEU 
for all uncollected containers. The agents blamed the delay on the inability of shippers to 
move out the cleared containers and the lack of trucks. The Apapa port case is an example of 
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how privatisation, unaccompanied by related reforms from other relevant sectors, could 
impinge on the efficiency. 
 
 
The dry bulk cargo category also recorded an increase in throughput, but not so high 
compared to the containers and general cargo terminals. This may not be surprising, as most 
of the bulk terminals are dedicated terminals and the growth in throughput is dependent on 
the demands for the product in the economy. For instance, as Nigeria intensified its efforts to 
produce the quantity of cement needed by the country locally, the importation of bulk cement 
reduced drastically. Figure 6.8 shows the fluctuations in throughput for both pre- and post- 
concession periods. 
 
  
Figure 6.8: Pre- and post-concession DBC throughput 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
 
The general cargo throughput showed a remarkable increase after privatisation (Figure 6.9). 
As observed previously, ports in developing countries still handle a large volume of general 
cargo, because containerization has not taken foothold in those countries as in developed 
countries. Nigeria is no different, as general cargo still accounts for the largest volume in 
terms of throughput. General cargo accounts for the highest growth in throughput after 
concession.  
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Figure 6.9: Pre- and post-concession GC throughput 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
 
6.8.2.2 Turnaround Time 
There are a broad range of studies on the outcome of privatisation programmes, particularly 
in Europe and Asia, on port efficiency and the productivity of ports. However, the researcher 
came across only a single study (Ducruet & Merk, 2012) that examined container vessel 
turnaround times across the World. Though the study dwelt more on China, even that the 
survey only gave a snapshot, as it was based only on the average turnaround time (ATT) for 
the month of May. Despite that, the turnaround time is regarded as a key indicator of 
efficiency. Average turnaround time (ATT) is simply the average difference between 
departure and arrival dates of all ships calling at a port (or country), within one year (Ducruet 
& Merk, 2012). A review of the container vessels‘ turnaround times for 1996, 2006 and 2011, 
showed some surprising twists (Ibid). In 1996, ports with a high efficiency in terms of ATT 
were located in Western Europe, while the worst performing ports were in the former 
socialist countries (Cuba, Ukraine, the Baltic States, Poland, Russia, India, Vietnam, North 
Africa). In addition, Canada and Austria also ranked low, while Japan ranked highest among 
the countries handling large traffic volumes (Ducruet & Merk, 2012). In comparison to the 
Asian, European and American countries, African ports lagged behind. 
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A decade later (2006), the East-West dichotomy has faded away as former socialist countries 
have improved their rankings considerably, except for Cuba and Vietnam, while the 
efficiency of African ports has worsened. There were also noticeable, but gradual 
improvements, in Russia, Brazil, Canada and Turkey. In 2006, China was a major exception; 
it has the highest number of vessel calls but very low efficiency.  The profile of China 
changed entirely in 2011; it has reached the first rank in terms of number of calls, with an 
ATT of 0.96 days, compared with 5.8 days in both 1996 and 2006. This change is remarkable 
compared to the more gradual change in some large countries and the stagnation of others 
(India, Indonesia and South Africa). China‘s performance is below Hong Kong (0.72 days), 
Taiwan (0.71 days) and South Korea (0.68 days). However, it performed better than 
Singapore (1.16 days) and the United States (1.02 days). On the other hand, Africa as a whole 
lags behind the World average; most of its ports exhibited very long ATT in 2011, with the 
exception of Morocco and Egypt. While the ports with the worst efficiency scores based on 
ATT are Kolkata (India), Mombasa (Kenya) and Algiers (Algeria); for the whole period 
under review, African ports consistently obtained low efficiency scores.  The Nigerian 
container terminals are still below 1million TEUs per annum. They are not ranked among the 
busiest container ports. Despite that, the evaluation of the average turnaround time achievable 
at the ports is of paramount importance, as Nigerian ports are notorious for congestion. 
 
Figure 6.10: Pre- and post-concession average time efficiency of Nigerian ports 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
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One of the primary objectives of the Nigerian port privatisation is to reduce the turnaround 
times of ship at the nation‘s ports, as the ATT of vessels was considered high in comparison 
with other neighbouring ports and constituted an obstacle to trade (Palsson & Leigland, 
2007). Figure 6.10 shows the average yearly turnaround of different cargo vessels 
(Multipurpose, Container and RORO) in Nigerian ports, from 2000-2011. The average 
turnaround of multipurpose ports has gradually reduced from an all-time high of 11days in 
2002 to 6.2 days in 2011. The lowest turnaround time of 5.3 days was recorded in 2007, a 
year after the private operators took over the operation of the terminals. Although there are 
some improvements, it is still considered very high. There are also diverse differences in 
ATT among the different ports in Nigeria. While the ports of Lagos (Apapa and TCIP) and 
Onne showed significant improvement after privatisation, the PH port‘s improvement was 
gradual, the Calabar port‘s improvement was fluctuating and the Warri port‘s efficiency 
deteriorated.  
 
Figure 6.11: Pre- and post-concession time efficiency of container terminals 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
There is no remarkable improvement in the ATT of container vessels after privatisation 
(Figure 6.11). The best ATT achieved after privatisation is four days, while the highest is 9 
days in 2007, which the APM terminal operator attributed to the constant breakdown of the 
equipment inherited from the NPA. When new and modern cranes were brought in, the ATT 
reduced to 4 days in 2009 and 2010 and then moved slightly higher to 5 days in 2011. 
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Figure 6.12: Pre- and post-concession time efficiency of RORO terminals 
Source: Researcher‘s fieldwork (2012) 
For the RORO terminals, the efficiency based on ATT decreased after privatisation (Figure 
6.12). The lowest ATT achieved after privatisation was 4 days and the highest 5 days. For the 
pre-concession period, the lowest and highest were 2 and 3 days respectively. However, 
privatisation does not on its own improve the time efficiency of ports. Other approaches 
designed to improve ship-to-shore operations and other terminal services and functions need 
to be in place. Ship-to-shore operations can be enhanced by employing vessel queuing 
systems, the modernisation of equipment that can improve the speed of operations (double 
cycling, tandem and multiple lift cranes) and skilled manpower capable of achieving high 
crane productivity rates. Ship-to-shore operations are largely interlinked with other terminal 
operations, including yard equipment, terminal surface, storage capacity and terminal 
planning. These can constitute obstacles that affect the turnaround time of ships. Ship 
turnaround can be improved if the general conditions in the whole port area are favourable. It 
includes good intermodal connections with the hinterland within an integrated transport 
system, truck appointment systems at the gate, plus increased competition between different 
terminals and global terminal operators (Ducruet & Merk, 2012).  
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6.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter examined the relationships between ownership and efficiency, the level of 
competitiveness and efficiency and scale of production (port size) and efficiency, using both 
bivariate and multivariate analysis. In addition, the productivity change analysis was 
undertaken in this chapter. The result of the bivariate analysis showed an increase in 
efficiency after the adoption of the Landlord model (transfer of cargo handling operations to 
the private sector). While the multivariate analysis was performed on a projected efficiency 
model of Nigerian ports, assuming a relationship between a dependent variable efficiency and 
the predictor variables (production scale, ownership and competitiveness), using a two-stage 
log-transformed regression. The results indicated a statistically significant relationship 
between efficiency and ownership, as well as efficiency and port size represented by the scale 
of production and an insignificant relationship between the level of competition and 
efficiency. Therefore, the null hypothesis for port size and ownership was rejected and 
accepted for the degree of competition. In terms of the productivity change analysis, the 
results show that the total factor productivity of the Landlord model is higher than that of the 
Public port. However, the difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Likewise, 
the scale efficiency of the Landlord model is greater than that of the Public port, but 
statistically insignificant, while the technical efficiency change of Landlord and Public is 
equal (no change). On the other hand, the mean technological change of the Public port is 
higher than that of the Landlord port, but not statistically significant. The next chapter 
discusses the findings and the policy implications of this study. 
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Chapter Seven: Research Findings, Policy Implication and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The research concerns the influence of the transfer of the ownership of port terminal 
operations from the public to the private sector, through concession contracts, on the 
performance of the Nigerian port industry. The performance of Nigeria ports was analysed 
from both efficiency and productivity perspectives. This chapter presents the findings from 
the analyses of both primary and secondary data collected from port users, the ports and 
terminals. In this chapter, the results of the research are discussed under three sub-headings 
based on different aspects of the research themes and for clarity. Thereafter, it draw 
conclusions and the policy implications of the results and highlights the contribution of this 
research to existing knowledge. Finally, the limitations of this research and the areas for 
further studies in Nigerian port privatisation will be highlighted. 
 
7.2  Research Findings 
Unlike previous studies that relied on container terminal operations worldwide to determine 
the impact of different ownership styles on port efficiency, this research is based on the 
activities of multipurpose ports.  Additionally, it was observed from analyses of the literature, 
that most studies that are employing the DEA for performance evaluation use ports and 
terminals interchangeably. It contravenes the homogeneity assumption necessary for the DEA 
analysis. This research recognised that ports and terminals are distinct; therefore the analysis 
and benchmarking of ports was carried out on multipurpose ports in the same country for 
homogeneity. The efficiency measures were computed within the framework of the frontier 
function theory by adopting a non-parametric DEA. The frontier approach is consistent with 
the economic theory of optimising behaviour. It considers ports that operate on the frontier as 
efficient and interprets those that operate below the frontier as inefficient.  
 
The DEA models adopted in this study allowed us to isolate the factors militating against the 
ability of the ports to achieve efficient operations. The possible reasons for inefficiency are 
classified into pure technical and scale efficiency. In terms of productivity change analyses, 
the study relied on the DEA-based Malmquist index, which decomposes the sources of 
productivity change into catching-up and frontier shift effects. The former captures overall 
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technical efficiency change (EFFCH), while the latter captures technological change 
(TECHCH). Thereafter the EFFCH is further decomposed into pure technical efficiency 
change (PECH) and scale efficiency change (SECH).  
 
The results of the port analyses using different DEA approaches (Intertemporal, 
Contemporaneous and Window) indicate that the efficiency differs from port to port and from 
year to year. The efficiency score from the DEA-BCC is greater than from the DEA-CCR, 
showing the presence of inefficiency due to a non-optimal scale of production. However, the 
efficiency gap experienced by the ports for the 12 years under study is more due to technical 
than scale efficiency. It is indicative of the mean technical and scale efficiency scores for the 
12 years under study, which is 77.15% and 82.78% respectively. The most efficient port for 
the period is the Onne port with a mean efficiency of 97.5%, while the least efficient is the 
Warri port with an average efficiency of 53.5%. This finding is consistent with the Bv 
Haskoning of Netherlands (2001) study that precipitated the Nigerian ports‘ concession 
programme. The study indicated that the Onne port, which was the only port that adopted the 
Landlord model, as the most efficient port. It prompted the replication of the model in all the 
ports through the concession programme. However, the intriguing part of the findings of the 
research is in terms of benchmarks. The benchmark operation for all the ports to emulate is 
the PH port operations in 2004, which appeared 29 times as the reference operation for the 
inefficient ports. Although it is closely followed by the Onne port‘s operations in 2006, which 
appeared 28 times as a reference (Appendix 7.1). The results show that the PH port has 
performed well before concession. This supports the argument of this study that some of the 
ports would have been better off if left in the public domain. The low performance of the 
Warri port is attributed to the insecurity of the port‘s immediate hinterland. It led to most of 
the shipping lines deserting the port for fear of their crew members being kidnapped by Niger 
Delta militants, resulting in under-utilisation of the port‘s available resources.  Most of the 
ports showed high variation in both technical and scale efficiency, as indicated by the mean 
standard deviations of 24.32 and 19.26 respectively. The yearly mean overall efficiency 
equally showed significant fluctuation; the highest mean efficiency score of 79.45% occurred 
in 2011, while the lowest efficiency score of 45.55% was recorded in 2000.  
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The efficiency estimates from the DEA-analysis suggest that the reason the Nigerian ports 
departed from the efficiency frontier for the period 2000-2011, were due to both technical 
and scale inefficiency. However, as the mean scale efficiency score is higher than the average 
technical efficiency index the overriding effect is attributable to technical inefficiency. 
Applying Farrell‘s estimated efficiency criterion, there is a 22.85% potential for improvement 
in pure technical efficiency of the average port in the sample. Pure technical inefficiency can 
be interpreted partly from motivational deficiency at both worker and managerial level. In 
other words, it is due to differences in the technical levels of ports. In an industry like ports, 
with long-lived infrastructure and highly specialised equipment, the coexistence of different 
levels of technology at any point in time is not an aberration. Therefore, for the Nigerian 
ports, all the DEA models indicate that the deviations from the best possible performance (the 
frontier) are mostly due to technical inefficiency, rather than scale. It implies that there is 
wastage in input, as technical efficiency is a measure of how well the port is allocating its 
resources to maximise its output generation. 
 
On the other hand, the scale inefficiency of an average Nigerian port for the period 2000-
2011 is 17.22%. Scale inefficiency is related to the excessive use of capital input (equipment) 
factors relative to labour input. The DEA measures have indicated the direction of 
improvements in scale efficiency values by the nature of returns to scale. The Lagos ports 
(Apapa and TCIP) are operating under increasing returns to scale, while the Eastern ports 
(Calabar, Onne, PH and Warri) are operating under decreasing returns to scale. The Lagos 
ports require an increase in cargo throughput and an improvement in turnaround time 
(outputs). The Eastern ports should reduce the quantity of inputs to operate at the optimum 
efficiency scale. In other words, the Eastern ports are underutilised. 
 
This study examined the influence of port size on efficiency using intertemporal, 
contemporaneous and window analyses and the results indicate that no matter the DEA 
approach used, ports with larger production scales obtain higher efficiency scores. In other 
words, ports with larger production scales are more efficient than ports with smaller 
production scales. Larger ports have the requisite management skills to convert given inputs 
optimally to increase outputs, because they are technology leaders and have locational 
advantages. Therefore, the null hypothesis H0: There is no relationship between port size, and 
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port efficiency, is rejected. This is evident from the average technical efficiency scores for the 
period under study. The ports with a high mean efficiency score of 90% and above are the big 
ports in terms of throughput (Onne, Apapa and PH). While the smaller ports (Calabar and 
Warri) have mean efficiency scores below 60%. This is in agreement with the results of the 
total productivity change analysis, which also showed that the change in the Nigerian ports‘ 
productivity after concession is driven by scale efficiency change.  
  
A comparison of pre- and post-concession efficiency reveals that all the ports obtained higher 
efficiency scores after concession, except the PH port that has lower efficiency index. The 
operations of the Onne port after concession was considered 100%, albeit weakly efficient, as 
the operations in 2009-2011 are below optimal level as it still operates under DRS. The least 
efficient port is still the Warri port, which may be because most shippers are still reluctant to 
use the port as there is still skirmishes from the militants, despite the amnesty granted to 
them. It also shows that the ports in Lagos (Apapa and TCIP) improved tremendously after 
concession. While the ports in the Eastern zone either improved slightly (Onne port), or 
deteriorated in efficiency (Calabar, PH and Warri). The driver of this change is a change in 
scale efficiency.  It suggests that the wholesale concession of the entire nation‘s ports, 
without recourse to the peculiarities of each port is not the best after all. That could be the 
reason why concessions in both developed and developing countries is a gradual process 
starting with container terminals, then other terminals. Even the British ports credited with 
the most advanced form of privatisation in the port industry, practice different governance 
models. It is only the 14 largest ports in terms of tonnage that are private ports, operated by 
three different companies and quoted on the British stock exchange. The trust ports have a 
different governance model; they have no known shareholders and are peculiar to British 
ports. 
  
In summary, the analyses of the pre- and post-concession efficiency reveal that ports 
performed better after concession, as the mean overall technical, pure technical and scale 
efficiency are higher for the post-concession than the pre-concession period. However, this 
observation is not correct for all ports, as the Calabar and PH port performed better overall in 
the pre-concession than the post-concession period. While in theWarri port, it is only in terms 
of scale efficiency that the pre-concession is higher than the post-concession scale efficiency. 
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In terms of productivity change, the results obtained from the analyses of data show that total 
factor productivity increased after concession, but the increase is not statistically significant 
at both the 1% and 5% confidence levels. In addition, it indicated the source of efficiency 
change as being mainly scale rather than technical. This study also reveals the deterioration in 
technological change after concession. The results suggests that terminal operators have not 
brought the required investment in modern cargo handling equipment needed to improve the 
performance of the ports under study and to reduce turnaround time.  On the other hand, a 
short run productivity change captured by the year-by-year MPI shows that the difference in 
the yearly efficiency of the ports is more due to pure technical than scale efficiency. It 
indicates that the focus of the terminal operators was on improving outputs through superior 
managerial processes, using existing inputs and technology. It is at variance with the primary 
objective of the concession of attracting private investment to the Nigerian port sector. 
 
7.2.1 Summary of findings on the influence of ownership change on Nigerian ports 
performance. 
The port concession programme has brought the six major Nigerian ports into the private 
domain. As Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, the new dispensation is 
unsympathetic to public ownership. Many publicly owned companies, especially in the 
transport sector of which ports are a part, have been privatised. The primary objective of the 
port concession programme is to improve efficiency and reduce the cost of doing business in 
Nigerian ports. Plus, a reduction in the turnaround time of ships and cargo clearing time 
which among the highest in the World. However, there is no empirical basis considering 
Nigeria‘s geographical, socio-cultural and economic setting, for believing the superior 
performance of private ports. Nevertheless, Nigeria embarked on the most elaborate port 
privatisation exercise, dubbed the most ambitious port concession that has taken place 
worldwide.  
 
 
However, the findings of this research suggest that the argument that the transfer of a port‘s 
terminal operations from the public to private sector improves the efficiency of the ports is 
right after all.  The result of the preliminary analysis showed that the efficiency of Nigerian 
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ports under the Landlord model is greater than the efficiency under the public sector. Even 
the efficiency of mixed ownership comprising of the two years‘ transitional period, is higher 
than that for public ownership. In addition, the findings of both the efficiency and 
productivity change analysis indicate an overwhelming influence of scale of production on 
efficiency. Plus, the competition level analysis shows the influence of intra-port competition 
after concession. Consequently, in order to determine which of the three factors (ownership, 
production scale and competition) is responsible for the improved operational performance of 
the ports understudy, a two-stage multivariate regression was undertaken. Firstly, on the 
factors that determine port size and secondly on the factors influencing port performance. The 
results, based on available data, show that the production scale captured by throughput 
volumes and ownership change are the primary determinants of Nigerian port performance.  
Therefore, the following hypotheses are accepted:   There is a relationship between the transfer of port terminal operations from public to 
the private sector and Nigerian ports‘ performance.  There is a relationship between port size and port efficiency 
While we reject the hypothesis:  There is a relationship between port competition and port efficiency. 
Although the delineation of ports into terminals as a result of the concession programme 
induced some intra-port competition, its influence is negligible in the presence of other 
factors affecting Nigerian ports‘ efficiency.  On the contrary, inter-port competition does not 
exist in the Nigerian port industry due to non-completion of the second phase of the 
concession programme, which involves the unbundling of the NPA into four autonomous 
port authorities. As a result, the six ports understudy is non-autonomous and operate under a 
single national port administrative authority the NPA. Therefore, the conclusion that there is 
no relationship between port competition and efficiency drawn from this study should be 
interpreted with caution.  As it may be a one-off thing due to the prevailing circumstance at 
the Nigerian port sector. 
 
7.3 Policy Implications 
The discussion of findings from this research reveals that the overall technical inefficiency of 
Nigerian ports after concession is primarily due to pure technical inefficiencies than scale 
inefficiencies. The lower pure technical efficiency compared to scale efficiency after 
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concession, suggests that the inefficiency is due to the inability of the ports to meet target 
output (throughput and turnaround time). The results of the analysis shows that for the ports 
to be on the frontier, the throughput should be increased by 55.59%, and the turnaround time 
improved by 25.5% (Figure 5.1). Therefore, port managers should put in place management 
practices in tune with the market requirements of the various ports, in order to attract ships to 
the ports and reduce ship turnaround time by investing in modern cargo handling equipment.  
In addition, the study revealed that 25% of the ports achieved constant returns to scale (CRS), 
and another 25% of the ports operated at decreasing returns to scale (DRS). It implies that for 
ports with DRS, the percentage increase in output is below that of the input. While the other 
50% of the ports that show increasing returns to scale (IRS), it mean that operations are 
greater than those of their CRS counterparts and should consider further expanding. 
 
 
Globalisation coupled with the economic downturn experienced by the developed countries 
and instigated by the banking crisis of 2008, has paved the way for economic growth in the 
developing World, mainly in African countries. While the developed countries have been 
experiencing little or no growth and in some cases retardation after the crisis. The Nigerian 
economy has been growing at an annual rate of 7% since 2009 and has just overtaken South 
Africa as the largest economy in Africa. The emergency of Nigeria as the economic 
powerhouse of Africa entails growth in cargo shipment into the country. Nigerian ports have 
been at the forefront of the development as a net importer and the 11th largest exporter of 
crude oil. Demand has been expanding in many parts of the country and, as a result, most of 
the ports operate at IRS. Therefore, policies should be geared towards expanding the ports to 
enhance competitive advantage. 
 
 
Although the study indicates that the concession programme on average has improved the 
performance of the Nigerian ports, this is not across the board as was revealed by the analysis 
of the pre- and post-concession port efficiency. While the ports in the Lagos zone improved 
in performance, the performance of ports in the Eastern region, except the Onne port 
deteriorated. It shows that the wholesale concession of all the national ports in one scoop is 
not the best after all, or the concessionaires in those ports are not performing as envisaged. 
The landlord, theNPA (as an independent regulator is not yet in place) should evaluate the 
activities of the terminal operators from time to time, in order to detect operators that are not 
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performing, for the purpose of renegotiation. The ports of PH, Warri and Calabar fall under 
this category as the performance in the public sector outweighs the performance in the private 
sector. It should be considered during contract renegotiations if the trend persists, until the 
expiration of the contract. 
  
Many inferences can be drawn from the use of systematic benchmarking through efficiency 
evaluations, as a tool for terminal operators to determine the efficiency of their terminals 
employed in this research. In contrast to piecemeal single performance indicators, global 
efficiency assessment methods using the DEA Panel data techniques offers port terminal 
operators overall assessment of the performance of the terminals, in comparison to others in 
the same circumstances. Benchmarking analysis is distinct from targets that are based on 
single terminal performance indicators. It allows local terminal operators to set priorities and 
to pursue improvements where resources are needed, in order to secure perceived gains. The 
findings from the DEA benchmark analyses can be used by port operators to allocate 
resources based on identified areas of need, so as to improve performance. 
 
7.4 Achievement of Study Objectives 
Objective 1: To measure and examine the trend of efficiency of Nigerian seaports.  
To achieve the above objective a 12-year (2000-2011) panel data was collected from the 
statistics department of six Nigerian ports (Apapa, Calabar, Onne, PH, TCIP and Warri). 
Additionally from the headquarters of the Nigerian port authority (NPA) located in Lagos. 
The researcher collected data on annual throughput, mean yearly turnaround time, number of 
berths, the total number of equipment, the total number of staff employed by each port and 
the total storage capacity. The data were cleaned and summarised to fit the format required by 
the different DEA approaches (Intertemporal, contemporaneous and window) used in the 
analyses. The data were tested for positivity, homogeneity and isotonicity. The Pearson 
correlation between the variables was significant and positive, validating their use in a DEA 
analysis. The database and the descriptive of the variables used in the analyses are shown in 
appendix 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
The analysis considers each port-year as a DMU to increase the number of data points and to 
improve the discriminatory power of the DEA. The efficiency scores for the different DEA 
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approaches were computed for both the CRS (DEA-CCR) and the VRS (DEA-BCC) models. 
The overall (technical) efficiency score was obtained from the CRS model. While the VRS 
model gives the pure technical efficiency, the ratio of CCR and BCC efficiency scores 
(CCR/BCC) gives the scale efficiency. The results indicated high, but fluctuating efficiency 
levels. The operational efficiency of the ports is in terms of CCR, BCC and SE, Chapter 5 
discusses the influence of port size on the efficiency of the ports and the implications.  
 
Objective 2: To evaluate the pre- and post-concession Nigerian ports efficiency.  
 
The study adopted an ex-post facto design (aka ―causal-comparative‖) to achieve this 
objective, as the research is based on investigating the cause-effect of concession on 
operational performance of seaports. This relationship is examined by observing the post-
concession state of affairs in the ports for the six years after concession (2006-2011) and also 
searching back six years before the concession (2000-2005) for plausible causal factors. This 
method is chosen as the researcher has no control over the variables of the pre- and post-
concession periods, nor to be able to manipulate them because the concession programme is 
already in place. In this circumstance, to tease out the possible events that occurred in the 
past, the study attempts a reconstruction. It is done by using the operational variables of the 
ports before concession, to determine the level of efficiency for that period and the 
operational statistics after, to determine the state of affairs after concession. The study also 
solicited for the perceptions of port users on the influence of the concession programme on 
their operations, through semi-structured interviews. The result of the efficiency analyses 
revealed an increase in efficiency after concession, although, not across the board. The port 
users were of the view that the concession programme has significantly increased the cost of 
doing business at the ports. The driver of improved efficiency after concession is due to 
increase in throughput (scale efficiency). Section 5.4 of the thesis shows the results and 
discussions of this aspect of the research. 
 
 
Objective 3: To examine the overall performance of Nigerian ports from the productivity and 
efficiency change perspectives.   
 
Efficiency and productivity concepts are used in the literature to describe the performance of 
economic systems or DMUs and in this case ports. In achieving this objective, the study 
employed the theory of total factor productivity change by using the DEA-based Malmquist 
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index (MPI). This technique gives sources of productivity change between periods, in this 
case pre-and post-concession. The pre- and post-concession multi-year total factor 
productivity change (TFPCH) of Nigerian seaports was obtained through this method. The 
TFPCH is decomposed into an efficiency change (EFFCH) component and technology 
change (TECHCH) component. The EFFCH further decomposes into the PECH and SECH. 
The results of the productivity change analyses indicated an increase in productivity and the 
source of this growth is EFFCH, rather than TECHCH. It is consistent with previous studies, 
as change in technology can only be observed in the medium to long term. A decomposition 
of the EFFCH shows that the increase in efficiency is more due to SECH than PECH. 
Likewise, the post-concession period showed increase in productivity change and the source 
is due to EFFCH as TECHCH deteriorated during the period. The source of increase in 
EFFCH during the post-concession period is SECH. Section 5.6 discusses the empirical 
results of TFPCH and the implications.  
  
 
Objective 4: To determine the competitiveness of the Nigerian seaports.  
 
For this objective, the level of competitiveness of the ports was computed based on market 
share. The pre- and post-concession market share of the ports and the HHI index were 
calculated based on the throughput levels. The analysis made use of the HHI technique based 
on market share of the ports, to determine the concentration index, which is an indication of 
the degree of competition.  The main finding showed that the level of competition increased 
overall after concession. Though, it is most noticeable in the Apapa and PH ports (lower HHI 
index after concession), but overall the effect of competition on the performance is 
statistically insignificant at the 5% level.    
  
 
Objective 5: To determine the factors that influence Nigerian ports‟ performance.  
 
A theoretical model of operational performance was conceptualised in section 6.4, to achieve 
this objective. The model is used to resolve the complex relationship between production 
scales, port efficiency, port ownership and other exogenous variables in the model. The study 
assumed that the output can be endogenous in the relationship among variables. In the 
proposed model, port production and port efficiency are in a recursive path. Since port 
efficiency affects production scale and knowledge of previous port efficiency affects 
production level, creating a loop in the model. Two equations were proposed by the model: 
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one involving the determinants of throughput (production scale) and the second involving 
determinants of efficiency, so as to resolve the relationship between efficiency and 
production scale and performance of the ports. Thereafter, a two-stage OLS regression 
involving the logs of the factors that influence throughput and efficiency, as the two 
equations were non-linear. Firstly, with throughput as a dependent variable and the projected 
throughput derived from the first regression is employed in the second regression with 
efficiency as the dependent variable, in order to determine the significance of each factor. By 
so doing, the study was able to determine among these factors; production scale, level of 
competition and ownership change which are responsible for the improved performance of 
Nigerian ports after concession. The results of the analysis will enable policymakers to 
understand which factors are contributing to the overall performance of Nigerian ports and 
the areas to focus on for further improvements. The main finding is that competition plays an 
insignificant role in the operational efficiency of the Nigerian seaports, notwithstanding the 
delineation of ports into terminals through the concession programme. It is probably due to 
the inability of the government to implement the second phase of the concession programme, 
which involves the unbundling of the NPA into two autonomous port authorities to set the 
stage for inter-port competition.  
 
7.5 Contribution to Knowledge 
The findings of this research are of immense benefits to academia, policy makers and the 
NPA. The Nigerian port privatisation is a guinea-pig for studying the impact of wholesale 
concessions on the performance of national ports in Africa and indeed the whole World, due 
to the manner and speed in which the programme was executed. In the African context, it is 
the only country that has embraced the advanced form of the Landlord model of port 
administration and in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Nigerian port concession accounted for 55% 
of the private investment in ports in the sub-region, totalling $1.3billion as at 2008. Again in 
terms of trade, Nigeria occupies a strategic position in the sub-regional trade, as 70% of trade 
by volume meant for West and Central African are destined for Nigeria. Although Nigeria 
has undertaken an unprecented port reform, most of the studies on port reform, privatisation, 
ownership and efficiency are concentrated on Europe, Asia, North America and South 
America with very few from Africa and none for Nigeria. Hence, the need for this research 
titled: ―Evaluation of Nigerian ports‘ post-concession performance‖. It was to ascertain the 
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influence of port concession on the performance of the ports six years after the concession 
and to determine if the ports are on the path towards greater efficiency. 
 
 
In addition, most of the literature on the effects of ownership change from the public to the 
private sector is based on European and Asian ports and mainly container terminals. No study 
has dealt with the effect of this change in ports in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite that, as at 
2008; 42 concessions have taken place in the sub-region and 50% involves ports in Nigeria. 
Therefore, this study is a reference material for academia on the influence of increased 
private participation on the efficiency of the ports of a major player in the sub-region. 
 
For the policy makers, it is a reference material on the evaluation of the first six years of the 
concession programme. Since it provides a holistic and independent view, based on empirical 
findings, on areas of inefficiency and weakness in the policy implementation and 
interventions required to improve performance. For instance, as the study revealed, there is 
limited competition six years into the implementation of the programme. Policy action should 
be geared towards unbundling the NPA and putting in place an independent regulator which 
can impose sanctions on anti-competitive behaviour by the terminal operators. For Sub-
Saharan African sub-region policymakers, it is particularly important as a reference document 
for ports in the sub-region that have undertaken, or intending to undertake concessions, on the 
pitfalls and favourable outcomes of the programme.  
For the landlord NPA, the study has identified the operators that are not making efficient use 
of the resources allocated and the efficient operators, as a benchmark for others to emulate. 
This information is particularly necessary for the NPA for the purpose of contract 
renegotiation and to apply sanctions where appropriate. 
   
7.6 Limitations of the Research 
There were several limitations encountered in conducting this research. First and foremost 
was an issue of collecting panel dataset going back 12 years in time, from an organisation 
without a database which proved an uphill task. Therefore, the data for this research was 
obtained from different sources (annual reports, abstracts of port statistics and the National 
Bureau of Statistics). 
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Since the data collected were not in conformity with the information required, 
transformations in the form of extrapolations from the available data were undertaken, in 
order to obtain consistent and compatible information necessary for the analyses. 
Extrapolation was first carried out on the post and pre-concession port nomenclature of ports. 
Before concession, reporting was based on 8 ports, as the container terminal in the Apapa 
port and the RORO terminal in the TCIP were regarded as separate ports. However after 
concession, the data reporting changed to a port basis for consistency and the researcher had 
to undertake some manipulation in order to bring the data for the two periods into the same 
format. For instance, prior to concession, the port input and output variables used in this 
study were reported on a port by port basis, but after concession, the reporting changed to a 
port authority basis. 
  
 
 As all the port authorities compared have multipurpose ports, the cargo volume was denoted 
in tonnes for uniformity. It is especially necessary for the benchmarking of the container 
terminals, as some of the terminal concessions for container operations do handle some other 
types of cargo. Therefore, to be fair in the comparison of the terminals, the container/cargo 
throughputs of the container terminals were captured in tonnes, not TEU. In addition, where 
there is a discrepancy in the value of variables obtained from different sources, the average of 
the value is taken as the figure used for this analysis. It was done in the throughput values and 
the number of equipment obtained from terminal operators and the port authorities. If all the 
information needed was available in a database, it would have been less cumbersome to 
manage and handle. 
 
 
Another limitation is the small sample size involved in the study that restricted the number of 
variables employed for the DEA analyses. As a result, the DEA analysis produced high 
efficiency scores, especially in the BCC analysis. However, as the efficiency measures 
obtained from the DEA analysis are relative, as the number of years of operation increases, 
the relative efficiency of the ports may give a better result due to increase in the dataset. 
Nonetheless, the results obtained in this research gave a synopsis of the efficiency of 
operations of the Nigerian ports after concession. 
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7.7 Future Research on the Performance of Nigerian Ports 
This study has attempted a comparison of pre- and post-concession efficiency and 
productivity change analysis, employing only physical measures and without recourse to cost 
information, due to lack of data. However, for a holistic view, if the information on price is 
available, a further research on pre- and post-concession efficiency analyses, can be 
undertaken, that will take into consideration allocative efficiency. 
 
 
Furthermore, the present study did not put the consumer perspective into consideration. 
Future studies may use supply chain approach to benchmark the efficiency, so as to include 
the effectiveness perspective. Further studies on port terminal efficiency measurement, can be 
undertaken, using parametric and econometric methods as a control on the DEA 
methodology. 
  
 
In addition, the APM terminal is now a dominant player in the container industry in the West 
African sub-region. It controls equity shares in nine terminals in eight West African 
countries, it controls two terminals in Nigeria (APMT, Apapa and WACT, Onne). While DP 
World is incharge of Dakar container terminal in Senegal. Therefore, the need for further 
studies on the effects of the transfer of container terminals from the public to global terminal 
operators, cannot be overemphasised. Especially, as it seems the sub-region is moving 
gradually from a public to a private monopoly that may not augur well for the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the ports. 
 
7.8 Conclusions 
This study set out to find the effects of privatising the Nigerian ports‘ operations through 
concession contracts on the performance of the ports and to identify the terminal operators 
that are making efficient use of the resources allocated to them. The literature review and 
discussions on the media, indicated gaps and the need to undertake this study. As most 
studies in port efficiency literature tilted towards Europe, Asia, the Americas, Australia and 
Oceania and there was barely anything on Africa. In terms of Nigeria, although there are 
some studies on the seaports, no study has evaluated the effects of the transfer of  the port 
terminal operations from the public to the private sector on the performance of the ports six 
years after the implementation of the programme. 
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This research employed mainly quantitative techniques to evaluate the operational data of the 
different ports and terminals. The non-parametric DEA method was used for the analysis of 
efficiency, while the DEA based MPI was used for the productivity change analysis. 
Additionally, econometric techniques such as ANOVA, t-test and multivariate regression 
were employed for hypothesis testing, while the level of competitiveness was computed using 
concentration index.  
 
Based on the empirical findings, the research was able to achieve the objectives. The main 
conclusion is that the port concession program has improved the efficiency of the ports 
through an increase in throughput levels. However, productivity has declined due to the 
deterioration in technological progress after concession. It suggests that the envisaged 
investment in ICT, tracking equipment and technologies, including modern cargo handling 
equipment by terminal operators, that will fast track port development in the Nigerian port 
sector and reduce turnaround time, has not materialised. Another salient finding is that 
competition is not a significant contributor to the Nigerian ports‘ performance, despite 
concession. In other words, concession, even without inducing intra-port competition, 
improves port operational performance by securing increased throughput through global 
alliances of GTOs.   
  
 
The empirical findings and discussions have highlighted areas that policymakers need to 
consider in the further implementation of the concession programme and contract 
renegotiations. It has also spotlighted areas for further studies by other academics. 
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Appendix 1.1: Literature of DEA Applications in the port sector and the variables used 
 
 Model parameters (Variables) 
Author Domain Data DMUs Outputs Inputs 
Roll and 
Hayuth (1993) 
Entire world Fictitious and 
cross-
sectional, 
single period 
20 ports Container throughput, 
service level, User 
satisfaction, Ship calls 
Size of labour force, Annual investment per 
port, The Uniformity of facilities and cargo 
Poitras et al. 
(1996) 
Australian 
and 
international 
Cross-sectional 23 ports TEU berth hour, Total 
number of containers 
handled per year 
Mix of 20-foot and 40-foot containers, Average 
delays in commencing stevedoring, Difference 
between the berth time and gross working time, 
Number of containers lifted per quay crane 
hour, Number of gantry cranes, Frequency of 
ship calls, Average government port charges 
per container 
Martinez-
Budria et al. 
(1999) 
Spain Time series 
(1993-1997) 
26 ports 
in five 
year span 
Total cargo moved 
through the docks 
Labour expenditures, Depreciation charges, 
Miscellaneous expenditures 
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Tongzon 
(2001) 
Australia Cross-sectional  16 ports Cargo throughput, 
Ship working rate 
Capital (number of berths, cranes, tugs), 
Labour(number of stevedore gangs), Land(size 
of terminal areas) Length of delay 
Valentine and 
Gray 
(2001,2002) 
Entire world Cross-sectional 21 ports Total tonnes 
throughput, Number 
of containers 
Total length of berth, container berth length 
Bonilla et al 
(2002 
Spain panel 23 ports Throughput Equipment 
Itoh, 2002 Japan Panel 1990-
1999 
8 major 
container 
Throughput Container terminal area, Number of berthed, 
Number of gantry cranes and labour 
Barros (2003) Portugal Panel data 11 ports Ships, Movement of 
freight, Gross gauge, 
Break-bulk cargo, 
Containerised freight, 
Solid bulk and liquid 
bulk 
Labour (number of workers), Capital (book 
value of assets 
Park and De 
(2004) 
Korea Cross-sectional 11ports Productivity, Cargo 
throughput, Number 
of ship calls, 
profitability, Revenue, 
Productivity, Berthing capacity, cargo-handling 
capacity, Profitability, Revenue, Cargo 
throughput, No. of ship calls, Marketability, 
Revenue, Overall efficiency, Berthing capacity, 
 291 
 
Marketability, Overall 
efficiency, Customer 
satisfaction 
cargo handling capacity 
Cullinane et 
al. (2004) 
Worldwide  Time series 
(1992-1999) 
25 ports Throughput Land factor Total quay length, terminal area 
Equipment factor Number of quay gantry 
cranes, yard gantry cranes, straddle carriers 
Barros and 
Athanassiou 
(2004) 
Greece and 
Portugal 
Balanced panel 
data 
6 ports Ships, Movement of 
freight, Total cargo 
handled, Containers 
loaded and unloaded 
Number of workers, Book value of assets 
Cullinane et 
al.(2005) 
Worldwide Times series 
(1992-1999) 
25 ports Container throughput 
(TEU)  
Terminal length, Terminal area, Quayside 
gantry, Yard gantry, Straddle carrier 
Min and park 
(2005) 
Korea Time series  11 
container 
terminals 
in four 
year span 
Cargo throughput Total length of quay, Number of cranes, Size 
of hard areas, Size of labour force 
      
Wang and Pan Cross-sectional 104 Container throughput Terminal length, Terminal area, Equipment 
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Cullinane, 
2006 
European terminals (TEU) costs 
Cullinane et 
al. (2006) 
Worldwide Cross-sectional  57 Container throughput 
(TEU) 
Terminal length, Terminal area, No. of 
quayside gantry cranes, No. of yard gantry 
cranes, No. of straddle carriers 
Rios and 
Macada 
(2006) 
North 
America 
(Brazil, 
Argentina, 
Uruguay) 
Time series 
(2002-2004) 
23 
terminals 
TEUs handled, 
Average number of 
containers handled per 
hour per ship 
Number of cranes, Number of berths, Number 
of employees, Terminal area 
Barros (2006) Italy Balanced panel 
data (years 
2003-2004) 
24 ports Liquid bulk, Dry bulk, 
Number of ships, 
Number of 
passengers, Number 
of containers with 
TEU, Number of 
containers with no 
TEU, Total sales  
Number of personnel, Value of capital 
invested, Size of operating costs 
Eraqi et al 
(2008) 
Middle East 
and East 
Panel data 
(2000-2005 
 Throughput (Tonnes), 
Ship calls 
Berth length(m), storage area (m2),Handling 
equipment 
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Africa 
Wu et al 
(2010) 
Worldwide Cross-sectional 
data 
77 major 
world 
container 
ports 
Container throughput 
(TEU) 
Capacity of handling equipment, No of berths, 
Terminal area& storage capacity 
Ng and Lee 
(2007) 
Malaysia Cross-sectional 
data and Panel 
data 
6 major 
Malaysia
n 
container 
ports 
Throughput and 
Number of ship calls 
Total yard area, No. Of cranes, Total length of 
berth, No. Of quay cranes 
De koster et al 
(2009) 
World wide Panel data World 
major 
container 
terminals 
Container throughput Gantry cranes, quay length & yard area 
Jiang & Li, 
2009 
North-East 
Asia 
Cross-sectional 12 ports Throughput (TEU) Import/Export by Customs, GDP by regions, 
berth length, number of cranes 
Barros et al 
(2010) 
Angola, 
Mozambiqu
e & Nigeria 
Panel data 
(2004-2006) 
23 ports Total tonnes, 
Containers & No. Of 
ship calls 
Berth depth, Total Area (m2), No. Of cranes 
and No. Of employees. 
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Pjevčević et 
al. (2012) 
Serbia Panel data 
(2001-2008) 
5 ports Annual Throughput Total area of warehouse, quay length, number 
of cranes and port throughput 
Caldeirinha 
and Felicio, 
2011 
Iberia  22 EU 
container 
terminals 
Annual TEU Size of terminal, quay size, and number of 
cranes 
Herrera et al 
(2008) 
Worldwide  86 
container 
terminals 
Annual TEU Terminal area, Ship-to-shore gantries, the 
number of quay, yard and mobile gantries & 
number of tractors and trailers. 
Munisamy et 
al. (2011) 
Latin 
America 
Panel data 
(2000-2008) 
30 ports Throughput Berth length, Terminal area, Total number of 
quay equipment, Total number of yard 
equipment, total number of general equipment 
and total number of sophisticated equipment. 
Shu-Wan 
Hung et al 
(2010) 
Asia-
pacific-
region 
Cross-sectional 31 
container 
terminals 
Container Throughput Terminal area, ship-shore container gantry, 
number of berths, & terminal length. 
Cullinane & 
Wang (2010) 
Worldwide Panel data 
1992-1999 
25 
container 
terminals 
Throughput Terminal area, terminal length, quayside 
gantry, yard side gantry and straddle carrier 
So et al (2007) North-east Cross-section 19 Throughput TEU Number of quay, yard equipment, total berth 
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Asia container  length and terminal area 
Li & Liu 
(2009) 
China Cross-section 
2008 
8 Ports Per-share earnings, 
input of main business 
& profit after tax 
Net asset, Net-asset per share, cost of main 
business and number of staff 
Rajasekar et al 
(2014) 
India Panel data 
1993-2011 
7 major 
ports 
Throughput & total 
traffic 
Number of berth, berth length, No of 
equipment and number of employees 
Kasypi 
Moktar, 2013 
Malaysia Panel data 
2003-2010 
6 major 
container 
Throughput Total terminal area, Maximum draft, Berth 
length, Quay crane index, Yard stacking index, 
Vehicles and number of gate lanes. 
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Appendix 1.2: Newspaper Articles on Nigerian Ports Concession 
S/
N 
 Article title Newspaper Name 
& Date of 
Publication 
Website 
1 Harnessing gains of new 
seaports reform 
Nigeria Leadership, 
16/10/2011 
http://allafrica.com/stories/20111016000
8.html 
2 Nigeria: Agents grumble 
over delay at Onne 
seaport 
Nigeria Vanguard, 
11/07/12 
 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201207110393.ht
ml 
3 Reduction of multiple 
charges, panacea for 
cargo diversion 
National Mirror, 
05/07/2013 
http://nationalmirroronline.net/new/reduction
-of-multiple-port-charges-panacea-to-cargo-
diversion/ 
4 Groans over port charges  PM News 
10/09/2012 
http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/09/10/groan
s-over-port-charges/ 
5 House Representative 
members to investigate 
concessionaires of 
Nigerian seaports 
Daily News Watch, 
Nigeria, 08/11/2013 
http://www.mydailynewswatchng.com/2013/
11/08/reps-investigate-concessionaires-
nigerian-seaports/ 
6 The Battle for Eastern 
ports 
16/03/2012 http://www.marineandpetroleum.com/conten
t/battle-eastern-ports 
7 Why Eastern ports are 
Under-utilised 
16/03/2012 http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/-
why-eastern-ports-are-under-utilised-
/111573/ 
8 NPA and the competition 
for hub port status 
Nig. Daily 
independent 
01/12/2012 
http://dailyindependentnig.com/2012/12/
npa-and-the-competition-for-hub-port-
status/ 
9 Why ports are not 
Working-ICPC 
Vanguard, 
15/12/2013 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/12/po
rts-working-icpc/ 
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10 Africa celebrates Nigeria 
over port reform 
Vanguard 
29/12/2010 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/12/africa
-celebrates-nigeria-over-port-reforms/ 
11 Maritime fraud: How 
terminal operators, 
shipping agencies defraud 
importers 
20/01/2014 http://sunnewsonline.com/new/business/
maritime-fraud-terminal-operators-
shipping-agencies-defraud-importers/ 
12 Terminal Operators decry 
Cost of doing Business in 
Nigerian ports 
thisday, 26/07/2013  http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/term
inal-operators-decry-cost-of-doing-
business-in-nigerian-ports/154406/ 
13 Has Concession of ports 
helped Nigeria? 
Financial 
intelligence, 
21/01/2013 
http://www.myfinancialintelligence.com/
transport/has-concessioned-ports-helped-
nigeria/2013-01-21 
14 Why ports aren‘t making 
profits despite concession 
Daily Trust 
 8/10/2012 
http://allafrica.com/stories/20121007034
5.html 
15 Port reform: The gains, 
the expectations 
Daily champion 
19/07/2013 
 
http://championonlinenews.com/index.ph
p?option=com_k2&view=item&id=8816
:port-reform-the-gains-the-
expectations&Itemid=221&lang=en 
16 The gains and challenges 
of port concession in 
Nigeria 
businessday19/02/20
14 
http://businessdayonline.com/2014/02/the-
gains-and-challenges-of-port-concession-in-
nigeria/ 
17 Ports concession in 
Nigeria is a success story 
Ships and ports 
19/07/2013 
http://www.shipsandports.com.ng/2013/news
/Ports_concession_in_Nigeria_is_a_success_
story.php 
18 Container Transfer, Ships 
allocation blamed for 
Lagos ports‘ congestion 
Thisday newspaper 
13/09/2013 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201309130464.ht
ml 
19 Reps to investigate 
concessionaires of 
Daily News watch 
08/11/2013 
http://www.mydailynewswatchng.com/2013/11/0
8/reps-investigate-concessionaires-nigerian-
seapor 
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Nigerian ports 
20 Fed Government blamed 
for corruption in ports 
Nigeriaintel.com 
14/08/2013 
http://www.nigeriaintel.com/2013/08/14/fed-
govt-blamed-for-corruption-in-ports/ 
21 Concessionaires plan to 
hike port charges 
Nigeria daily 
independent 
October, 2013 
http://dailyindependentnig.com/2013/10/concessi
onaires-plan-to-hike-port-charges/ 
 
22 Seaports Concession Conduit to Cede or 
Chide NPA, March, 
2008 
http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2008/mar/254.ht
ml 
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Appendix 5.1: Nigerian port level analysis data (2000-2011) 
PORTS Thrup TAT NOB NOE NOS STC 
APAPA 2000 11,008 13 26 183 3991 617.5 
APAPA 2001 13,898 15 26 110 3943 617.5 
APAPA 2002 14,306 23 26 102 4103 617.5 
APAPA 2003 14,579 21 26 88 3592 717.9 
APAPA 2004 15,152 21 26 92 3,747 720.4 
APAPA 2005 16,931 14 26 123 3,022 720.4 
APAPA 2006 15,113 9 27 120 893 720.4 
APAPA 2007 18,567 9 27 100 1182 720.4 
APAPA 2008 20,309 10 28 80 1269 720.4 
APAPA 2009 21,119 9 28 86 1391 720.4 
APAPA 2010 22,005 7 28 91 1489 720.4 
APAPA 2011 23,365 8 29 95 1487 720.4 
CAL 2000  306 3 12 69 583 131 
CAL 2001 325 6 12 53 566 131 
CAL2002  400 6 12 29 595 131 
CAL 2003 481 5 12 30 597 131.3 
CAL 2004 753 5 12 13 570 131.3 
CAL 2005 858 2 12 15 499 131.3 
CAL 2006 777 3 12 15 459 131.3 
CAL 2007 1,042 2 12 18 275 131.3 
CAL 2008 1,165 4 12 18 220 131.3 
CAL 2009 1,699 4 12 20 431 131.3 
CAL 2010 1,588 3 12 20 219 131.3 
CAL 2011 1,880 4 12 21 369 131.3 
ONNE 2000 7,166 4 6 43 1876 151 
ONNE2001 9,056 4 6 45 1,775 151 
ONNE 2002 10,182 8 6 45 1,853 151 
ONNE 2003 11,995 3 6 48 1690 270.8 
ONNE 2004 13,688 3 6 46 1,185 271 
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ONNE 2005 13,809 3 6 46 1,146 270.8 
ONNE 2006 15,820 2 6 40 1747 270.8 
ONNE 2007 21,559 2 7 45 2157 979 
ONNE 2008 21,419 5 7 48 2593 979 
ONNE 2009 17,462 5 7 48 2894 979 
ONNE 2010 23,302 3 10 55 3364 979 
ONNE 2011 26,217 4 10 250 3364 979 
PH 2000  4,684 11 8 77 1252 81 
PH 2001 5,690 12 8 36 1,243 81 
PH 2002 5,302 14 8 17 1,286 81 
PH 2003 4,845 17 8 16 1249 83.4 
PH 2004 4,964 17 11 31 1,096 83 
PH 2005 5,347 13 11 20 929 83.4 
PH 2006 5,580 12 11 23 291 83.4 
PH 2007 4,879 10 11 25 504 83.4 
PH 2008 4,885 10 11 21 631 83.4 
PH 2009 5,185 11 11 28 870 83.4 
PH 2010 5,797 9 11 22 936 83.4 
PH 2011 7,464 10 11 27 1157 83.4 
TCIP 2000 3,938 12 16 147 1976 376 
TCIP 2001 5,116 10 16 78 1,979 376 
TCIP 2002 4,755 11 16 71 2,196 376 
TCIP 2003 5,293 9 16 104 2398 376 
TCIP 2004 4,694 8 16 119 2,126 383 
TCIP 2005 5,461 7 16 118 1,772 383 
TCIP 2006 7,400 4 18 105 1106 383 
TCIP 2007 10,003 4 18 113 1155 395.2 
TCIP 2008 13,413 4 18 122 1376 395.2 
TCIP 2009 14,099 7 18 120 1550 404 
TCIP 2010 13,076 5 18 99 1678 404 
TCIP 2011 15,371 5 18 119 1678 404 
WARRI 2000 1,837 6 20 79 1216 301 
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WARRI 2001 1,855 6 20 33 1,214 301 
WARRI 2002 2,043 6 20 25 1,206 301 
WARRI 2003 1,886 8 20 19 1169 301 
WARRI 2004 1,566 8 20 15 1092 301 
WARRI 2005 2,223 6 20 38 942 301 
WARRI 2006 1,461 7 23 25 836 301 
WARRI 2007 1,516 6 23 35 644 301 
WARRI 2008 4,002 7 23 28 685 301 
WARRI 2009 7,345 9 23 30 815 301 
WARRI 2010 9,142 8 23 37 829 301 
WARRI 2011 8,467 7 23 32 840 301  THRP(„000Tonnes)= Throughput in thousand tonnes,   TAT(Days)= Yearly average turnaround time in days,   NOB(Units)= Total number of berths in units,   NOE(Units)= Total number of equipment in units,   NOS(Units)= Total number of staff in units,   STC („000Tonnes) = Storage capacity in thousand tonnes 
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Appendix 5.2: Descriptive statistics of input and output variables 
YEAR DESCRIPS THRUP('000tonnes) TAT(units) NOB(units) NOE(units) NOS(units) STC('000tonnes) 
2000 Mean 4823.2 8.17 14.67 99.67 1815.67 276.25 
 
STDEV 3843.6 4.36 7.55 53.44 1179.68 200.96 
 
Kurtosis 0.1 -2.63 -0.88 -0.68 2.76 0.53 
 
Skewness 0.7 -0.10 0.45 0.89 1.4675 1.05 
 
Minimum 306.0 3 6 43 583 81 
 
Maximum 11008 13 26 183 3991 617.5 
2001 Mean 5990 8.83 14.67 59.17 1786.67 276.3 
 
STDEV 4939.3 4.22 7.55 29.66 1166.23 200.92 
 
Kurtosis 0.009 -1.32 -0.88 0.625 2.85 0.54 
 
Skewness 0.7 0.44 0.45 1.203 1.49 1.05 
 
Minimum 325 4 6 33 566 81 
 
Maximum 13898 15 26 110 3,943 617.5 
2002 Mean 6164.7 11.33 14.67 48.17 1873.17 276.3 
 
STDEV 5203.3 6.50 7.55 32.57 1224.78 200.92 
 
Kurtosis -0.5 1.71 -0.88 -0.01 2.37 0.54 
 
Skewness 0.7 1.38 0.45 1.03 1.39 1.05 
 
Minimum 400 6 6 17 595 81 
 
Maximum 14306 23 26 102 4,103 617.5 
2003 Mean 6513.2 10.5 14.67 50.83 1782.5 313.4 
 
STDEV 5606.7 7.04 7.55 37.09 1070.34 226.08 
 
Kurtosis -1.3 -1.09 -0.88 -1.59 0.72 1.97 
 
Skewness 0.6 0.71 0.45 0.69 1.01 1.25 
 
Minimum 481 3 6 16 597 83.4 
 
Maximum 14579 21 26 104 3592 717.9 
2004 Mean 6802.8 10.33 15.17 52.67 1636 314.98 
 
STDEV 6147.8 7.09 7.11 43.48 1150.97 227.38 
 
Kurtosis -1.7 -1.07 -0.29 -1.07 2.29 1.88 
 
Skewness 0.7 0.79 0.43 0.83 1.56 1.23 
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Minimum 753 3 6 13 570 83.4 
 
Maximum 15152 21 26 119 3747 720.4 
2005 Mean 7438.2 7.5 15.17 60 1385 314.98 
 
STDEV 6472.7 5.01 7.11 48.25 902.87 227.38 
 
Kurtosis -1.3 -1.77 -0.29 -1.86 2.08 1.88 
 
Skewness 0.7 0.43 0.43 0.74 1.45 1.23 
 
Minimum 858 2 6 15 499 83.4 
 
Maximum 16931 14 26 123 3022 720.4 
2006 Mean 7691.9 6.17 16.17 54.67 888.67 314.98 
 
STDEV 6516.6 3.87 7.94 45.77 515.48 227.38 
 
Kurtosis -1.9 -1.10 -1.37 -1.63 0.76 1.88 
 
Skewness 0.4 0.56 0.20 0.89 0.77 1.23 
 
Minimum 777 2 6 15 291 83.4 
 
Maximum 15820.4 12 27 120 1747 720.4 
2007 Mean 9594.4 5.5 16.33 56 986.17 435.05 
 
STDEV 8769 3.45 7.69 40.38 677.20 350.08 
 
Kurtosis -1.9 -1.97 -1.50 -1.64 1.09 -0.74 
 
Skewness 0.5 0.33 0.31 0.80 1.07 0.77 
 
Minimum 1042 2 7 18 275 83.4 
 
Maximum 21559 10 27 113 2157 979 
2008 Mean 10865.6 6.67 16.5 52.83 1129 435.05 
 
STDEV 8763.7 2.80 7.97 40.96 836.10 350.08 
 
Kurtosis -2.4 -2.23 -1.26 0.29 1.46 -0.74 
 
Skewness 0.3 0.43 0.41 1.14 1.13 0.77 
 
Minimum 1165 4 7 18 220 83.4 
 
Maximum 21419 10 28 122 2593 979 
2009 Mean 11151.6 7.50 16.50 55.33 1,325.17 436.52 
 
STDEV 7580.2 2.66 7.97 39.53 869.84 349.90 
 
Kurtosis -1.8 -  1.40 -     1.26 -    0.26 2.08 -     0.75 
 
Skewness 0.1 -  0.14 0.41 1.06 1.34 0.75 
 
Minimum 1699 4 7 20 431 83.4 
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Maximum 21119 11 28 120 2894 979 
2010 Mean 12485.1 5.83 17 54 1419.17 436.52 
 
STDEV 8747.9 2.56 7.32 34.25 1084.10 349.90 
 
Kurtosis -1.7 -2.13 -1.31 -1.95 2.14 -0.75 
 
Skewness 0.2 -0.05 0.66 0.48 1.25 0.75 
 
Minimum 1588 3 10 20 219 83.4 
 
Maximum 23302 9 28 99 3364 979 
2011 Mean 13794.1 6.33 17.17 90.67 1,482.50 436.52 
 
STDEV 9579.2 2.42 7.63 87.81 1,033.14 349.90 
 
Kurtosis -1.7 -1.14 -0.96 1.95 2.51 -0.75 
 
Skewness 0.2 0.56 0.75 1.45 1.36 0.75 
 
Minimum 1880 4 10 21 369 83.4 
 
Maximum 26217 10 29 250 3364 979  THRP(„000Tonnes)= Throughput in thousand tonnes,   TAT(Days)= Yearly average turnaround time in days,   NOB(Units)= Total number of berths in units,   NOE(Units)= Total number of equipment in units,   NOS(Units)= Total number of staff in units,   STC („000Tonnes) = Storage capacity in thousand tonnes. 
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Appendix 5.3: Descriptive analysis of the variables 
The main objective of the descriptive statistics is to understand the behaviour of the 
variables that are employed for the analysis. By observing the value of mean, median, 
maximum and minimum values, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis the statistical 
behaviour of the variables will be ascertained (appendix 5.2). The relatively high value of 
standard deviation is an indication of high dispersion among the data in the sample. In other 
words, the finding shows that all the 72 port-years in the sample have large dispersion in the 
throughput level, turnaround time, number of berths, total number of equipment, total 
number of staff and storage capacity across the period under review. All the data show 
positive skewness while throughput, turnaround time and the total number of equipment are 
moderately skewed; whereas the total number of staff and total storage capacity are highly 
skewed (appendix 5.2). The absolute value of kurtosis for all the variables is less than 3 
indicating a platykurtic distribution. A platykurtic distribution in terms of shape exhibits a 
more flattened peak around the mean and longer tails. 
 
 
Appendix 5.2 shows the changes in the input resources (infrastructure) and the outputs for 
the year before the concession 2005 and the 6th year (2011) after concession. It can be 
observed that, six years after the transfer of port operation from public to private hands, the 
mean throughput value which was 7,438,210metric tonnes in 2005 has increased to 
13,794,080 in 2011. This represents an increase of 85.45%. The average turnaround time 
has reduced from 7.5 to 6.33 days indicating an improvement of 15.56%. The input 
resources also witnessed an upward trend after concession. The average number of berths 
increased from 15.17 to 17.17 an increase of 13.19%. The increase is due to construction of 
new berths by terminal operators that their concession is based on build, operate and 
transfer. The terminal operators have also brought new equipment as the average total 
number of equipment in use at the ports under consideration shot up from 60 to 90.67 an 
increase of 51.11%. The mean storage capacity increased from 314.98 thousand metric of 
cargo storage capacity to 436.52 thousand metric tonnes an improvement of 38.58%. 
Likewise the mean staff strength of the six ports increased from 1385 in 2005 to 1483 in 
2011 an increase of 7.04. This should not be a basis for justifying that private participation 
increases employment because the 2005 figure is the figure after the massive retrenchment 
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by NPA that paved way for the takeover of the terminals by the private operators in 2006. 
This figure only signifies that six years after the private sector took over the operational 
function of Nigerian seaports the mean staff strength has increased by 7.04%. However, this 
increment falls short of the total number of staff of 9816 employed by the six ports before 
the massive retrenchment of 2004 which paved way for the concession programme.  
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Appendix 5.4: Port level Inter-temporal Analysis technical efficiency scores, RTS, Actual/Target Input and Output 
variables 
Port-Year Score RTS Actual 
Throu
ghput 
Actual 
Turnar
ound 
Actual 
No. of 
Berths 
Actual 
No. of 
Equips
Actual 
No. of 
Staff 
Actual 
Capacity 
Target 
Throughp
ut 
Target 
Turnaro
und 
Target 
No. of 
Berths 
Target 
No. of 
Equips
Target No. 
of Staff 
Target 
Capacity 
APAPA 2000 68.38 1 11008 13 26 183 3991 617.5 16098.27 19.01 26 96.91 3322.143 617.5 
APAPA 2001 83.76 1 13898 15 26 110 3943 617.5 16593.52 17.91 26 95.51 3106.372 617.5 
APAPA 2002 100 1 14306 23 26 102 4103 617.5 14306 23 26 102 4103 617.5 
APAPA 2003 100 1 14579 21 26 88 3592 717.9 14579 21 26 88 3592 717.9 
APAPA 2004 100 1 15152 21 26 92 3747 720.4 15152 21 26 92 3747 720.4 
APAPA 2005 89.92 1 16931 14 26 123 3022 720.4 18829.65 15.57 25.83 111.6 3022 687.76 
APAPA 2006 100 1 15113 9 27 120 893 720.4 15113 9 27 120 893 720.4 
APAPA 2007 97.49 1 18567 9 27 100 1182 720.4 19044.50 9.23 27 91.38 1182 680.45 
APAPA 2008 100 0 20309 10 28 80 1269 720.4 20309 10 28 80 1269 720.4 
APAPA 2009 98.17 1 21119 9 28 86 1391 720.4 21512.28 9.17 28 86 1391 720.4 
APAPA 2010 96.21 1 22005 7 28 91 1489 720.4 22872.23 7.81 27.61 91 1489 720.4 
APAPA 2011 100 0 23365 8 29 95 1487 720.4 23365 8 29 95 1487 720.4 
CAL 2000 21.72 1 306 3 12 69 583 131 5356.56 13.81 11 25.90 583 83.25 
CAL 2001 43.77 1 325 6 12 53 566 131 5369.57 13.71 11 25.73 566 83.26 
CAL 2002 43.20 1 400 6 12 29 595 131 5347.37 13.89 11 26.02 595 83.25 
CAL 2003 35.97 1 481 5 12 30 597 131.3 5345.84 13.90 11 26.04 597 83.25 
CAL 2004 100 
-1 753 5 12 13 570 131.3 753 5 12 13 570 131.3 
CAL 2005 54.52 
-1 858 2 12 15 499 131.3 1573.87 6.08 11.84 15 499 123.45 
CAL 2006 65.10 
-1 777 3 12 15 459 131.3 1193.54 5.22 11.93 15 459 128.00 
CAL 2007 61.73 
-1 1042 2 12 18 275 131.3 1687.96 5.18 11.87 18 275 125.04 
CAL 2008 100 
-1 1165 4 12 18 220 131.3 1165 4 12 18 220 131.3 
CAL 2009 39.26 
-1 1699 4 12 20 431 131.3 4327.06 10.63 11.03 20 431 95.29 
CAL 2010 100 
-1 1588 3 12 20 219 131.3 1588 3 12 20 219 131.3 
CAL 2011 40.07 
-1 1880 4 12 21 369 131.3 4691.56 10.89 11.09 21 369 92.00 
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ONNE 2000 100 
-1 7166 4 6 43 1876 151 7166 4 6 43 1876 151 
ONNE 2002 100 0 10182 8 6 45 1853 151 10182 8 6 45 1853 151 
ONNE 2003 84.40 
-1 11995 3 6 48 1690 270.8 14212.84 3.55 6 42.00 1690 242.48 
ONNE 2004 98.88 
-1 13688 3 6 46 1185 271 13843.47 3.03 6 45.71 1185 268.88 
ONNE 2005 100 0 13809 3 6 46 1146 270.8 13809 3 6 46 1146 270.8 
ONNE 2006 100 0 15820 2 6 40 1747 270.8 15820 2 6 40 1747 270.8 
ONNE 2007 100 0 21559 2 7 45 2157 979 21559 2 7 45 2157 979 
ONNE 2008 100 0 21419 5 7 48 2593 979 21419 5 7 48 2593 979 
ONNE 2009 87.11 
-1 17462 5 7 48 2894 979 20046.78 5.74 7 46.27 2490.17 893.96 
ONNE 2010 100 1 23302 3 10 55 3364 979 23302 3 10 55 3364 979 
ONNE 2011 100 1 26217 4 10 250 3364 979 26217 4 10 250 3364 979 
ONNE2001 100 
-1 9056 4 6 45 1775 151 9056 4 6 45 1775 151 
PH 2000 88.58 
-1 4684 11 8 77 1252 81 5608.79 12.42 8 32.02 1252 81 
PH 2001 100 
-1 5690 12 8 36 1243 81 5690 12 8 36 1243 81 
PH 2002 100 0 5302 14 8 17 1286 81 5302 14 8 17 1286 81 
PH 2003 100 0 4845 17 8 16 1249 83.4 4845 17 8 16 1249 83.4 
PH 2004 100 0 4964 17 11 31 1096 83 4964 17 11 31 1096 83 
PH 2005 95.97 1 5347 13 11 20 929 83.4 5571.27 13.55 9.34 20 929 83.4 
PH 2006 100 0 5580 12 11 23 291 83.4 5580 12 11 23 291 83.4 
PH 2007 83.17 1 4879 10 11 25 504 83.4 5866.27 12.02 11.00 24.31 504 83.4 
PH 2008 88.69 
-1 4885 10 11 21 631 83.4 5507.65 12.66 9.98 21 631 83.4 
PH 2009 85.35 1 5185 11 11 28 870 83.4 6074.95 12.89 11.00 27.07 870 83.4 
PH 2010 95.21 
-1 5797 9 11 22 936 83.4 6088.80 12.11 9.83 22 936 83.4 
PH 2011 100 0 7464 10 11 27 1157 83.4 7464 10 11 27 1157 83.4 
TCIP 2000 63.98 1 3938 12 16 147 1976 376 7697.94 18.76 15.39 51.78 1976 239.42 
TCIP 2001 55.97 1 5116 10 16 78 1979 376 9139.84 17.87 16 50.98 1979 297.89 
TCIP 2002 57.43 1 4755 11 16 71 2196 376 8304.48 19.16 16 54.56 2196 275.06 
TCIP 2003 50.18 1 5293 9 16 104 2398 376 10547.25 17.93 16 64.71 2398 371.15 
TCIP 2004 45.87 1 4694 8 16 119 2126 383 10233.79 17.44 16 55.38 2126 347.35 
TCIP 2005 46.57 1 5461 7 16 118 1772 383 11727.15 15.03 16 59.74 1772 383 
TCIP 2006 49.10 1 7400 4 18 105 1106 383 15072.69 8.15 17.14 55.95 1106 383 
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TCIP 2007 63.20 1 10003 4 18 113 1155 395.2 15828.35 6.33 15.02 58.64 1155 395.2 
TCIP 2008 80.08 1 13413 4 18 122 1376 395.2 16749.56 5.00 13.60 57.38 1376 395.2 
TCIP 2009 87.13 1 14099 7 18 120 1550 404 16181.99 8.03 16.37 59.69 1485.28 404 
TCIP 2010 77.48 1 13076 5 18 99 1678 404 16877.58 6.45 15.05 58.43 1553.86 404 
TCIP 2011 89.11 1 15371 5 18 119 1678 404 17248.54 5.61 14.34 57.76 1590.43 404 
WARRI 2000 34.80 1 1837 6 20 79 1216 301 5336.81 17.24 11.60 33.83 1216 104.33 
WARRI 2001 34.85 1 1855 6 20 33 1214 301 5322.11 17.21 11.46 33 1214 104.52 
WARRI 2002 35.96 1 2043 6 20 25 1206 301 5681.75 16.69 10.16 25 1206 117.17 
WARRI 2003 47.84 1 1886 8 20 19 1169 301 4906.66 16.72 8.69 19 1169 83.33 
WARRI 2004 61.54 
-1 1566 8 20 15 1092 301 3481 13 9.33 15 1022.67 99.37 
WARRI 2005 38.30 1 2223 6 20 38 942 301 5804.44 15.67 11.79 31.68 942 112.84 
WARRI 2006 46.09 1 1461 7 23 25 836 301 5162.56 15.19 10.38 25 836 83.23 
WARRI 2007 42.28 1 1516 6 23 35 644 301 5309.88 14.19 11 26.51 644 83.22 
WARRI 2008 54.40 1 4002 7 23 28 685 301 7355.99 12.87 12.04 28 685 172.52 
WARRI 2009 80.60 1 7345 9 23 30 815 301 9113.01 11.17 11.35 30 815 272.20 
WARRI 2010 83.88 1 9142 8 23 37 829 301 10899.27 9.54 12.92 37 829 301 
WARRI 2011 81.24 1 8467 7 23 32 840 301 10421.78 8.62 9.95 32 840 301 
RTS= Returns to scale, 1=Increasing returns to scale (IRS) -1=Decreasing Returns to scale (DRS), 0= Constant returns to scale (CRS), Target Output 
(throughput) = the volume that needed to be produced for the DMU to be on the efficient frontier, Actual Output=the volume produced, Target 
inputs=quantum of inputs that ought to be employed for the DMU to be on the efficient frontier, Actual inputs=the actual resources used. 
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Appendix 5.5: Nigerian ports reference peers (benchmarks), Input/output slacks for inefficient port-year operations 
 
Port-Year Score Refs Peers Slacks 
Throug
hput 
Slacks 
Turnaround 
Time 
Slacks No. 
of Berths 
Slacks No. of 
Equips. 
Slacks No. of 
Staff 
Slacks 
Capacity 
APAPA 2000 68.38 0 4 0 0 0 34.4% 16.3% 0 
APAPA 2001 83.76 0 4 0 0 0 5.8% 20.4% 0 
APAPA 2002 100 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APAPA 2003 100 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APAPA 2004 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APAPA 2005 89.92 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APAPA 2006 100 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APAPA 2007 97.49 0 4 0 4.2% 1.8% 10.0% 0 5.8% 
APAPA 2008 100 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
APAPA 2009 98.17 0 6 0 0 0 0 0.3% 0 
APAPA 2010 96.21 0 4 0 2.3% 1.3% 0 0 0 
APAPA 2011 100 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAL 2000 21.72 0 2 15.1% 0 3% 17.2% 0 5% 
CAL 2001 43.77 0 2 17.6% 0 3% 10.9% 0 5% 
CAL 2002 43.20 0 2 16.9% 0 3% 1.2% 0 5% 
CAL 2003 35.97 0 2 15.3% 0 3% 1.6% 0 5% 
CAL 2004 100 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAL 2005 54.52 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAL 2006 65.10 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAL 2007 61.73 0 3 0 9.0% 0.8% 0 0 0.4% 
CAL 2008 100 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAL 2009 39.26 0 3 0 1.5% 3.5% 0 0 2.1% 
CAL 2010 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CAL 2011 40.07 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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ONNE 2000 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE2001 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2002 100 4 0 0 0 0 2.4% 0.0000 2.9% 
ONNE 2003 84.40 0 3 0 0 0 0.1% 0.0000 0.2% 
ONNE 2004 98.88 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2005 100 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2006 100 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2007 100 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2008 100 3 0 0 0 0 0.7% 9.8% 8.7% 
ONNE 2009 87.11 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2010 100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ONNE 2011 100 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PH 2000 88.58 0 2 1.2% 0 0 18.0% 0 0 
PH 2001 100 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PH 2002 100 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PH 2003 100 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PH 2004 100 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PH 2005 95.97 0 5 0 0 5.7% 0 0 0 
PH 2006 100 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PH 2007 83.17 0 4 0 0 0.0000 0.28% 0 0 
PH 2008 88.69 0 4 0 6.0% 3.53% 0 0 0 
PH 2009 85.35 0 4 0 0 0.01% 0.4% 0 0 
PH 2010 95.21 0 4 0 11.6% 4.02% 0 0 0 
PH 2011 100 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TCIP 2000 63.98 0 2 0 0 15.2% 45.7% 21.3% 27.7% 
TCIP 2001 55.97 0 4 0 0 5.7% 14.9% 20.7% 17.1% 
TCIP 2002 57.43 0 3 0 0 9.6% 13.5% 26.3% 21.5% 
TCIP 2003 50.18 0 4 0 0 2.1% 24.1% 30.6% 13.1% 
TCIP 2004 45.87 0 4 0 0 2.1% 30.2% 24.0% 13.9% 
TCIP 2005 46.57 0 5 0 0 0 30.5% 12.5% 4.4% 
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TCIP 2006 49.10 0 4 0 0 3.0% 19.6% 0 0 
TCIP 2007 63.20 0 4 0 0 10.3% 21.7% 0 0 
TCIP 2008 80.08 0 4 0 0 15.2% 25.8% 0 0 
TCIP 2009 87.13 0 3 0 0 5.6% 24.1% 1.6% 0 
TCIP 2010 77.48 0 3 0 0 10.2% 16.2% 3.0% 0 
TCIP 2011 89.11 0 3 0 0 12.6% 24.5% 2.1% 0 
WARRI 2000 34.80 0 2 0 0 30.2% 18.9% 2.9% 21.4% 
WARRI 2001 34.85 0 4 0 0 30.1% 0.5% 2.8% 21.2% 
WARRI 2002 35.96 0 4 0 0 33.9% 0 0.4% 19.0% 
WARRI 2003 47.84 0 3 3.7% 0 39.0% 0 0 22.2% 
WARRI 2004 61.54 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
WARRI 2005 38.30 0 3 0 0 28.3% 2.5% 0 19.2% 
WARRI 2006 46.09 0 3 7.6% 0 43.5% 0 0 22.2% 
WARRI 2007 42.28 0 2 6.6% 0 41.4% 3.4% 0 22.2% 
WARRI 2008 54.40 0 4 0 0 37.8% 0 0 13.1% 
WARRI 2009 80.60 0 4 0 0 40.2% 0 0 2.9% 
WARRI 2010 83.88 0 5 0 0 34.7% 0 0 0 
WARRI 2011 81.24 0 5 0 0 45.0% 0 0 0 
 
Slacks= Percentage Adjustments to be made each input/output variable of inefficient and weakly efficient DMU to be on the frontier 
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Appendix 5.6: Port overall (CCR), technical (BCC), scale (SE) and super-efficiency 
scores and return to scale 
  Yearly efficiency in percentages (100= 
“efficient”) 
PORT-YEAR CCR BCC SE Super-efficiency 
score RTS 
APAPA 2000 35.2 68.4 51.5  IRS 
APAPA 2001 42.7 83.8 51  IRS 
APAPA 2002 53.4 100 53.4  IRS 
APAPA 2003 54.7 100 54.7  IRS 
APAPA 2004 54.5 100 54.5  IRS 
APAPA 2005 52 89.9 57.8  IRS 
APAPA 2006 95.4 100 95.4  IRS 
APAPA 2007 96.1 97.5 98.6  IRS 
APAPA 2008 100 100 100 100.3 CRS 
APAPA 2009 97 98.2 98.8  IRS 
APAPA 2010 95.9 96.2 99.7  IRS 
APAPA 2011 100 100 100 102.2 CRS 
CALABAR 2000 19.7 21.7 90.8  IRS 
CALABAR 2001 39.8 43.8 90.9  IRS 
CALABAR 2002 39.2 43.2 90.7  IRS 
CALABAR 2003 32.6 36 90.6  IRS 
CALABAR 2004 49.3 100 49.3  DRS 
CALABAR 2005 20.8 54.5 38.2  DRS 
CALABAR 2006 29.8 65.1 45.8  DRS 
CALABAR 2007 22.4 61.7 36.3  DRS 
CALABAR 2008 44.1 100 44.1  DRS 
CALABAR 2009 33.8 39.3 86  DRS 
CALABAR 2010 37.8 100 37.8  DRS 
CALABAR 2011 35.3 40.1 88  DRS 
ONNE 2000 70.8 100 70.8  DRS 
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ONNE2001 89.5 100 89.5  IRS 
ONNE 2002 100 100 100 112.9 CRS 
ONNE 2003 83.5 84.4 98.9  DRS 
ONNE 2004 98.8 98.9 99.9  DRS 
ONNE 2005 100 100 100 121.6 CRS 
ONNE 2006 100 100 100 127 CRS 
ONNE 2007 100 100 100 115.1 CRS 
ONNE 2008 100 100 100 115.8 CRS 
ONNE 2009 86.9 87.1 99.8  IRS 
ONNE 2010 92.9 100 92.9  IRS 
ONNE 2011 91.1 100 91.1  DRS 
PH 2000 84.8 88.6 95.7  DRS 
PH 2001 99.5 100 99.5  DRS 
PH 2002 100 100 100 103 CRS 
PH 2003 100 100 100 129 CRS 
PH 2004 100 100 100 105.3 CRS 
PH 2005 96 96 100  IRS 
PH 2006 100 100 100 207* CRS 
PH 2007 83.2 83.2 100  IRS 
PH 2008 86.9 88.7 98.0  DRS 
PH 2009 85.3 85.4 99.9  IRS 
PH 2010 92 95.2 96.6  DRS 
PH 2011 100 100 100 133.1 CRS 
TCIP 2000 40.8 64 63.8  IRS 
TCIP 2001 39.1 56 69.8  IRS 
TCIP 2002 38.7 57.4 67.4  IRS 
TCIP 2003 34 50.2 67.7  IRS 
TCIP 2004 32 45.9 69.7  IRS 
TCIP 2005 34.2 46.6 73.4  IRS 
TCIP 2006 45.6 49.1 92.9  IRS 
TCIP 2007 59.6 63.2 94.3  IRS 
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TCIP 2008 70.3 80.1 87.8  IRS 
TCIP 2009 67.5 87.1 77.5  IRS 
TCIP 2010 59.4 77.5 76.6  IRS 
TCIP 2011 69.8 89.1 78.3  IRS 
WARRI 2000 22 34.8 63.2  IRS 
WARRI 2001 25.2 34.9 72.2  IRS 
WARRI 2002 29.6 36 82.2  IRS 
WARRI 2003 45.5 47.8 95.2  IRS 
WARRI 2004 52.3 61.5 85.0  DRS 
WARRI2005 25.4 38.3 66.3  DRS 
WARRI 2006 40.4 46.1 87.6  DRS 
WARRI 2007 30.1 42.3 71.2  DRS 
WARRI 2008 50.1 54.4 92.1  DRS 
WARRI 2009 76.1 80.6 94.4  DRS 
WARRI 2010 80.8 83.9 96.3  DRS 
WARRI 2011 80.5 81.2 99.1  DRS 
MEAN 64.88 77.15 82.78   
STDEV 28.24 24.32 19.26   
CORREL(CCR&BCC) 0.825     
 CCR= efficiency scores from DEA constant returns to scale model,   BCC= efficiency scores from variable returns to scale model,   SE= Scale efficiency ratio of CCR and BCC,   RTS= Returns to scale characteristics,   CRS= Constant returns to scale,   IRS= Increasing returns to scale,   DRS= Decreasing returns to scale.  GREEN Colour=  Overall efficient(both technical and scale)  YELLOW Colour= Only technically efficient   BLUE Colour =  Most efficient port-year operation 
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Appendix 5.7: Nigerian ports DEA-BCC Window efficiency scores (2000-2011) 
PORTS  DEA BCC EFFICIENCY SCORES  IN PERCENTAGES  (100= "EFFICIENT") 
   
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STD VAR 
APAPA 2000-2002 78.10 99.2 100          92.43 12.4 154.2 
2001-2003  97.5 100 100         99.2 1.4 2.1 
2002-2004   100 100 100        100 0 0 
2003-2005    100 100 100       100 0 0 
2004-2006     100 100 100      100 0 0 
2005-2007      100 100 100     100 0 0 
2006-2008       100 97.5 100    99.2 1.4 2.1 
2007-2009        99.2 100 100   99.7 0.5 0.21 
2008-2010         100 100 100  100.00 0 0 
2009-2011          100 97.6 100 99.2 1.4 1.92 
TOTAL MEAN 78.1 98.4 100 100 100 100 100 98.9 100 100 98.8 100 99.0 3.8 16.1 
CL RANGE  1.7 0 0 0  0 1.7 0 0 2.4     
CAL 2000-2002 66.6 100 100          88.87 19.3 371.9 
2001-2003  100 100 100         100 0 0 
2002-2004   100 84.4 100        94.8 9.0 81.1 
2003-2005    89 100 100       96.3 6.4 40.3 
2004-2006     100 58.8 100      86.3 23.8 565.8 
2005-2007      100 100 100     100 0 0 
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2006-2008       64.9 100 100    88.3 20.3 410.7 
2007-2009        89.4 100 55.1   81.5 23.5 550.8 
2008-2010         100 56.5 100  85.5 25.1 630.8 
2009-2011          100 100 89 96.3 6.4 40.33 
TOTAL MEAN 66.6 100 100 91.1 100 86.3 88.3 96.5 100 70.5 100 89 91.79 10.0 225.1 
CL RANGE  0 0 15.6 0 41.2 35.1 10.6 0 44.9 0     
ONNE 2000-2002 100 100 100          100 0 0 
2001-2003  100 100 100         100 0 0 
2002-2004   100 100 89.3        96.4 6.2 38.2 
2003-2005    100 100 100       100 0 0 
2004-2006     100 100 100      100 0 0 
2005-2007      100 100 100     100 0 0 
2006-2008       100 100 100    100 0 0 
2007-2009        100 100 100   100 0 0 
2008-2010         100 100 100  100 0 0 
2009-2011          100 100 100 100 0 0 
TOTAL MEAN 100 100 100 100 96.4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 99.6 2.0 3.8 
CL RANGE  0 0 0 10.7 0 0 0 0 0 0     
PH 2000-2002 88.6 100 100          96.2 6.6 43.3 
2001-2003  100 100 100         100 0 0 
2002-2004   100 100 100        100 0 0 
2003-2005    100 100 100       100 0 0 
2004-2006     100 100 100      100 0 0 
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2005-2007      100 100 87.4     95.8 7.3 52.9 
2006-2008       100 87.4 100    95.8 7.3 52.9 
2007-2009        100 100 100   100 0 0 
2008-2010         100 100 100  100 0 0 
2009-2011          100 100 100 100 0 0 
TOTAL MEAN 88.6 100 100 100 100 100 100 91.6 100 100 100 100 98.78 3.4 13.89 
CL RANGE  0 0 0 0 0 0 12.6 0 0 0     
TCIP 2000-2002 74.1 65.1 65.1          68.1 5.2 27 
2001-2003  60.3 58.2 52.4         57.0 4.1 16.7 
2002-2004   57.4 51.3 47.5        52.1 5.0 24.9 
2003-2005    51.9 47.4 51.5       50.3 2.5 6.2 
2004-2006     47.5 50.1 56.8      51.5 4.8 23.0 
2005-2007      54.4 53.4 68     58.6 8.2 66.5 
2006-2008       51.7 67.9 84.6    68.1 16.5 270.6 
2007-2009        76.9 99 100   92.0 13.1 170.5 
2008-2010         98.4 100 93.7  97.4 3.3 10.7 
2009-2011          92.5 85.5 100 92.7 7.3 52.6 
TOTAL MEAN 74.1 62.7 60.2 51.9 47.5 52 54.0 70.9 94 97.5 89.6 100 68.8 4.5 365.9 
CL RANGE  4.8 7.7 0.8 0.1 4.3 5.1 9 14.4 7.5 8.2     
WARR1 2000-2002 45.4 45.5 45.8          45.6 0.2 0.04 
2001-2003  38.7 41.5 51         43.7 6.4 41.56 
2002-2004   37 49.5 61.5        49.3 12.3 150.1 
2003-2005    49.1 61.5 44.9       51.8 8.6 74.5 
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2004-2006     100 38.5 48.9      62.5 32.9 1084 
2005-2007      46.1 54.5 47.8     49.5 4.4 19.7 
2006-2008       58.3 50 59.1    55.8 5.0 25.4 
2007-2009        57.8 68.1 93.7   73.2 18.5 341.7 
2008-2010         69.5 95 99.3  87.9 16.1 259.5 
2009-2011          100 100 100 100 0 0 
TOTAL MEAN 45.4 42.1 41.4 49.9 74.3 43.2 53.9 51.9 65.6 96.2 99.7 100 61.9 10.0 479.6 
CL RANGE  6.8 8.8 1.9 38.5 7.6 9.4 10 10.4 6.3 0.7     
CL= Column range 
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Appendix 5.8: Nigerian ports DEA-CCR Window efficiency scores (2000-2011) 
PORTS DEA-CCR EFFICIENCY SCORES IN PERCENTAGES (100%=”EFFICIENT”) 
  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 MEAN STDEV 
APAPA 2000-2002 53.2 67 71.8          64  
2001-2003  60.1 66.1 74.5         66.9  
2002-2004   54.6 59.7 58.6        57.6  
2003-2005    57.9 57 60.5       58.5  
2004-2006     64 53.8 96.6      71.5  
2005-2007      100 100 100     100  
2006-2008       100 97.5 100    99.2  
2007-2009        98.2 100 100   99.4  
2008-2010         100 100 100  100  
2009-2011          100 96.3 100 98.8  
TOTAL MEAN 53.2 63.6 64.2 64.0 59.9 71.4 98.9 98.6 100 100 98.2 100 81.4 19.5 
CL RANGE  6.9 17.2 16.6 7 46.2 3.4 2.5 0 0 3.7    
CAL 2000-2002 47.3 97.4 92.6          79.1  
2001-2003  77.9 74.1 61.5         71.2  
2002-2004   65 54 59.1        59.4  
2003-2005    54 59.1 29.2       47.4  
2004-2006     60.1 22.2 33.9      38.7  
2005-2007      68.3 99.2 78.4     82.0  
2006-2008       83.3 55.4 100    79.6  
2007-2009        51 100 100   83.7  
2008-2010         100 56.3 88.8  81.7  
2009-2011          72 100 82.8 84.9  
TOTAL MEAN 47.3 87.7 77.2 56.5 59.4 39.9 72.1 61.6 100 76.1 94.4 82.8 70.8 22.7 
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CL RANGE  19.5 27.6 7.5 1 46.1 65.3 27.4 0 43.7 11.2    
ONNE 2000-2002 73.1 100 92.8          88.6  
2001-2003  91.6 100 100         97.2  
2002-2004   100 89.3 100        96.4  
2003-2005    89.3 99.3 100       96.2  
2004-2006     99.3 100 100      99.8  
2005-2007      100 100 100     100  
2006-2008       100 100 100    100  
2007-2009        100 100 94.1   98.03  
2008-2010         100 94.1 100  98.03  
2009-2011          100 100 100 100  
TOTAL MEAN 73.1 95.8 100 92.9 99.5 100 100 100 100 96.1 100 100 97.43 5.7 
CL RANGE  8.4 7.2 10.7 0.7 0 0 0 0 5.9 0    
PH 2000-2002 85.8 100 100          95.3  
2001-2003  100 100 100         100  
2002-2004   100 100 100        100  
2003-2005    100 100 100       100  
2004-2006     100 100 100      100  
2005-2007      100 100 82.4     94.1  
2006-2008       100 83.7 93.5    92.4  
2007-2009        100 100 100   100  
2008-2010         100 100 100  100  
2009-2011          100 100 100 100  
TOTAL MEAN 85.8 100 100 100 100 100 100 88.7 97.8 100 100 100 98.18 5.0 
CL RANGE  0 0 0 0 0 0 17.6 6.5 0 0    
TCIP 2000-2002 55.8 55.4 49.3          53.5  
2001-2003  52.2 46.5 42.6         47.1  
2002-2004   40.5 35.2 34.1        36.6  
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2003-2005    34.9 33.8 39.2       35.97  
2004-2006     36.9 36.5 46.3      39.9  
2005-2007      91.5 68.4 75.2     78.4  
2006-2008       49.8 65.4 79.2    64.8  
2007-2009        76.7 99 100   91.9  
2008-2010         98.2 100 92  96.7  
2009-2011          91.5 83.1 97.7 90.8  
TOTAL MEAN 55.8 53.8 45.4 37.6 34.9 55.7 54.8 72.4 92.1 97.2 87.6 97.7 63.6 24.6 
CL RANGE  3.2 8.8 7.7 3.1 55 22.1 4.3 13.2 8.5 8.9    
WARR1 2000-2002 45.3 45.4 45.7          45.5  
2001-2003  37.9 40.2 50.3         42.8  
2002-2004   36.5 48.8 53.4        46.2  
2003-2005    48.8 53.4 44       48.7  
2004-2006     82.1 27.8 46.6      52.2  
2005-2007      27.8 46.6 31.5     35.3  
2006-2008       53.7 32.9 53.2    46.6  
2007-2009        47 63.7 93.1   67.9  
2008-2010         68 94.4 95.5  86.0  
2009-2011          100 100 100 100  
TOTAL MEAN 45.3 41.7 40.8 49.3 63.0 33.2 49.0 37.1 61.6 95.8 97.8 100 57.1 24.6 
CL RANGE  17.5 12.8 1.5 28.7 56 72.2 19.6 32 5.6 4.5    
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Appendix 5.9: Pre-concession DEA-CCR & BCC efficiency scores and returns to scale 
PORT-YEAR 
PRE-
CCR PRE-BCC SE RTS 
APAPA 2000 36.1 72.6 49.72 IRS 
APAPA 2001 44.3 90.4 49 IRS 
APAPA 2002 54 100 54 IRS 
APAPA 2003 57.9 100 57.90 IRS 
APAPA 2004 57 100 57 IRS 
APAPA 2005 60.5 100 60.50 IRS 
CALABAR 2000 33.2 48.4 68.60 CRS 
CALABAR 2001 68.3 100 68.30 DRS 
CALABAR 2002 65 100 65 DRS 
CALABAR 2003 54 82.5 65.45 DRS 
CALABAR 2004 59.1 100 59.10 DRS 
CALABAR 2005 29.2 100 29.20 DRS 
ONNE 2000 71.9 100 71.90 DRS 
ONNE 2001 90.4 100 90 DRS 
ONNE 2002 100 100.0 100 CRS 
ONNE 2003 88.7 88.7 100 CRS 
ONNE 2004 99.2 99 100 CRS 
ONNE 2005 100 100 100 CRS 
PH 2000 85.1 88.6 96.05 DRS 
PH 2001 100 100 100 CRS 
PH 2002 100 100 100 CRS 
PH 2003 100 100 100 CRS 
PH 2004 100 100 100 CRS 
PH 2005 100 100 100 CRS 
TCIP 2000 43.4 64 67.81 IRS 
TCIP 2001 42 57.2 73.43 IRS 
TCIP 2002 40.3 57.4 70.21 IRS 
TCIP 2003 34.9 51.3 68.03 IRS 
TCIP 2004 33.8 47.4 71.31 IRS 
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TCIP 2005 39.2 51.5 76.12 IRS 
WARRI 2000 32.2 34.8 92.53 IRS 
WARRI 2001 32.4 34.9 92.84 IRS 
WARRI 2002 34.8 36.9 94.31 IRS 
WARRI 2003 48.8 49.1 99.39 DRS 
WARRI 2004 53.4 61.5 86.83 DRS 
WARRI2005 44 44.7 98.43 DRS 
MEAN 62.0 79.5 78.7 
STDEV 25.33 24.12 19.33 
CORREL 0.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 325 
 
Appendix 5.10: Post-concession Overall, pure technical, scale efficiency scores and 
returns to scale  
PORT-YEAR POST-CCR POST-
BCC 
SE RTS 
APAPA 2006 95.4 100 95.4 IRS 
APAPA 2007 96.1 97.5 98.6 IRS 
APAPA 2008 100 100 100 CRS 
APAPA 2009 97.1 98.4 98.7 IRS 
APAPA 2010 96.0 96.2 99.8 IRS 
APAPA 2011 100 100 100 CRS 
CALABAR 2006 38.3 100 38.3 DRS 
CALABAR 2007 22.5 64.9 34.7 DRS 
CALABAR 2008 44.1 100 44.1 DRS 
CALABAR 2009 38.3 46 83.3 DRS 
CALABAR 2010 37.8 100 37.8 DRS 
CALABAR 2011 36.7 42.3 86.8 DRS 
ONNE 2006 100 100 100 CRS 
ONNE 2007 91.1 100 91.1 CRS 
ONNE 2008 100 100 100 CRS 
ONNE 2009 100 100 100 DRS 
ONNE 2010 92.8 100 92.8 IRS 
ONNE 2011 93.4 100 93.4 IRS 
PH 2006 100.0 100 100 CRS 
PH 2007 84.7 84.7 100 CRS 
PH 2008 93.7 100 93.7 DRS 
PH 2009 92.1 92.1 100 CRS 
PH 2010 97.4 100 97.4 DRS 
PH 2011 100 100 100 CRS 
TCIP 2006 48.3 49.1 98.4 IRS 
TCIP 2007 63.5 64.3 98.8 IRS 
TCIP 2008 77.5 81 95.7 IRS 
TCIP 2009 75.8 88.7 85.5 IRS 
TCIP 2010 67.1 78.1 85.9 IRS 
TCIP 2011 78.8 89.6 87.9 IRS 
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WARRI 2006 53.7 58.3 92.1 IRS 
WARRI 2007 32.9 50 65.8 IRS 
WARRI 2008 53.2 59.1 90.0 IRS 
WARRI 2009 78.5 83.2 94.4 IRS 
WARRI 2010 80.8 83.9 96.3 IRS 
WARRI 2011 80.5 81.4 98.9 IRS 
MEAN 76.1 85.8 88.2  
STDEV 24.63 18.73 19.06  
CORREL 0.72    
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Appendix 6.1: Port-year DEA-efficiency scores of ownership types  
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEA  EFFICIENCY SCORES
OWNERSHIP TYPE 
PORT-YEAR PUBLIC PORT-YEAR MIXED PORT-YEAR LANDLORD
APAPA 2000 74.40% APAPA 2006 100.00% APAPA 2008 100.00%
APAPA 2001 93.20% CALABAR 2006 100.00% APAPA 2009 98.40%
APAPA 2002 100.00% CALABAR 2007 100.00% APAPA 2010 96.70%
APAPA 2003 100.00% PH 2006 100.00% APAPA 2011 100.00%
APAPA 2004 100.00% TCIP 2006 75.90% CALABAR 2008 100.00%
APAPA 2005 100.00% WARRI 2006 58.30% CALABAR 2009 56.50%
CALABAR 2000 48.40% WARRI 2007 50.00% CALABAR 2010 100.00%
CALABAR 2001 100.00% CALABAR 2011 68.20%
CALABAR 2002 100.00% ONNE 2008 100.00%
CALABAR 2003 82.50% ONNE 2009 100.00%
CALABAR 2004 100.00% ONNE 2010 100.00%
CALABAR 2005 100.00% ONNE 2011 100.00%
PH 2000 88.60% PH 2008 100.00%
PH 2001 100.00% PH 2009 100.00%
PH 2002 100.00% PH 2010 100.00%
PH 2003 100.00% PH 2011 100.00%
PH 2004 100.00% TCIP 2008 91.10%
PH 2005 100.00% TCIP 2009 92.50%
TCIP 2000 64.00% TCIP 2010 85.50%
TCIP 2001 57.40% TCIP 2011 100.00%
TCIP 2002 57.40% WARRI 2008 69.50%
TCIP 2003 53.40% WARRI 2009 94.80%
TCIP 2004 47.70% WARRI 2010 98.60%
TCIP 2005 56.10% WARRI 2011 100.00%
WARRI 2000 34.80%
WARRI 2001 34.90%
WARRI 2002 37.50%
WARRI 2003 49.10%
WARRI 2004 61.50%
WARRI 2005 44.70%
MEAN 76.19% 0.83457 93.83%
STDEV 0.249649096 0.22 0.1199051
Std Error 0.04557948 0.08315 0.0244755
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Appendix 6.2: Comparison of port efficiency score of different ownership styles  
 
 
Appendix 6.3: Bivariate analysis of public and mixed ownership efficiency scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
PUBLIC 30 22.856 0.761867 0.062325
MIXED OWNERSHIP 7 5.842 0.834571 0.048401
LANDLORD 24 22.518 0.93825 0.014377
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.415014876 2 0.207507 4.95592 0.010304 3.155932
Within Groups 2.428495681 58 0.041871
Total 2.843510557 60
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
PUBLIC MIXED OWNERSHIP
Mean 0.761866667 0.834571429
Variance 0.062324671 0.048400619
Observations 30 7
Hypothesized Mean Diffe 0
df 10
t Stat -0.766722152
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.230481967
t Critical one-tail 1.812461102
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.460963934
t Critical two-tail 2.228138842
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Appendix 6.4: Bivariate analysis of mixed and landlord ownership efficiency scores 
 
 
Appendix 6.5: Ownership and sources of efficiency analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances
MIXED OWNERSHIP LANDLORD
Mean 0.834571429 0.93825
Variance 0.048400619 0.014377239
Observations 7 24
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 7
t Stat -1.196106923
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.135296736
t Critical one-tail 1.894578604
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.270593472
t Critical two-tail 2.364624251
PORT-YEAR PMPI PTECHCH PPECH PSECH PORT-YEAR LMPI LTECHCH LPECH LSECH
APAPA2002-2003 1.1319 0.9573 1 0.9573 APAPA2008-2009 0.9655 0.9655 1 0.9655
APAPA2003-2004 1.0028 1.0028 1 1.0028 APAPA2009-2010 0.9686 0.9686 1 0.9686
APAPA2004-2005 1.1404 1.1404 1 1.1404 APAPA2010-2011 1.0491 1.0491 1 1.0491
CALABAR2002-2003 0.8305 1.2503 1 1.2503 CALABAR2008-2009 0.5362 0.7305 1 0.7305
CALABAR2003-2004 1.1664 1.0233 1 1.0233 CALABAR2009-2010 1.3383 0.9824 1 0.9824
CALABAR2004-2005 0.5079 1.1924 1 1.1924 CALABAR2010-2011 0.8503 0.8503 1 0.8503
PH2002-2003 1.0701 1.0701 1 1.0701 PH2008-2009 0.9334 0.9334 1 0.9334
PH2003-2004 0.7756 0.7756 1 0.7756 PH2009-2010 1.0185 1.0185 1 1.0185
PH2004-2005 1.1226 1.1226 1 1.1226 PH2010-2011 1.0765 1.0765 1 1.0765
TCIP2002-2003 1.0251 0.9602 0.8871 1.082403 TCIP2008-2009 1.0546 1.0546 1 1.0546
TCIP2003-2004 0.9355 0.9825 0.9729 1.009867 TCIP2009-2010 0.9395 0.9558 1 0.9558
TCIP2004-2005 1.1918 1.1073 1.0562 1.048381 TCIP2010-2011 1.1593 1.1395 1 1.1395
WARRI2002-2003 1.2662 1.1509 1.1226 1.025209 WARRI2008-2009 1.3252 0.9012 1.4286 0.630827
WARRI2003-2004 1.1645 0.602 1.941 0.310149 WARRI2009-2010 0.9694 0.9694 1 0.9694
WARRI2004-2005 0.5452 1.1648 0.4613 2.525038 WARRI2010-2011 0.9657 0.9657 1 0.9657
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Appendix 6.6: comparison of change in total factor productivity of public and landlord 
ports 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.7: Comparison of technological change of public and landlord ports 
 
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
PMPI 15 14.8765 0.991766667 0.053666
LMPI 15 15.1501 1.010006667 0.036112
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.002495232 1 0.002495232 0.055587 0.815329 4.195972
Within Groups 1.256894063 28 0.044889074
Total 1.259389295 29
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
PMPI LMPI
Mean 0.991766667 1.010007
Variance 0.053666127 0.036112
Observations 15 15
Pearson Correlation 0.560726258
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 14
t Stat -0.35142463
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.365251291
t Critical one-tail 1.761310115
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.730502582
t Critical two-tail 2.144786681
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
PTECHCH 15 15.5025 1.0335 0.028354131
LTECHCH 15 14.561 0.97073333 0.009570604
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.029547 1 0.02954741 1.558213032 0.222265 4.195972
Within Groups 0.530946 28 0.01896237
Total 0.560494 29
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Appendix 6.8: Comparison of technical efficiency change of public and landlord ports 
 
 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
PTECHCH LTECHCH
Mean 1.0335 0.970733333
Variance 0.02835413 0.009570604
Observations 15 15
Pearson Correlation -0.2945824
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 14
t Stat 1.11386784
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.14204716
t Critical one-tail 1.76131012
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.28409433
t Critical two-tail 2.14478668
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
PPECH 15 15.4411 1.02940667 0.085312674
LPECH 15 15.4286 1.02857333 0.012246531
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 5.21E-06 1 5.2083E-06 0.000106773 0.991829 4.195972
Within Groups 1.365829 28 0.0487796
Total 1.365834 29
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
PPECH LPECH
Mean 1.02940667 1.028573333
Variance 0.08531267 0.012246531
Observations 15 15
Pearson Correlation 0.08826645
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 14
t Stat 0.01064921
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.49582679
t Critical one-tail 1.76131012
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.99165358
t Critical two-tail 2.14478668
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Appendix 6.9: Comparison of scale efficiency change of public and landlord ports 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.10: Throughput determinants data in Log form  
PORT-YEAR LNTHRPUT LNEFF LNDEP LNCALLS SEC 24HRS LNPCTR 
APAPA 2000 9.306 3.561 2.351 7.159 0 0 15.873 
APAPA 2001 9.540 3.754 2.351 7.252 0 0 15.899 
APAPA 2002 9.568 3.978 2.351 6.861 0 0 15.924 
APAPA 2003 9.587 4.002 2.351 6.797 0 0 15.949 
APAPA 2004 9.626 3.998 2.351 7.227 0 0 15.975 
APAPA 2005 9.737 3.951 2.351 6.862 0 0 16.000 
Anova: Single Factor
SUMMARY
Groups Count Sum Average Variance
PSECH 15 15.84994835 1.056663223 0.431431
LSECH 15 14.29062738 0.952708492 0.01713
ANOVA
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit
Between Groups 0.081049396 1 0.081049396 0.361375 0.552579 4.195972
Within Groups 6.279852632 28 0.224280451
Total 6.360902028 29
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means
PSECH LSECH
Mean 1.056663223 0.952708492
Variance 0.431431174 0.017129729
Observations 15 15
Pearson Correlation 0.183337928
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
df 14
t Stat 0.623449941
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.271506672
t Critical one-tail 1.761310115
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.543013344
t Critical two-tail 2.144786681
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APAPA 2006 9.623 4.558 2.351 7.028 0 0 16.025 
APAPA 2007 9.829 4.565 2.442 7.215 0 0 16.047 
APAPA 2008 9.919 4.605 2.526 7.281 0 0 16.069 
APAPA 2009 9.958 4.575 2.526 7.343 0 0 16.091 
APAPA 2010 9.999 4.563 2.603 7.370 0 1 16.112 
APAPA 2011 10.059 4.605 2.603 7.374 0 1 16.134 
CAL 2000 5.724 2.981 2.197 5.333 0 0 14.725 
CAL 2001 5.784 3.684 2.197 5.037 0 0 14.750 
CAL 2002 5.991 3.669 2.197 4.691 0 0 14.775 
CAL 2003 6.176 3.484 2.197 5.094 0 0 14.800 
CAL 2004 6.624 3.898 2.197 5.361 0 0 14.826 
CAL 2005 6.755 3.035 2.197 5.620 0 0 14.851 
CAL 2006 6.655 3.395 2.197 5.771 0 0 14.876 
CAL 2007 6.949 3.109 2.197 5.505 0 0 14.898 
CAL 2008 7.060 3.786 2.197 5.861 0 0 14.920 
CAL 2009 7.438 3.520 2.197 5.771 0 0 14.942 
CAL 2010 7.370 3.632 2.398 5.283 0 0 14.963 
CAL 2011 7.539 3.564 2.398 5.187 0 0 14.985 
ONNE 2000 8.877 4.260 2.380 5.497 1 0 15.309 
ONNE 2001 9.111 4.494 2.380 6.157 1 0 15.335 
ONNE 2002 9.228 4.605 2.380 6.192 1 0 15.360 
ONNE 2003 9.392 4.425 2.380 5.889 1 0 15.385 
ONNE 2004 9.524 4.593 2.351 5.966 1 0 15.411 
ONNE 2005 9.533 4.605 2.351 6.047 1 0 15.436 
ONNE 2006 9.669 4.605 2.526 6.529 1 0 15.461 
ONNE 2007 9.979 4.605 2.526 6.597 1 0 15.483 
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ONNE 2008 9.972 4.605 2.526 6.568 1 0 15.505 
ONNE 2009 9.768 4.465 2.526 6.531 1 0 15.527 
ONNE 2010 10.056 4.532 2.526 6.645 0 1 15.548 
ONNE 2011 10.174 4.512 2.526 6.786 0 1 15.570 
PH 2000 8.452 4.440 1.977 6.258 1 0 15.309 
PH 2001 8.646 4.600 2.069 6.248 1 0 15.335 
PH 2002 8.576 4.605 2.069 6.207 1 0 15.360 
PH 2003 8.486 4.605 2.069 6.205 1 0 15.385 
PH 2004 8.510 4.605 2.069 6.014 1 0 15.411 
PH 2005 8.584 4.564 2.197 5.476 1 0 15.436 
PH 2006 8.627 4.605 2.197 6.120 1 0 15.461 
PH 2007 8.493 4.421 2.197 6.120 1 0 15.483 
PH 2008 8.494 4.465 2.197 6.176 1 0 15.505 
PH 2009 8.554 4.446 2.197 6.129 1 0 15.527 
PH 2010 8.665 4.522 2.197 6.178 0 0 15.548 
PH 2011 8.918 4.605 2.197 6.370 0 0 15.570 
TCIP 2000 8.278 3.709 2.442 6.506 0 0 15.873 
TCIP 2001 8.540 3.666 2.442 6.561 0 0 15.899 
TCIP 2002 8.467 3.656 2.442 6.504 0 0 15.924 
TCIP 2003 8.574 3.526 2.442 6.724 0 0 15.949 
TCIP 2004 8.454 3.466 2.442 6.545 0 0 15.975 
TCIP 2005 8.605 3.532 2.442 6.205 0 0 16.000 
TCIP 2006 8.909 3.820 2.398 6.737 0 0 16.025 
TCIP 2007 9.211 4.088 2.398 7.184 0 0 16.047 
TCIP 2008 9.504 4.253 2.398 7.184 0 0 16.069 
TCIP 2009 9.554 4.212 2.485 7.236 0 0 16.091 
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TCIP 2010 9.479 4.084 2.485 7.316 0 1 16.112 
TCIP 2011 9.640 4.246 2.485 7.395 0 1 16.134 
WARRI 2000 7.516 3.091 2.140 5.727 1 0 15.074 
WARRI 2001 7.526 3.227 2.140 6.038 1 0 15.100 
WARRI 2002 7.622 3.388 2.140 5.953 1 0 15.125 
WARRI 2003 7.542 3.818 2.140 5.756 1 0 15.150 
WARRI 2004 7.356 3.957 2.140 5.697 1 0 15.175 
WARRI2005 7.707 3.235 2.140 5.889 1 0 15.201 
WARRI 2006 7.287 3.699 2.197 5.549 1 0 15.226 
WARRI 2007 7.324 3.405 2.197 5.606 1 0 15.248 
WARRI 2008 8.295 3.914 2.197 5.733 1 0 15.270 
WARRI 2009 8.902 4.332 2.197 5.771 1 0 15.291 
WARRI 2010 9.121 4.392 2.197 5.832 1 0 15.313 
WARRI 2011 9.044 4.388 2.197 5.892 1 0 15.335 
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Appendix 6.11: First- Stage Regression with throughput Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.969642801
R Square 0.940207161
Adjusted R Square 0.934687822
Standard Error 0.294048317
Observations 72
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 6 88.37412583 14.72902097 170.34778 8.9336E-38
Residual 65 5.620186839 0.086464413
Total 71 93.99431267
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept -9.690506686 2.506327534 -3.866416722 0.0002579 -14.6959884 -4.68503 -14.695988 -4.685025
LNEFF 0.60998141 0.059708425 10.21600234 3.782E-15 0.49073545 0.729227 0.49073545 0.72922737
LNDEP 1.889004171 0.335949942 5.622873936 4.26E-07 1.21806581 2.559943 1.21806581 2.55994253
LNCALLS 0.489796157 0.139554405 3.509714776 0.0008202 0.21108677 0.768506 0.21108677 0.76850555
SEC 0.390373467 0.097160591 4.017816927 0.000155 0.19633037 0.584417 0.19633037 0.58441656
24HRS -0.013666384 0.147906996 -0.092398494 0.9266656 -0.30905705 0.281724 -0.309057 0.28172428
LNPCTR 0.540483227 0.214887714 2.515189062 0.0143787 0.11132283 0.969644 0.11132283 0.96964362
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Appendix 6.12: Data on determinants of Nigerian ports efficiency  
PORT-YEAR LNEFF LNTHRPUT COM OWN 
APAPA 2000 3.561 8.891 0.160 0 
APAPA 2001 3.754 9.119 0.160 0 
APAPA 2002 3.978 9.017 0.160 0 
APAPA 2003 4.002 9.002 0.160 0 
APAPA 2004 3.998 9.325 0.160 0 
APAPA 2005 3.951 9.037 0.160 0 
APAPA 2006 4.558 9.631 0.159 1 
APAPA 2007 4.565 9.974 0.159 1 
APAPA 2008 4.605 10.238 0.158 1 
APAPA 2009 4.575 10.272 0.158 1 
APAPA 2010 4.563 10.397 0.156 1 
APAPA 2011 4.605 10.443 0.155 1 
CALABAR 2000 2.981 6.198 0.021 0 
CALABAR 2001 3.684 6.529 0.018 0 
CALABAR 2002 3.669 6.280 0.021 0 
CALABAR 2003 3.484 6.446 0.024 0 
CALABAR 2004 3.898 6.967 0.032 0 
CALABAR 2005 3.035 6.515 0.033 0 
CALABAR 2006 3.395 6.911 0.030 1 
CALABAR 2007 3.109 6.512 0.032 1 
CALABAR 2008 3.786 7.296 0.031 1 
CALABAR 2009 3.520 7.041 0.041 1 
CALABAR 2010 3.632 7.201 0.035 1 
CALABAR 2011 3.564 7.091 0.037 1 
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ONNE 2000 4.260 8.543 0.150 1 
ONNE 2001 4.494 9.214 0.151 1 
ONNE 2002 4.605 9.337 0.154 1 
ONNE 2003 4.425 8.993 0.157 1 
ONNE 2004 4.593 9.131 0.159 1 
ONNE 2005 4.605 9.212 0.158 1 
ONNE 2006 4.605 9.941 0.159 1 
ONNE 2007 4.605 10.001 0.160 1 
ONNE 2008 4.605 9.992 0.159 1 
ONNE 2009 4.465 9.870 0.152 1 
ONNE 2010 4.532 9.389 0.158 1 
ONNE 2011 4.512 9.488 0.158 1 
PH 2000 4.440 8.391 0.128 0 
PH 2001 4.600 8.712 0.127 0 
PH 2002 4.605 8.699 0.121 0 
PH 2003 4.605 8.711 0.112 0 
PH 2004 4.605 8.585 0.111 0 
PH 2005 4.564 8.444 0.110 0 
PH 2006 4.605 8.956 0.111 1 
PH 2007 4.421 8.828 0.091 1 
PH 2008 4.465 8.913 0.084 1 
PH 2009 4.446 8.876 0.086 1 
PH 2010 4.522 8.413 0.086 1 
PH 2011 4.605 8.628 0.094 1 
TCIP 2000 3.709 8.718 0.118 0 
TCIP 2001 3.666 8.739 0.121 0 
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TCIP 2002 3.656 8.703 0.115 0 
TCIP 2003 3.526 8.778 0.118 0 
TCIP 2004 3.466 8.616 0.108 0 
TCIP 2005 3.532 8.431 0.112 0 
TCIP 2006 3.820 8.957 0.127 1 
TCIP 2007 4.088 9.497 0.132 1 
TCIP 2008 4.253 9.633 0.141 1 
TCIP 2009 4.212 9.834 0.143 1 
TCIP 2010 4.084 9.749 0.132 1 
TCIP 2011 4.246 9.940 0.136 1 
WARRI 2000 3.091 7.200 0.076 0 
WARRI 2001 3.227 7.543 0.066 0 
WARRI 2002 3.388 7.616 0.069 0 
WARRI 2003 3.818 7.812 0.064 0 
WARRI 2004 3.957 7.888 0.054 0 
WARRI2005 3.235 7.493 0.065 0 
WARRI 2006 3.699 7.730 0.047 1 
WARRI 2007 3.405 7.560 0.042 1 
WARRI 2008 3.914 8.050 0.074 1 
WARRI 2009 4.332 8.406 0.105 1 
WARRI 2010 4.392 8.507 0.111 1 
WARRI 2011 4.388 8.559 0.101 1 
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Appendix 6.13: Second-Stage regression efficiency Model  
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.8909903
R Square 0.7938637
Adjusted R Square 0.7847694
Standard Error 0.4030676
Observations 72
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 42.54575004 14.18192 87.29293 2.8554E-23
Residual 68 11.0475191 0.162464
Total 71 53.59326914
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.1026507 1.62283847 -0.06325 0.94975 -3.34097445 3.135673 -3.3409744 3.13567297
LNTHRPUT 0.4256784 0.188714842 2.25567 0.027312 0.049103787 0.802253 0.04910379 0.80225298
LNCOM 0.0847491 0.088220278 0.960654 0.34013 -0.09129168 0.26079 -0.0912917 0.26078996
OWN 0.4033311 0.112163374 3.595925 0.000608 0.17951256 0.62715 0.17951256 0.62714961
 341 
 
Appendix 8.1: Nigerian ports Inter-temporal analysis VRS reference 
efficiency benchmarks 
 
 
 
